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ABSTRACT 
With post-2008 political and economic crises as its backdrop, this inquiry into the 
political roles and functions of public service broadcasting (PSB) in Ireland is 
principally concerned with examining the capacities for and actuality of critical 
and counter-hegemonic professional journalistic and institutional mediations of 
crisis. Recognising the diversity of influences on the normative identity of Irish 
PSB, the dissertation adopts a sociological approach that acknowledges the 
systemic embedding of media institutions in the broader field of power.  
An initial tracing of the formative impacts of endogenous and exogenous forces 
on the democratic horizons of PSB suggests that the present crisis conjuncture 
does not represent promising terrain for engendering critical crisis and recovery 
imaginaries. A methodologically diverse intra-institutional empirical research 
agenda aims to explore at close hand Irish PSB’s contingent navigation of crisis, 
encompassing ethnographic observation in the newsroom, practitioner 
interviews and textual analysis of broadcast output. These methods afford close 
analysis of practices of journalistic production and reflexivity, self-conceptions of 
the journalistic habitus, and ideological affinities of crisis framings in broadcast 
output. These analyses are supplemented by a participant observation study of 
the possibilities for public agenda-building in a key institutional venue of public 
participation in broadcasting governance.  
The findings offer an evidential basis for the arguments that the crisis has 
prompted only minimal changes to professional norms and practices of 
representation and inclusion; that journalistic crisis framings tend toward 
effecting hegemonic repair by lending support to neoliberal crisis and recovery 
imaginaries; and that the institutional openings for the building of public counter-
power are highly constrained.  
The overall conclusion is made that the normative democratic orientation 
embedded in the professional and institutional projects of public service 
broadcasting help render it ill-equipped to act as a re-democratising 
countervailing power against the democratic regressions engendered by the 
present crisis of democratic capitalism. 
 xii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘It should be considered a form of state violence in itself, because during the state of 
exception, specific types of knowledge and specific voices are privileged, while other types 
of knowledge and many other voices are discredited and become muted’.  
Nico Carpentier (2011: 24) 
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Chapter 1: Crisis, Communication 
and the Public Sphere 
 
I don’t know what we could have done differently to put ourselves in the position to 
predict the magnitude of the fall. We reported the news forensically. We challenged 
the consensus and canvassed all views and published them. 
    
     Geraldine Kennedy, former Editor of ‘The Irish Times’ (Kennedy, 2015: 6) 
 
1.1 Introduction   
 
1.1.1 The political role of the press 
 
When called in early 2015 to provide testimony at the Irish parliament’s 
Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis- whose terms of reference included 
scrutiny of ‘the role of the media’ (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2014) as part of its 
exploration of the domestic contexts of the recent crisis- senior editorial and 
management figures from major Irish newspapers and public service 
broadcasting deployed a defence of their record by marshalling evidence that 
they did demonstrate an editorial scepticism toward Ireland’s “Celtic Tiger” boom 
(Mulhall, 2015: 980-1) and that space was made in print and on the airwaves to 
those outside the prevailing economic consensus (Kennedy, 2015: 6). If the 
volume of critical voices could in retrospect be plainly seen as insufficient, this 
was only, so went the explanation, because a pervasive consensus around the 
sustainability of Ireland’s “economic miracle” meant that there was a relative 
paucity of critical voices in society from which the media could draw (Vaughan, 
2015: 884).  
 
While much recent academic research on the role of the media in relation to the 
post-2008 financial and economic crisis has focused on the extent to which it 
failed to sound the alarm of an impending crash (see Berry, 2013: 254), the 
implications of the editorial construction of innocence as articulated at the 
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parliamentary inquiry- in which an insufficiency of critique, insofar as it is 
acknowledged at all, is attributed more to a broad societal failure rather than a 
specifically journalistic one- is of particular interest to this thesis. 
 
While this innocence has long since been punctured by decades of critical 
scholarship on media production and journalistic work- not least crystallised in 
Max Weber’s characterisation of the press as political organisations and the 
journalist as a type of ‘professional politician’ (1946) - the present economic and 
financial crises represent a tantalising opportunity to leverage a disclosing 
critique on the contemporary political roles played by news media, seen here as 
saturated with normative as well as informational dimensions  (Blumler and 
Gurevitch, 1986: 88). 
 
1.1.2 Crises as moments of truth 
 
The particular analytic value of moments of crisis in explicating journalism’s 
political role lies in general characteristics of crisis, the exigencies and contexts 
of journalistic production, and the particular dynamics of the crisis in question. 
While the objective aspect of crisis is captured by Sum and Jessop’s crisis 
definition (2013: 396), following Debray (1973: 113) as a scenario in which a set 
of social relations can no longer be reproduced by the means heretofore 
employed, as ‘objectively overdetermined yet subjectively indeterminate’, crises 
are triggered by multiple inter-penetrating causes which do not come ‘pre-
interpreted’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 396). As such, they must be subjected to 
sense-making processes that call to attention the inevitable significance of its 
subjective moment- construals of crisis (ibid)- understandings that specify its 
parameters, origins, and symptoms which precede and shape how crisis 
resolution is imagined. As Davies (2014: 32) puts it, conditions of uncertainty in 
general, and economic crises in particular, have the potential to cast into sharp 
relief for actors the ‘incommensurability of rival normative-empirical 
worldviews’ and the ‘constructed nature of socio-economic reality’ (see also 
Kouvelakis, 2012: xv-xvi). 
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Whether incumbent governing orthodoxies can scramble to reassert themselves 
sufficiently to retain dominant or even hegemonic status and dominate crisis 
responses, or whether challenger interpretations can gain currency that is 
translated into practical action is, in liberal democracies, at least partially 
dependent on how crisis is mediated in the public sphere (Franklin, 2004, 
Livingstone, 2009). 
As central sources of information about the world beyond our personal 
experiences, mass media platforms are key sites for the discursive contestation 
of crisis construals- what Gurevitch and Levy (1985:19) describe as a key ‘site on 
which various social groups, institutions, and ideologies struggle over the 
definition and construction of social reality’, with the professional journalist’s 
status as gatekeeper of mediated political communication underlining the 
significance of their political role. 
Given that the substance of those mediated crisis construals are, inevitably, 
inextricably linked to both internal and external contexts of journalistic 
production, this thesis takes as its subject matter the conditions shaping the 
mediation of crisis construals in the temporal, material and ideological contexts of 
the recent global financial crisis- what Sum and Jessop (2013) describe as the 
‘North Atlantic financial crisis’ (NAFC), and the institutional and cultural contexts 
of public service broadcasting in the Republic of Ireland. For reasons that are 
elaborated below, both the selections of crisis and institutional site of mediation 
represent particularly propitious territory for the critical exploration of 
relationships between media, society, economy and democracy, whose 
contemporary interpenetrations require sustained theoretical and empirical 
inquiry.  
 
1.2 Crisis contexts- containing and managing the North Atlantic Financial 
Crisis in Ireland and Europe  
1.2.1 NAFC in context 
A detailed aetiology of the contemporary financial and economic crisis is 
unnecessary here, with the accumulation of a voluminous literature on the topic 
 4 
 
since 2008 (see, for example, Stiglitz (2010), Krugman (2009), Calhoun and 
Derluguian (2011) and Mirowski (2013) on the US crisis context, Lapavitsas et al. 
(2012), Patomäki (2013) and Pisani-Ferry (2011) on its European instantiation 
and repercussions, and McCabe (2013), Donovan and Murphy (2013), O’Riain 
(2014) and Kearns (2014) on the Irish dimensions). 
In general terms, the genesis of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis may be located 
in the neoliberal shift of the 1970s, whose epicentre was the United States. 
Symptoms of the current crisis trajectory manifested in a credit crunch in the sub-
prime mortgage crisis of 2007-8, swiftly morphing into a full-scale financial crisis 
reflecting the consequences of long-run instability generated by de-regulated 
finance, hyper-financialisation and deferred sectoral crises, and generating crises 
of liquidity in the financial sector and of solvency in the real economy, and fiscal 
and sovereign debt crises associated with the cost of bailing out the financial 
sector (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 421).  
The global contagion that followed was uneven, differentiated and mediated both 
by the internal configurations of national economies and the nature of their 
integration into regional and global circuits of capital (Jessop, 2013: 244). 
 
1.2.2 Ireland’s crash and crisis management 
 
Ireland’s developmental model as a whole- particularly since economic 
modernisation- has been indicted by critical accounts of Irish political economy 
including those of McCabe (2013) and Coakley (2012) as short-termist, lopsided 
and fostering dangerous dependencies on particular productive and non-
productive sectors often beyond domestic control (see Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation). O’Riain (2014: 8) summarises orthodox accounts of the collapse of 
the Irish Celtic Tiger in terms of a distinction between a ‘sustainable’ period of 
growth in the 1990s (based on a healthy “real” economy with market 
liberalisation policies balanced by the maintenance of wage competitiveness and 
low inflation and bolstered by corporatist mechanisms) and a post-millennial 
descent into pathological development (characterised by the abandonment of 
fiscal restraint, the skyrocketing of wages, and the overheating of the economy 
 5 
 
through the development of a credit and property ‘bubble economy’ (ibid: 61)), 
propelled by regulatory weaknesses, financialisation at home and abroad and 
further facilitated by currency union. 
 
With the Irish economy dangerously dependent upon the construction industry 
and Irish banks’ risky lending behaviours contributing to the build-up of 
enormous exposures to property loans (Whelan, 2013), the elite consensus 
positing the probability of a “soft landing” proved disastrously misplaced. The 
bursting of the housing bubble in the latter part of 2007 badly exposed the Irish 
economy’s structural weaknesses, and as the global financial crisis intersected 
with Ireland’s domestic crisis in 2008, a liquidity crisis was prompted in Irish 
banks which culminated in the arrival of senior banking executives at 
Government buildings on the night of September 29th who brought the message 
that the entire banking system in Ireland was on the brink of collapse (Carswell, 
2011). 
 
Thus began a multi-year programme of crisis management by the Irish state, with 
the domestic trajectory of crisis evolving from acute financial crisis to a fiscal 
crisis of public finances, underpinned by a broader economic crisis of the 
domestic economy in particular, and complemented in the five-part crisis schema 
of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC, 2009) by ‘social’ and 
‘reputational’ crises. Proliferating economic hardship reversed gains in living 
standards and saw skyrocketing unemployment, with Ireland’s declining 
creditworthiness leading to an eventual inability to secure lending to fund the 
day-to-day running of the country by the end of 2010. 
 
Large-scale emergency state interventions, most notably a bank guarantee of 
unprecedented breadth (Carswell, 2011), bank recapitalisations that amounted 
to actual or effective nationalisation of almost the entire banking system, and the 
establishment of a state ‘bad bank’ which acquired impaired loans from the 
financial institutions covered by the bank guarantee and sought to maximise their 
value all represented the strength of the state’s desire to protect and shore up 
Ireland’s financial architecture. However, by transferring the burden of financial 
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crisis onto the public finances, these policy responses had the effect of ‘limiting 
the knock-on effects of the Irish banking difficulties within the international 
financial system, but amplifying them within the domestic public finances’ 
(O’Riain, 2014: 248). Laeven and Valencia (2012, cited in O’Riain, 2014: 240) 
found that the costs to the state of Ireland’s banking crisis rendered it ‘one of the 
most severe in world economic history’. A reduced capacity to secure funding on 
the bond markets saw, at the end of 2010, Ireland forced into a three-year bailout 
programme funded by the EU, IMF and World Bank at the cost of punitive interest 
rates- later reduced- and a strict programme of economic supervision entailing 
steep fiscal retrenchment requiring years of austerity budgets and state asset 
sales, banking sector and labour market reforms (see also O’Sullivan et al., 2014: 
554-5). 
 
The extraordinary (O’Riain, 2014: 242)- even unprecedented (Whelan, 2010)-
extent to which policy responses employed fiscal consolidation was such that by 
the 2014 budget, ‘In eight budgets over the course of seven years the Government 
have taken almost €30 billion out of the economy, a cumulative adjustment of 
almost one fifth of GDP’ (Whelan, 2014). 
 
That the axe was not swung equitably has been noted by Coulter and Nagle 
(2015) who identify the regressive character of cuts and their harsh impacts on 
vulnerable groups. In addition, Keane et al.’s (2014) analysis of the distributional 
impacts of budgets from 2009 to 2015 suggests that overall, those in the bottom 
decile of income distribution have had their incomes squeezed to nearly the same 
extent as those with the highest incomes, with more recent budgets 
disproportionately benefiting the better off (see also O’Riain, 2014: 250, Social 
Justice Ireland, 2015, TASC, 2015). 
 
The primary goal of the state’s crisis management- spanning two coalition 
governments- may be identified in terms of the promotion of a recovery 
imaginary based on the rehabilitation of the Irish economy within circuits of 
regional and global capital and political power. Evidence of such a strategy is 
supplied by, inter alia, the extraordinary lengths taken to preserve the banking 
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system, the compliant posture taken toward supranational bodies and creditors 
(exemplified by the failure to seriously propose the ‘burning’ of bondholders and 
the stratagem of converting vast quantities of promissory notes into long-term 
government bonds, thus irrevocably consolidating private banking losses into 
sovereign debt), the emphasis on fiscal retrenchment, the singular focus on 
“economic competitiveness” as the sine qua non of recovery, and the unequal 
socio-economic distribution of the burden of the crisis response. For these 
reasons, Irish crisis management may be described as entailing a radicalisation 
of neoliberal governance (Mercille and Murphy, 2015). 
 
1.2.3 Eurozone crash and crisis management 
 
At European level, the impact from the North Atlantic Financial Crisis was severe, 
triggering first banking crises and then sovereign debt crises in a range of 
peripheral nations, bringing into serious question the viability of the single 
currency. In common with Blyth (2013: 78) who describes the Euro as a 
‘monetary doomsday device’, Sum and Jessop (2013: 427) identify monetary 
union without fiscal and political union as a structural flaw that made financial 
contagion inevitable in the event of a crisis of the magnitude of the NAFC. The 
poor integration of peripheral Eurozone nations (Lapavitsas et al., 2012: 1) into 
monetary union meant that ‘as the contagion effects of the NAFC destabilized the 
Southern European economies…they could neither exit the Eurozone nor boost 
exports in a weakened world market’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 427). 
 
Crisis management by European institutions since 2009 has involved both 
specific interventions in the economies (and polities) of particular member states 
and overhauls to the legislative architecture of the European Union in general and 
the Eurozone in particular, with Barnard (2012, p.99) identifying ‘four limbs’ to 
European crisis management: financial reform (with an emphasis on banking 
oversight), crisis stabilisation (funding programmes to ameliorate the sovereign 
debt crisis), enhanced economic governance (ostensibly to prevent similar crises 
in the future), and (limited) growth measures.  
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The neoliberal character of European crisis management has been emphasised 
by many critics of European governance. For example, Blyth (2013: 52) argues 
that the selection of fiscal consolidation as a core plank of the European response 
to crisis arose from an ideologically-motivated definition of the crisis as arising 
from the unsustainable spending of ‘profligate periphery states’, rather than in 
private banking losses and moreover, their mutation into the responsibility of 
states via socialised bank debts. He further suggests that Germany’s status as 
Eurozone hegemon has enabled the imprinting of the Eurozone and consequently 
the Eurozone response to crisis with an ‘ordoliberal’ flavour (a policy regime 
primarily distinguished by its explicit advocacy of state intervention in ‘setting 
the framework conditions necessary for markets to operate effectively’ (ibid: 
133)), in which there is ‘no room for the profligate except austerity’ and ‘no room 
for compensation apart from policies that speed the adjustment of the market’ 
(ibid: 143). This is evidenced by the strict austerian and market liberalisation 
conditionality attached to bailout loan programmes agreed with some of the 
countries under greatest pressure, including Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, and 
perhaps most extraordinarily symbolised by Greece’s ongoing subjection to 
austerity and market liberalisation. 
 
O’Riain (2014: 273) suggests that the broad European response to crisis mirrored 
the domestic Irish response in its overarching goals- to create a protective 
‘firewall’ around the financial system (involving the mass socialisation of banking 
debts), with the ensuing fiscal crisis dealt with by fiscal retrenchment. The extent 
to which crisis management actions represented a radicalisation of neoliberalism 
is further apparent in the failure to successfully implement even moderate 
initiatives like enhanced banking regulation (Fleming and Chon, 2014) and a 
Europe-wide Financial Transaction Tax (Kalaitzake, 2014). Arguing that a crisis 
of neoliberalism has not been forthcoming, Jessop and Sum (2013: 436) describe 
the NAFC as precipitating a ‘new phase of ‘blowback’ neoliberalism’, seen in ‘the 
continuing structural power of finance-dominated accumulation and 
accumulation through dispossession’, a phenomenon also noted by O’Riain 
(2014: 3), Crouch (2011) Peck (2010), Mirowski (2013) and Davies (2014). 
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1.3 Crises in Democracy 
 
1.3.1 Neoliberalism and democracy  
 
That the neoliberal radicalisation associated with post-2008 crisis management 
has entailed profound democratic as well as economic implications has been 
foregrounded by critical political economists and radical democratic theorists.  
 
What Wendy Brown (2005: 38) termed neoliberalism’s ‘political rationality’ 
captures its status as more than a series of tenets about economics and finance, 
but nothing less than ‘a form of governmentality’ which aims at ‘extending and 
disseminating market values to all institutions and social action’ (ibid: 40) (a view 
echoed in Fraser’s (2014) holistic conception of capitalism as an ‘institutionalised 
social order’.  
 
Dardot and Laval (2013: 301) summarise the principle tenets of neoliberal 
reason as, firstly, entailing an acceptance of the market as a constructed reality 
requiring active state intervention for its proper functioning and that the primary 
role of the state is to maintain a framework for the operation of the market based 
on the principle of competition. The norm of competition extends both to the 
state, whose every activity must conform to the same market principles, and to 
all persons via the dissemination of an entrepreneurial mode of self-government. 
 
According to Brown (2005: 41), the subordination of the political sphere to an 
economic rationality entails not only the diminution of space for non-market 
rationalities but embeds a radically new model of political legitimacy in which the 
authority of the nationally-bound public is supplanted by the authority of the 
market, effecting a powerful erosion of liberal democratic institutions and 
practices (ibid: 38).  
 
For Colin Crouch (2000, 2004, 2011) neoliberalism is a core contributor to the 
modern condition of 'post-democracy', in which the more ‘maximal’ participative 
impulses of democracy retreat into a more minimalist form, focusing on mere 
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constitutional essentials, epitomised in the occasional act of voting between 
competing political parties. In a formulation close to Gearty’s (2013) concept of 
‘neo-democracy’ in which nations ‘play’ at democracy by going through the 
motions despite their hollowed-out substance, Brown (2006) characterises post-
democratic conditions under a neoliberal political rationality as entailing a 
situation where the formal machinery of democracy continues to exist as before 
but in the broader context of steady shrinkage of democracy’s sphere of influence. 
 
Crouch's account of the origins of the present post-democratic moment has close 
affinities with Wolfgang Streeck's (2011, see also 2014b) account of the 
structural underpinnings of the present crisis, which he contextualises as merely 
the contemporary instantiation of a long-run ‘distributional conflict’ within post-
WWII ‘democratic capitalism’, in which governments have struggled to mediate 
between ‘the two contradictory principles of allocation’, ‘social rights on the one 
hand and marginal productivity, as evaluated by the market, on the other’, 
generating intermittent crises ameliorated through the engineering of spatio-
temporal fixes that have shifted or submerged symptoms between institutional 
sites.  
 
On this account, the collapse in 2008 of the era of the ‘unacknowledged policy 
regime of privatised Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 2009), entailing a catastrophic 
build-up of enormous levels of private debt facilitated by financial deregulation 
is only the latest site of conflict. The key consequence of that crash- the 
socialisation of private debt- represents for Streeck a new phase in the 
distributional conflict in which democracy has become more subordinated to 
capital than ever, noting that the capacity of finance to ‘blackmail’ democratic 
nation remains as potent today as it was in 2008, because with the failure of 
meaningful regulatory reform in the financial sector, ‘the banks that were too big 
to fail in 2008 can count on being so’ (Streeck, 2011: 25) in the future. A 
permanent neoliberalism is therefore enforced not just by conditionality 
attached to bailout agreements but by financial markets and ratings agencies who 
have the means to wreak economic chaos on nation states at will. 
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For Fraser (2014b), the power of ‘private and quasi-public regulatory agencies 
which make coercively enforceable rules that govern vast swathes of social 
interaction throughout the world’ amounts to the global emergence of 
‘governance without government’, revealing for Crouch (2000: 20) the fact that 
‘democracy has simply not kept pace with capitalism's race to the global'. 
 
1.3.2 Crisis management and democratic crisis 
 
In a later article, Streeck (2014a: 64) justifies the idea that 'capitalism's shotgun 
marriage with democracy since 1945 is breaking up' by pointing to an 
acceleration of democracy's neutralisation by capital, in which the market 
economy is increasingly insulated from democratic interference (see also Klein, 
2008).  This corresponds to a process described by Gill (1998: 23, see also Gill 
and Cutler, 2014) as the 'new constitutionalism', a project of governance reform 
which aims to 'allow dominant economic forces to be increasingly insulated from 
democratic rule and popular accountability'. Describing the new 
constitutionalism as a mode of embedding 'disciplinary neoliberalism' (ibid) into 
international law, and propelled by the 'capital mobility associated with the 
power and reach of transnational capital' (ibid: 25), it can be seen in the context 
of both Brown's (2006) 'de-democratisation' and Crouch's (2000,2004) 'post-
democratic' concepts in that new constitutionalism makes use of existing 
democratic mechanisms, 'attenuating, co-opting and channelling' (Gill, 1998: 25) 
them in the interests of 'separating the economic from the political' (ibid) in order 
to make democracy safer for capital (see also Gilbert, 2013). Dardot and Laval 
(2013: 306-7) argue that neoliberalism’s opposition to effective popular 
sovereignty renders it an essentially anti-democratic doctrine.  
 
Macartney (2013: 4) argues that the dominant modality of contemporary 
European governance- preceding but radicalised by crisis (ibid: 38)- corresponds 
to a deliberate new constitutionalist project, closely linked to ordoliberalism and 
neoliberalism, to 'insulate policymaking from democratic demands' (ibid: 7) by 
're-structuring social relations in favour of capital' (ibid: 37).  
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The onset of the European debt crisis saw an increasing radicalisation of 
centralised policymaking, with a range of key measures (for example, the 
European Semester and Euro Plus Pact in 2011 and Fiscal Compact in 2012) 
embedding new constitutionalist ‘lock-in’ involving the supranationalisation of 
powers formerly retained at national level and representing a major 
enhancement of the EU’s economic surveillance, co-ordination and disciplinary 
apparatus (see Barnard, 2012: 114 and Adams et al., 2014 for critiques). 
 
For Macartney (ibid: 65), the increasingly coercive imposition of market 
discipline is exemplified by a radicalised 'anti-democratic statecraft' emanating 
from the European Union. That disciplinary action extended to the effective 
deposing- in ‘virtual coups d’état’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 427)- of the Prime 
Ministers of Greece and Italy by European fiat in late 2011 and replaced by 
compliant technocrats speaks to the extent of such a radicalisation, as did the fate 
met by the anti-austerity SYRIZA government in Greece when it attempted to 
chart a path out of crisis by breaking with austerian and neoliberal logics 
(Ovenden, 2015).  
 
The widening legitimacy deficits and democratic decay at the heart of Europe has 
exacerbated structural divisions between Eurozone core and periphery. 
Habermas (2011) warns of a European descent into ‘non-transparent post-
democratic domination’, with Smith (2014: 102) suggesting the demise of Europe 
as a 'post-humiliation regime'.  
 
European crisis management may be characterised as entailing a de facto state of 
exception in which the ‘old-European model of hierarchical dominance through 
law and instrumental steering’ (O’Mahony, 2014: 252) has been powerfully 
reasserted (see also Auer, 2013). 
 
As well as becoming subject to the de-democratising tendencies of European 
crisis management, democracy as popular sovereignty in Ireland has undergone 
further endogenous weakening. For example, whatever domestic steering power 
was left on macro-economic policy became even further centralised within a new 
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four-member body senior to cabinet level, the Economic Management Council- an 
institutional innovation described by O’Riain (2014: 270) as deepening the 
‘already strong oligarchic tendencies within Irish politics’ (see also Beesley, 
2015). Jessop’s (2013: 428) description of bank restructuring, nationalisations 
and the establishment of bad banks as being ‘pursued behind a veil of secrecy 
through emergency legislation and executive discretion’ aptly describes the Irish 
approach, characterised by a range of shock-and-awe legislative tactics pursued 
by the Irish government aimed at securing external market ‘confidence’ at the 
cost of fidelity to ordinary parliamentary procedures. 
 
1.3.3 Post-democracy and contentious politics 
 
The political reverberations prompted by crisis in Europe suggest a pair of trends 
that are at first blush inconsistent. At the level of national and European 
governance, there is an enduring political dominance of parties and political 
groupings broadly committed to neoliberal governance (evidenced by the 
enduring pre-eminence of the European People’s Party (EPP) grouping in the 
European Parliament), an electoral trend further supporting Sum and Jessop's 
(2013: 435) assertion that the crisis has not engendered a crisis of neoliberal 
regimes. However, a second, longer-run trend and one accelerated by crisis 
suggests evolving popular responses to economic and democratic pathologies 
generated by neoliberalism that increasingly promise to transform both 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics. 
 
Commenting on the proposed practice (since enshrined in the Fiscal Compact in 
2012) of national budgets becoming subject to European Commission oversight, 
Habermas (2012: 130) suggests that even the mere suspicion that national 
governments are reduced to ‘merely rubber-stamping prior decisions taken 
elsewhere…inevitably corrodes any democratic credibility’ and that political 
elites in Europe are ‘persisting unapologetically in their elite project and the 
disenfranchisement of the European citizens’ (ibid: 132). Streeck (2011: 27) 
suggests that such a loss of democratic agency was not lost on citizens with 
widespread disillusionment arising from democracy's inability to contain 
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oligarchic capitalism likely to prompt ‘all sorts of political disorder, from 
declining turnout to a rise of populist parties to riots in the streets’, an analysis 
mirrored in the diagnosis of Peter Mair (2006: 25, see also 2013), whose 
pessimistic account of a range of secular trends in European democracies traces 
the causes and consequences of a hollowing out of contemporary Western 
democracy, which he describes as being 'steadily stripped of its popular 
component-democracy without a demos'.  
 
Mair attributes rising citizen withdrawal from participation in electoral politics 
and increasing public distrust in parties and other political institutions to parties 
themselves, who are withdrawing ‘from the arena of popular democracy’ (ibid: 
48), increasingly reduced to 'appendages of the state' (ibid: 50) and increasingly 
attuned to governance as an end ('office-seeking' (ibid: 47)) rather than as 
‘associative organs’ (Honneth, 2013: 325) of publics, and vehicles of popular 
mobilisation. This is further evidenced by steep declines in party memberships 
(Mair and Van Biezen, 2001, Van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012). 
 
Axel Honneth (2014: 325) similarly argues that the phenomenon of political 
‘disenchantment’ often attributed to modern populaces, manifesting in a ‘public 
turn away from state-mediated politics’ is far from being a simple outcome of 
‘spreading privatisation or political disinterest’ (ibid: 326) but is in fact a 
‘normatively substantial reaction’ by publics. He suggests that it reflects a ‘sober 
realization’ of the ‘increasing decoupling of the political system from democratic 
will-formation’ (ibid) arising from the awareness that democratic self-legislation 
in decision-making is only poorly realised and realisable within the structural 
constraints of the capitalist political economy which delimits the capacity of 
citizens to ‘impress upon the political economy interests and demands that are 
incommensurable with those of capital owners’ (Streeck, 2011: 29). 
 
Because the imperatives of financialised globalised capitalism have rendered 
ineffective the spatio-temporal fixes of social democracy- hitherto a popular 
bulwark against capitalism’s depredations (Ryner, 2010, Varoufakis, 2014)- the 
‘paradox’ (Macartney, 2013: 77) has arisen of the enthusiastic participation of the 
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European centre-left in neoliberal reform both before and during the crisis. This 
phenomenon has played a particularly important role in hastening the spread of 
disenchantment with the possibilities of parliamentary politics, but also in 
promoting counter-developments.  
 
Disillusionment prompted by the neoliberal mantra of “There Is No Alternative” 
(TINA)- whether delivered by conservative or nominally centre-left 
governments- has both accelerated the splintering of existing party political 
loyalties and the development of oppositional political formations in Europe on 
both left and right. Mair (2006) suggests that political opposition today is 
increasingly coming in the form of predominantly youth and working-class 
grassroots movements which often eschew electoral politics on the grounds of 
disillusionment with the failures of representative democracy (see also Saenz, 
2014). 
 
The evolution of the indignados of the Spanish 15-M movement, an instantiation 
of the broader, diffuse Occupy phenomenon, into the horizontalist electoral 
political movement of Podemos (Delclós, 2015) demonstrates both the volatility 
of the political map and the new forms of electoral organisation demanded by 
electorates disillusioned with both the old social democratic left and the 
neoliberal right (Sitrin and Azzellini, 2014, Mason, 2012). This has been further 
underlined by electoral earthquakes like the sudden emergence of the 5 Star 
Movement in Italy in 2013, the virtual ejection of the two major parties from 
Scotland in 2015 as the rise of the independence agenda sponsored by the 
Scottish National Party continues to threaten the UK’s constitutional settlement, 
the elevation to power of the SYRIZA party in Greece in 2015 and most recently, 
the British Labour Party’s election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader which holds out 
the possibility of a break with neoliberal logics. On the right, with austerity biting, 
the political centre collapsing in on itself, and the ideology of European 
integration at its weakest, rightist, fascist, racist and xenophobic parties have 
benefited from increased support, notably in the UK, France, Finland, 
Netherlands, and Greece (Lentin and Titley, 2011).  
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In Ireland, mounting evidence of a secular decline in the dominance of Ireland’s 
post-independence ‘two and half-party’ system (Blondel, 1968), accelerating 
electoral de-alignment and volatility (Mair, 2011) and collapsing public trust in 
domestic and European institutions (O’Riain, 2014: 261-262, O’Sullivan, Healy 
and Breen, 2014, Edelman 2015, European Commission, 2013)- including 
journalism (Suiter, 2015, Reuters, 2015, Edelman, 2015)- suggests that change is 
afoot here, too. The sporadic emergence of anti-austerity movements around 
particular policy impositions has galvanised oppositional politics in Ireland to an 
increasing degree. In particular, the Right2Water movement which emerged in 
2014 in opposition to Troika-mandated water charges represents a serious 
grassroots challenge to governmental authority (Hearne, 2015), and whose 
diffuse organisational structure reflects the heterogeneous organisation of post-
2008 oppositional groups. 
 
The continuing electoral domination of the centre-right, therefore, lends a patina 
of 'business as usual' on a political landscape that is undergoing significant 
rupture across the continent. 
 
1.4 Crisis, the public sphere, and democratic legitimacy 
 
1.4.1 Crisis, ideology and power 
 
Given the magnitude both of the crisis symptoms and the extraordinary 
interventions made by states to rescue the edifice of globalised, financialised 
capitalism in the wake of the 2008 crash, Ryner’s (2010: 554) suggestion that 
‘even the sturdiest of hegemonic discourses have difficulties surviving such 
dissonance’, raises in the domestic context the necessity of interrogating the 
achievement of relatively 'stable' neoliberal crisis management in Ireland since 
2008.  
 
Any examination of the state’s capacity to secure the consent or at least 
quiescence of the population to increasingly authoritarian neoliberal crisis 
management techniques must explore the role of the discursive environment in 
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which crises are made sense of and acted upon by publics. This is because, as has 
been emphasised by neo-Marxist scholars from Antonio Gramsci to Raymond 
Williams, public compliance in liberal democracy is secured less through the 
actuality of outright physical repression but mainly through a mastery of the 
ideological environment of public discourse- via the achievement of cultural 
hegemony, or the more or less successful societal diffusion of a set of legitimating 
meanings, values and beliefs sponsored by ruling groups. When taking 
hegemonic form, these meanings acquire a type of power that is ‘routine, 
institutionalized, organized and generally accepted’ (Rutherford, 2000: 45), a 
definition that, following Gramsci, sees hegemonic power as representing an 
entire canon of naturalised, depoliticised ‘common sense’, which provide a 
background, tacit ‘hierarchical series of normative rules by which social life is to 
be understood’ (Allan, 2010: 84).  
 
Underpinned by relationships of domination and subordination, elite hegemony 
operates through practical alliances of the powerful who work to maintain their 
power by determining the ‘signs, meanings and practices that operate in the 
public sphere’ (ibid), engendering tacit or active submission to authority.  
Hegemonic power emphasises that ideological leadership and the winning of 
governmental power are not one and the same thing (Gramsci, 1971: 57-58) but 
that the former must be regularly renewed via the intensification of persuasive 
mechanisms- backed by the threat of coercion- to prevent the proliferation of 
dissent. 
 
Drawing on Sum and Jessop’s (2013: 397) observation of the importance of crisis 
‘imaginaries’ in shaping both the ‘interpretation of crises and the responses 
thereto’, the role of crisis construals in helping direct the flow of events and the 
legitimation of particular responses through the creation of ‘truth effects’ or the 
‘hegemonic or dominant meanings of crisis’ (ibid: 437) is a central concern of this 
thesis because these construals can lead to ‘strategic interventions’ (ibid, italics in 
original) in crises that powerfully shape their outcomes. The path-indeterminacy 
of crises means that they can lead to rupture in established social relations and 
institutions or a re-assertion of existing policy paradigms and power relations. 
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The outcome that eventually transpires is a function of a range of structural and 
contingent factors that are to some extent locally, temporally, politically and 
culturally specific. Exploring which crisis construals acquire hegemonic power 
and why means taking seriously the role of institutions of the public sphere in 
mediating crisis. 
 
1.4.2 The public sphere 
 
As observed by Fenton and Titley (2015: 5), the Habermasian ‘public sphere’, or 
Öeffentlichkeit has long occupied the status of ‘dominant normative framework, 
critical touchstone and ritual allusion’ in scholarship concerned with the 
relationships between media and democracy.  The public sphere (Habermas, 
1989 [1962]) refers in its broadest sense to a ‘realm of social life’ (Habermas, 
Lennox and Lennox, 1974: 49), ‘in which the public organizes itself as the bearer 
or [sic] public opinion’ (ibid: 50).  
 
Described by Fraser (1990: 57) as a ‘theater in modern societies in which political 
participation is enacted through the medium of talk’, the public sphere represents 
an ‘institutionalised arena of discursive interaction’ distinct from the state and 
the market economy in which organised publics deliberate on matters of common 
import in order to bring about greater co-ordination between public will-
formation and effective decision-making. 
 
For Fraser (2014b), the ideal of the public sphere posits the existence of sites in 
civil society in which ‘all who are governed can participate in free and open 
discussions aimed at assessing the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of the powers to 
which they are subject’. Based on a series of communicative ground rules that 
ensure that discussion is ‘open, unrestricted, inclusive, and fair’, discourse in the 
public sphere generates ‘normatively legitimate’ outcomes because they reflect 
just and autonomous public will-formation free from the distorting effects of 
power imbalances. 
 
As Honneth (2014) describes in his review of the development of European 
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public spheres since the 18th century, the institutional form of theatres of the 
public sphere, their criteria of eligibility for participation, their discursive modes, 
and their functions with regard to national political systems have taken a variety 
of historical forms. Broadly speaking, one may distinguish between the bourgeois 
or literary public spheres of 18th century Europe, crystallised in Habermas’ 
frequently-cited description of the emergent public spaces of metropolitan 
literary salons and London coffee houses, characterised by their exclusive and 
elite character, and the contemporary democratic public sphere, propelled by the 
expansion of parliamentary democracy and the achievement of liberal rights of 
freedom and political rights to participation in the 18th and 19th centuries 
respectively (see also Marshall, 1950). With this ‘constitutional framework’ 
(Honneth, 2014: 263) in place for nationally-unified publics to engage in 
democratic will-formation, the necessity for technological means of co-ordinating 
discourse across anonymous, non-co-present publics across large territories 
increased. Such a need was met first by print media, then radio and television in 
the 20th century as well as, more recently, the Internet.   
 
1.4.3 The public sphere, democratic will-formation and political legitimacy 
 
The significance of the public sphere’s conceptual ability to catalyse and 
guarantee efficacious democratic will-formation lies in its contemporary 
relationship with the idea of democratic legitimacy. This is a normative concept 
that ‘provides the necessary moral justification for a political order to wield 
power and to make, apply and enforce laws’ (Buchanan, 2002, cited in O’Sullivan 
et al., 2014: 547). Beetham’s (2001, 1991, cited in O’Sullivan et al., 2014: 548) 
argument that the exercise of democratic political power is legitimate if it is 
‘established and exercised in accordance with legal rules, justified by shared 
beliefs of the population, and acquired through the consent of citizens’ calls to 
attention the status of legitimate political authority as requiring ongoing renewal.  
 
With the bourgeois public sphere having institutionalised a new principle of 
legitimacy- the idea that ‘all acts of government…were to face up to the public 
opinion that took shape in the discursive exchange of arguments within the 
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forums of the public sphere’ (Honneth, 2014: 256), Honneth considers 
contemporary will-formation in the democratic public sphere as the principle 
‘source of the democratic legitimacy of state action’ (ibid: 255) and central to all 
democratic constitutions since the French Revolution (ibid: 327).  
 
Although not corresponding to any formally-specified constitutional function 
beyond intermittent electoral processes (contra more direct, plebiscitary modes 
of democracy in the Rousseauian tradition), Honneth emphasises that 
nonetheless, the broad diffusion of the idea of popular sovereignty means that 
democratic legitimacy is now inextricably linked in the public imagination with 
the extent to which political decision-making is responsive to public demand 
(ibid: 320). This means that where governmental action floats free of public 
demand, this may now be perceived as the illegitimate use of ‘merely borrowed 
authority’ (ibid: 307). 
 
1.4.4 Legitimation crisis 
 
With democratic legitimacy tethered not only to electoral processes or 
guaranteed by the mere existence of democratic institutions (Heath, 2010: 31) 
but in reciprocal communication between publics and political authorities, the 
possibilities for a new kind of state crisis emerged. 
 
In his work Legitimation Crisis, Habermas (1988: 36) sought to update the 
classical Marxist account of capitalist crisis tendencies in the context of the post-
war welfare state compromise. He posited that the state’s growing intervention 
in economic activity- including economic crisis management- meant that the state 
required enhanced levels of legitimacy in order to justify its increasingly 
pervasive influence over the lives of citizens, raising the possibility of the state 
being held accountable for administrative failures in managing the economy, 
provoking crises of economic rationality (ibid: 61) and even political legitimation 
(ibid: 68, see also O’Connor, 1973, Offe, 1984).  
 
While the social-democratic compact enabling downward redistribution for a 
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time rendered class cleavages politically latent (Plant, 1982: 342), contemporary 
state responses to the crisis of democratic capitalism have increasingly been 
‘unmasking the opposition of social classes’ (Habermas, 1988: 29). The bringing 
to consciousness of interest conflicts between classes is viewed as provoking 
social disintegration, the collapse of value consensuses, and ‘the possibility of a 
large-scale loss of legitimacy for government institutions’ (Heath, 2010: 1). In the 
context of the present crisis, Fraser (2014a) poses the question in terms of 
whether the state can maintain support for measures that are ‘aimed ultimately 
at preserving class domination, without provoking a true legitimation crisis, 
without that is, activating the citizenry and causing it to question the class 
character of society and the private appropriation of social surplus?’ 
 
The increased autonomy of the market has meant that ‘the state has been put at 
the mercy of the former’s increased capacity for obstruction’ (Honneth, 2014: 
326-7), thus bringing into play Rodrik’s (2011) governance trilemma- the 
impossibility of combining ‘deep economic integration (globalisation), national 
government, and democratic politics’ (O’Riain, 2014: 6) and the consequent 
development of yawning legitimacy deficits. 
 
In the context of class societies- ones where the ‘fundamental material interests 
of groups are in opposition’ (Heath, 2010: 10)- in order to effect repair of the 
‘hegemonic economic imaginary’ (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 293), social integration 
and value-consensus must be achieved by rendering conflict latent (Habermas, 
1988: 27) through the deployment not just of coercive but ideological 
justifications (Heath, 2010: 12) for the maintenance of the established socio-
economic order. 
 
For Habermas, whether the state’s efforts to mitigate the development of an 
administrative crisis into a legitimation crisis would be successful depend in large 
part on the contingent socio-cultural environment, including the strength of 
public ‘socialisation to normative justification of the institutional orders to which 
they are subject’ (Fraser, 2014a) and the extent of public motivation to ‘demand 
legitimation of class domination, and failing to get it, to insist that it be overcome’ 
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(ibid). In other words, whether an administration crisis is rendered apparent to 
publics as a legitimation crisis depends on the capacities of national political 
cultures and a public sphere capable of recognising and thematising the signs of 
democratic crisis. 
 
1.4.5 Raising the alarm in the contemporary public sphere 
 
The extent to which the achievement of individual rights in the constitutional 
state and the communicative affordances of new media technologies would be 
sufficient to realise the ultimate democratic promise of the public sphere- self-
government through discursive means- has been the subject of profound doubt 
by critical theorists in the second half of the 20th century. Once again, the 
privatising and de-democratising energies associated with the neoliberal 
ascendancy were singled out for concern. Whether conceived as a venue of 
‘rational deliberation over universalizable aims’ (Honneth, 2014: 281) in 
Habermas’ formulation, or as a ‘place of communicative arbitration of political 
disputes’ (ibid) following Arendt’s (1958) ‘agonistic’ public sphere, the 
privatising energies driving change in media style, organisation, content and 
consumption were seen as undercutting its possibilities as a public venue for 
realising democratic self-legislation.  
 
Habermas’ concerns about the contemporary public sphere are summarised in 
his diagnosis of the ‘colonization of the public sphere by market imperatives’ 
(2006: 422), taking the specific form of the ‘intrusion of functional imperatives of 
the market economy into the ‘internal logic’ (ibid) of media production. In a 
formulation strongly redolent of Dewey’s (1927) concerns about the effects of a 
commercialised public sphere, and the Frankfurt School critique of mass culture 
associated with Horkheimer and Adorno (1972), Habermas (2006: 422) posits a 
trivialisation of political discourse in contemporary mass media, in which logics 
of entertainment effect ‘the dramatization of events, the simplification of complex 
matters, and the vivid polarization of conflicts’ working to ‘promote civic 
privatism and a mood of antipolitics’, contributing to what Honneth identified as 
the ‘privatistic hollowing out of the public sphere’ (Honneth, 2014: 281). 
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It is a critique echoed by Pierre Bourdieu’s (1999) polemic on a range of 
pathological tendencies inherent to television journalism with regard to its 
democratic functions including undue commercialisation, diversion, 
depoliticisation, trivialisation and dehistoricisation, amounting to a form of 
symbolic violence on viewers who are denied the possibility of exercising their 
democratic rights through the medium. Habermas (1989: 158) posits a 
consequent ‘refeudalisation’, of the public sphere, in which ‘authority asserted its 
dominance over the people, whether medieval subjects or modern masses’ 
(Rutherford, 2000: 20), with the mass media reduced to ‘presenting and 
representing authority to supine groups of clients and consumers’ (ibid).   
 
While, as Fraser (2014b) suggests, all the conditions for an administration crisis 
and many of those for a legitimation crisis are contemporaneously present in 
Western democracies, the translation from first to second may be ‘blocked’ by the 
capture of public power by private and hegemonic interests. Her critique 
implying that mass media institutions of the public sphere may be capable neither 
of communicatively assisting in the maintenance of democratic legitimacy for the 
extant political order, nor able to sufficiently help translate an administrative 
crisis into a legitimation crisis, calls to mind Gramsci’s formulation about the 
death of the old but the foreclosed birth of the new (Gramsci, 1971: 276). 
 
Even in the context of representative liberal democracies where the promise of 
the public sphere of democratic self-legislation is realised only in sharply 
attenuated form, media institutions in the public sphere may nonetheless be seen 
as suffused with the basic animating logics of a more expansive public sphere, 
evident in their rhetorical valourisation of pluralistic political debate as essential 
to democracy.  
 
Yet, because of the absence of formally-specified reciprocal links outside of 
elections between democratic publics and the executor of public authority- the 
state and its agencies- precisely how communicative democracy in the public 
sphere is supported by media institutions remains somewhat opaque. 
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Fraser’s (1990) conception of ‘weak’ publics, where debate is geared towards the 
dual functions of guiding elite decision-making on the part of legislators and 
guiding voting behaviours on the part of publics, may be viewed as corresponding 
to the dominant paradigm democratic paradigm shaping contemporary 
journalism’s political role (see Chapter 2). 
 
In Habermas’ (1996: 359) terms, the public sphere on this account guides 
political action by acting as a ‘warning system with sensors that, though 
unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society’. 
 
The analysis of such sensoria takes on an urgency in the context of democratic 
crisis, given the mass media’s status as ‘one of the principal vehicles through 
which the society-wide significance of particular problem definitions can seek 
recognition’ (Johnson, 2009: 89). 
 
Peters (1993, 2007) uses the metaphor of the ‘sluice gate’ to explain the (albeit 
idealised) formal operation of public sphere sensoria. This refers to the 
‘switching mechanisms through which the results of the opinion and will forming 
functions of an informal public sphere can be delivered up to the decision-making 
functions of the formal public sphere and then channelled back to seek approval 
from the affected parties’ (Johnson, 2009: 89). Whether such ‘influential 
thematisation’ (Johnson, 2009: 91) catalysed in the periphery is allowed to take 
root at all, let alone progress upwards, depends firstly on the extent of civil 
society capacities to as Habermas puts it, ‘ferret out, identify, and thematize latent 
problems of social integration’, (Habermas, 1996: 358 cited in Callinicos, 2006: 
32) and ‘distil and transmit’ resonating issues in ‘amplified form back to the 
public sphere’ (Habermas, 1996: 367). It further depends on the extent to which 
public sphere institutions, including the mass media, are sensitive to and willing 
to legitimise issue thematisations from below. Lastly, it is contingent on the 
sensitivity or otherwise of the judicial and parliamentary spheres. 
 
If institutions of the political public sphere do not possess the sensory apparatus- 
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or cannot or will not deploy them- to detect and thematise the latent morbid 
symptoms of legitimacy crises, then the mass withdrawal of public consent for 
the present socio-economic order may not be appropriately thematised in the 
public sphere, inhibiting its efficacy. This is why the selection of the 
contemporary crisis as the entry point for an analysis of the mediation of 
contested imaginaries in the public sphere involves, irresistibly, a moment of 
truth for institutions of the public sphere, whose underlying normative horizons 
in relation to democracy and publicity are crystallised and forced to the surface 
as particular crisis construals and responses are selected, retained and form the 
basis for action. 
 
Governmentality theory (Dean, 2009) suggests that the sluice-gate model is 
unlikely to operate in a manner that reflects the development of an autonomous 
public opinion under the hegemonic influence of anti-democratic power such as 
neoliberalism which ‘rigs the game’ in its favour through the diffusion of an ethic 
of ‘self-control’ (Lunt, 2009) and specific forms of ‘rationality’ (Brown, 2015), in 
part through social institutions like the media that shape ‘the minds, bodies and 
conduct of subjects’ (Lunt and Lewis, 2008: 17). This corresponds to the third 
face of power in Lukes’ (1974) description; the hegemonic radicalisation of the 
second “agenda-setting” face of power in which actors have their ‘perceptions, 
cognitions, and preferences’ shaped in ‘such a way that they accept their role in 
the existing order of things’ (ibid: 24). 
 
The construction of journalistic innocence which defended its role in the crisis by 
pointing to the paucity of whistle-blowers and dissonant voices and the strength 
of ideological consensus loses cogency when the generative functions of ideology 
are taken seriously. It also begs the question of the extent and character of the 
role of media institutions in facilitating or countering the dissemination of 
particular ideologies. 
 
One dimension of this generative role is captured in the idea of the structuring 
impact of ‘opportunity structures’ in political life and in the public sphere. In his 
typology of the main dimensions of the political opportunity structure that 
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mediates the extent to which the potential for public mobilisation can be 
transformed into contentious political action (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007), Tarrow 
(1998: 76) notes that periods of crisis can occasion unusually high levels of public 
contention manifested in collective action (ibid: 73) or the very opposite, de-
mobilisation and ‘sullen resentment’ (ibid: 71). For Ferree et al. (2002b: 62), the 
political opportunity structure refers to ‘all of the institutional and cultural access 
points that actors can seize upon to attempt to bring their claims into the political 
forum’.  
 
Driven by a recognition of the need to rectify political opportunity theory’s 
neglect of cultural dynamics in movement outcomes (McCammon, 2013), it is 
increasingly recognised by scholars that whether objective possibilities for 
successful mobilisations of contentious action are realised is determined in part 
by contingent discursive affordances and constraints. Ferree et al. (2002b: 62) 
describe this subset of the political opportunity structure as the discursive 
opportunity structure, a ‘framework of ideas and meaning-making institutions in 
a particular society’ (ibid: 62) which govern processes of issue thematisation. The 
‘pivotal role of the mass media and the gatekeeping functions of editors and 
journalists’ (McCammon, 2013) is identified by Koopmans and Olzak (2004: 202, 
cited in Broer and Duyvendak, 2009: 338) who describe discursive opportunities 
as ‘the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s chances of 
diffusion in the public sphere’. That diffusion depends not simply on visibility in 
the public sphere but on the capacity of a message or set of messages to provoke 
reactions or ‘resonance’ (ibid: 204) points to the importance of attention not only 
to media dynamics but to political and socio-cultural dimensions. In particular, 
the ‘privileged role of hegemonic beliefs and values’ (McCammon, 2013) in a 
given public sphere is an essential condition of resonance.  
 
1.5 Public service broadcasting and contemporary crisis 
 
The selection of public service broadcasting in Ireland as the institutional focus of 
this study was made in part due to its sheer centrality to what Habermas et al. 
(1974: 49) describe as the ‘political public sphere’- parts of the public sphere 
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where ‘public discussion deals with objects connected to the activity of the state’- 
as attested to by the consistent dominance in terms of audience size for television 
and radio broadcasts (see for example, RTÉ, 2015c: 20) of the main public service 
broadcasting institution, Raidió Teilifís Éireann.  
 
The selection is also linked to the unique characteristics of public service 
broadcasting (PSB) as a legal-institutional media form and how its location in 
public sphere, occupying a space somewhere between State and demos, ensures 
that the crystallising quality of crisis on the underlying normative orientations of 
public sphere institutions is at its most acute. This is due in no small part to PSB’s 
precarious position on the horns of a structural dilemma pertaining to its 
conception of its place in the Irish public sphere, its democratic functions, and the 
seat of legitimate political authority. In the context of growing legitimacy gaps in 
representative democracy deepened by contemporary crisis management, the 
question of how PSB envisions the State-public relationship comes into sharp 
relief.  
 
Simultaneously a peripheral part of the state yet with one foot outside it, 
broadcasting as it does in the name of a national community and in the service of 
a general public interest- we may follow Scannell (1990: 24) in asking in relation 
to moments of crisis, ‘whose interests, in the last resort, broadcasting is there to 
serve- those of the state or the people?’ 
 
Following the period of initial flux brought on by the onset of crisis, in which 
social imaginaries become more deeply politicised and contested (McCullagh, 
2010), the questions of whether imaginaries solidify around emergent, critical 
construals or whether old ones are reasserted- and why- lie at the heart of this 
thesis. This requires an assessment of the communicative capacities of PSB to 
problematise existing social, political and economic relations, and how this is 
(recursively) shaped by the affordances and constraints of the political and 
discursive opportunity structures in the public sphere. 
 
In seeking to establish the endogenous and exogenous conditions of resonance 
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for different kinds of crisis construal, this study seeks to establish whether public 
broadcasting in Ireland functions more as an amplifier of ideological contention, 
giving voice to pluralistic crisis critiques or as a soporific, subsidising the 
explanations and justifications of the powerful, helping cut off the oxygen of 
publicity to existing challengers and discouraging potential carriers of counter-
hegemonic discourses, thus raising the costs of collective action to potential 
participants (Tarrow, 1998). The diagnoses and prognoses of crisis definition and 
responses heard in public media therefore constitute a crucial intervention in 
crisis itself. As Cottle (2008: 853) notes, ‘[i]t is in and through the news media 
especially that the politics of protest and dissent is now generally conveyed to 
wider audiences’. Whether or not organised responses from below to the crisis of 
democratic capitalism in their manifold forms carry within them the potential 
energy of re-democratisation, the news media are ‘powerfully positioned to keep 
this bird caged, clip its wings or let it fly’ (ibid: 867). 
 
In the context of a ‘dead but dominant’ ‘zombie neoliberalism’ (Peck, 2010: 108) 
in which neoliberalism which has to ‘actively defend itself through increasing 
authoritarian statecraft’ (Stanley, 2012, see also Bruff, 2013), the question of how 
its corpse is being re-animated post-mortem is urgent. With its origins in the 
consensual post-war Keynesian era of the trente glorieuese, does the normative 
model of democracy at work in public service broadcasting have the capacity to 
name the assailants of democracy and work toward the expansion of a 
democratic public sphere, or does it contribute- actively or passively- to its 
winnowing? Does it sharpen the political contradictions of financialised, 
globalised capitalism or are they sublimated under the hegemonic common-
sense of the Irish model of neoliberal capitalism? 
 
Such matters represent the central rubric of this thesis, and may be summarised 
in an overall research question which queries how Irish public service 
broadcasting’s democratic imaginary shapes its counter-hegemonic potentials and 
tendencies in the context of contemporary crisis. 
 
Such a research question demands a dual focus on, first, interrogating the 
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capacities shaping the parameters of institutional democratic and crisis 
imaginaries, and second, exploring the actuality of the hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic content of these imaginaries.  
 
These two aims in turn inform the dissertation structure, whose first two parts 
explore, respectively, the democratic affordances and constraints of Irish public 
service broadcasting’s place in the political public sphere, and the contingent 
institutional enactment of such configurations.   
 
The remainder of Part I of the dissertation approaches the question of the 
mediating influences on public service broadcasting’s democratic identity by 
adopting a sociology of media view, which ‘considers how media power functions 
within a larger social context’ (Reese, 2001: 174). This is seen as a function of an 
array of interpenetrating influences, ranging from micro to macro- ‘individual, 
routines, organization, extra-media, and ideological’ (ibid: 178) that shape the 
political rationality and broader normative content of the project of public service 
broadcasting, additionally attuned to the locally-specific nature of the crisis 
conjuncture and its interaction with local hegemonies, cultural tendencies and 
public sphere institutions.   
 
A macro-sociological framework for exploring the ‘field’ of mediating influences 
on public service broadcasting’s political rationality and their impacts on the 
possibilities of counter-hegemonic mobilisation is offered, encompassing 
analysis of the formative influences of the state, market and demos on public 
service broadcasting from without; the influence of professional and 
administrative cultures from within; and at a more macro level, the pervasive 
impacts of the underlying political and democratic cultures that permeate society 
as a whole and which animate different models of democracy and the public 
sphere (O’Mahony, 2013: 31). 
 
Following this framework, Chapter 2 offers a general account of the systemic 
contexts in which public media institutions are embedded, exploring its 
European development as a form of media with distinctive legitimating myths 
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and variegated ideological-practical relationships with their host states, 
economies and publics. Chapter 3 contributes an account of public service 
broadcasting’s place in the Irish public sphere and polity, tracing its 
developmental trajectory in the 20th and 21st centuries from the social and 
political forces which birthed this institutional media form in Ireland to its 
subsequent buffeting by socio-cultural and political-economic currents.  
 
Part II of the dissertation turns its attention to the empirical investigation of 
intra-field contingent institutional and professional dynamics of public service 
broadcasting’s normative democratic orientations. Chapter 4 explicates a 
methodological approach to the intra-institutional analysis, justifying the range 
of methods applied towards attaining a better understanding of public service 
broadcasting’s political rationality from within, the implementation and results 
of which are elaborated on in detail in Chapters 5 to 8 (inclusive).  
 
The concluding Chapter 9, comprising Part III of the dissertation, synthesises the 
findings of the foregoing field and empirical analyses in the service of responding 
to the overall research question with a holistic account of the mediating 
influences on and hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tendencies of Irish public 
service broadcasting’s democratic and crisis imaginaries. 
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Chapter 2: Public Service Broadcasting: 
A Field Perspective 
 
The journalistic Order is inserted within the political Order, and thus is Ordered 
without any need for orders. 
          Darras (2005: 165) 
  
2.1 Introduction 
 
2.1.1 Media institutions in systemic context 
 
Chapter 1 identified public service broadcasting as a crucial and unique node in 
the circuitry of the Irish national political public sphere, whose understandings 
and representations of crisis would play a role in influencing whether an 
administrative crisis of economic steering associated with the North Atlantic 
Financial Crisis and its domestic reverberations would spill over into a 
legitimation crisis of governance of the state and the socio-political order. 
 
In the interests of applying an appropriate theory of media power that assists in 
deconstructing and analysing public media’s role in crisis construal, this chapter 
offers a justification for a macro-sociological framework for identifying the 
mediating influences on PSB’s hegemonic and counter-hegemonic capacities that 
places it within its systemic contexts in orbits of state, political, economic and 
professional power. 
 
Recognising that organisational practices and structures tend to be ‘either 
reflections of or responses to rules, beliefs and conventions built into the wider 
environment’ (Powell, 2007), this thesis proceeds from perspectives that 
explicitly explain the character of normative media cultures as the outcome of 
intra-institutional, inter-institutional and extra-institutional influences, seeing 
media institutions as both ‘economically and socially constrained agencies’ 
(Corner, 2003: 370).  
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Nor does it, as per classical institutionalism, see organisations as defined simply 
by ‘sets of norms and rules, more or less obeyed, more or less binding, 
internalized or legitimated’ (Petre, 2012: 40). Instead, it adopts the ‘new 
institutionalist’ emphasis on agency and how the ecological environment of 
organisations involves the recursive shaping of institutional logics- (supra-
organisational patterns of activity structured by symbolic systems) at the level of 
society and organisational-specific logics (Spicer and Sewell, 2010). 
 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004: 8) view that ‘one cannot understand the news media 
without understanding the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the 
pattern of relations between economic and political interests, and the 
development of civil society’, echoed in Jakubowicz’s (2007b: 16) idea of 
‘systemic parallelism’ and in the work of Kaplan (2009) and Siebert, Peterson and 
Schramm (1963) all emphasise the need to recognise ‘the ultimate structuring 
power of political institutions and political culture’ (Benson, 2006: 199) in 
shaping media cultures, while retaining the systems-theoretical and new 
institutionalist insight that processes of influence go both ways.  
 
Adopting such a framework implies both the inadequacy of a media-centric 
research agenda and that recognising the interdependence of internal media 
cultures and external public cultures means that exploring the question of the 
media as agent or retardant of change requires contextual precision (Rosengren, 
1981: 248). 
 
This approach reflects Curran’s (1999: 11) view of the potential complementarity 
of media-centric and socio-centric approaches, advocated on the basis of 
necessity both by Blumler and Gurevitch (1986: 70) and Schudson (2000: 175) 
and whose formative role in the project’s methodological approach is discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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2.1.2 Field and habitus  
 
Bourdieu’s (1984, 1993) concept of the field as the most appropriate level of 
analysis for organisational research (Powell, 2007)- shared by new 
institutionalism- is adopted here as the basis of an analytical approach that can 
assist in helping ‘pinpoint the journalistic field’s relative position vis-á-vis the 
range of other societal fields that compete to shape our vision of the social world’ 
(Benson and Neveu, 2005: 19). It demands and proposes ‘a new unit of analysis 
for journalism studies: between the individual news organization and the society 
as a whole, the "mezzo-level" interorganizational and professional environment 
of the field/institution’ (Benson, 2006: 199, see also McQuail and Windahl (1993: 
61)). 
 
Defined as hierarchical ‘series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, 
categories, designations, appointments and titles which …produce and authorise 
certain discourses and activities’ (Webb, Schirato and Danaher 2006: 21-2), the 
spatial metaphor of the field underpins Bourdieu’s explanation of the 
development in modernity in terms of the gradual differentiation of semi-
autonomous spheres of action- including politics, economics, or cultural 
production- with each field representing a terrain of struggle between actors 
seeking to influence the trajectory of that field (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 3). As 
‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions’ 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96-7), the relational character of cultural fields 
is of essential importance. 
 
Understanding the formative influences on journalistic crisis construal requires 
the acknowledgement of actor agency in the field and the intra-field and inter-
field forces which help determine the kinds of position-taking possible by such 
actors who consequently ‘organize the allocation of the symbolic resources 
necessary to structure our knowledge about, and by extension our capacity to 
intervene in, the world around us’ (Freedman, 2014: 2). 
 
For Bourdieu, the significance of the journalistic field arises from its mediating 
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role in a larger field of power comprising sub-fields that compete to impose a 
‘legitimate vision of the social world’ (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 6). Benson’s 
(2006: 199) conceptualisation of the journalistic field locates journalistic 
professionalism as playing a ‘mediating role’ between ‘two poles of the state, one 
constituting market power, the other constituting non-market (or even anti-
market) civic power’, a distinction with particular salience for public service 
broadcasting. Another key field theory tenet shared by new institutionalism 
(Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) is that ‘fields possess some autonomy from external 
pressures’ (Benson, 2006: 188), although Bourdieu ascribes the journalistic 
field’s stronger subjection to the heteronomous pole (denoting external influence) 
on the basis of its increasing subjection to ‘the constraints of the economy and of 
politics’ (1995: 41). 
 
The closely-related concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1977: 78) refers to the 
internalised sets of dispositions, rules and values that tend to go along with 
particular field memberships. The habitus represents a kind of 'socialised 
subjectivity' (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 126) shared more or less by field 
members, which is both guided by and constituted in 'moments of practice' 
(Webb et al., 2006: 38), and operates as a 'feel for the game' (ibid) of daily life and 
participation in a field. The stability of the habitus is supported by the diffusion 
of doxic knowledge, or the ‘universe of tacit presuppositions’ common to field 
members (Bourdieu, 1995). 
 
That the habitus- durable, yet flexible- is produced by 'shared cultural 
trajectories' (Webb et al., 2006: 40) and inclinations, values and rationales that 
are acquired from various formative contexts' (ibid: 58) implies that it is more 
than a deterministic product of class affiliation but also of immersion in particular 
cultural systems, rules and categories of meaning (Benson and Neveu, 2005: 18). 
 
The status of the habitus as comprising pre-theoretical assemblages of 
assumptions and rules guiding action align it with Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) 
account of the socially constructed nature of reality, which describes how 
socially-generated knowledge is produced by processes of habitualisation, 
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institutionalisation and objectivation. The habitus may be viewed as a reflection 
of the ‘space of possibles’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2006: 216) which constrain the 
‘thinkable and the unthinkable, the do-able and the impossible for agents in the 
field’, and whose relational character, along with the field concept, ‘allows us to 
conceptual-ize the margins available for intervention, resistance, and the renewal 
of journalistic practices’ (Neveu, 2005: 206). 
 
2.1.3 Media power in context 
 
A key benefit of applying a sociology of media view which ‘considers how media 
power functions within a larger social context’ (Reese, 2001: 174) is that it 
facilitates the navigation of both the Scylla of an undue media-centrism 
(Schlesinger, 1990) whose narrow focus on individual news producers, content, 
or even the psychologism of individual reception processes elides the complex 
interplay between culture, media production and public resonance, and the 
Charybdis of an overly deterministic socio-centrism, exemplified by a political-
economic functionalism which explains away journalistic actions and 
orientations as merely the outcomes of choices made and processes initiated 
elsewhere.  
 
Such an approach aligns with Freedman’s (2014) ‘contradiction’ paradigm of 
media power which, as well as rejecting the ‘consensus’ and ‘chaos’ paradigms 
respectively linked to liberal pluralist communication studies and cultural 
studies, urges caution against too strong a reading of the ‘control’ paradigm of 
media power associated with the materialist critiques of McChesney (1999), 
Mosco (1996) and Herman and Chomsky (1988). 
 
Contrary to Bourdieu’s extreme pessimism about journalists as uncritical 
‘doxosophers’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 7) the contradiction perspective provides the 
basis of a framework that recognises ‘structure and agency, contradiction and 
action, consensus and conflict’, emphasising instability and contingency, 
foregrounding the ongoing potential for fissures and disruptions to hegemony 
generated from extra and intra-institutional sources (Freedman, 2014: 12). Such 
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an approach therefore responds to Cottle’s (2007) and Corner’s (2003) insistence 
on taking journalistic agency seriously. 
 
The account of field relations in this chapter is also sensitive to the new 
institutionalist concept of institutional isomorphism, which refers to the ways in 
which organisational characteristics come into alignment with the characteristics 
of fields under whose spheres of influence they come (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991: 66). Their distinctions between ‘coercive’, ‘mimetic’ and ‘normative’ 
isomorphism (ibid: 67-73) provide a useful framework for tracing the sources 
and character of field influences and determining the extent to which the 
institutionalised habituses of administrative and journalistic professionals in 
public broadcasting become isomorphic with dominant symbolic patterns, 
regimes of truth (Foucault, 1980) and objectivated knowledge in other fields. 
 
Following Benson’s (2006: 196) suggestion of the need to ‘restore attention to 
the political as well as economic constraints’ on media production while retaining 
an emphasis on the capacities of publics to influence mediated crisis construals, 
the approach adopted here focuses on exploring the public broadcasting sub-field 
of the broader journalistic field with respect to its relationships with three critical 
sub-fields most relevant to the themes of the research. These comprise the 
political field (formal institutional politics), the economic field (the market), and 
the civic field (the public), a set of forces roughly corresponding to Tuchman’s 
(2002: 79-80) specification of the major forces bearing on media.  
 
Despite the socially, culturally and historically contingent nature of the 
normative orientation of public broadcasting and journalistic ideologies (whose 
Irish specificities are the focus of subsequent chapters) it is nonetheless possible 
to broadly situate the form of public broadcasting within recognisable 
institutional, extra-institutional and professional contexts shaped by field 
relationships in its Western European ‘heartland’ (Collins, 2005: 42). The 
following section provides an introductory overview into how PSB’s 
relationships with their host states, domestic, regional and global economies and 
publics are navigated, particularly in the contexts of contemporary political, 
 37 
 
social, technological and regulatory change. 
 
2.2 Public service broadcasting: between state, market and demos 
 
2.2.1 PSB and the state 
 
2.2.1.1 From “state to “public service” broadcasting 
 
The origins of state involvement in broadcasting in the early decades of the 20th 
century may be principally attributed to, first, the need for an authority 
empowered to manage scarce electromagnetic spectrum (Tinic, 2009, Curran, 
2002: 195), and secondly, the desire of states to avoid bequeathing, through 
inaction, a nascent private radio broadcasting industry the same kinds of 
influence as that enjoyed by the newspaper industry (Honneth, 2014: 270). 
 
Since then, state involvement in broadcasting governance has taken a range of 
forms. A straightforward typology is offered by Raboy (1999, cited in 
Seneviratne, 2006:12), who identifies three broad types of broadcasting systems: 
private enterprise core systems, dominated by commercial organisations where 
the state’s role is limited to frequency allocation and regulation (United States, 
parts of Asia and Latin America); public service core systems, characterised by the 
persistence of strong public broadcasting institutions with relative autonomy 
from the state (usually supplemented by a mixed economy of broadcasting and 
most closely associated with Western European nations); and state broadcasting 
core systems, extant in parts of Africa and Asia, characterised by the persistence 
of monolithic state-controlled broadcasters with little autonomy and often only a 
nascent set of private and community-based alternatives. Other typologies have 
been offered by Moe and Syvertson (2009), Mendel (2000) and Hoffman-Reim 
(1996). 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 30-33) propose four ideal-typical models for the 
governance of public broadcasting in Western Europe whose development 
corresponds to the exigencies of national political cultures. The government 
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model, which is only minimally differentiated from ‘state’ broadcasting, involves 
direct control of public broadcasting by the government, a model they suggest is 
exhibited to varying degrees by Greece, Portugal and Spain but elsewhere 
becoming untenable for reasons of political legitimacy and broadly supplanted 
around the mid-20th century (ibid: 52-3) by forms of governance that ‘insulate 
public service broadcasting to a substantial degree from control by the political 
majority’ (ibid: 30). This corresponding to the second, professional model, where 
day-to-day control of public broadcasting was vested in broadcasting 
professionals, of which the BBC in the UK, the CBC in Canada, RTÉ in Ireland, PBS 
in the United States, and some Scandinavian countries are cited as exemplars. 
Two other modes of governance, the parliamentary or proportional 
representation model, and the civic or corporatist models, both involve the 
distribution of control over broadcast governance to different groups in society. 
In the former case, this is undertaken according to parliamentary representation 
as in Italy (Habermas, 2006: 420-1) and in the latter along social and cultural 
lines, as in the Netherlands (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 53). 
 
By virtue of its focus on the Irish PSB instantiation, the focus of this project is on 
the second model of broadcasting governance which vests a controlling share of 
power (at least, day to day) in broadcasting professionals- what Mary Kelly 
(1983) identified as formally autonomous PSB governance systems. 
 
2.2.1.2 Legitimating ideologies of public service 
 
That public service broadcasting developed ‘pragmatically, often with a good deal 
of piece-meal post hoc rationalisation’ (Goodwin, 1997: 60, see also Hamada, 
1997: 37) underscores the difficulty of specifying (or generalising across 
borders) the normative thrust of the new institutional form of public service 
broadcasting, a slipperiness frequently noted by scholars, government and even 
public service broadcasters themselves (Scannell, 1990: 11, Albertazzi and 
Cobley, 2013). 
 
Collins (2005: 42) describes European public service broadcasting in its classic 
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form as comprising three core elements: ‘publicly-owned not for profit 
organisation, a monopoly of service provision and a strongly normative 
programming policy emphasising national and high cultural themes’ (see also 
Seneviratne, 2006: 26) 
 
However, Syvertson (1999: 5-6) notes that even by the cusp of the 21st century 
‘no single understanding of “public service” had crystallised’ across Europe, 
suggesting through a discussion of each of three historically significant versions 
of the concept that all three elements of Collins’ definition are have fallen into 
anachronism. These include PSB’s original ‘technical-economic’ (Syvertson, 
1999: 6) justification as a public utility rooted in its origins as a centrally-
controlled tool of the state and whose primary criteria of success are technical, 
notably the provision of universal access; as broadcasting in the service of the 
public sphere, as in Scannell’s (1990: 14) association of PSB with the Reithian 
belief that PSB could powerfully contribute to ‘the formation of an informed and 
reasoned public opinion as an essential part of the political process in a mass 
democratic society’; and broadcasting in the service of the listener/viewer, in 
which the PSB duty to satisfy ‘the interests and preferences of individual 
consumers’ (Syvertson, 1999: 7) is emphasised- validated through audience 
metrics- which Syvertson argues has held increasing sway with the loss of the 
monopoly position of PSBs. 
 
Blumler (1992: 7-14) identified PSB values across Europe as entailing a 
comprehensive remit (offering omnibus services), generalised mandates (with 
PSBs granted broad freedom to interpret its functions under law) diversity, 
pluralism and range (recognising the need to provide programmes for many 
groups and tastes), a cultural vocation (the view that PSBs should play a role in 
‘sustaining and renewing the society’s characteristic cultural capital and cement’ 
(ibid: 11). Finally, they accepted a place in politics. As ‘creatures ultimately of the 
state’ (ibid: p.12), PSBs intervened in political life by assuming ‘some 
responsibility for the health of the political process and for the quality of public 
discourse generated within it’, with news and current affairs output elevated to a 
special status.  
 40 
 
 
2.2.1.3 PSB, state and nation 
 
The centrality of the ‘service’ concept intertwines with the character of PSB’s 
relationships with the state. Given the strong extent to which the BBC 
represented the institutional and ideological template for PSB when exported 
elsewhere- particularly in Ireland (McLoone, 1991: 10)- a brief exploration of key 
aspects of its ideological and material relationships with the political field in the 
UK is warranted here. 
 
Hood (1986: 55) notes that that the foundation of the BBC on the basis of a 
‘Trustee for the national interest’ (Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1925) 
in the form of a public corporation (Briggs, 1995, Seaton, 2003) should be 
understood in the context of a broader legitimation of the ‘public service’ concept, 
associated with a cross-party consensus about the suitability of public 
corporations to manage certain parts of the economy. Citing Raymond William’s 
comments on the formative influence of the Victorian ‘service’ concept, Scannell 
(1990: 22) describes it as ‘animated by a sense of moral purpose and of social 
duty on behalf of the community, aimed particularly at those most in need of 
reform- the lower classes’ and that it was ‘institutionalized in the bureaucratic 
practices of the newly emerging professional classes’ (ibid: 22). He identifies in 
John Reith’s (the first Director General of the BBC) Arnoldian emphasis on the 
broadcasting imperative for education and cultural improvement a culturalist 
expression of the Victorian value of service (Reith, 1924). Under his leadership, 
the BBC would develop a distinctive and influential approach to ‘national’ ‘public 
service’ broadcasting, which would become ‘symbolically associated with the 
Western nation-state itself, and with the public culture of representative 
democracies’ (Horsti, Hultén and Titley, 2014: 4).  
 
Echoing Scannell’s (1990: 23) description of the BBC ethos as suffused with ‘a 
concern for social unity mingled with national pride’, Goodwin (1997: 72) notes 
that public service broadcasting in the UK had historically emphasised ‘delivering 
a uniform national culture to a uniform audience’, based on the assumption of the 
 41 
 
existence of a national community (Schlesinger, 1979: 20). This is a point 
emphasised by Morley and Robins (1995: 10-11) who suggest that broadcasting 
enjoyed a special status as one ‘of the key institutions through which listeners 
and viewers have come to imagine themselves as members of the national 
community’, fulfilling the dual functions as ‘the political public sphere of the 
nation state, and as the focus for national cultural identification’ (see also 
Scannell, 1992).  
 
 In the UK, Reith saw the BBC as serving as a unifying force in the political life of 
the nation, as an ‘integrator of democracy’ (quoted in Cardiff and Scannell, 1987: 
159), and through ‘making the nation as one man’ (quoted in Scannell, 1990: 23).  
This role was endorsed by the state in the Annan report (1977: 79, quoted in 
Scannell, 1990: 24) which identified the BBC’s role as ‘natural interpreter of 
[great national occasions] to the nation as a whole’ (Annan, 1977). For Blumler 
and Gurevitch (1986: 73), this is premised in part on the elevation of parliament 
to the status as ‘the presumed institutional embodiment of the central values of 
British democracy’. That its vision of politics has privileged the national frame is 
supported by Horsti et al. (2014: 15) and Curran (2002: 209). More broadly, 
Scannell (1990: 23-24) notes that ‘public service in the national interest’ (italics 
in original) represented a journalistic rapprochement with the state, and a 
significant departure from the primacy of the ‘public interest’ ideal, which 
entailed struggles for press freedom that were often directed against the power 
of the state.  
 
Propelling the value alignment between nation and public service broadcasting 
is PSB’s ongoing dependence on the state for its ongoing funding, regulation and 
even legitimation. Despite the retention of license fee systems in most nations 
with ‘strong’ PSB systems (Moe and Syvertson, 2009: 398), designed to fund 
broadcasters at one level of remove from direct state subvention, the funding of 
public broadcasting may nonetheless be politicised as a means of influencing 
broadcasters (Blumler, 1992: 19). Governmental control of the legislative basis 
of PSB, control over its regulatory context, key internal appointments, and above 
all regular re-negotiations of its funding settlements, means that broadcasters are 
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forced to ‘bear in mind the acceptability of how they work and what they produce 
to those who are ultimately in a position to determine their organizational 
futures’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986: 73). The closure of the Greek public 
broadcaster in 2013 (Iosifidis and Katsirea, 2014) demonstrates the vulnerability 
of PSB institutions to central government fiat, and how their dependence on their 
political masters has meant that they are often ‘constrained to prudence’ 
(Blumler, 1992: 13). 
 
The influence of the political field over the field of public broadcasting extends to 
its mediation of another set of field relations- that between public broadcasting 
and the market. 
 
2.2.2 PSB and the market   
 
2.2.2.1 Commercial isomorphism 
 
The end of the ‘golden era’ of public service broadcasting has been widely linked 
to its increasing imbrication in competitive domestic and global media markets. 
Blumler (1992: 7) describes this as the ‘commercial deluge’, entailing the 
dissolution of national broadcasting monopolies in the 1970s and 1980s which 
paved the way for commercial competition, and the decreased centrality of the 
national media sphere in the context of the globalising impact of cable, satellite 
and new media technologies (Horsti et al., 2014: 4). These changes have 
engendered challenges for PSB’s reproduction in changed political, economic, 
regulatory and technological contexts, heralding for Katz (1996) an existential 
crisis of PSB (for an overview of threats to PSB in its heartland, see Lowe and 
Steemers, 2012). In response, PSBs have had to ‘renegotiate the balance between 
their informational, cultural and economic roles’ (McCullagh, 2002: 83). 
 
The subjection of PSBs to a ‘combined commercial, political and ideological 
assault’ (Curran, 2002: 191) is aptly symbolised by their status as key targets 
(Spicer and Sewell, 2010: 922) of ‘New Public Management’, involving the 
introduction of managerial innovations to the public sector which had heretofore 
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been associated with private enterprise.  
 
This entailed from the 1970s their transformation along business lines, ‘In 
pursuit of competitiveness and economic efficiency, demanded by regulators and 
essential for survival,’ (Murray, 2011: 77) changes that included outsourcing, the 
use of management consultancies, organisational restructuring, the use of 
performance management systems, and the flexibilisation and casualisation of 
labour (Spicer and Sewell, 2010: 922, Murray, 2011, Davies 2008, Born, 2004: 
180). 
 
While participation in the ‘bare-knuckle fray for market share and operational 
efficiencies’ (Lowe, 2010) has helped to ensure institutional stability (Steemers, 
2003: 123), the ‘survival strategies’ (Steemers, 1999: 50) enacted by PSBs have 
come at a price. 
 
By internalising commercial and competitive logics (Bardoel and d’Haenens, 
2008: 340), PSBs have, according to the ‘convergence hypothesis’ (see also 
Iosifidis, 2007: 81) rendered them isomorphic with private sector media in terms 
of their ‘style and ethos’ (Steemers, 1999: 50).  
 
Curran (2002: 203), Born (2003, 2004), Tracey (1998) and Mills (2015) in the 
UK, Lowe and Alm (1997) in Finland, Spicer and Sewell (2010) in Australia and 
Murray (2011) in Ireland have traced the impact of value transformation 
propelled by the incorporation of public broadcasting into a market environment. 
Such a process has gone well beyond commercial activities being ‘de-demonised’ 
(McQuail, 1998: 112) but extending to the embedding of market logics into public 
service mandates- even for those public broadcasters most insulated from direct 
market pressures like the BBC. This has resulted in direct state 
instrumentalisation of the broadcaster in line with national economic goals 
(Steemers, 1999: 49, Golding and Murdock, 1991: 23). 
 
In technological terms, scholars including Steemers (2003) have noted the 
success of PSBs in transitioning away from the analogue era with successful and 
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even path-breaking use of new media technologies, from digital terrestrial 
television (DTT) to online catch-up services, with the EBU (2007, p.20) 
suggesting that the transition from public service broadcasting to a broader 
public service media (PSM) is yielding dividends.  
 
More than a series of technological changes associated with the deprecation of 
‘legacy’ analogue technologies and the embrace of digital transmission and 
internet platforms, the shift from PSB to PSM necessarily entails an at least partial 
reconceptualisation and practical reorientation of the public service project 
(requiring new legitimation strategies) and its relationship to (domestic and 
global) states, societies and media markets whose contours are coming into view 
(Horsti et al., 2014: 5, Spicer and Sewell, 2010). It is a shift whose European 
dimension has brought into sharp focus the uncertain supranational political 
support for public service media. 
 
2.2.2.2 The neoliberalisation of European media policy 
 
At the supranational level, Jakubowicz (2004) identifies an ascendancy of 
marketisation policies in the European Union as helping reshape media policy in 
ways that have diminished recognition of the social, cultural and democratic 
aspects of communication. With private broadcasters outnumbering their public 
counterparts in Europe by 1989 (Coppens and Saeys, 2006), they were 
emboldened to pressure European institutions to arrest the development of 
public broadcasters and denude what remained of their protection from market 
imperatives. Steemers (1999: 58) notes that the EU’s focus on market 
liberalisation has meant that it has struggled to reconcile the concept of public 
service broadcasting with EU competition rules, in particular with respect to 
treaty rules on state aid (Kleist and Scheuer, 2006), leading Jakubowicz (2004) to 
describe PSB as a ‘square peg in a round hole’ in terms of EU audio-visual policy. 
 
For private operators, the goal has been to either marginalise PSB through the 
promotion of a ‘market failure’ or ‘monastery model’, in which PSBs would 
narrow their focus to solely produce the kinds of output that commercial 
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competitors wouldn’t- along the lines of the US model- or via an ‘arrested PSB 
evolution’ (Jakubowicz, 2007a: 8) strategy which would prevent or restrict public 
broadcasters from developing digital platforms, in effect ensuring its swift 
obsolescence.  
 
Jakubowicz (2004: 295) characterises the evolving European compromise in 
terms of on one hand, the validation of the ‘full portfolio’ model of public service 
broadcasting, allowing for its digital expansion, yet refusing to shield PSB from 
‘regulations designed to promote competition in the internal market’, an analysis 
supported by Moe and Syvertson (2009: 401) who note the ambiguity of 
simultaneous rhetorical support for PSB at national and European level yet the 
imposition of policies limiting their ‘range and scope’ (see also d’Haenens, Sousa 
and Hultén, 2011: 190).  
 
Curran (2002: 191) notes that notwithstanding the impact of deregulatory 
regimes, tough competition, and influential organised hostility to public service 
broadcasting, many European PSBs are nonetheless weathering the storms 
rather successfully- particularly in terms of maintaining high audience shares- 
taking issue with the “terminal decline” thesis as advanced by Katz (1996). 
 
2.2.3 Public service media and their publics 
 
Debates on the alleged crisis of public broadcasting extend well beyond the 
matter of its survival. As the original technological, regulatory and competitive 
justifications for PSB’s existence have faded, the question of how- and why- to 
secure the future of a reconfigured public service media as a distinctive and 
relevant institution of the national public sphere in the context of a rapidly 
changing mediascape has taken a renewed salience (e.g. Moe, 2009, Iosifidis, 
2010, Glowacki and Jackson, 2013, F. Corcoran, 2004). Critical debates have 
ensued around the desirable role of the journalist in public life (Rosen, 1999, 
Charity, 1995, Glasser, 1999) as well as the proper role of the public in public 
media (Cammaerts and Carpentier, 2007, Baldi and Hasebrink, 2007). 
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Carpentier (2011: 67) identifies ‘participation in the media and through the 
media’ (italics in original) as the key participatory components of audience 
activity in which publics may assert ‘their right to communicate’ (ibid: 68). 
Participation through the media refers to ‘the opportunities for mediated 
participation in public debate and for self-representation’ (ibid: 67), while 
participation in the media describes ‘participation in the production of media 
output (content-related participation) and in media organizational decision-
making (structural participation’) (ibid: 68), each of which corresponds to the 
ideal-typical poles of minimalist and maximalist modes of participation. The 
former is characterised by the retention of power by media professionals, with 
participation restricted to ‘access and interaction’, with public involvement 
conceived along narrow lines, unidirectional, and depoliticised (ibid: 69). More 
maximalist forms of participation entail a more balanced power relationship 
between public and media professionals, with participatory modes going beyond 
mere access and interaction to substantive interventions in content and 
governance, and an acknowledgment of ‘audience diversity and heterogeneity, 
and of the political nature of media participation’ (ibid).  
 
Whether due to what Bardoel (2007: 50) see as the tradition of enlightenment 
paternalism as representing the roots of PSB institutions’ tendency to ‘keep the 
people and civil society at a distance, while politics and the government served 
as the preferred partner in the past’, or linked to the cultural legacy of the one-to-
many broadcasting paradigm (Lowe and Bardoel, 2007), the public’s limited 
practical role in the public media enterprise is an entrenched tendency.  
 
Lowe (2010) suggests that while many PSB organisations have developed a 
strong rhetoric of the centrality of publics to the PSB enterprise, its practical 
translation has generally been limited. Participation through “mainstream” 
media, including PSBs, is most associated with the dedicated “access” 
programming genre, generally comprising dedicated radio phone in shows and 
in-studio television discussion programmes which afford some opportunities for 
publics to speak on air (McNair, Hibberd and Schlesinger, 2003, Livingstone and 
Lunt, 1994). However, by virtue of usually high levels of professional supervision, 
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Carpentier, Dahlgren and Pasquali (2013: 133) characterise these kinds of 
programmes as ‘minimalist-participatory’. Participation in media is more 
restricted still, with opportunities for publics to produce their own programming 
very rare (for an exception, see Carpentier, 2003), with structural participation 
in PSB governance limited to generally minimalist forms.  
 
Rather, what Scannell (1992: 322) describes as the ‘democratic thrust’ of public 
broadcasting upon its inception lay in the way that it opened access to ‘virtually 
the whole spectrum of public life’ to all, by ‘placing political, religious, civic, 
cultural events and entertainments in a common domain’ for the first time 
through establishing the ‘right of the microphone’ (Scannell, 1989: 322)- and 
later the camera- to relay events to the public. This “democracy as access” ideal 
continues to pervade the ‘official canon’ (Curran, 2002: 212) of PSB ideology 
today, in which ‘access’ and ‘diversity’ tend to be actualised as ‘catering for 
different tastes rather than giving expression to different perspectives and 
cultures’. As Rakow (1999: 80) puts it, public participation tends to be ‘equated 
with public access to the means to purchase, view and listen, not to speak and be 
heard’. 
 
Under rationalised management and accounting mechanisms (Murray, 2011), 
public participation is rearticulated through the rubric of audience research, 
representing what Ang (1991: 7) described as ‘market feedback technology’, 
whose main function is to provide broadcasting executives with ‘objectifying and 
controlling knowledge that can be converted into an economic commodity’ 
(Belanger, 1993). More direct audience involvement mechanisms include 
‘audience council’ structures (See Lowe’s (2010) edited volume on civil society 
participation in European PSM organisations for nationally-specific examples as 
well as Kleinsteuber, (2008) and Nehls, (2008), for discussions on the operation 
of audience councils in German public broadcasting and Bakker, (2012) on user-
generated content). Blumler and Hoffman-Riem (1992: 219) note that systems of 
public accountability for the activities of public broadcasters exist, yet are 
monopolised by a small ‘circle of “licensed” participants’, a sentiment echoed by 
Freedman’s (2015) critique of how media policymaking is typically undertaken 
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far away from the public eye or voice. In a more positive vein, Enli (2008) points 
to increased experimentation by a range of European PSBs with participative 
initiatives, driven by new technological affordances. 
 
2.3 PSB and normative democratic orientations 
 
2.3.1 Public service professionalism 
 
The account of public broadcasting’s external field relations suggests its strong 
subjection to the logics of the state and market, profoundly shaping in turn its 
normative orientation toward publics. Conceptualising PSB as entailing not only 
an institutional project but a professional one allows for further insights into its 
mediation of field relations and political roles. 
 
Champagne (2005: 57) suggests that ‘[g]eneric discourse on “the journalist’’’ 
occludes rather than sheds light on the precise ‘field of relations’ within which 
journalists in public service broadcasting are situated. Viewing journalism of a 
‘public service orientation’ (encompassing institutional public service 
broadcasting but not exhausted by it) as a ‘historically specific conception of the 
journalist’s role in society with important consequences for the practice of 
journalism and the relation of the media to other social institutions’ (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004: 36) allows for a more precise elucidation of what is distinctive 
about PSB praxis as a professional ethic and esprit de corps.  
 
In recognition of weakly formalised codes of professional and institutional ethics 
and practices, Gans’ (1979: 68-9) useful delineation of journalistic paraideology 
offers a productive starting point for the delineation of general values that guide 
journalistic activity. He conceptualises the dominant journalistic ethic of 
contemporary American news workers as a mélange of general, somewhat vague 
and flexible values and practices characterised by a mix of “liberal” and 
“conservative” positions. These entail explicit or implicit support for 
‘ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town 
pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and national leadership’ 
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(ibid: 42). They also reflect a zeal for political and social reform captured in its 
support for honest, meritocratic government- leavened by support for capitalism 
(albeit a capitalism with a human face)- as well as the conceptualisation of 
representative democracy as the locus of political life and a disapproval of 
bureaucracy and populism.  
 
The coalescing of these values into a distinct professional canon (later so broadly 
diffused within the media of the Western world that they would become the 
yardstick by which alternative normative models of the media in democracy 
would be judged) is located by Kaplan (2009) as occurring against the backdrop 
of a series of political realignments in the early 20th century United States 
associated with the weakening of the two main political parties and the advent of 
Progressive reforms (Hofstadter, 1990). 
 
Dispensing with its former role as ‘appendages’ (Kaplan, 2009: 31) of politicians 
and an attendant ‘explicit, formal partisanship’ (ibid: 26) this new public ethic 
corresponded to the end of the ‘advocacy’ (ibid: 28) model of journalism and its 
replacement by the ‘trustee’ model (Schudson, 1998: 136), in which journalists 
accepted a new place in politics by providing ‘news according to what they as a 
professional group believe citizens should know’. Founded on the basis of 
‘objectivity’, and valourising journalistic autonomy and independence, it sought 
to secure ‘a space for neutral, factual information and public deliberation outside 
the corruption, rancor, and partisan spin that normally characterizes public 
discourse’ (Kaplan, 2009: 25).  
 
This development was driven by the economic imperative of the need to serve 
‘politically heterogeneous audiences without alienating any significant segment 
of the audience’ (Carey, 1965: 32), which was ‘subsequently rationalized into a 
canon of professional competence and ideology of professional responsibility’ 
(ibid: 33). 
 
Journalism’s paucity of ‘esoteric knowledge’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 37, see 
also Tuchman, 1972: 662) also propelled the rise of the new legitimating ideology 
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of professional journalism. Kaplan (2009: 33) describes how, with objectivity 
(and cognate principles of ‘impartiality’ and ‘balance’ and ‘accuracy’ (McQuail, 
1983: 91) at its heart, the new professionalised journalistic ethic adopted 
‘Progressive notions of ‘public service’ and ‘professional expertise became the 
rhetorical mainstay of journalism’s occupational ideals and a defence against all 
external criticisms’ (see also Shaw, 1991: 14). Summarising a cogent strain of 
critique against journalistic objectivity, Curran (2002: 155) suggests that it 
serves to ‘obviate the need to evaluate what is true, avoid causing offence to the 
powerful and facilitate the meeting of deadlines’. 
 
Kaplan further suggests that the adoption of this new ethic reflected the broader 
cultural change of the ‘general expansion of professional authority and decision-
making by experts and managers’ (ibid: 34), influenced by the Progressive view 
that ‘social problems were a question of facts and technical solutions best left to 
impartial, informed experts’ (ibid) with the press taking on a gatekeeping role as 
‘technocratic, professional mediator of the public sphere’ (ibid) through which all 
contending voices must apply for access. 
 
Professionalisation built around the idea of journalism as trustee of the public 
sphere and democratic citizenship standing above the rancour of political 
partisanship supplied an ideal normative basis for the public service ethos of the 
20th century public broadcasting monopolies (Christians, Glasser and McQuail, 
2009: 10). This is in part because it satisfied the political need for a model of 
journalism detached from party partisanship yet with commitments to defending 
and ‘neutrally speaking for the entire commonweal’ (Kaplan, 2009: 34) and the 
institutional and journalistic desire for autonomy from government, proprietors 
and others seeking to influence it. The enduring centrality of autonomy and 
objectivity is illustrated by their centrality to Carpentier’s (2005) account of key 
‘hegemonic nodal points’ of the (dominant) identity of the modern media 
professional. 
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2.3.2 Normative media philosophies 
 
Notwithstanding the vagaries and distinctiveness of the nationally-specific forms 
it has taken, as is suggested by the above account, the ‘professional project’ 
(Larson, 1977) of public service broadcast journalism cannot be separated from 
its close relationship with broader normative conceptualisations of the role of the 
press in society.  
 
The shift toward trustee journalism entailed adopting an ethic of ‘social 
responsibility’ (see Nerone, 1995 for a discussion) which was famously 
schematized as one of four distinct models in Siebert et al.’s seminal (1963) Four 
Theories of the Press. McQuail (1983: 90) notes that the normative focus of the 
social responsibility approach to the media’s role in society lies in its emphasis 
on enhancing the relationship between media institutions and democracy by 
reconciling the independence of media institutions with societal obligations. The 
democratic function of the press was now conceived of in terms of information 
provision to a mass public and the pluralist imperative to facilitate the airing of a 
diverse range of views, supported by a self-regulating, increasingly 
professionalizing (Petre, 2012: 48-53) journalistic class.  
 
Of the numerous efforts to update the Four Theories of the Press schema of 
linkages between media and societies referred to by Christians et al. (2009: 6-
14), including that of McQuail (2005), the authors’ own three-level analysis 
specifying connections between (Western-centric) normative philosophical 
traditions of public communication, conceptions of democracy and media roles 
offers a useful heuristic framework which may be briefly applied here in order to 
link the above discussion of public broadcasting’s field relations and dominant 
professional ethic with recognisable normative media traditions. 
 
Each of the four normative media philosophies they refer to contributes 
recognisable traits to public broadcasting’s normative thrust. The close 
consonance of social responsibility theory with public broadcasting has been 
noted above, with the public service ethos adopting an emphasis on 
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professionalism associated with minimalist modes of accountability based 
principally on self-regulation, its role in defending democracy as a ‘fourth estate’ 
(ibid: 55) and supporting democracy through the responsible provision of 
information to voter-citizens. We may identify the key contributions from the 
corporatist tradition a worldview that is co-operative in matters of ‘national 
interest’ and projecting an affinity with authority and dominant social 
institutions (ibid: 22). From the libertarian tradition, we may identify 
commitments to discursive openness and support for free speech in a 
‘marketplace of ideas’. The citizen participation tradition contributes to PSB the 
rhetorical elevation of the public as the sine qua non of journalistic enterprise 
even if in its professional orientation its practical embodiment is usually 
circumscribed. 
 
Implicit in normative philosophies of the media in society are higher-level 
conceptualisations in relation to the ‘moral foundations of democracy and 
democratic institutions’ (Christiano, 2015), which provide an account of ‘when 
and why democracy is morally desirable’ as well as taking positions on what may 
reasonably be expected of citizens in democratic societies, how equality in 
representation should be secured, and the basis of democratic authority and 
political legitimacy (ibid). These directly contribute to media roles and functions 
that represent the practical embodiment of the public service orientation to 
democracy (Christians et al., 2009: 30-32, Schudson, 2008: 12). 
 
Following Christians (2009) and Habermas (1994: 1) the axes of liberal and 
republican normative democratic theories represent, as two ‘received views of 
democratic politics’ a productive heuristic with which the general normative 
democratic thrust of PSB may be broadly and initially identified.  
 
Although the precise normative complex of individual institutions may not be 
established on an a priori basis, the general legitimating institutional ideologies 
of public service broadcasting and its characteristic mode of journalistic 
professionalism may nonetheless be explored in terms of its liberal and 
republican moments, crystallised in the orientations to politics, political 
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communication and the state represented by both classical and social varieties of 
liberalism on one hand and (national) communitarian republicanism on the other.  
 
2.3.2.1 Liberalism and PSB 
 
The extent of the PSB affinity with liberal conceptions of democratic politics can 
be summarised with respect to how the mélange of social responsibility, 
corporatist, libertarian and public participation (Christians et al., 2009) visions of 
the media-society linkage characteristic to the public service enterprise are 
underpinned by their common adoption of a liberal pluralist model of society. 
This perspective views society as a ‘complex of competing groups and interests’ 
(Curran, 2002: 108) whose ‘central credo’, is ‘the belief that the media in free 
societies serve the public as a consequence of being independent from 
government, accountable to the public through the market and influenced by the 
professional concerns of media staff’ (ibid: 132). For Freedman (2014: 3) social 
responsibility theory is grouped under the broader liberal-functionalist 
‘consensus’ paradigm of media power which views power in advanced liberal 
democracies as ‘widely distributed, pluralistically organized, and contributes to 
a relatively stable social arrangement’.  
 
More specifically, PSB’s ‘classical’ liberal moment (roughly corresponding to 
Christians et al.’s (2009: 97) ‘administrative’ mode of liberal democracy) lies 
above all in its conceptualisation of its support role for democratic politics.  For 
Ferree et al. (2002a: 291), classical liberalism represents a tradition, linked to 
Mill, Burke and Schumpeter, deeply sceptical about the desirability of political 
participation by ordinary citizens, adopting a ‘realist’ position that considers it 
‘both natural and desirable for citizens to be passive, quiescent, and limited in 
their political participation in a well-functioning, party-led democracy’. 
 
Popular sovereignty is only weakly realised via the exclusive means of elections 
to representative bodies, in which citizens assert their private interests at the 
ballot box. Liberal paradigms view will-formation in the public sphere and in 
parliament in terms of ‘the competition of strategically acting collectivities trying 
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to maintain or acquire positions of power’ (Habermas, 1994: 3), with success or 
failure quantified by validation at the polls, a formulation with echoes of rational 
choice theory. 
 
This liberal pessimism about citizen capacities and the desirable limits of popular 
sovereignty finds institutional expression in both the PSB emphasis on 
information-provision- implicitly based on an “information deficit” model of 
communication- to voter-citizens, rather than on popular participation, as well as 
a tendency toward valourisation of the formal sphere of parliamentary politics as 
the locus of political life (Curran, 2002: 211). The role of the public sphere is seen 
as ‘strengthening a system of formal representation through political parties that 
secures the real basis of democracy’ (Ferree et al., 2002a: 290).  
 
The influence of the social responsibility tradition can be associated above all 
with the monitorial (Christians et al., 2009) role played by the press, 
corresponding to the provision of information deemed useful to a democratic 
public, a role corresponding to Schudson’s information, investigation and analysis 
functions.  
 
The influence of liberal normative democratic theory, along with the libertarian 
and citizen participation philosophies facilitates adoption of a facilitative 
(Christians et al., 2009) role, whereby competing voices are granted a platform 
from which to engage in issue thematisation and agenda-building, corresponding 
to Schudson’s (2008) public forum function. Shaped by the corporatist tradition, 
the facilitative role also involves media granting space to ‘legitimate claimants to 
public attention’ (Christians et al., 2009: 31) that are consonant with the 
prevailing societal value complexes and the public service ethos in particular.  
 
The cognate tradition of ‘social’ or Rawlsian liberalism imparts something of a 
moderating influence on the elitism of classical liberalism on the normative 
democratic orientation of public service broadcasting, imbuing it with a proactive 
social role that chafes against classical liberalism’s emphasis on negative 
freedom. Rawls’ emphasis on the necessity of attaining ‘a significant measure of 
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publicly achieved equality’ (O’Mahony, 2013: 50) via, for example, endorsing 
policies that mitigate inequality and promote equality of opportunity (ibid: 51) 
and an orientation to the realisation of the ‘common good’ (ibid: 54) is reflected 
in both journalistic paraideology and the centripetal thrust of PSB’s advocacy of 
social cohesion supported by state policies. 
 
2.3.2.2 Republicanism and PSB 
 
Public service broadcasting’s affinity with liberalism does not exhaust its 
normative reach, which extends to at least some degree in directions associated 
with varieties of republicanism. This may be principally related to the 
insufficiency, for the national PSB model, of a conception of democracy and 
democratic communication as merely the aggregation of interests. The liberal 
emphasis on instrumental, competitive modes of communication is replaced here 
with democratic will-formation that takes the form of ‘ethical-political discourse’ 
(Habermas, 1994:6) amongst citizens, aimed at mutual understanding. 
 
While under liberalism, the victor of electoral contests wins the right to exercise 
‘legitimate domination’ on an open mandate, republicanism’s integrative desire 
for state and society to remain bound in at least some sense to communicatively-
legitimated public power is further evidenced in the conception of political 
legitimation which draws on a stronger version of popular sovereignty to view 
the victor of electoral processes as remaining bound to the desires of the broader 
community (Habermas, 1994: 9). 
 
We may view the PSB affinity with republicanism, however, as corresponding not 
to a radical republican view of politics as ‘directed against the state apparatus’ 
(Habermas, 1994: 6-7) informed by the insistence on decentralised self-
governance and ‘direct democracy’ (Christians et al., 2009: 97) but rather more 
in line with the alternative classification of ‘civic’ republicanism, which ‘honors 
the importance of a robust public life and cultivates the commitments to 
citizenship needed to sustain it’ (ibid: 102). Counterposing it against a ‘liberal-
individualist’ model of the public sphere, Fraser (1990: 71-2) notes that civic 
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republicanism stresses collective reasoning to discern a common good. This is 
reflected in the institutional desire of PSB to be a venue of public debate, where 
society comes to know itself, entailing both a valuation of deliberation and models 
of communicative inclusion that go some way, at least some of the time, beyond 
the elitism and communicative restrictions of classical liberalism. 
 
Insofar as deliberation in the republican tradition is presumed to be preceded by 
the existence of a ‘culturally established background consensus’ (Habermas, 
1994: 6) on society’s basic values, Habermas’ suggestion that contemporary 
republicanism’s tendency to take on a communitarian hue can be seen as 
particularly relevant to public service broadcasting. Rejecting liberal conceptions 
of the ethical neutrality of the state (O’Mahony, 2013: 146), communitarianism is 
premised on essentialist conceptions of the common good shared by a ‘concrete, 
substantively integrated ethical community’ (Habermas, 1994: 4) which is based 
on ‘ascriptive, communal identities such as ethnicities or nations’ (O’Mahony, 
2013: 88). For Rosenfeld (1998: 217), ‘communitarianism can invoke the image 
of a tightly woven organic whole encompassing a single community with a 
unanimously shared conception of the good’. 
 
Although frequently associated with more radically democratic modes of 
communication, in particular local community media (Brevini, 2015: 991), public 
broadcasting may nonetheless be associated with a nationally-focused variation 
of communitarianism given its historical role in nation-building and whose 
distinctively national modes of address aim toward the integration of the national 
community. 
 
This can mean the activation of Schudson’s (1998) mobilization function, in which 
media become advocates and encourage public mobilization in support of 
political projects and perspectives. However, the strength of the objectivity norm, 
allied with the prominence of the social responsibility and corporatist normative 
philosophies in public broadcasting implies that the radical and mobilization 
roles are likely to be de-emphasised or selectively channelled. 
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Given the earlier discussion on the susceptibility of PSB instrumentalisation by 
the state in regard to national aims of various kinds, we may see a likely outcome 
of this in a collaborative role with the ‘between the media and sources of political 
and economic power, primarily the state and its agencies’ (Christians et al., 2009: 
31). Additionally, communitarian and social liberal concerns with societal 
cohesion allow for the activation of Schudson’s (2008: 12) function of social 
empathy, particularly with regard to questions of social and economic 
disadvantage. 
 
2.4 PSB, hegemony and crisis 
 
Based on how public service broadcasting’s field relations, professional ethos and 
normative models of the press in democracy corresponds to a settlement that 
balances the state desire for a model of media conducive to its material and 
ideological projects, the professional desire to autonomously mediate the public 
sphere and the need to maintain public support for the PSB form, we may identify 
the basis of both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tendencies built into the 
DNA of the public service broadcasting enterprise. 
 
2.4.1 PSB’s hegemonic thrust 
 
PSB’s institutional material and ideological relationships to power- from its 
ideological valourisation of the nation state and of liberal democracy which 
demonstrably shapes its notion of ‘service’ in conservative and elitist directions, 
to its material dependence on the state and subjection to the dictates of the 
market- suggest the status of public broadcasting as a model vehicle for the 
maintenance of communicative hegemony around capitalist liberal democracy- 
in Althusser’s (1972) terms, an ideological state apparatus whose powers of 
‘interpellation’ assist in the construction of subjects amenable to its 
requirements.  
 
Stuart Hall (1977: 346) argued that public service media, in common with other 
media, performed ‘the critical ideological work of “classifying the world” within 
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the discourses of the dominant ideologies’, explained by Garnham (1978: 16) in 
terms of the material and ideological proximity of PSB institutions to power- 
‘government, big business and the cultural establishment’ who ‘socialise’ 
broadcasters to ‘almost unconsciously’ reproduce their value complexes.  
 
The attitudes to politics that flow from journalism’s professional canon and how 
it conceptualises its place in democracy have also been identified by critics, 
particularly those operating from a political economy perspective, as propelling 
a strong hegemonic function. Here, the principal charge has been that 
professional journalism conceals beneath a cloak of value neutrality a subtle but 
powerful partiality that serves to buttress incumbent social, political and 
economic sources of power via the reproduction of their ideological hegemony 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004: 36). For Kaplan (2009:35), the new professional ethic 
associated with social responsibility theory represented a rationalisation rather 
than a repudiation of journalism’s relationship to political and State power. He 
argues that ‘[f]ar from eliminating the influence of particular class interests in 
politics and publicity, journalism’s technocratic ideals took for granted the 
established hierarchy of power’ (ibid). 
 
Schlesinger (1979: 164) argues that the deployment of neutrality and 
impartiality ‘can only have a meaning in the context of an existing set of values, 
and in the case of the BBC the relevant complex of values is that of ‘the consensus’, 
meaning that ‘the social cartography which the news may offer is structurally 
limited by the organization’s place in Britain’s social order’ (ibid: 165)- resulting 
in news media being ‘indexed’ (Bennett, 1990) to the parameters of elite opinion. 
Put simply by Miliband (1969: 223-4, quoted in Schlesinger, 1979: 165), 
impartiality and objectivity ‘stop at the point where political consensus itself 
ends’. Schlesinger concludes that ‘[F]or being impartial in terms broadly pre-
defined by the state, it is rewarded with the gift of independence’ (ibid: 178). 
 
The consensualist orientation of PSB journalistic ideology leads it into a 
veneration of the parliamentary state, which Schlesinger (again with respect to 
the BBC) defines as its overarching ‘constitutional role’ (ibid: 167) and toward 
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which the normative orientation of PSB journalism entails the ‘extra-
professional’ dimensions (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986: 73) of deference even to 
the point of the accordance of ‘sacredness’ (ibid) in line with its ‘symbolic value 
in the political system’ and that journalism ‘should not undermine its integrity’ 
(ibid: 74). 
 
PSB’s imbrication in national political and cultural projects renders the BBC, for 
McLoone (1991: 10) a ‘hegemonic project’ and a ‘cultural manifestation of the 
liberal or social democratic thrust of the British state itself’ (ibid: 11), 
representing ‘a key site for mediating and promoting its underlying ideology’ 
(ibid). The role of PSB as a ‘centripetal, societally integrative force’ (Blumler, 
1992: 11) suggests that a national communitarian thrust contributes to the 
maintenance of the prevailing political order. This is understood on the Hallian 
basis that national cultures are ‘riven with internal differences and divisions, but 
are unified through cultural hegemony’ (Kapoor, 2008: 90) through the ‘all-
inclusive embrace’ of broadcasting’s mode of address as ‘the big We’ (McLoone, 
1991: 10) which operates as a ‘form of masking, forging links by denying (or at 
least playing down) difference’, encouraging a ‘sense of collective identity across 
the potentially divisive factors of class, gender, regional or ethnic background’ 
(ibid).  
 
2.4.2 PSB’s counter-hegemonic thrust 
 
Kellner’s (1990: 16) reminder that ‘Hegemony is thus a shifting, complex, and 
open phenomenon, always subject to contestation and upheaval’ suggests that 
gaps and opportunities for contention always exist- gaps that are sustained by 
liberal normative models of journalism which ensure that at least some counter-
hegemonic potential is always retained. This is a view captured by McLoone 
(1991: 11) who identifies ‘in its commitment to impartiality and its obligation to 
represent all sections of society’ the provision of a ‘space for the kinds of dissident 
or minority opinion which in its hegemonic role, it sought to disavow.’ This is 
propelled at least to some extent by what McNair, Hibberd and Schlesinger (2003: 
109) describe as a cultural shift from ‘obsequious deference to rigorous 
 60 
 
adversarialism’ in broadcasting. Similarly, Sheehan (1987: 70) describes 
broadcasting as inevitably embracing ‘numerous contradictory impulses, even 
subversive ones’, which, despite the ‘enormous capacity’ of the dominant 
ideology to ‘absorb, tame and trivialise’ challenges, cannot prevent challenges 
from arising. 
 
The retention, to varying degrees, of the social responsibility ethic and ‘fourth 
estate’ function that seeks to hold power to account- through, for example, the 
exposure of ‘graft and dishonesty in political machines’ (Christians et al., 2009: 
56) which is linked to a moral foundation in ‘promoting social justice’ (ibid) also 
represents an institutionalised counter-hegemonic force. It is supported by the 
need to attend to the maintenance of institutional public legitimacy without 
which they would be rendered both irrelevant to audiences and ‘ineffective 
ideological institutions’ (Hallin, 2005: 29). 
 
Hall’s (1988: 86) reminder that the claim of journalistic independence from 
‘political or economic interests, or of the state, is not wholly fictitious’ reminds us 
of the real measures of autonomy enjoyed by media producers. The freedom 
media workers- themselves not a socio-economically or politically homogenous 
group- enjoy, organisationally and through the flexibility of journalistic norms, 
allows for the ongoing possibility of giving voice to critical perspectives. The 
counter-hegemonic potential of PSB as a bulwark against a solely commercial 
media has also been stressed by some formerly radical critics of the form. In this 
vein, Moe and Syvertson (2009: 403-6) cite Garnham (1986) and Scannell (1989) 
who emphasise the significance of (and the need to protect) the unique 
democratic functions played by public broadcasting. 
 
As such, we may follow both Schudson (1991: 146) who notes that ‘both public 
and private media in liberal societies carry out a wider variety of roles, 
cheerleading the established order, alarming the citizenry about flaws in that 
order, providing a civic forum for political debate, acting as a battleground among 
contesting elites’, as well as Blumler and Gurevitch (1986: 90) who argue that 
‘Both potentially and in practice mass media…have both legitimizing and 
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disruptive implications for the social order’, involved both in processes of ‘social 
control and social change’.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter’s exploration of the general terrain of the field of public service 
broadcasting and its cultural orientations has suggested ways in which its inter-
penetrating field relationships shape the theory and practice of PSB as a model of 
organising the public sphere with distinctive orientations to the public sphere 
and democracy.  
 
Principally, it has been suggested that insofar as PSB’s normative thrust aligns it 
to a far greater extent within the orbits of state and market power more than 
public power, it may represent a poor candidate as a media-institutional model 
with the normative resources to adopt a critical posture to the crisis of 
democratic capitalism. 
 
Yet, the extent to which PSB may contribute toward the problematisation of 
hegemonic power depends meaningfully on contingent configurations of field 
relationships and aspects of the prevailing normative political culture which 
reciprocally influence the domestic political and discursive opportunity 
structures and enlarge or constrict the ‘space of the possibles’ within which 
public broadcasting may navigate. 
 
The following chapter directly explores this question by exploring the co-
evolution of the Irish political and media systems in the 20th and 21st centuries 
with a view to an assessment of the counter-hegemonic capacity of Irish public 
service broadcasting. 
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Chapter 3: Public Service Broadcasting in the 
Irish Public Sphere 
 
Internal policies of the station are but reflections of larger policies of the nation.  
      (Doolan, Dowling and Quinn, 1969: 175) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The new institutionalist insight of the necessity of viewing organisation-specific 
logics as localised configurations of society-wide institutional logics of ‘material 
practices and symbolic constructions’ (Spicer and Sewell, 2010: 913-4) that 
constitute the overall organising principles of the broader institutional order 
calls to attention the heuristic value of recognising institutions in their broader 
systemic context.  Institutions are thus viewed as ‘crystallizations of social 
practices of prior moments in history…rooted in power relationships’ (Castells, 
2009: 299), with relationships between media institutions and their economic, 
social and political contexts seen as ‘bi-directional, symbiotic’ (Horgan, O’Connor 
and Sheehan (2007: 2-3) and whose origins are recognised as lying in the 
outcomes of conflicts ‘rooted in major social transformations’ (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004: 62). 
 
These reciprocal relationships are particularly relevant to public service 
broadcasting, given McLoone’s (1991: 10) assertion of the central place of 
broadcasting in the ‘mediation, promotion and maintenance of collective identity’ 
in nation states in the 20th century. This is ably exemplified by Irish public 
broadcasting’s explicit role from its inception in nation building (Gorham, 1967: 
5) by ‘preserving and developing the national culture’ (Broadcasting Authority 
Act 1960) and to ‘reflect the democratic, social and cultural values of Irish society’ 
(Public Service Broadcasting Charter, 2004). F. Corcoran’s (2004: 1) view that 
PSB in Ireland in the form of RTÉ has ‘played a major role in dominating the 
symbolic environment in which Irish people construct their sense of identity and 
weave the “common sense” that underpins the everyday life of the community’ 
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underlines the significance of its symbolic role. 
 
This chapter responds to this imperative for a sociological view by charting in an 
introductory fashion the diachronic co-evolution of Irish media, society and 
economy over the course of the 20th century. 
 
This is undertaken firstly through brief explorations of the co-evolution of 
political and media systems, the political and cultural implications of the 
dominant Irish identity project and their influences on Ireland’s developmental 
trajectory and public sphere capacities.  
 
Secondly, a political-economic focus is put on public service broadcasting’s 
development in Ireland from its origins in state radio through its subsequent 
institutional transformations, with a focus on delineating the interpenetrating 
influences of state, market and culture on the normative orientations of the public 
service ethic in the Irish public sphere and the evolution of its political role.  
 
This enables an initial assessment of the broader ‘cultural model’ (O’Mahony, 
2011: 1) in which PSB is enmeshed, whose explanatory power for this project’s 
research interests lie in how communicative practices provide ‘the means to 
describe common worlds, as well as to evaluate and prescribe collective practices 
and states of affairs’ (ibid) and indicating the extent to which Irish public 
broadcasting, as a crystallisation of Irish public culture, represents fertile terrain 
for critical responses to the post-2008 crises. 
 
3.2 Irish democratic culture, nationalism and the public sphere 
 
3.2.1 Political parallelism: Irish media systems and political culture 
 
In their comparative review of national media systems which centres around the 
co-evolution of ‘media system’ and ‘political system’ variables (Hallin and 
Mancini, 2004: 21), Hallin and Mancini (ibid: 198) locate Ireland (along with the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Canada) squarely within the 'North 
 64 
 
Atlantic' or 'Liberal' model, as opposed to the other two main ideal-types posited, 
the 'Democratic Corporatist' model of North and Central Europe and the 
'Mediterranean' or 'Polarized pluralist' model.  
 
The authors (following Lijphart, 1999) suggest that ‘majoritarian’ (rather than 
‘consensus’) parliamentary systems characterised by the concentration of power 
in governing parties and cabinets typically involve the proliferation of catch-all 
parties that compete not to win power for small segments of society but ‘for the 
right to represent the nation as a whole’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 51). Such a 
system promotes the development of similarly ‘catch-all’ media, associated with 
high levels of professionalisation built around the norm of objectivity, separation 
from organised social interests, and embracing the idea that the media, like other 
political institutions, ‘represents a unitary general interest of society’ (ibid: 243).  
 
Each of these aspects is thoroughly institutionalised within the Irish political and 
media landscape, including a parliamentary system characterised by a winner-
takes-all majoritarianism (leavened in practice by a tendency toward coalition 
government) and a cohering of journalistic identity around objectivity, 
impartiality and (formal) detachment from interest groups (O’Brien, 2011: 20, 
see also Foley, 2011), as well as attachment to the ‘fourth estate’ ideal of the role 
of the media in society (Chubb, 1984). 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 53) point to the significance of the extent and modes 
of institutionalisation of social and political pluralism for the development of 
media systems. The tendency in Liberal-category nations like Ireland to adopt an 
‘individualized’ rather than ‘organised’ pluralism in which political 
representation is based around the relationship between individual citizens, 
political institutions with the informal mediation of “special interests” rather 
than the direct institutionalisation of organised social groups into the political 
process is associated with the professional model of broadcast governance. 
Unlike in Democratic Corporatist and Polarized Pluralist nations, organised social 
interests are excluded from participating in public broadcasting governance 
(ibid: 241). 
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The extent of political diversity is also highly consequential for the character of 
media systems. Ireland’s ‘moderate’ pluralism, like other Liberal nations, is 
marked by high levels of political consensus about the basic structure of society, 
whereas ‘Polarized’ pluralism is characterised by a wide political spectrum and 
‘sharply opposed ideologies’ (ibid: 60). Indeed, the authors suggest that Ireland’s 
‘strong liberal tradition combines with the central role of nationalism to produce 
a consensual political culture’ and that divisions between the main parties are 
‘more symbolic than substantive’ (ibid: 240). Lane and Ersson’s (1991: 184-5) 
placement of Ireland at the bottom of their index of political polarisation is cited 
in support of this (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 60). For media, the existence of a 
hegemonic political culture provides journalism with “a large ground of shared 
values and assumptions whose inclusion in the news is not seen as politically 
partial’ (ibid: 239). 
Ireland’s socio-political history reflects a shift in media roles in this regard. While 
‘politicized newspapers had an extremely important role to play in the political 
mobilizations that formed the Irish democratic system’ (ibid: 209) (see Legg, 
1999, Morash, 2010), for Foley (2011: 32), professionalisation and political 
change propelled Irish journalism’s transition ‘from being a politically engaged 
group of workers to a professional group working for a post-colonial, less 
politically aligned press, one more concerned with nation building’.  
Today, the era of party press parallelism (Seymour-Ure, 1974) has passed, and 
today ‘[m]ost Irish newspapers are politically conservative and have a middle-
class orientation’ (Truetzschler, 2004: 116). The shift away from serving defined 
political constituencies (Horgan, McNamara and O’Sullivan, 2007: 33) is also 
associated with the commercial pressures associated with the small population, 
enhancing the necessity of having a ‘wide appeal in order to survive’ (Chubb, 
1984: 79) and related to the adoption of the ‘new journalism’ (Steele and De Nie, 
2014, see also Wehrly, 2010) which eschewed contentious political partisanship 
(O’Brien, 2011: 19-20). 
The extent to which political cultures are saturated by rational-legal or 
clientelistic forms of authority is also identified by Hallin and Mancini (2004: 55) 
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as consequential for both the institutional form and professional ethos of media 
institutions. The former, linked with Liberal nations, is a Weberian concept 
characterised by the adherence to ‘formal and universalistic rules of procedure’ 
whose characteristic institutional form is that of the bureaucracy- an 
“administrative apparatus that is autonomous of particular parties, individuals, 
and social groups […] and is conceived as serving society as a whole” (ibid). For 
media systems, the existence of a strong culture of rational-legal authority is 
associated with a more bureaucratised and therefore more autonomous public 
broadcasting institutions (ibid: 56) and also a form of journalistic 
professionalism with deep affinities with administrative professionalism, 
exemplified by their shared emphasis on ‘rational and fact-centered discourses’ 
and the ‘notion of an autonomous institution serving the common good’ (ibid: 
57). 
 
Clientelism (associated with Polarized Pluralist nations) conversely, corresponds 
to ‘a pattern of social organization in which access to social resources is 
controlled by patrons and delivered to clients in exchange for deference and 
various forms of support’ (ibid: 58). The failure of political systems characterised 
by clientelism to ‘emphasise the separation between the public good and 
particular interests’ can have a variety of impacts, including high levels of political 
and business instrumentalisation of the media, a low emphasis on transparency 
in political communication, and 'private rather than public communication 
patterns' (ibid). 
 
The extant array of liberal institutions in Ireland based on rational-legal authority 
bequeathed by its pre-independence status as British colony (ibid: 73) ‘underpins 
the professional model of broadcast governance and regulation’ (ibid: 246) in 
Ireland with public broadcasting professionals, like higher civil servants, ‘a self-
regulating corp of professionals’ (ibid) promulgating the upholding of common 
public and national interests. Yet, this exists in parallel with a cultural context 
long characterised by political clientelism (Lee, 1984) and an ingrained culture of 
secrecy and non-communication (Murphy, 1984: 58). 
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That a culture of secrecy around access to public information, backed by the 
presence of strong legislation around official secrets, criminal and seditious libel 
and the delayed and limited onset of a freedom of information regime has 
contributed to a retarding of the ability of journalists to critique the state leads 
Chubb (1984: 79) to describe limitations on Irish media not just ‘on what papers 
can print but on what they can find out’ (see also Horgan, McNamara and 
O’Sullivan, 2007: 46). 
 
The ignominious pre-independence history of censorship against media deemed 
at odds with political- and moral- authority is chronicled in Rafter (2011) and 
Nowlan (1984) and included various forms of soft and hard repression against 
radical publications ranging from the imposition of ‘knowledge taxes’ (O’Brien, 
2011: 17) to outright suppression of critical outlets and direct subsidisation of 
compliant media. Its twentieth century manifestations took political/military and 
social/moral forms, with the civil war, its aftermath and World Wars I and II 
seeing the expansion of censorship (Horgan, 2001: 2) whose casualties were 
dissenting political voices (Murphy, 1984: 52) accused of threatening the political 
stability or moral purity of the new political order.  
 
3.2.2 Independence and national identity 
 
Axel Honneth (2014: 263) notes that the political public sphere- a ‘discursive 
sphere of democratic will-formation among a people that regards itself as 
sovereign’ (ibid: 263) is closely associated with the emergence of modern nation 
states. These facilitated the creation of spaces of communication in which matters 
of common interested could be ‘identified and publicly negotiated’, and whose 
‘cultural precondition’ of national identity (ibid: 263) provided the necessary 
cohesion for the formation of a political community (ibid: 313). Whether the 
character of national identity contributed to or mitigated against the public 
sphere’s capacity to act as a means of democratisation depends for Honneth on 
‘whether the relationship among the citizens was understood as an expression of 
some pre-political, ethnic or biological unity, or instead as the embodiment of the 
new universal principles of freedom and equality’ (ibid: 265-6, see also 
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Habermas, 1994). 
 
O’Mahony and Delanty (2002) locate in the developmental trajectory of Irish 
nationalism- from its mobilisations in the latter decades of the 19th century to its 
later institutionalisation in the nascent independent Irish state- the emergence 
from the contending wings of the movement a hegemonic identitarian project 
whose character had a range of enduring legacies on Irish public culture that 
correspond to Honneth’s first, pessimistic category.  
 
From the clerical wing of the movement represented by the Catholic Church, a 
code of anti-modernism sought to imbue Irish identity with an ‘uncritical, 
exclusive and anti-intellectual disposition’ wherein the ‘new state-nation should 
be preserved from reflexive scrutiny and critique’ (ibid: 69) and led by an 
‘enlightened middle-class leadership’ (ibid: 65).  
From the liberal democratic wing of Irish nationalism, represented by the Irish 
Parliamentary Party, an emphasis on rational parliamentary democracy was 
contributed that similarly valourised propertied respectability and a version of 
citizenship focusing on duties rather than rights. 
The revolutionary wing of the nationalist movement, which incorporated cultural 
nationalism as well as republican separatists, exerted a powerful influence 
through its aestheticised politics within which Irish identity was founded upon a 
pre-critical identification with the nation which the authors identify as a key 
‘architect of an anti-critical spirit towards interest conflicts within the nation’ 
(ibid: 84).  
The radical wing of the movement, mainly comprising agrarian and urban 
workers, is viewed by the authors as having been a relatively weak influence on 
the eventual shape of hegemonic Irish nationalism. Class tensions in the 
countryside and the city were, by virtue of structural and cultural factors (related 
to urban numerical weakness, rural isolation and the gravitational pull of 
nationalist identity), absorbed into a developing nationalist consensus (ibid: 91). 
This reflected a broader tendency for labour movements to become subsumed by 
nationalist movements (Honneth, 2014: 263). 
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The ‘relational field’ (ibid: 125) of Irish nationalism, leading into and after the 
Civil War, eventually coalesced into a broad master identity that was based 
around a ‘conservative Catholic communitarianism’ (ibid: 126), whose success in 
enlisting disparate groups in a highly class-stratified society into a strong 
identification with the nation afforded the new nationalist consensus an ability 
render social conflict latent and mask a deep social and political conservatism for 
the century to come (ibid: 15). 
The expansion of clerical power (Coakley, 2012: 160) in the new state over, for 
example, welfare provision and the education system, helped amplify its capacity 
to wield a moral hegemony which powerfully shaped political culture and the 
public sphere via the embedding of an authoritarian strain of clerical 
conservatism.  Its anti-modern project was policed via a combination of coercion 
and persuasion, where straightforward censorship was complemented by the 
technologies of sin, punishment, forgiveness and redemption (see Inglis, 1998).  
 
The post-civil war establishment of a Committee on Evil Literature, under the 
pretext of protecting the public from obscenity, ‘stultified the cultural 
community’ (Murphy, 1984, p.53) by providing opportunities for the banning of 
‘both message and messenger’ (Horgan, 2001: 14), with critical books and 
newspapers (often those suspected of having a ‘socialist or communist tone’ 
(Murphy, 1984: 54) targeted for their assumed lack of support for the ‘cause of 
Catholic nationalism’ (ibid). 
 
Its purpose, according to O’Mahony and Delanty (2002), was directed at 
maintaining the material and symbolic interests of Ireland’s middle class. The 
Catholic Church’s success in attenuating the deliberative possibilities of an 
autonomous public sphere is exemplified by the depoliticisation of whole areas 
of life under Catholic teaching meaning that ‘Christian verities’ (ibid: 163) of, for 
example, charity and compassion obscured more radical prescriptions for 
inequality and oppression. This depoliticisation was complemented by important 
aspects of the political culture fostered by the more populist nationalism of 
Fianna Fáil, whose cultivation of ‘web(s) of local patronage’ (ibid: 154) served to 
narrow the sphere of the political, leading O’Mahony and Delanty conclude that 
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clientelism has helped effect a ‘radical privatisation of life’ (ibid: 154), reducing 
the propensity of citizens to organise politically and involve themselves in the 
public sphere. 
 
Irish nationalism by the end of World War II had embedded itself as a mélange of 
“primordial Catholicism, rejection of foreign influence, conservative social 
arrangements, patriarchal familialism, restricted justice within the nation, 
economic protectionism, a minimal state and obedient individuation” (ibid: 156) 
and the suffocatingly authoritarian streak of the Church-State alliance had 
weakened Ireland’s pre-independence public sphere which had lost “whatever 
capacity it might have had to clarify possible alternatives” (ibid: 146). 
 
3.2.3 Modernisation and the neoliberal state 
 
The abandonment of the autarky experiment after WWII and the turn towards an 
active, interventionist state that eventually embraced a globalising economy and 
accession to the European Union meant the end of anti-modernism. Propelled by 
the gradual decoupling of various spheres of life from religious authority, a slow 
secularisation was set in train. The loosening grip of the church’s moral authority, 
combined with an internationalising culture, heralded new possibilities for the 
public sphere partly driven by the ‘emergence of a secular intelligentsia and 
media power from the 1960s’ (ibid: 171). 
 
Unable to prevent modernisation outright, the ancien régime was still able, 
however, to both retard and channel its flow in conservative ways up to the 
present day, not least through economic developmental agendas. 
 
In his critical economic history of the Irish state, McCabe (2013) locates the 
genesis of the conditions which would later shape the Irish instantiation of the 
2008 global financial crisis in the ways in which the economy of post-
independence Ireland was steered by successive Governments. He suggests that 
an orthodoxy in Irish historical writing positing a decisive break between the 
insular, anti-modern early decades of the Free State and the post-1960 
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expansionary period masks important continuities in the state’s steering of the 
economy toward the maintenance of particularistic class interests.  
 
Coakley (2012: 202) argues that while ‘earlier developmental strategies were 
premised on asserting greater national independence’, from the 60s onwards, 
‘further development was now to be achieved through subordinating Irish 
sovereignty to the requirements of North American and European capital’. This 
would be accomplished through strategically positioning Ireland within ‘circuits 
of North Atlantic capital’ (ibid: 203) in part by practising ‘broker’ (ibid) or 
‘comprador’ (McCabe, 2013) capitalism, focused on courting foreign-owned 
multinationals to pursue export-led manufacturing, and later property 
speculation and financial activities. The condition of political without economic 
independence was thus maintained, albeit latterly with global rather than 
regional dependencies (Silke, 2014: 91, O’Hearn, 2001).  
 
The path of FDI-led industrialisation which maintained the power of entrenched 
domestic interests (McCabe, 2013: 100) may be seen as emblematic of Ireland’s 
negotiated modernisation in which expansionary economic activity from the late 
1950s and consequent economic growth was engineered to take place without 
the profound social upheaval that might have been expected to accompany it 
(O’Mahony and Delanty, 2002: 168). Having sat out the period of the post-WWII 
welfarist consensus, Ireland was thus well-positioned to embrace the economic 
orthodoxy of the New Right, neoliberalism (if not its politically ‘militant’ period, 
associated with Thatcher and Reagan, certainly its subsequent ‘managerial’ 
period in which it was ‘now simply a matter of ‘good governance’ and sensible 
adaptation to ‘globalization’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 190-1). 
 
Ireland’s status as an exemplar of neoliberal policymaking- albeit rarely one 
‘neoliberal in spirit’ (Konings, 2012: 64) whose local vernacular subsumed its 
substance beneath the ‘non-ideological’ cloak of common-sense, pragmatic, even 
progressive modernisation (Kitchin et al., 2012: 1306 cited in Dukelow, 2014) 
has been noted by scholars writing in relation to public policy areas as diverse as 
planning (Kitchin et al., 2010), housing (O’Connell, 2007, McCabe, 2013, Norris & 
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Coates, 2010), health (Flynn, 2014, Tussing & Wren, 2006, Burke, 2009), welfare 
(Considine and Dukelow, 2009), economics (Kirby, 2001), and banking (Taylor, 
2011).  
 
Echoing O’Mahony and Delanty’s (2002: 172) view of the ongoing endurance of 
"classical values of Irish political culture, emphasising authoritarianism, 
personalism, secrecy and a limited examination of issues’ Coakley (2012: 161) 
argues that the conservative political culture has endured through Ireland’s 
modernisation processes, encompassing urbanisation and secularisation, as well 
as membership of the European Union. He argues that the verities and mantras 
of neoliberalism have come to ‘dominate virtually all political, social and 
economic discourse in Ireland’ (ibid: 166), with Ireland’s intellectual and political 
elites more or less successfully defending their ‘strategic orientation of 
subordinating the country to the requirements of North Atlantic capital on the 
grounds of realism’ (ibid: 211). Indeed, in O’Mahony’s later formulation of 
‘techno-conservatism’ (2014: 252) as the dominant cultural model shaping 
contemporary European politics, we may identify a secularised re-articulation to 
the conservative Catholic communitarian cultural model in Ireland and the basis 
for the contemporary ideological co-ordination between Ireland and Europe in 
the arena of economic crisis management. 
 
3.2.4 Assessing the communicative capacities of the Irish public sphere 
 
In another volume, O’Mahony (2011a: 7-8) describes the communicative 
capacities of the contemporary Irish public sphere as attenuated by the 
restriction of public participation, an inability to hold office-holders accountable, 
a narrow thematic range shaped by particularistic media agenda-setting 
practices, a low capacity for ‘moral memory’, colonisation by administrative 
power and economic actors, and the exclusion of ‘pragmatic, moral-political and 
legal considerations’ repugnant to the dominant conservative order.  Citizenship 
has been ‘largely conceived in passive rather than active terms’ (O’Mahony, 
2011b: 93) and democracy has, as a result, ‘tended to be strictly representative, 
clientelistic and elitist’ (ibid). 
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While modernisation has heralded a slow, tortuous uncoupling of democratic 
political identity from national identity, Skillington (2011: 98) suggests that the 
‘moral grammar’ (Skillington, 2011: 98) of a contemporary ‘authoritarian secular 
Catholic moral order’ nonetheless intervenes in ‘preventing the connection of 
ideas in a way that exposes the development path of the society, or its present 
configurations, to critique’ (O’Mahony and Delanty, 2002: 179), including the 
fatalistic enlistment into submission to external economic forces (Skillington, 
2011). 
 
For O’Mahony (2011c: 203-205), deploying Miller’s (2002) framework of conflict 
and social learning, the Irish public sphere is characterised by the entrenchment 
of ‘consensus’ pathologies, reflected in ideological blockages to learning 
represented by the repressive hegemony of Catholic traditionalism, anti-
intellectualism and, latterly, economic rationalism as part of a hegemonic project 
that has enabled the successful projection of particularistic interests as the 
‘general interest’ (O’Mahony and Delanty, 2002: 185).  
 
While no longer capable of subjecting social cleavages and nascent critical 
discourses to outright ‘anaesthetisation’ (O’Mahony and Delanty, 2002: 185), the 
capacity of alternative value systems to assert themselves in the arenas of, for 
example, the family, work, gender, redistribution, the environment, and Ireland’s 
economic developmental trajectory remain impeded. 
 
Honneth’s (2014: 293) account of contemporary public spheres as dominated by 
a ‘background consensus secured by cultural hegemony’ whose carriers and 
sponsors were ‘able to control access to the public expression of opinion’ through 
‘cultural mechanisms of exclusion’ (ibid: 314) is echoed in Fraser’s (1990: 64) 
account of how, in the public sphere, ‘unequally empowered social groups tend 
to develop unequally valued cultural styles’, generating ‘powerful informal 
pressures that marginalize the contributions of members of subordinated 
groups’. Such pressures, in the Irish context, favour participants on the basis of 
nationality, ethnicity, gender, religion, geographical location, and economic 
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power. 
Honneth (2014: 298) further charges journalism in a context of the decline of 
labour movements as tending to fall into an ‘elitist solipsism’ (ibid: 298), 
indifferent to whole swathes of society outside its central middle-class 
constituency. 
Ireland’s weak labour movement, overwhelmingly conservative print and 
broadcast media and whose ownership lies in vanishingly fewer hands 
(Truetzschler, 2004, p.116, see also Horgan, McNamara and O’Sullivan, 2007: 43 
and O’Brien and Larkin, 2014) constrains its capacity to act as a plebeian public 
sphere (Negt and Kluge, 1993). 
Elsewhere, Browne (2004, p.140) notes a general tendency in Irish media to 
contribute to sowing consent to the hegemonic global capitalist order by 
rendering invisible the ‘governing ideology’ (ibid: 130) of advanced capitalism 
via the naturalisation of its orthodoxies and when that wasn’t quite enough, 
participating in the ‘repression of dissent’ (ibid: 131). Devereux (1996: 294) has 
pointed to its complicity in promoting neoliberal public policy. 
The Irish public sphere’s cultural pathologies and media concentration and lack 
of ideological diversity mitigates against the domestic public sphere as a site of 
democratic self-legislation on Honneth’s (2014: 291) terms, failing on multiple 
grounds his criteria for a ‘highly differentiated system of mass media’  which 
‘enables its audience to take part in informed processes of will-formation by 
providing enlightening information on the emergence, causes and possible 
interpretations of social problems’.  
 
If public service broadcasting was to succeed on this basis, it would have to act as 
a pluralistic counterweight, swimming against the grain of the dominant 
impulses built into the structure of the Irish public sphere.  
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3.3 The political economy of Irish public service broadcasting: an overview 
 
3.3.1 PSB and the state 
 
3.3.1.1 From state radio to public service broadcasting 
 
For most of the 20th century, to speak of state or public broadcasting in Ireland 
is to speak of broadcasting in toto, as until the comparatively belated 
liberalisation of the airwaves in 1989 (as discussed by F. Corcoran, 2004: 45 and 
Murphy, 2008: 155), Irish public radio and later public television enjoyed a 
formal monopoly, notwithstanding the significant overspill of British terrestrial 
television signals (MacConghail, 1984: 74). 
 
Detailed historical accounts of the social, political and economic factors shaping 
the foundation and subsequent development of Irish state radio and public 
service broadcasting may be found in the work of, for example, Gorham, 1967, 
Savage, 1996, F. Corcoran, 2004, Horgan, 2004, 2001, Pine, 2002, and Bowman, 
2011. Here, the focus is placed on briefly tracing aspects of the transition from a 
state-controlled monopoly broadcaster to a semi-state monopoly professional 
model broadcaster (via the establishment of Raidió Éireann in 1960 (Savage, 
1996)), up to its present day status as part of a public service core system (Raboy, 
1999) in which public service broadcasting coexists alongside a commercial 
media sector. 
 
Radio broadcasting in Ireland had begun with the establishment of the state radio 
station 2RN in 1926, (Flynn, 2002: 161), partly motivated by the assumed need 
to ‘create an integrating cultural force for the emergent state’ (Golding and Elliot, 
1979: 33) and was staffed by civil servants under the direct ownership and day-
to-day control of the Department of Posts and Telegraphs until 1953. 
 
Chubb (1992: 64) notes that the principal political effect of running a 
broadcasting service as a branch of the Department was, perhaps counter-
intuitively, to ‘insulate it entirely from politics’ as the station 'took a strictly 
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neutral position simply by broadcasting no political material at all’- even to the 
extent that TDs and Senators were formally banned from appearing (Golding and 
Elliot, 1979: 34). 
 
‘Smothered under civil service control and expected to promote unquestioningly 
the dominant ethos of Catholic Ireland’ (McLoone, 1991: 15), Murphy (2008: 155) 
suggests that broadcasting in Ireland ‘developed as a public utility primarily 
oriented towards a policy of cultural nationalism’ (ibid: 67), and ‘from its earliest 
days it set about the task of uniting its audience around common points of 
identification’ (McLoone, 1991: 13). Chubb (1984: 81) suggests that it was not 
until the fifties that anything resembling ‘political broadcasting’ would emerge. 
 
Following a series of well-documented political and civil service debates about 
what form a state-supported television service should take (including the 
possibility of a fully commercial model), and the 1960 establishment of the 
statutory Radio Éireann authority which would independently manage public 
broadcasting as a public trust, the eventual decision taken was to set up a public 
service broadcaster, part-funded by advertising but structured broadly along 
BBC lines (Horgan, 2001: 78 and Bowman, 2011). 
 
Ideologically, the new broadcaster’s relationship with the State would be 
characterised by an expansion beyond the culturalist aspirations of State radio 
into a more all-embracing national communitarian ethic. The integration of the 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983) suggested by the embracing gaze of the 
new TV service on the populace as ‘primarily national subjects with common 
interests and goals’ (Murphy, 2008: 159) was made possible by what had by then 
stabilised into consensualist political order (ibid: 74). 
 
While RTÉ has been described- partly by virtue of its establishment in the 
immediate wake of the abandonment of isolationism- as a key ‘part of the 
modernising process in Ireland’ and even ‘its primary source of mediation’ 
(McLoone, 1991: 14), Murphy (2008: 67) describes RTÉ’s identity as a public 
broadcaster as ‘routinely under pressure for re-definition as a national 
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broadcaster’. He characterises the definitional struggle over PSB in Ireland in 
terms of ‘RTE’s identity and practice as a national, cultural institution reflecting 
the catholic (and later, consumerist) values of the state or as a public 
informational broadcaster reflecting the UK and continental leaning towards ‘a 
liberal pluralist public sphere’ (ibid: 68).  
 
These dual tendencies are reflected both in the democratic role legislatively 
ascribed to RTÉ and institutional literature which anchor Irish public service 
broadcasting as serving both a pluralist liberal democratic state and the nation.  
 
In addition to committing the broadcaster to the Reithian (Burke and Briggs, 
2005: 177) formulation of a national, free-to-air service that produces 
‘programmes that entertain, inform and educate’ (Broadcasting Act 2009: s.114), 
RTÉ’s democratic function is linked to constitutional compliance, specifying that 
RTÉ must ‘uphold the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution’ (ibid). The 
broadcaster’s liberal credentials are established by RTÉ’s own advocacy of 
‘fundamental democratic principles’ (2014: 9) and delineated in a charter 
document (Public Service Broadcasting Charter, 2004) as including the need to 
‘cherish freedom from political control or influence and from all other vested 
interests’ (ibid: 5), the elevation of the need to ‘respect the sanctity of an 
individual’s private life’ (ibid: 4) and an espoused commitment to embrace the 
social, cultural, religious, ethnic and sexual diversity of Ireland and all its peoples. 
 
Evidence of RTÉ’s integrative national role is provided by its founding legislation 
which instructs RTÉ with regard to its duties around supporting ‘national aims’, 
including ‘preserving and developing the national culture’ (Broadcasting Act 
1960, s.17). Contemporary evidence of acceptance of a role of this kind is 
provided by institutional commitments to ‘project Ireland’s cultural heritage’ 
(RTÉ, 2004a: 17), to offer a ‘distinctive Irish voice and perspective’ (RTÉ, 2010: 
4) on the basis of Ireland’s status as ‘sovereign in culture’ (Curran, 2011: 2) and 
because of RTÉ’s role as the ‘daily keeper of much of what is ours- culture, history, 
language and identity’ (ibid: 11). 
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Such commitments suggest a ‘unitary view of the polity’ (Delanty, 2003: 34) 
characteristic of republicanism, premised on the ‘recognition of culture as 
defining of a people: the demos is based on an ethnos’ (ibid: 29), with political 
community resting on ‘a prior cultural community, defined in terms of common 
bonds, collective values and a shared sense of the common good’ (ibid). 
 
3.3.1.2 Freedom and constraint in practice  
 
The new structural configuration undoubtedly represented a significant increase 
in autonomy for Irish broadcasting. Recognised as such internally (RTÉ, 1971), 
the broadcaster was placed in charge of most of its appointments; staff ceased to 
be civil servants (Golding and Elliot, 1979: 35); its access to a steady license fee 
income shielded it somewhat from commercial pressures; and it was legislatively 
beholden to only mostly vague stipulations regarding programme content. 
 
However, this newfound autonomy did not mean a clean break from political 
influence. A heightened political awareness of the potential of the medium of 
television to mould the hearts and minds of viewers meant that RTÉ’s 
independence had, from the beginning, sharp limits both in theory and in 
practice.  
 
Golding and Elliot (1979: 51) point to a further ambiguity in RTÉ’s constitutional 
position, noting that ‘the role of RTÉ in the state has been unclear, that is the 
extent to which its general policy and purposes should coincide with those of 
elected governments’. This was all the more salient given Irish Taoiseach Seán 
Lemass’ declarations that the new TV service would be considered as an 
‘instrument of public policy’ (Ward, 2007: 170) and the government had ‘the 
obligation to ensure that its programmes do not offend against the public interest 
or conflict with national policy as defined in legislation” (Horgan, 2004: 41). 
 
In practice, Golding and Elliott (1979: 61) describe the broadcaster’s relationship 
with the state as based on ‘[t]he tacit exchange of autonomy for responsibility’, 
which, depending on how such autonomy is exercised by RTÉ, leads it to enjoy 
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anything from ‘considerable liberal license to direct constraint’ (ibid: 64).  
 
Indeed, McLoone (1991: 13, see also MacConghail 1984: 730) goes as far as to 
suggest that ‘successive Irish governments…have always viewed broadcasting’s 
relationship to the state in ways which we might recognise as more Gaullist than 
strictly Reithian’. 
 
Legislatively, the state retained an important series of powers over the new 
service (RTÉ, 1971: 3). These included Authority appointments, control over both 
the extent of RTÉ’s ability to earn money from advertising and the license fee, the 
power to insist on governmental broadcasts on demand and, via the highly 
consequential Section 31 provision, the censoring of any material deemed 
inappropriate.  
 
Each of these would become sources, particularly in the early years of the 
broadcaster, of ‘constant tension, frequent friction and occasional crises’ (Chubb, 
1984: 83) between various Governments that often centred on the politically 
proximate genres of news and current affairs, particularly as investigative and 
‘public affairs’ journalism found its feet in the late 60s (Chubb, 1984: 80). 
 
What F. Corcoran (2004: 60) described as a ‘Government assumption throughout 
the Sixties, that it should control RTÉ as tightly as it could a Government 
Department’ was demonstrated in a well-documented range of episodes 
(MacConghail, 1984: 68-74, Horgan, 2004: 40, F. Corcoran, 2004) in which the 
forms of pressure applied ran the gamut from subtle forms of steering and veiled 
threats to the application of extreme pressure and even legislative reprisals 
against RTÉ’s independence. 
 
The intervention of most enduring significance came in the form of exogenously 
and endogenously-imposed censorship on and by RTÉ following the flaring up of 
violence in Northern Ireland in the late 60s and 1970s, with the ministerial 
privilege to direct RTÉ to refrain from broadcasting materials activated in 1971 
for the first time (Chubb, 1992: 70, Corcoran and O’Brien, 2005). Purcell (2014: 
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65) posits that an internal climate of fear engendered by the enforcement of 
Section 31 and the sacking of the RTÉ Authority following an incident in which a 
senior IRA operative was interviewed (White, 1993: 105) ‘never left the 
organisation’ but ‘deepened’ in the ensuing years. This extended to an assiduous 
and overzealous interpretation of Section 31 that amounted to what was later 
found by the Supreme Court to be extra-legal self-censorship (Fisher, 2005: 71), 
with the whole experience leaving what a future RTÉ Authority chairman would 
later describe as an ‘unhealthy legacy’ (Corcoran and O’Brien, 2005: 93, see also 
Quinn, 2011: 72) in the broadcaster as it struggled in a range of ways to come 
terms with the post-censorship order. 
 
The experience of Section 31, along with many other skirmishes, illustrated the 
difficulties faced by governments- used to a deferent political culture and to being 
in complete control of its domestic media representation- in resisting the 
temptations to meddle in the new broadcaster. They also cast into sharp relief 
challenges faced by the broadcaster- by no means itself an ideological monolith- 
in its efforts to embed a model of public media that had real independence from 
the State. A process of mutual acclimatisation and accommodation was to 
continue to evolve through experimentation, compromise and occasional 
controversy throughout the remainder of the century, and ultimately matured to 
an outcome where today the relationship between the State and its public 
broadcaster is a predominantly stable one (in spite of intermittent low-level 
conflict (e.g. McGee, 2014, McGee and Kelly, 2015)). 
 
Outside the formal political sphere, that RTÉ helped provoke social 
modernisation in Ireland in the second half of the 20th century is an achievement 
often ascribed to it (Farrell, 1984: 116, see also Bowman, 2011: 227-9 for a brief 
review of scholarship on this topic). The ways in which RTÉ ‘mirrored, perhaps 
stimulated, an iconoclasm’ (Farrell, 1984: 116) is summarised by O’Tuathaigh 
(1984: 99) as entailing the promotion of secularism and the expansion of 
discourses around public and private morality as well as on the prevalence of 
inequality in Irish society. 
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3.3.1.3 Professional habitus and field relations 
 
The surveillance to which it was subject, yet the ‘studied vagueness’ of its 
‘constitutional and legislative strictures’ (Golding and Elliott, 1979: 61) meant 
that the broadcaster’s acclimatisation to the limits of its autonomy would be 
predicated on a ‘trial and error’ (Orlik, 1976: 469) attunement to the cultural 
environment. Journalistic precepts like impartiality and objectivity- themselves 
impervious to straightforward codification- evolved not just in accordance with 
news values but as part of the ‘underlying political ideology’ (Golding and Elliott, 
1979: 198) of journalism, they would be shaped by ‘the broader prevailing social 
consensus’ (ibid). 
 
Hallin and Mancini (2004: 236) suggest in their discussion on the extent of the 
relative autonomy enjoyed by the BBC that ‘the most important political limits on 
broadcasting are to be found not in political intervention from outside, but within 
the community of broadcasting professionals, in their commitment [to] a centrist, 
consensualist view of “responsible” professional broadcasting’. Golding and Elliot 
(1979: 62) suggest that guiding RTÉ’s discharge of its ‘responsibilities’ are ‘root 
assumptions about legitimate political contentions shared by government and 
broadcasters alike’.  
The content of such assumptions is suggested by the recognitions by senior RTÉ 
figures of the broadcaster’s responsibility in ‘inculcating an appreciation of the 
basic values of the social and political order and a respect for the institutions on 
which this order is based’ (ibid: 61) and the acceptance of an assumed 
requirement to operate within the boundaries of a ‘tacitly acknowledged 
consensus within which all of us stay’, (Orlik, 1976: 469) a consensus that is seen 
internally as ‘best for stability’ (ibid). 
RTÉ’s explicit exceptions to the legislatively-mandated dictates of impartiality 
and objectivity in news and current affairs output (Broadcasting Act 2009: s.39) 
include references to being ‘not impartial about crime or racial prejudice or 
religious intolerance’ (Golding and Elliot, 1979: 62) and more recently, 
embracing of ‘fundamental democratic principles’ including commitments to ‘the 
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rule of law, freedom of expression and religion, parliamentary democracy and 
equality of opportunity’ (RTÉ, 2014a: 9). These speak to the culturally-mediated 
nature of boundaries on impartiality, whose character here clearly reflects 
Southern political anxieties in relation to the conflict in Northern Ireland and 
legitimate authority, as well as, latterly, support for a social-democratic compact 
in an “inclusive” liberal democratic parliamentary state (McLoone, 1991: 14). 
 
That RTÉ’s practice of journalism is influenced by the broader field of media in 
Ireland is indicated by Orlik (1976: 471) who noted the status of RTÉ as 
something of a microcosm of the Irish press, given that ‘virtually all’ of RTÉ’s 
reporters and correspondents came to RTÉ from newspapers, who ‘think in 
terms of print’ and whose news agendas were powerfully influenced by the 
contents of the daily (broadly centre-right) press. 
 
Foley’s (2011: 27) suggestion that the professionalising journalistic cohort has 
been drawn from ‘the emerging urban middle classes, especially the Catholic 
middle classes’ and Devereux’s (1996: 299) study of RTÉ which identified the 
existence of a ‘pervasive middle-class culture which dominates in the 
organisation’ is supported by M. Corcoran’s (2004) survey-based exploration of 
the demographic composition and ideological orientations of Irish print and 
broadcast journalists. This identifies the contemporary Irish journalistic cohort 
as ‘predominantly middle class’ (ibid: 30) as well as predominantly male (70%) 
(ibid: 28) and highly educated. The survey found a high level of support for the 
norm of objectivity with only a small minority (10%) in favour of “advocacy” 
journalism (ibid: 40). In their self-ascribed left-of-centre ideological orientation, 
their party-political affiliations (ibid: 36-37), as well as their strong support as a 
cohort for a range of social democratic precepts (ibid: 30-32), they appear to 
broadly conform to the picture of professional journalism captured by Gans’ 
(1979) account of journalistic paraideology described in the previous chapter 
and to the social responsibility normative model. 
 
Owing to its ambiguous relationship to the State, RTÉ has been, to an even greater 
extent than the print media, not fertile ground for explicit political partisanship- 
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although the much-debated (and mythologised) influence of the leftist Workers 
Party or ‘Stickies’ (see Purcell, 2014 for a discussion) on the broadcaster’s 
political programming point towards some internal political heterogeneity.  
 
3.3.2 Irish PSB and the market 
 
3.3.2.1 The economics of funding PSB 
 
Governmental control of the broadcasting purse strings and regulatory contexts 
for public and commercial media alike continues to constitute a powerfully 
influential set of exogenous and endogenous forces on and within RTÉ. On one 
hand, it has meant that RTÉ has had to be attuned to the sensitivities of the 
Governments of the day, any of whom if angered could inflict significant damage 
to RTÉ’s balance sheets. On the other, the decision at the outset of the 
broadcaster’s life to force it to rely to a significant degree on commercial revenue 
(Broadcasting Act 1960: s.20) meant that the organisation was, from the 
beginning, imbued with a commercial culture (MacConghail, 1984: 66), with a 
requirement to ‘exploit…commercial opportunities’ (Broadcasting Act 2009: 
s.114) later built into its public service “objects”. 
 
RTÉ’s reliance on commercial income has fluctuated over the decades in 
accordance with both political and economic climates. Politically, the broadcaster 
has been subject to governmental reticence to increase or even index-link the 
license fee (F. Corcoran, 2004: 101), and its capacity to raise commercial income 
was even for a time politically interfered with (F. Corcoran, 2004: 46). 
 
The collapse of advertising revenue associated with the post-2008 crisis saw 
commercial revenue dip beneath 50% of total revenue by 2011 (PwC, 2013: 13) 
but the continuing recalcitrance of the State to make up the shortfall via public 
funding plunged RTÉ into a deep financial crisis of its own. RTÉ’s total funding 
fell by over 20% since 2007 (ibid) and the organisation has had to implement 
swingeing cuts in staff and operating costs (Curran, 2014). 
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Even with collapsing commercial revenue, RTÉ’s dual-funded model still relies 
far more heavily on commercial revenue than most other European public service 
broadcasters, at ‘more than double the EBU average’ and almost four times that 
of other Western European PSBs with a license fee (PwC, 2013: 14). This leaves 
it deeply vulnerable to economic fluctuations (contributing to intermittent 
internal financial crises), to the cultural impacts of an increasingly commercial 
internal culture, and entailing a concomitant restriction of its ability to engage in 
medium to long term planning, with organisational energies dedicated to 
retrenchment and the deployment of ‘survival strategies’ (Steemers, 2003: 129). 
 
Despite RTÉ’s outlier status in this regard, it is supported by an orthodoxy shared 
by broadcasting executives (see for example, Curran, 2011: 21) and politicians 
that full public funding for RTÉ is both unattainable and undesirable and that the 
dual-funding model is not only a pragmatic solution to the challenges of 
delivering public service broadcasting to a small media-saturated market, but a 
desirable one that forces RTÉ to ‘remain close and responsive to its audience’ 
(ibid), affording RTÉ sufficient independence from both market and state. 
 
3.3.2.2 Neoliberalism and the business of broadcasting  
 
The material and ideological imprinting of the state’s developmental trajectory 
on RTÉ extends into the broader structural integration of Irish PSB into the 
orthodoxies of neoliberalised, rationalised management, both State-led and 
increasingly self-imposed.  
 
For Murray (2011: 118), this diffusion of marketised economic rationality in RTÉ 
is symbolised by the practice of externally and self-imposed reviews undertaken 
by management and financial consultants whose typical proposals of ‘free market 
remedies for the problems of public service’ (Bell and Meehan (1989: 106) have 
entailed, amongst other prescriptions, the promotion of flexibilised labour 
practices, the creation of an independent commercial production sector and 
underpinned by a general shift towards an increased organisational concern with 
economic efficiency. 
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Hazelkorn (1996: 36), in her analysis of labour restructuring in RTÉ, in addition 
to noting degraded conditions of staff, goes so far as to speak of the intentions of 
the recommendations of one consultancy report (Stokes Crowley Kennedy, 1985) 
as seeking to effect a ‘managed privatization’ of the broadcaster in its cocktail of 
‘fiscal and legislative restrictions on the state sector and incentives to the private 
sector’.  
 
A subsequent RTÉ-led review (RTÉ, 1998) echoed the business focus of these 
recommendations, most notably in proposing the restructuring of the 
broadcaster into divisions individually responsible for revenue-generation 
(Murray, 2011: 126-9). This foreshadowed the later restructuring of the 
broadcaster into six ‘Integrated Business Divisions’ (ibid: 136), and is described 
by Murray as an explicit effort aimed at imposing ‘an economic, quasi-commercial 
rationality on the organisation’ (ibid: 137) that suggests that RTÉ had 
internalised the prevailing economic orthodoxies of the era. 
 
Such changes weren’t restricted to organisational structure or work practices but 
encompassed an increasing isomorphism with commercial competitors in terms 
of programme genres and content. Murray’s (2011: 41) account of RTÉ’s 
contemporary ‘Management by Schedule’ affirms a commercially isomorphic 
structuring role in RTÉ programme-making (see Kinsella, 2005: 7 quoted in 
Harris, 2005: 115, see also F. Corcoran, 2004: 16 and Quinn, 2001: 91). 
 
Whilst helping accomplish the avoidance of overall institutional ghettoisation 
within a ‘monastery model’ of PSB (Jakubowicz, 2004: 284), this programming 
strategy has nonetheless come at a high cost, including an organisational 
bifurcation between “core” PSB functions and those run on a de facto or explicitly 
commercial basis. These aspects of its development mean that RTÉ cannot be 
considered a ‘classical’ PSB in the BBC mould, but as a ‘semi-commercial’ (ibid) 
type.  
 
These costs are captured in the critique of Sit Down and Be Counted (Doolan et al., 
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1969: 231), penned by a number of RTÉ resignees only a decade into the 
broadcaster’s existence. The authors point to the imposition of ‘systematised 
managerial techniques on creative people’ as deeply ‘culturally formative’ (ibid: 
234), embedding positivist philosophies of communication and management and 
leading to creative atrophy and suppressing critical broadcasting impulses. In 
particular, echoing Bourdieu’s (1995: 42) critique of the formative impact of 
rationalised audience research on programming, they point to the establishment 
of the TAM ratings system in Ireland as the ‘commercial basis of a system which 
began to regulate programming schedules’, whose ‘endless ramifications’ 
(Doolan et al., 1969: 328) on programme production encompassed managerial 
interference in programming (ibid: 91) and extended to the internalisation of 
commercial and entertainment logics by programme makers (ibid: 329). 
Elsewhere, Watson (1996) has described the tensions to RTÉ’s role in linguistic 
preservation and development engendered by its commercial imperatives. 
 
3.3.2.3 From PSB to PSM 
 
Recent RTÉ strategic policy documents and speeches from senior management 
suggest that the transition from a ‘legacy’ public service broadcaster to what RTÉ 
now describes on its website as ‘Ireland’s national public-service media 
organisation’ (RTÉ, 2015a) is conceived as a mainly technological transition, 
entailing a minimally differentiated continuity with the traditional PSB mission. 
 
Today, the strategic priorities identified by RTÉ involve, above all, consolidating 
its position in a multi-platform digital media environment, leaving intact the core 
ideologies of public service and the bases of its legitimation. This is indicated not 
least not by its justification for the continued institutionalisation of PSM in a 
mono-organisation configuration on the basis of its capacity to act as guarantor 
of cultural distinctiveness. As suggested by the broadcaster’s Director General 
Noel Curran in a recent major strategic document, ‘[A]s a small country, Ireland 
needs a media organisation that has the scale and resources to guarantee a 
distinctive Irish voice and Irish perspective on the world’ (RTÉ, 2013a: 7)- all the 
more necessary given the threat posed by globalising forces that are ‘diluting 
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national and local culture like never before’ (ibid: 6). 
 
That the broadcaster still embraced a role in nation-building was suggested in a 
previous speech (Curran, 2011: 28) in which it was suggested that the 
broadcaster ‘must be part of building Ireland’s new future’, contributing to 
‘Ireland’s renewal and sense of common purpose’ (ibid: 29). That this would be 
accomplished through isomorphic adaptation to political and State-defined 
economic exigencies was suggested by Curran’s summary of the necessary 
changes to consolidate RTÉ’s position for the future as including the need to forge 
a ‘leaner, more focused, more competitive, more open, partnership based 
organisation with an enhanced digital presence’ (ibid: 4), citing enhanced 
coverage of ‘Innovation, including Science and Technology’ (ibid: 28) as one of six 
‘output priorities’ (ibid: 29) for RTÉ. 
 
In his discussion of the broadcaster’s five-year strategy document (RTÉ, 2013a), 
Cullinane (2013) argued that the promises of a more open and partnership-
oriented RTÉ mainly amount to strategic commercial partnerships, in the 
interests of supporting ‘the leadership of Ireland’s digital economy’ (RTÉ, 2013a: 
188, see also RTÉ, 2014b) which aimed toward rapprochement with Ireland’s 
private media sector who have long sought a curtailment of RTÉ’s dominant 
position. 
 
Despite a rocky transition from analogue broadcasting to a digital terrestrial 
platform (F. Corcoran, 2004), RTÉ’s technological adaptation has yielded 
demonstrable success, evidenced in strong take-ups of its digital terrestrial 
service and online catch-up services (RTÉ, 2015c: 8). 
 
Yet, in line with Bardoel and Brants’ (2003) suggestion that neoliberal 
orthodoxies have had an impact not just on the economics of public service 
broadcasting but on its rationales for existence, we might conceive of RTÉ’s 
‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (Spicer and Sewell, 2010: 915) as entailing the 
retasking of PSM along increasingly neoliberal lines. This is exemplified by how 
its reorientation as a global media player with an Irish voice, and as a domestic 
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media organisation at harmony with Ireland’s commercial creative technological 
class reflects a continuity within a minimally differentiated consensualist frame 
of national goals. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to explore the extent to which the Irish public sphere in 
general and public service broadcasting in particular has developed the 
institutionalised capacities for the kind of radical pluralism requisite to 
effectively subject contemporary crisis management to critique and increase the 
likelihood of administrative crises progressing to a broader crisis of political 
legitimation. 
 
Principally, the chapter identified public broadcasting’s imbrication in a 
conservative culture- political, identitarian and developmental- and ongoing 
subjection to the broader field of power, as exerting a strong delimiting effect on 
its critical potential. 
 
In the first instance, it was suggested that the character of the hegemonic political 
culture in early 20th century Ireland- Catholic, nationalistic, authoritarian, 
secretive, suspicious of external influences, and valourising of the class interests 
and bodily hexis of a narrow portion of society- became naturalised in the 
character of the bourgeois public sphere. Linked with the depoliticisation of a 
heretofore more ideologically distinctive and diverse mass media and its 
concentration in ever-fewer hands, the journalistic field in which public service 
broadcasting would develop would be one marked by material and ideological 
alignment with power-holders in Irish society.  
 
The subsequent modernisation of Irish society and economy in the second half of 
the century proceeded along lines that protected the material interests of those 
power-holders, but whose ideological character was masked in part by the 
integrative power of the nationalist consensus to anaesthetise interest conflicts, 
providing an environment particularly propitious for the naturalisation of 
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neoliberal policy and governmentality more generally. 
 
In a society marked by low levels of politically-institutionalised ideological 
pluralism (evidenced in part by the dominance of conservative governance of 
minimally differentiated hues since the foundation of the state), the intrinsically 
hegemonic tendencies of public service broadcasting were always likely to be 
particularly strongly activated. The dominance of the hegemonic Catholic-
nationalist identity project meant that the centripetal logics of public service 
broadcasting were not subjected to strong countervailing forces. 
 
Co-ordination with the state and its aims was and is coercively achieved through 
control of PSB’s governing legislation, appointments, funding, and the 
background threat of further interference. Ideologically, this is accomplished 
through mimetic and normative isomorphism with the bureaucratic and 
professional habitus of RTÉ’s administrative and journalistic classes.  
 
Both have a close affinity with the dominant bourgeois habitus, with the former 
representing an extension of state bureaucracy (and mimicking its propensity for 
secrecy (Quinn, 2001, F. Corcoran, 2004: 24)) and the latter, by virtue of a 
combination of class position and professional ideologies embodying a version of 
social responsibility tinged with a particular concern for social cohesion. 
 
RTÉ’s inexorable integration into broader domestic and global media markets via 
private-sector isomorphism in organisational structure, goal-setting, 
measurement and accountability practices represents a further vector of material 
and ideological consonance with broader State developmental ideologies. 
Dovetailing with RTÉ’s close ideological proximity to the nation, the broadcaster 
is rendered vulnerable to self-instrumentalisation in the service of national goals. 
 
RTE’s imbrication in a centre right-leaning, commercial journalistic field 
represents a further structuring force, profoundly influencing both its agenda-
setting practices (Browne, 2012a) and shaping the ideological character of the 
pool of potential recruits. 
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The professional insistence on autonomy from the public renders Irish PSB ever 
more tied to the field of power. That its pact with the political sphere of (relative) 
autonomy for responsibility constrains its constitutional role to prudence 
(Blumler, 1992: 13), strengthens its general alignment with the hegemonic 
political culture, and allows for its ready instrumentalisation by the state 
suggests its Faustian character. 
 
The Irish PSB model can be described, like its British counterpart, as a project of 
‘consensus broadcasting’, a ‘harmony model’ that ‘presumes the existence of a 
reasonably homogenous and unified culture and society’ (Butler, 1991: 100). This 
is an outlook that powerfully constrains its counter-hegemonic potential. 
 
The vanguardist tendencies frequently attributed to RTÉ in propelling Ireland’s 
social modernisation must be seen within the context of the strictures of a 
broader value alignment between broadcaster and state. While the discursive 
space allowing for the challenging of orthodoxies in the private sphere of, for 
example, sexual mores, has undoubtedly expanded and was at least partially 
facilitated by public service broadcasting (Doyle-O’Neill, 2013), RTÉ’s control 
over the sluice gate for the critical thematisation of matters pertaining to the 
present crises- notably, economic justice- is mediated by less propitious 
circumstances.  
 
It may be suggested in conclusion that the possibilities for critical, counter-
hegemonic and democratising responses by either the political system, public 
sphere in general and public service broadcasting in particular to the economic 
and democratic crises of the post-2008 conjuncture were not promising, and that 
the ‘morbid symptoms’ of democratic crisis were likely to be elided by the 
normative sensoria of Irish public service broadcasting. This was likely both 
because the character of the justice claims involved, and their subaltern carriers 
of latent counter-publics (Calhoun, 2010) resonate poorly with institutional 
sensoria weakly calibrated to their frequency.  
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Although similarly adopting the basic liberal core, institutional structure, modes 
of rational-legal authority and management and professional ethos of its UK 
counterpart, Irish public service broadcasting’s subjection to a political culture 
characterised by a strong Catholic communitarianism contributed to a dilution of 
PSB’s characteristic liberalism- its main potential source of counter-hegemonic 
potential- in favour of its amplified communitarian republican moment 
vulnerable to an over-substantialisation of ‘the pre-existing ethos of community 
in a manner that could only colonize public discourse’ (O’Mahony, 2013: 41).  
 
If public service broadcasting represents, on the whole, a poor candidate for a 
media-institutional form capable of thematising and responding critically to 
democratic crisis, the character of its embedding in the Irish media system and 
the Irish political opportunity structure, with its poorly-institutionalised 
pluralism and powerful integrative tendencies, renders Irish public service 
broadcasting even less of a likely counter-hegemonic force. Rather, it is 
constrained to a role, ‘out of respect for national consensus’, to a position where 
‘the main obligations of public broadcasting were to reflect the pluralism of 
society and diversity of audience, to avoid offense to significant streams of 
opinion, and to promote cultural values’ (Christians et al., 2009: 10). 
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Chapter 4: From Field to Institutional Analysis:  
A Critical Empirical Approach 
 
 …editors, writers, contributors, and analysts, cannot but be influenced by the 
prevailing climate at a given point in time. 
 
   Gerry O’Regan, former Editor of the ‘Irish Independent’ (O’Regan, 2015: 1) 
 
4.1 Introduction   
 
The previous chapter’s exploration of the formative political, economic, 
professional and cultural influences on public service broadcasting’s 
development in Ireland go some way towards explaining the character of its 
normative democratic horizons. Recognising Benson’s (2006: 196) observation 
that journalism, as a semi-autonomous professional field, ‘refracts rather than 
simply reflects the play of external forces’ (italics in original), a programme of 
research is called for that is attuned to identifying the determinants and modes 
of refraction. This necessitates closer empirical attention to how the specificities 
of the present crises are navigated in the practice of public service broadcasting. 
 
In selecting the general institutional locus of empirical interest, of foremost 
importance is the consideration of the sources of public service broadcasting’s 
power in the political public sphere. This project’s interest in media power arises 
from the recognition of the critical role of media in shaping crisis construals 
insofar as they, according to Habermas (2006: 419) ‘select and process politically 
relevant content and thus intervene in both the formation of public opinions and 
the distribution of influential interests’, and exert power via the ‘the choice of 
information and format, in the shape and style of programs, and in the effects of 
its diffusion- in agenda setting, or the priming and framing of issues’. 
 
This suggests the desirability of an empirical focus on aspects of the institution 
most proximate to the production and dissemination of political meaning, guiding 
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the selection of news and current affairs as the principal institutional site of 
analysis chosen on their basis of their centrality to the daily production of 
political meaning and sheer pervasiveness (Cottle, 2000a: 20).  
 
This chapter comprises two main sections. First, a brief review is offered into how 
empirical work in the 20th and 21st centuries undertaken by scholars of mass 
communication and media sociology has contributed to the understanding of the 
roles played by news media in circuits of political, social, economic and cultural 
political power. This is followed by a detailed specification of this project’s 
empirical research agenda, entailing the selection and justification of specific 
research methods and the particulars of their deployment in the field. 
 
4.2 Studying news workers, news institutions and news agendas: a review  
 
4.2.1 Major research traditions 
 
Schudson (1991: 142) notes that formal sociological scholarship on journalistic 
work dates back only to the 1950s. He delineates three dominant contemporary 
traditions of researching the social production of news since then- social 
organisational, political-economic and cultural. For Tuchman (2002: 78), these 
traditions represented counter-reactions to the consensualist orientation of 
structural functionalist approaches (e.g. Parsons, 1951) to the understanding of 
the role of the media in society (Murdock, 2002: 55). 
 
The three contemporary traditions focus, respectively, on the interactions among 
and between individuals and institutions, on the place of the media in broader 
systemic complexes, and on news as a cultural form with ideological implications. 
 
Empirical studies influenced by these traditions have emphasised the usefulness 
of attending to, inter alia,  the minutiae of the news production process through 
ethnographic observation; the self-conception of journalistic professionals 
through interviews, surveys and similar approaches; the implications of the 
embeddedness of media organisations in political, economic and cultural 
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contexts; the textual analysis of news output, the fruit of journalistic labour; and 
the reception of journalistic output by audiences.  
 
This review offers an attenuated summary of how research in these theoretical 
and methodological traditions have helped illuminate some of the key factors that 
structure media and journalistic relationships to power. The focus is placed on 
scholarship exploring the determinants of media agenda-setting (what the media 
invites us to think about and how) and how the media may be said to represent a 
‘vehicle of influence’ (Curran, 2002: 158) for those engaged in media agenda-
building (‘those forces which set the media’s agenda’ (Reese, 2001: 174)). In so 
doing, it reflects Reese’s (2001: 178) media-sociological classification of 
mediating influences that reflects a broad gamut from micro pole of individual 
influences to mezzo-level influences at the level of professional norms and 
organisational routines and cultures and macro poles of political-economic and 
cultural-ideological contexts. 
 
For reasons of focus, the voluminous literature on media ‘effects’ (for reviews, see 
Curran, 2002: 157-165 and McCullagh, 2002: 151-68) is not explored, nor is a 
strong position taken on the extent to which media agenda-setting (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972) results in public agenda transfer (the extent to which audiences 
‘acquire the same set of saliences as those present in the media’ (McCullagh, 
2002: 22). As Murdock (2002: 57) puts it, in this debate, ‘accounts of powerful 
media have continually rubbed up against celebrations of audience refusal and 
resistance’. These accounts are characterised by the existence of the twin 
extremes of, on one hand, ‘semiotic democracy’ (Fiske, 1987), which suggests that 
any and all meanings may be derived from cultural artefacts, and on the other, 
views of the audience as 'passive dupes' (Taylor and Harris, 2008: 4) that 
unproblematically absorb the ‘encoder’s preferred meaning’ of the media 
message in question (Bignell, 2002: 102).  
 
The 'multidimensional quality of audiences’ practices' (Dahlgren, 1998) is 
acknowledged here, where potential exists for both conformity and resistance to 
dominant readings of media messages- whether described in terms of 'cognitive 
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bricolage' (Horlick-Jones et al., 2007) or ‘structured polysemy’ (Dyer, 1979). The 
position is taken that as providers of a great deal of information about the world 
beyond our direct personal experiences, journalistically mediated 
representations of the world have at least some social significance both with 
regard to public issue salience and the interpretive frameworks in which matters 
are understood, cueing particular audience understandings (Curran, 1999: 9) 
that reflect distinctive modes of interpellation. 
 
4.2.2 The social production of news 
 
In his review of ethnographic studies on the sociology of news, Cottle (2003, see 
also Schudson, 1989, 1991, 2000 and Tuchman, 2002) points to the distinctive 
contributions of early ‘formative’ studies of newsroom ‘gatekeeping’ (Lewin, 
1947) practices, with studies including those by White (1950), Gieber (1964), 
and Epstein (1973, 1975) offering compelling early evidence of the stability of 
professional editorial judgements across institutional contexts.  
 
Later studies came to see newswork as a form of knowledge “production”, whose 
character reflected the product of a range of influences, including organisational, 
professional and cultural contexts (Tuchman, 2002: 78). Schudson (1991: 143) 
describes how social-organisational approaches aim to ‘understand how 
journalists’ efforts on the job are constrained by organizational and occupational 
routines’ (see also McCullagh, 2002: 74). 
 
Under the influence of social constructionism and ethnomethodology, research 
adopting a social-organisational approach utilised observational and interview 
techniques (Tuchman, 2002: 81) to explore the formative impacts of professional 
socialisation, daily newsgathering routines, the division of journalistic labour and 
how journalistic ideologies are translated into daily practice.  
 
Journalism’s class composition (Gitlin, 1980: 259, Rapple, 1997: 75, M. Corcoran, 
2004), working in tandem with credentialisation and the shared values of a 
professionalising craft (M. Corcoran, 2004: 40, Elliott and Golding, 1979, 
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Patterson and Donsbach, 1996: 466, Croteau, 1999) have also been identified as 
playing an important contemporary role in shaping the dominant journalistic 
habitus (see also Miliband, 1969). 
 
Studies like those of Breed (1955) and Sigelman (1973) brought an 
organisational approach to the analysis of journalistic socialisation, shedding 
light on the determinants of professional conformity, deviance and control 
structures, while Shoemaker’s (1991) contribution to gatekeeping theory 
emphasised the diversity of gatekeeping practices that take place within 
organisational and inter-organisational contexts, shaped by social, cultural and 
institutional factors. 
 
A series of ‘substantive’ newsroom ethnographies of the 1970s and 1980s, 
encompassing those undertaken by, for example, Epstein (1973); Altheide and 
Rasmussen (1976); Murphy (1976);  Burns (1977); Tracey (1978); Schlesinger 
(1979); Tuchman (1973, 1978); Gans (1979); Bantz et al. (1980); Fishman 
(1980); Gitlin (1983); Ericson et al. (1987); and Cottle (1993) saw researchers 
immerse themselves for often extended periods of time in the milieu of 
newsroom life- mainly in the context of American and British print and, later, 
broadcast media (Tuchman, 2002: 81). Work by Golding and Elliott (1979), 
Devereux (1998) and Cawley (2008) represent rare examples of Irish studies that 
deployed these methods.  
 
Cottle (2007: 1) summarises their contributions as helping elucidate the many 
implications of the ‘daily routines, bureaucratic nature, competitive ethos, 
professional ideologies, source dependencies and cultural practices of the news 
media’. He credits their findings with helping to qualify neo-functionalist 
accounts of media roles, from ‘instrumentalist ideas of news control and 
conspiracy’ to ‘structurally “over-determined” theories of news as ideological 
reproduction’ (ibid: 4) Nonetheless, he takes the view that the substantive 
ethnographies, by revealing the powerful structuring and constraining influence 
of journalistic “routines” which worked in tandem with the ideology of objectivity 
(Soloski, 1989, Hall et al., 1978), helped establish the reasons both why news took 
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on a ‘relatively standardised form’ across disparate outlets (Cottle, 2007: 4) and 
tended to evince a pliant ideological orientation towards ‘social and political 
elites and the endorsement of the prevailing capitalist social system’ (ibid). 
 
Owing to the ‘limited carrying capacity’ (Zhu, 1992) of media and their status as 
‘rational enterprises’ (Tuchman, 1973: 111), organised selectivity is inevitable in 
determining the thematic range and breadth in content of the topical agendas 
carried by media. Routinised newsgathering has been widely identified as a 
crucially formative response to the practical, technical and professional 
exigencies of daily newswork. 
 
Under the influence of social constructionism, studies demonstrated how the 
“facts” gathered by newsworkers, far from reflecting a ‘reality-out-there-to-be-
described’ (Molotch and Lester, 1974: 105) rather represent ‘pertinent 
information gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the 
relationship between what is known and how it is known’ (Tuchman, 1978: 82-
3). Institutionalised ‘typifications’ (Tuchman, 1973) facilitated consistent and 
routinised ways of categorising and dealing with discrete phenomena, including 
assisting in the advance planning of news to ensure consistency and 
predictability of the news product (Golding, 1981: 70-1).  
 
Bantz et al. (1980) employed the metaphor of the ‘news factory’ to describe the 
rationalised news production process, echoed in Golding and Elliot’s (1979: 137) 
description of broadcast journalism as a ‘highly regulated and routine process of 
manufacturing a cultural product on an electronic production line’ whose final 
product carries ‘the marks of the technical and organisational structure from 
which it emerges’.  
 
News values, or the criteria governing the selection of news, have been the 
subject of much academic discussion (Brighton and Foy, 2007) not least in terms 
of their formative impact on what is ruled in and out of news agendas and the 
terms in which issues are discussed. Formal, oft-cited taxonomies of news values 
like that of Galtung and Ruge (1965, see also Gans, 1979, Barrat, 1986 and Palmer, 
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1998) point to their professional, pragmatic, cultural and even psychological 
determinants. Despite being ‘nowhere written down, formally transmitted, or 
codified’ (Hall et al., 1978: 54), scholars have widely observed that news values 
‘seem to be widely shared as between the different news media...and form a core 
element in the professional socialisation, practice and ideology’ (ibid). Shared 
production routines and codes of professional ethics promote a high level of 
material and ideological consonance between journalistic production in 
newsrooms operating in both public service and commercial institutional 
contexts (Schudson, 2000: 188, Tunstall, 1971, Golding and Elliott, 1979, Sparks 
and Splichal, 1989).  
 
What can be considered the ‘cardinal news value’ (Hall et al., 1978: 53) of news- 
that which is ‘extra-ordinary’, or which is considered a departure from what is 
considered ‘normal’ (Soloski, 1989) means that it is a practical imperative for 
journalists to ‘share assumptions about what is normal in society’ (Soloski, 1989: 
215). This may be identified as at the heart of a host of entrenched tendencies of 
news, including its ‘events orientation’ (McCullagh, 2002: 87), its inherent affinity 
with ‘episodic’ (Iyengar, 1991) occurrences, focusing on the ‘discrete and 
disconnected’ (Curran, 2002: 163), its ‘transient and ephemeral quality’ (Park, 
1940), and its temporal emphasis on recency and immediacy (Roshco, 1975).  
 
This is crystallised in Gitlin’s (1980: 263) line of critique, in which he argues that 
by focusing on the ‘novel event, not the underlying, enduring condition; the 
person, not the group; the visible conflict, not the deep consensus; the fact that 
“advances the story”, not the one that explains or enlarges it’, the very ways in 
which news is defined helps ensure that it ‘plays out within a field of terms and 
premises which does not overstep the hegemonic boundary’ (see also Hall, 1973: 
183, Edelman, 1988). 
 
Affinities between news values, the production requirements of routinised 
newsgathering, and professional ideologies can be readily identified by exploring 
patterns of news sourcing (see Manning, 2001), defined here in the expansive 
sense as referring to ‘individuals and organisations that either directly or 
 99 
 
indirectly influence or shape the news’ (McCullagh, 2002: 66). 
 
That routinised newsgathering practices tend to result in a dominance of ‘official’ 
sources shaping and appearing in the news is one backed up by a large amount of 
scholarship (e.g. Sigal, 1973, Hoynes, 2002, Schudson, 1991: 148), and may be 
explained explored with regard to a combination of professional, political-
economic and social-organisational imperatives. 
 
Lippmann’s (1922) suggestion that the professional imperative of facticity 
favours sources of news with a reliable and consistent ‘machinery of record’ was 
later followed up by Fishman’s (1980) social-organisational exploration of how 
the journalistic division of labour in the form of the ‘beat’ system favoured well-
placed institutional sources who could provide an ‘information subsidy’ (Gandy, 
1982: 61) to resource-constrained journalists. The practice of making available 
pre-packaged news easily available for journalists at convenient intervals (see 
also Tuchman, 1978: 21) meant that journalists, in practice, ‘leave much of the 
task of selection of news to its sources’ (Sigal, 1973). 
 
Arguing that access to the news as a source ‘reflects the social structure outside 
the newsroom’, (Gans, 1979: 81), indeed reflecting the ‘hierarchies of nation and 
society (ibid: 119), Gans concludes that journalists are ‘repeatedly brought into 
contact with a limited number of the same types of sources’ (ibid: 144) (see also 
Grabe, Zhou and Barnett, 1999 and Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994).  He argues 
that developing symbiotic relationships with sources whose preferred qualities 
of availability, reliability and authoritativeness lead journalists to privilege 
powerful, official sources who are granted ‘habitual’ (Molotch and Lester, 1974) 
access to news agendas by mere virtue of their standing- or their capacity to 
create staged ‘pseudo-events’, made-for-news set pieces designed to resonate 
with news values (Boorstin, 1992). 
 
Other studies have suggested that the journalistic reliance on powerful sources is 
suggestive of more than expedient newsgathering but speaks to underlying 
affinities with power associated with professional and extra-professional 
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ideologies and paraideologies. Hall et al. (1978: 58) locate in the consensualist 
orientation of news media allied to legal and professional imperatives for 
“objective” and “authoritative” statements a tendency for journalists to seek 
sources accredited on the basis of institutional power, representativeness or 
disinterestedness which produces a ‘systematically structured over-accessing to 
the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions’ (italics in 
original).  
 
They further suggest that this deference extends to ceding the definitional ground 
of events and issues to these sources, which they describe as ‘primary definers’ of 
topics (Hall et al., 1978: 58, italics in original), placing challengers in a weak, 
reactive position against a dominant framing. This reduces the media’s 
autonomous role to that of secondary definer status, which for the authors 
demonstrates how professional practices of sourcing ‘ensures that the media, 
effectively but “objectively”, play a key role in reproducing the dominant field of the 
ruling ideologies’ (ibid: 60, italics in original) (see also Murdock, 1973: 172, 1982) 
 
McChesney and Nichols (2005) suggest that the reliance on official sources has a 
‘disciplinary effect on the range of legitimate news story’, going so far as to 
conclude that as a consequence, the ‘public is at the mercy of those in power to a 
far greater extent than was the case under partisan journalism’.  
 
4.2.3 Media access: negotiated accounts 
 
Seeking to moderate the ‘essentially structuralist’ claims of the primary definer 
thesis while remaining sympathetic to its thrust, Schlesinger (1990) and later 
Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) helped establish a rebuttal against too strong a 
conception of elite dominance, on the basis that the constantly shifting sands of 
hegemony necessitated the need to take source competition seriously. 
 
Factors exogenous to the media, like political or economic crises and inter-elite 
disagreements (Hallin, 1986, Miller, 1993) as well as endogenous characteristics, 
including the insatiable appetite of news producers for a constant flow of news 
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(Altheide and Rasmussen, 1976), the conflict imperative of news (Bantz, 1985, 
Gitlin, 1980: 274), and the professional norm of balance and impartiality 
(Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994, Golding and Middleton, 1982: 119) suggest the 
existence of both structural and contingent opportunities for profitable ‘issue 
entrepreneurship’ (Cracknell, 1993) by oppositional and marginal voices not 
granted routine access to the mediated public sphere. 
 
A body of research (e.g. Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994, Curran, 1990, Gamson 
and Modigliani, 1989, Eder, 1992) has demonstrated the ways in which groups 
seeking inclusion in news agendas have, with varying but tangible degrees of 
success, strategically oriented themselves to the media in ways that have 
demonstrated the porosity of the media’s agenda-building capacities.  
 
This has been accomplished by, amongst other strategies, providing information 
subsidies to journalists in the manner of more powerful sources (Gitlin, 1980), 
the strategic promotion of issue ‘frames’, comprised of symbolic packages 
calculated to resonate with both journalistic paraideologies and with ‘existing 
chains of cultural meaning’ (Hansen, 2010: 101, see also Manning, 2001: 156 and 
Bosso, 1989), and taking advantages of moments where issues have escaped the 
‘bounds of cultural consensus’ (Bennett, 1996: 379). 
 
There are good reasons, however, to view the media as merely a ‘half-open door’ 
McCullagh (2002: 54) to both non-official sources and challengers to dominant 
ideologies. For one, while Goldenberg’s (1975: 47) study demonstrated that 
‘resource-poor’ groups can mobilise non-economic resources like ‘size, 
legitimacy and credibility’ to gain access to news agendas with the help of 
attention-grabbing ‘stunts’ (Molotch and Lester, 1974), he argues that the real 
challenge lay in securing consistent or ‘regularised’ (Goldenberg, 1975: 137) 
access. This leads him to conclude that these groups lacked the ‘political, symbolic 
and material resources’ (Manning, 2001: 159) possessed by resource-rich groups 
who were better able to ‘initiate and sustain media contacts’ (ibid).  While elites 
may be caught off balance temporarily, allowing challengers to catapult an issue 
and even their chosen frames onto the media agenda, powerful sources are often 
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able to reassert source- and frame- dominance by either co-opting an issue 
(Hansen, 1993: 160) or by dint of their material and cultural advantages, able to 
assert routinised access following the establishment of a story (Linne, 1993, 
McCullagh, 2010).  
 
Elsewhere, Gitlin (1980) argues that the partial accommodation of oppositional 
voices like social movements represents a crucial means of maintaining overall 
hegemonies in liberal democracies, citing what he views as the U.S media’s 
hegemonic boundary management in relation to anti-war critiques in the 1960s. 
While successfully enlisting the media in a shift of the hegemonic terrain 
regarding the Vietnam war, he argues that oppositional demands were typically 
accommodated only after being refracted, ‘fragmented’, even ‘domesticated’ 
(Gitlin, 1980: 270) with news producers filtering out ‘demands, individuals and 
frames which do not fundamentally contradict the dominant hegemonic 
principles’ (ibid: 270-1) of capitalist society (see also Downing, 1980). 
 
This study, and others like it, implies that the journalistic support for hegemonic 
formations ‘operates in a reformist key’ (Gitlin, 1980: 280). Hallin’s (1994) 
suggestion that for media to remain effective ideological institutions they need to 
attend to their own legitimation suggests that the provision of at least occasional 
space for dissenting perspectives is one born of necessity. 
 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the power to create and distribute 
meaning still resides with centres of material and political power (Deacon and 
Golding, 1994: 203), and that news media ‘do not easily represent demands, 
movements, and frames which are inchoate, subtle, and most deeply subversive’ 
(Gitlin, 1980: 271) of dominant hegemonies. 
 
Elsewhere, bodies of work (Ettema and Glasser, 1998, Lewis et al., 2005, Eliasoph, 
1998) have demonstrated the marginality of direct public opinion within 
journalistic output, particularly in terms of their routine exclusion as citizens 
with political perspectives (Lewis et al., 2005: 49, see also Cottle, 2000b, Lewis, 
2001). This may in part by predicated on limitations in what journalists know 
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about their audiences (Ettema and Whitney, 1994) and ambiguities in the extent 
to which they want to know, crystallised by Gans’ (1979: 230) finding that 
reporters and editors ‘had little knowledge about the actual audience and 
rejected feedback from it’ (see also Wahl-Jorgensen, 2002). 
 
4.2.4 Media power and political economy  
 
The idea that ‘different ways of financing and organising cultural production have 
traceable consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the 
public domain’ (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 15) is at the heart of political-
economic approaches to studying the media, which focus on relationships 
between the ‘prevailing structures of political and economic power in a society 
and the cultural products of that society’ (Sheehan, 1987). Thinkers in political-
economic traditions have linked the association between journalism and power 
with the imbrication of media organisations in distinct political and economic 
contexts, citing the critical influence of ‘media ownership, advertising, the 
structure and logic of the market’ (Curran, 2002: 110). It is a category that 
includes the work of Murdock and Golding (1977), Murdock (1982), Curran 
(1980, 1986), McChesney (1999), Bagdikian (2004) and Herman and Chomsky 
(1988). 
 
As a heterodox analytical paradigm, different strands of political economy 
attribute varying levels of significance to the detail of the actual news production 
process and view the material impact of ownership structures on media 
discourses in different ways.  
 
Some radical functionalist accounts which as a whole ‘relate[s] the outcome of 
the news process to the structure of the state and the economy and to the 
economic foundation of the news organisation’ (Schudson, 1991: 143) take the 
view that news output merely reflect structural political-economic imperatives. 
As an exemplar of radically functionalist political-economic thinking, Herman 
and Chomsky’s (1988) ‘propaganda model’ emphasises the decisive impact of 
corporate ownership in terms of, on one hand, the shared interest of proprietors 
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in keeping oppositional discourses out of the public sphere in order to help 
maintain their class advantages; and on the other, how an institutional 
dependence on advertising ineluctably shapes media output. News organisations 
on this account must deliver the right kinds of audiences on a consistent basis 
and to ‘create an environment in which advertising messages will be seen in the 
most sympathetic light’ (McCullagh, 2002: 79, see also McManus, 1992). 
 
While the existence of a long term trend towards media concentration is well-
established (Curran, 2002: 130, McChesney, 1999), some of the more totalising 
aspects of functionalist political economy have frequently been disputed, not 
least by its elision of countervailing tendencies that pull the media in counter-
hegemonic directions (see Curran, 2002: 151-55 for a summary). Querying some 
of the assumptions of more radical traditions, Curran (2002, p.130) points, for 
example, to a decrease in direct proprietorial control in the modern era, with 
media owners more likely to be ‘market-oriented pragmatists’. Other strands, 
influenced by French neo-Marxism (e.g. Gramsci, 1971) recognise the ‘semi-
autonomous status of media’ (Tuchman, 2002: 81) but suggest that media 
‘nevertheless ‘exercise hegemony by limiting both the specific agendas of the 
political process and the cultural universes made available through media 
representations’. 
 
While political economy approaches have ably and productively demonstrated 
structural affinities between commercial media enterprises and national, 
regional and global political and economic configurations, definitively linking this 
to news output is not straightforward. The ‘convergence hypothesis’ (Steemers, 
1999: 50) referred to in Chapter 2 suggests evidence that the ‘style and ethos’ of 
programming on public broadcasters differs little from private competitors, a 
theme discussed by Brants (1998: 328) with respect to similar treatments of 
news and current affairs by European public and private broadcasters and 
Hoynes’ (2002) analysis of US public television. 
 
More broadly, the political-economic critique of news as a commodity suggests, 
inter alia, that topics that that are costly to cover, which are seen as potentially 
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alienating viewers or insufficiently interesting to those sections of the audience 
most coveted by advertisers are less likely to be covered (McCullagh, 2002: 79-
80), and that the economic imperative to hold viewers’ attentions leads to 
presentational styles that favour the dramatic, the entertaining, as well as 
emphasising a ‘human interest’ orientation (van Zoonen, 1991, 1994, McCullagh, 
2002: 59). 
 
Other influences on output exerted by the economic organisation of media 
enterprises include a long-term reduction in media pluralism, driven in part by 
the high entry costs for new entrants (Curran, 2002: 148), a factor associated 
with the decline of radical press in the UK and elsewhere; the homogenising 
influence of an increasing reliance on news agency services as newsroom staffing 
levels shrink (Krauss, 2000, Davies, 2008, Gitlin, 1980: 273); the formative 
influence of a competitive journalistic ethos (Ehrlich, 1995); and the impact of 
advertising (Curran, 1986). 
 
While political-economic accounts tend to lay the stress on the economic rather 
than the political (Schudson, 1991), political influences on the media are legion. 
They include a ‘wide range of coercive, regulatory and patronage powers’ 
(Curran, 2002: 148) possessed by the state, which for Curran include legal limits 
on freedom of expression, partisan allocation of newspaper, TV and radio 
licenses, control over public broadcasting governance, control over regulatory 
bodies, and even the provision of financial aid to pro-government media- all of 
which have been deployed by different states at different times in the interests of 
instrumentalising the media as an agency of social control (Curran, 1978). 
 
4.2.5 Cultural influences and the analysis of news output 
 
Devereux (1995: 111, see also Curran, 2002: 108) writes that a ‘growing interest 
in the ideological functions of the media’ from the 1960s onward saw the 
utilisation of qualitative textual analysis methodologies like frame and discourse 
analysis to discern ‘the ways in which news texts produce particular perspectives 
on social reality, while blurring or obscuring others’ (Tuchman, 2002: 81). 
 106 
 
 
Cultural approaches emphasise ‘the constraining force of broad cultural 
traditions and symbolic systems’ Schudson (1991: 143) over the news 
production process. It recognises that news inevitably ‘draws upon the ideas, 
images and assumptions that are embedded in cultural tradition’ (Curran, 2002: 
128, see also Hallin and Mancini, 1984). Culturalist perspectives developed partly 
from a recognition that ‘day-today “relative autonomy” of the journalist and news 
producers’ was a reality in most modern media organisations (Hall et al. 1978: 
57, cited in Curran, 2002: 113), leading researchers to ‘pay more attention than 
before to wider cultural and ideological influences’ (Curran, 2002: 113). 
 
Given that cultural approaches to the analysis of news texts have encompassed a 
broad theoretical and methodological and topical diversity, it is sufficient here to 
refer to some historic and contemporary work particularly germane to the 
concerns of this project: specifically, research on media representations of social 
conflict and the present economic crisis. 
 
Van Dijk (1988: 9) notes that the British tradition of ideological analysis of media 
output in the last quarter of the 20th century frequently focused on issues of class. 
In this vein, Curran (2002: 109) highlights the contribution of the Glasgow 
University Media Group, which made a ‘concerted assault on a liberal conception 
of public service broadcasting as a disinterested source of information and 
balanced forum of public debate’, demonstrating in a series of studies in the 70s 
and 80s that ‘much television reporting reflected the assumptions of the 
powerful’ (ibid) (see Glasgow University Media Group 1976, 1980, 1982, 1985). 
 
Curran (2002) highlights other studies, including those by Halloran, Elliot and 
Murdock (1970), Cohen (1980), Young (1974), Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke 
and Roberts (1978) and Beharrell and Philo (1977) which have looked at media 
representations of subaltern and “deviant” groups of various kinds (including 
protesters, youth gangs, muggers, and drug users). These took an interest in 
patterns of selection and bureaucratic constraints on newsmaking as well as 
exploring how issues are diagnosed and the extent to which news texts supported 
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dominant ideologies. Despite methodological and theoretical diversity, these 
broadly argued that the media construction of these issues was to a strong degree 
‘consonant with dominant interests’ (ibid: 109), concluding in Hall’s (1977: 340) 
terms that media frames issues in terms drawn from ‘a very limited ideological 
or explanatory repertoire’. 
 
The apparent readiness by which the voices and perspectives of the powerful are 
transmitted through patterns of issue representation without transgressing 
formal professional, institutional or regulatory prohibitions on partiality is 
emphasised by Schudson (1991: 144) who cites Bennett’s (1982: 306) suggestion 
that broadcast news programmes ‘achieve their ideological effectivity precisely 
through their observation of the statutory requirements of balance and 
impartiality’ (italics in original).  
 
This may be explained in terms of the cultural contingency governing the 
activation of journalistic balance and impartiality norms referred to in Chapter 3, 
with issues and issue positions existing within spheres of consensus, deviance or 
legitimate controversy (Hallin, 1986) rendering certain speech ‘uncontested’ or 
‘contested’ (Gamson and Stuart, 1992). 
 
Cognisant of the contingent status of the values underpinning issue 
representation, Cottle (2008: 858) cautions against the risk of adopting static 
assumptions about news framings based on past research, pointing to 
contemporary research around, for example, protest and demonstration 
reporting in a range of areas including the environment and war that he sees as 
pointing to the ‘variable, shifting and sometimes more progressive alignments of 
the news media’s reporting…than in the past’. 
 
Contemporary literature on media representations of financial and economic 
crisis has further reinforced prior findings in relation to elite sourcing patterns 
and ideological affinities with political and economic power, which frequently 
conspire to produce framings of crisis that have supported neoliberal crisis 
construals and crisis management. Research by Berry, (2013), Wahl-Jorgensen et 
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al. (2013), Schechter (2009) Tambini (2010) and pre-crisis research by Davis 
(2000), Durham (2007), Kantola (2006) emphasises, variously, ‘the role of elite 
sourcing, financial constraints, political pressure, advertising, deficiencies in 
journalistic training and resources and the impact of public relations’ (Berry, 
2013: 254) as contributing both to failures in anticipating crisis and a subsequent 
lack of critical engagement with elite explanations (see Marron, 2010 and Fraser, 
2009 for further discussion in relation to UK journalism and Starkman (2009), 
Harber (2009) and Huxford (2012) on the US journalism context).  
 
Analyses of European dimensions of the contemporary financial crisis and its 
aftermath have demonstrated, in particular, media tendencies to elide systemic 
critique in favour of reproducing hegemonic crisis frames, in particular colluding 
in scapegoating the governments and citizens of peripheral nations (Mylonas, 
2015), a finding also established by Tracy (2012) and Sarikakis (2012), although 
Tzogopoulous (2013) identified a substantial media emphasis on the 
humanitarian dimensions of crisis in Greece. 
 
A small but burgeoning critical Irish literature emerging from the post-2008 
crises has begun to look at the role played by Irish journalism in proffering 
particular accounts of crisis and evaluating solutions. McCullagh’s (2010) 
argument that the discursive space opened up for challengers in the immediate 
wake of crisis was short-lived, as a ‘discursive fightback’ by a coalition of Irish 
political and economic elites successfully helped reframe the crisis in ways more 
congruent with their material and ideological interests is one that has been 
supported by subsequent evidence. 
 
Both Mercille (2014a, see also 2014b, 2014c) and Silke (2014, see also Preston 
and Silke, 2011) undertook studies using quantitative and qualitative approaches 
in order to discern the ideological orientation of a range of organs of the agenda-
setting Irish press during a series of pre-crisis and in-crisis critical discourse 
moments. Both come to similar conclusions about the prevailing ideological 
orientation of the Irish press, which they characterise as conservative and 
supportive of both policies which led to the crisis and crisis management 
 109 
 
techniques deployed by the state. Also in a political-economic vein, Fahy et al. 
(2010) found from a series of interviews with financial journalists’ pre-crisis 
evidence of close relationships with their sources, contributing to soft reporting 
and even advocacy of financial interests, suggesting the belated journalistic 
adoption of a critical orientation only after the onset of acute crisis symptoms 
(see also the testimony to the Banking Inquiry made by Browne, 2015: 841). 
Cawley’s (2012) press analysis found evidence of framing consonant with a 
favourable orientation toward neoliberal responses to crisis, notably via the 
consistent ‘othering’ of the public sector which is counterposed against the need 
for the state to adopt the logics of private sector in the interests of securing 
economic recovery. Elsewhere, Rafter (2014: 606) confirmed studies undertaken 
elsewhere that demonstrate the dominance of official sources in news discourse, 
arguing that coverage in the programmes analysed reflected a ‘narrow insider 
perspective’ and told through the eyes of (mostly male) journalists, pro-
guarantee politicians, city and business group representatives’. 
 
4.3 Methodological approach 
 
4.3.1 Towards a methodological synthesis 
 
The overall methodological approach is shaped in the first instance by the aim to 
complement the field approach utilised in Chapters 2 and 3 by undertaking a 
study focusing on the observed institutional enactment of public service 
journalism’s field relations vis-à-vis the political, economic and civil society 
spheres and that, through the exploration of practices of inclusion, 
representation and participation, goes beyond the specificities of contemporary 
crisis and helps discern Irish PSB’s overall approach to communicative 
democracy in the public sphere.  
 
This is accomplished by the adoption of a pluralistic methodological approach 
that selectively draws on the research traditions discussed above. It aims to 
combine the utility of social-constructivist accounts in the sociologies of news 
and work that critically interrogate professional norms and daily practices of 
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journalistic work in the newsroom; that draws on political-economic and new 
institutionalist accounts of the affordances and constraints on institutionally-
embedded professional autonomy; that recognises the value of critical cultural 
studies’ emphasis on discerning ideological meanings in practices and patterns 
of representation in journalistic output; and that foregrounds the status of media 
production as a ‘site of ideological-democratic struggle’ (Carpentier, 2011) 
between media professionals, publics and other actors. 
 
On this basis, four methods were applied. Firstly, ethnographic study through 
direct observation of newsroom work practices was undertaken, allowing the 
researcher to witness the daily operationalisation of journalistic ideologies and 
practices. Interviews with broadcasting professionals were conducted, 
facilitating the expression of self-conceptions of journalistic professionalism. 
Separately, textual analysis of journalistic output was completed, allowing for the 
examination of particular crisis construals evident in the product of journalistic 
labour. Finally, the research involved participant observation in an institutional 
mechanism of public participation in organisational governance within the 
broadcaster. 
 
This synthesis of methods aims at a measure of methodological holism that is 
cognisant of Cottle’s (2003: 17) observation that ‘news “text” and production 
“context”’ are not ‘separate analytical moments’, but ‘mutually constitutive and 
interpenetrating’. As argued by Willig (2013: 5), the adoption of a field 
perspective, bridging ‘micro and macro levels of investigation’ to newsroom 
ethnography helps negate the limitations of many prior studies where 
‘ethnographers rarely investigated the political economy of journalism or the 
wider cultural implications of the daily practices of journalists’ (ibid). 
 
The complementarity of analysing both texts and contexts lies in the recognition 
that analysts solely of news output are ‘confronted with the products of action 
but denied access to the processes which lie behind them’ (Schlesinger, 1987: 
xxxii), problematically eliding key aspects of the ‘circuit of mass communications’ 
(Philo, 1999: xiii), including the link between media representations and the 
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material realities of their production (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 22).  
 
In its attendance to the observed practices of journalistic production, the 
testimony of practitioners, the ideological implications of news texts and 
structural avenues of public access to the field of public service broadcasting 
governance, the project’s methodology offers a tentative synthesis of the 
phenomenological/social-organisational, political-economic and cultural/textual 
traditions, responding to Tuchman’s (2002: 88) call for recognition of the natural 
complementarity of approaches analysing empirically the multiple ‘moments’ of 
news production - ‘its political-economic preconditions, its organizational 
enactment, and its textual articulation’. 
 
4.3.2 Venues and methods of analysis 
 
4.3.2.1 Newsroom observations 
 
The ethnographic portion of the research encompasses two components- 
newsroom observations and interviews.  As a bustling, concentrated venue of 
journalistic practice, the ‘separate social universe’ (Bourdieu, 1993) of the 
newsroom represented an ideal venue and vantage point for ethnographic 
observations, which took place over a three-month duration from April to July 
2012 in the newsroom of the main RTÉ campus at Montrose in Dublin. 
 
The approach taken sought to respond to Cottle’s (2000a: 22) calls to, firstly, 
avoid an over-emphasis on journalistic routines, which he views as tending 
toward an ‘organizational functionalism’ (see also Eliasoph, 1988), instead taking 
journalistic agency seriously within its distinctive internal ‘regimes of truth’, 
including the objectivity norm and its ‘closest correlates’ of ‘balance, impartiality, 
fairness, truthfulness, factual accuracy’ (Cottle, 2003: 18). The approach also 
recognises that these regimes ‘do not exhaust the epistemological claims of 
journalism’ (ibid) and that ethnographers should be alive to the existence of 
variegated, subjectivist news epistemologies and professional praxis that go 
beyond official canons and frameworks. In addition, contra scholarship positing 
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a certain professional ignorance of audiences, ethnographers should recognise 
that an ‘imagined audience’ may nonetheless be operative, informing everything 
from story selection, content, and presentation style (ibid: 11). 
 
The observational focus of the ethnographic work thus emphasises the study of, 
inter alia, the daily editorial decision-making, institutionalised modes of 
reflexivity, journalistic conceptualisations of and responses to external and 
internal crisis, with the vantage points adopted jointly determined by both the 
advance identification of suitable locales but shaped by the contingencies, 
constraints and opportunities of fieldwork. These included observation of the 
general newsroom milieu, daily and weekly editorial meetings, and flows of 
internal electronic communication. 
 
4.3.2.2 Practitioner interviews 
 
Recognising the insufficiency of a merely observational approach, the 
methodology acknowledges the need to take the indigenous, ‘experience-near’ 
(Geertz, 1976) meanings of journalists seriously. 
 
On the basis that ‘both questions and answers must be discovered from 
informants’ (Spradley, 1979: 84) conducting semi-structured interviews while 
immersed in the institutional environment of the newsroom facilitates a more 
fluid approach to theory-building and theory-testing. A total of 32 semi-
structured interviews were arranged and carried out while present in the 
newsroom, with selection undertaken on the dual basis of convenience sampling 
(including serendipitous encounters) and the desire to encompass a range of both 
journalistic specialisms and professional roles. 
 
The overall goal of this research component dovetails closely with that of the 
ethnographic observations: to assess the professional orientation of the 
journalistic habitus with respect to its political role in a time of crisis. This is 
accomplished through a focus on the following meta-themes: a) journalistic 
conceptions of crisis and the durability of journalistic norms; b) the role of (public 
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service) journalism in the mediation of politics; and c) the rightful place of the 
public in the project of public service broadcasting.  
 
Together, these observational and testimonial accounts of the journalistic habitus 
seek to contribute a more thorough understanding of public service journalism’s 
political interventions, seeking to assess the sensitivity of the journalistic habitus 
to hegemonic and counter-hegemonic power. 
 
4.3.2.3 Framing in news texts 
 
Above all, the inclusion of the analysis of journalistic news and current affairs 
texts in the methodological mix may be justified on the basis that the selections 
made in news output inevitably betray particular issue construals by ‘actively 
ruling in and ruling out certain realities, offering the maps and codes 
which…assign problematic events and relations to explanatory contexts’ (Hall, 
1977). 
 
The selection of the specific thematic focus of the analysis was guided both by the 
desire to identify an issue complex particularly suitable for focused analysis, 
reflective of what Chilton (1987) calls ‘critical discourse moments’, as well as one 
which sharply demonstrated the intersection of the local, the regional and the 
global dimensions of capitalist and democratic crisis. 
 
On this basis, a series of key moments pertaining to the political dimensions of 
what has become known as the Euro ‘debt crisis’ (Macartney, 2013) between 
2011 and 2013 were selected, centring on a series of clashes of crisis 
management between national governments in Greece and Italy and 
supranational governance at the level of the institutions of the European Union. 
The exigencies engendered by this phase of crisis, it is suggested, would be likely 
to elicit with particular clarity journalistic “framings” (Hertog and McLeod, 2001: 
148) of crisis- ‘interpretive structures’ (Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad, 2000, 
cited in Norris, 1995: 358) which ‘diagnose, evaluate and prescribe’ (Entman, 
1993: 52) aspects of perceived reality.  
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A corpus of 156 television and radio items from the programme genres of news 
and current affairs pertaining to key phases of the Euro debt crisis was generated, 
representing a full population of coverage across defined topical and temporal 
axes, allowing for both a ‘case study’ (Van Dijk, 1988: 5) approach and 
comparative analysis within different parts of the corpus. 
 
This analysis is aimed at exploring how the agenda of ‘legitimate political 
controversy’ (Cobb and Elder, 1971: 904) is shaped, inquiring into the extent to 
which observable crisis construals in journalistic texts either buttress and 
legitimise or challenge neoliberal crisis diagnoses and responses. 
 
That frame analysis specialises in unearthing the ‘deep structure’ of ideological 
formations (van Dijk, 2011: 393) underpins its suitability for the task of 
interrogating ideological meanings in ostensibly non-ideological discourses. 
 
The sensitivity to the ideological underpinnings of media texts seeks to answer 
the call of Downey et al. (2014) for critical media analysis to, at this present 
conjuncture of crisis and in conditions of neoliberal hegemony, (once again) 
‘rediscover’ ideology, along the lines of that advocated by Hall (1988). Attention 
to ideology recognises the Althusserian view of the media’s role as ideological 
institutions who “hail” or “interpellate” audiences as subjects with common 
understandings of crisis and interests in particular modes of crisis resolution (see 
also Van Gorp, 2007: 63). The constructionist (Van Gorp, 2007: 64) recognition 
of discursive frames as ‘socially constitutive as well as socially shaped’ (Wodak 
and Fairclough, 1997: 258) underlines the significance of interpellative practices 
through framing. 
 
4.3.2.4 Managing public participation 
 
Interest in the penetration from below of publics into professional journalistic 
practice is a recurring analytic focus within the three research methods outlined 
above, with newsroom observations, interview testimony and textual analysis 
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revealing much about the actual and desirable role of public voices and agendas- 
real, ‘imagined’ (Cottle, 2003: 11) and ‘implied’ (Schudson, 1991: 152) in daily 
journalistic practice.  Given the ‘permanent tension’ (Carpentier, 2011: 10) 
between participation, representation and power, the ways in which public 
involvement in public institutions is envisioned and actualised speaks to 
underlying normative orientations to democracy and publicity (see also Hagen, 
1999). 
 
Following the completion of the period of newsroom ethnography, a 
serendipitous opportunity to directly take part in the broadcaster’s formal, 
statutory structure of public participation in institutional governance allowed for 
an expansion of the research inquiry into public broadcasting’s participative 
logics beyond journalistic practice. 
 
With this component of the research aimed at answering the question to what 
extent do RTÉ’s modes of participation in and through media reflect the status of 
the public as a partner in democratic communication, a brief review of RTÉ’s 
historic and contemporary modes of interfacing with the public is followed a 
detailed study of the democratic affordances and constraints of the Audience 
Council, based on the author’s period of two and a half years of participation as 
an ordinary member of the Audience Council. 
 
In addition to a general discussion the Council’s history, its place in the RTÉ 
governance structure and the evolution of its functions, the chapter recounts a 
series of episodes during my time on the Council that illustrate exogenous and 
endogenous affordances and limits on the Council’s status as an avenue of public 
agenda-building. 
 
4.3.3 Research ethics 
 
The nature of the venues of research and methodologies employed necessitated 
paying close attention to the ethical implications of the project before, during and 
after the periods of primary research. 
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To this end, prior to gaining access to RTÉ and following discussions with 
newsroom management, I provided details on the project’s proposed approaches 
to data gathering that sought to balance the informational and access needs of the 
research with the imperatives of mitigating disruption to a busy work 
environment, as well as the necessities of respecting individual privacy and 
maintaining appropriate levels of discretion and confidentiality.  
 
Following the granting of access, this was subsequently expanded into a general 
information sheet on the research project and its methodology which was made 
available to all staff (see Appendix 5-1). In addition, prospective interviewees 
were provided with written documentation on, inter alia, the institutional ethical 
framework in which the research was undertaken (University College Cork, 
2010), procedures for ensuring informed consent (Sin, 2005), anonymisation 
processes (following a modified form of those prescribed by the Irish Qualitative 
Data Archive (2008), as well as detail on data collection, management, secure 
storage and ethical publication of data. 
 
The use of audio recording equipment was confined to formal interviews where 
express permission to make a recording was granted. All interviewees were given 
the opportunity to specify the terms on which interview data may be used, 
including their preferred extent of anonymisation. Requests for quote approval 
and the provision of interview transcripts were also honoured.  
 
During my time on the RTÉ Audience Council, my status as a PhD candidate 
researching the organisation was known to colleagues, and my intentions to write 
about participative structures, including the Council, were communicated to the 
Chair in writing. In the accounts of Council business, individuals are neither 
named nor directly quoted, and internal rules about disclosures are honoured. 
 
 
 
 
 117 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The four chapters that follow report on the implementation and findings of the 
research methods discussed above. Data accruing from the period of ethnography 
in RTÉ, including observations and interviews, is explored in Chapters 5 and 6 
respectively. Chapter 7 focuses on the analysis of journalistic framing in news 
texts. Chapter 8 reports on RTÉ’s participatory practices, as well as an extended 
case study of participant observation on the Audience Council. 
 
In the concluding Chapter 9, findings are analysed holistically in the context of 
their contributions toward answering the research question. 
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 119 
 
Chapter 5: Making the News I: A Snapshot of 
Journalistic Production and Reflexivity 
 
5.1 Setting the scene 
 
5.1.1 Crisis contexts 
 
2012 was not supposed to have begun like this. To mark the 50th anniversary of 
television broadcasting in Ireland, RTÉ had commissioned a range of 
programming in the hopes of stimulating a celebratory, nostalgic and forward-
looking mood about the nation and broadcasting’s role in narrating the story of 
Irish life (RTÉ, 2012a).  
 
With macroeconomic indicators suggesting the worst of the crisis had passed 
(though with few signs of substantive economic “recovery”), it seemed as good a 
time as any both for a period of organised reflection on the past, present and 
future of broadcasting and for my own planned ethnographic sojourn in the RTÉ 
newsroom. But while the research interest in gaining access to the newsroom was 
justified on the basis of its value in observing at first hand the journalistic 
mediation of national and international dimensions of crisis, the fallout of a series 
of immediate crises internal to RTÉ News and Current Affairs threatened the 
likelihood of gaining research access. 
 
The most visible dimension of internal crisis was an editorial error which was 
(eventually) seen by the broadcaster as ‘the most serious editorial question that 
has arisen since the late 1960s' (RTÉ, 2011a) at the broadcaster, arising from the 
libelling of a Catholic priest in the Mission to Prey episode of RTÉ’s flagship 
television current affairs programme Primetime earlier in 2011, in which it was 
alleged that the Irish Catholic priest Fr. Kevin Reynolds had raped a teenage girl 
in Kenya and fathered her child.  
 
Following the revelation that the accusation was entirely without basis and what 
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was widely seen as a belated and defensive initial response, a series of internal 
and external reviews were instigated, including a statutory inquiry (RTÉ, 2011b, 
BAI, 2012). 
 
The outcomes of these reviews and inquiries included the departure of two senior 
newsroom managers, an RTE-initiated series of major personnel, editorial 
management structure and operational changes to the News and Current Affairs 
department (RTÉ, 2012b), as well as a damning report from the regulator, the 
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, whose findings of a ‘significant failure of 
editorial and managerial controls’ (BAI, 2012: 4) and the existence of a ‘“group-
think” mentality' (ibid: 6) led it to impose a fine of €200,000 on the broadcaster- 
close to the maximum allowed under law. 
 
The atmosphere of crisis was not helped by a further significant editorial blunder 
that winter- widely seen as meaningfully shaping the outcome of the Irish 
presidential election campaign- nor by signs of internal dissent with the quality 
of RTÉ’s investigation journalism (Coyle and O’Brien, 2012 and Milotte, 2012), 
reports of ‘crushed’ internal morale (Hilliard, 2012) and, sensing weakness in 
Montrose, opportunistic attacks on the broadcaster by politicians (Coulter and 
Cullen, 2012). 
 
The broadcaster’s deteriorating financial situation represented a further, graver 
still context of internal crisis, with an internal austerity drive in full swing by 
2012. With much of the low-hanging fruit already picked, a sword of Damocles 
hung over every division of the broadcaster, with swingeing cuts to pay and 
reduced resources part of a response that also included the very real prospect of 
wholesale service cuts- not merely salami-slicing budgets- a context whose 
sensitivity was exacerbated by the growing pains of technological and work 
practice modernisation. 
 
In 2012, “crisis” for RTÉ meant pay and resource cuts, editorial controversy, 
wounded morale and a fight not just in terms of restoring editorial credibility but 
organisational survival.   
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5.1.2 Gaining access 
 
For a newsroom not accustomed to the presence of external researchers 
observing journalistic practices, the internal turmoil was nearly enough to 
prevent any ethnographic work taking place at all. The journey from initial 
contact with the broadcaster in April 2011 to the beginning of the fieldwork just 
over a year later was characterised by managerial concerns around internal 
sensitivities to external scrutiny, the potential for disrupting the life of a busy 
newsroom, and worries about confidentiality and security- concerns which only 
grew as the Fr. Reynolds controversy came to light in the intervening months. 
Nonetheless, an initial offer of a one-week period of research to be undertaken 
during the quiet summer months was later renegotiated, yielding the eventual 
agreement of an eleven-week period to begin the following Spring. 
 
The period of fieldwork from April 16th to June 31st 2012 was a time of 
significant internal turbulence and uncertainty. It was a time of interregnum 
between the old and the new, bookended as it was by the departure and arrival 
of new senior editorial management in News and Current Affairs, and peppered 
with several occasions in which the newsroom became the news itself. For a 
project in which gaining a measure of trust from news workers would be critical, 
it was perhaps not the most felicitous time to be embarking on ethnographic 
fieldwork. For an organisation and news division used to successfully protecting 
its borders from outsiders, the newsroom had been suddenly exposed to the glare 
of a range of observers- a bevy of investigators, politicians, and now a young 
budding sociologist. When I did finally ascend the twisted staircase from the main 
reception at the RTÉ Television building to begin the fieldwork proper, I quickly 
became aware that I was entering a workplace under strain- a realisation that 
would shape the 51 days I would go on to spend there. 
 
5.1.3 Doors opened and shut: maintaining and expanding access 
 
The scale of the internal turmoil and its likely impact on ethnographic work came 
quickly into view, with a number of early encounters with staff who volunteered 
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details on the current newsroom atmosphere. One described the place as in a 
state resembling grieving following the recent departure of who was by many 
accounts a talismanic, highly respected leader. That the grieving process was to 
some extent a forcibly privatised one was conveyed by several staff who, 
cognisant the notoriously leaky nature of the Montrose ‘fishbowl’, did not feel 
able to express with confidence that their internal discussions would not appear 
in tomorrow’s newspapers. 
 
The body blow of the editorial crisis to newsroom morale was only worsened by 
the recent departure of many long-serving staff, with a popular voluntary 
redundancy scheme attracting a significant number of newsroom participants 
and consequently effecting a loss of institutional memory and contributing to a 
sense of flux and uncertainty. 
 
Save for two carefully-worded suggestions from senior management- ‘Less is 
more’ and ‘be gentle’-, I was let loose on the newsroom with only the briefest of 
introductions to either junior or senior staff, and allocated a spot at the back wall 
of the long, narrow open-plan newsroom, nestled between the teams of the Irish 
language Nuacht (Irish language news) and Nationwide programmes. The 
selection of such a secluded spot was, it was made clear, not an accident, 
providing an early reminder that achieving mere physical presence to the 
newsroom was only the first stage in a broader quest for access. 
 
On the other hand, it was a vantage point not without benefits: principally, the 
close proximity to the staff pigeon holes for letters, both aiding in the 
identification of unfamiliar staff and providing a good opportunity to engage in 
small-talk with passing journalists.  
 
My most immediate problem of access, however, was of the most mundane kind. 
Lacking an employee card to get in and out of the newsroom, I was reliant on the 
kindness of strangers to tailgate in and out of various parts of the campus, despite 
the prominently displayed signs admonishing the practice. When I was granted 
an access card a couple of weeks into the fieldwork, I found, conversely, that there 
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were few doors it couldn’t open. However, crossing the inter-personal barriers 
required for useful observations and cultivating informants proved a 
substantially more difficult challenge. 
 
The ethnographic literature (see for example, Geertz, 1973: 412) frequently 
speaks of the difficulties of researcher “invisibility” and the challenges of gaining 
a measure of acceptance by the researched group. Despite closely conforming to 
the field’s demographic characteristics in many ways- as a white, educated 
middle-class man, I neither looked nor sounded out of place- a series of 
countervailing factors ensured that the challenges of access would not be easily 
overcome. These included the professionalised nature of the setting, the multiple 
internal contexts of emergency, in addition to my relative youth (24 at the time) 
and the critical posture of the research. 
 
Intermediaries confided in me at various occasions that some hackles had been 
raised in various quarters by my presence, mostly down to uncertainty about the 
true motivations of the fieldwork and its timing. Introductions were intermittent 
and cordial when they did occur, although occasionally punctuated by a 
narrowing of eyes and questions about how I was going to use the information I 
gathered, and on a couple of occasions paraphrasing my explanation of 
ethnography as simply 'spying'. That conversations in my vicinity frequently took 
place in hushed tones did little to assuage my concern that I was not welcome. 
 
My initial goals to embed myself in the milieu of several key agenda-setting news 
and current affairs radio programme teams and to secure interviews with 
journalists were both quickly dashed, with programme gatekeepers in both the 
cases of Morning Ireland and News at One (prestigious and popular daily news 
programmes on RTÉ Radio One) not at all keen to engage. Personalised letters 
delivered to journalists and editors elicited only a single emailed response. A 
more hands-on approach was required, yet catching journalists during idle 
moments was an enduring difficulty, as was the honing of a sufficiently non-
threatening “elevator pitch” to encourage journalists to talk about their work. 
One exchange with a programme editor alerted me to the extent of the difficulties 
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facing a media sociologist in the newsroom milieu: my passing reference to 
newsroom work as entailing a process of “production” elicited the sharp response 
that news was principally what happened, not simply “produced”. It was a 
reminder that, as has been articulated by numerous ethnographies, that 
sociologists often speak a language that journalists ‘mistrust and misunderstand’ 
(Schudson, 1991: 143, see also Hansen, 1998: 53). 
 
Access to the twice-daily editorial meetings and weekly news planning meetings 
was granted, but the subject of some explicit and implicit negotiation. Daily 
editorial conferences had both a “public” and “private” component, with the first 
open to all newsroom journalists, and followed by a (usually brief) editors-only 
discussion. Having been asked on several occasions in my first week to leave at 
the end of the public component on the grounds that sensitive issues were due to 
be discussed, I subsequently beat a tactical retreat from this portion in the 
interests of demonstrating a sensitivity to their concerns. However, when 
‘sensitivities’ were subsequently cited as a reason to exclude me from attending 
weekly editorial planning meetings, it was eventually decided that this was an 
unnecessarily restrictive stance. Such a reversal was, I felt, at least partly 
attributable to the intervention of senior newsroom management who, although 
at all times distant, aloof and only outwardly interested in my work insofar as it 
impinged upon their staff, nonetheless on several occasions intervened to ensure 
that my formal access, at least, to key sites of observation was not unduly 
impeded. 
 
Testing the often-invisible lines demarcating my level of access was frequently 
necessary. For instance, efforts to observe a meeting of the Referendum Steering 
Group which oversaw editorial policy during the 2012 European Fiscal Treaty 
referendum were frustrated by inertia and non-communication rather than by 
direct refusal. On another occasion, when an all-staff meeting was convened to 
communicate updates on restructuring initiatives in the News and Current Affairs 
division, (including potential salary cuts and redeployments), my request to 
observe was met with a furrowed brow and a curt refusal; it was made clear that 
this was a family matter, and it wasn’t my place to intrude on private grief.  
 125 
 
 
On other occasions, pushing for greater access met with eventual success. Having 
been told by an informant early on that the newsroom's computer network was 
not simply an important work tool but in fact the very "nerve centre" of the entire 
news operation, I was initially refused access first on vague technical grounds and 
then on the basis that such deep access would not be ‘appropriate’ to a non-
employee. Further representations made in stronger terms resulted in being 
granted broad (albeit read-only) access to the internal intranet including the 
newsroom communication systems.  
 
As an observer rather than a participant, my lack of apparent function in the 
newsroom, paucity of prior acquaintances and spatial isolation meant that the 
opportunities for useful observation- let alone forging any kind of meaningful 
relationships- were constrained. My instinct to respect the privacy of the still-
reeling staff, reinforced by a fear of rejection arising from my own sense of 
insecurity as an apprentice researcher, wrestled daily with my sociological 
curiosity to learn about journalistic practice and ideologies. 
 
That on each of the 51 days of the fieldwork I ate alone in the canteen is testament 
to the failure of the ice to ever really break. However, although never fully 
surmounting either my own reserve or the middle-class guardedness of so many 
of the staff I conversed with, my time in the newsroom nonetheless yielded data 
from a range of sources. 
 
5.2 Greasing the wheels of news production: editorial conferences 
 
5.2.1 Structure and routine 
 
At 10am every morning, news and programme editors representing a variety of 
RTÉ News programmes across TV, radio and online services file into a room just 
downstairs from the main newsroom and adjacent to the atrium of the RTÉ 
Television building. For at least half an hour each weekday morning but shorter 
in the afternoon follow-up meeting, they took part in the daily ritual of the 
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editorial news conference. These meetings served a variety of functions, 
including planning, co-ordinating, and self-critique, and represented a ‘rich 
source of dense journalistic comment and verbalised decision-making’, providing 
‘some of the most insightful professional exchanges, revealing journalistic values 
and judgements in action’ (Hansen, 1998: 56). 
 
Although the bulk of each meeting was nominally open to all journalistic staff, 
they were the main preserve of news and programme editors as well as section 
heads like those of online and sport, with correspondents and reporters rarely 
seen. The more senior staff typically took the seats around the large boardroom 
table in the centre of the room, with latecomers often forced to stand owing to a 
paucity of chairs. The morning meeting, which was the longer and more 
important meeting by virtue of its agenda-setting role for the rest of the day was 
usually headed up by the Chief News Editor, whose frequently late arrival was 
met with the hushed tones reminiscent of a school headmaster entering a 
classroom, quickly breaking up the polite murmurings. Sitting at the head of the 
table, the Chief News Editor would begin every meeting the same way: by first 
distributing copies of the news list, and asking the room if there were any issues 
they would like to raise, usually in relation to the previous day’s output. Then, he 
would read from the news list a series of news items, many of which would have 
already been assigned to journalists earlier that morning. This was the 
centrepiece of the editorial conference, a key intermediary stage between 
newsgathering and publishing, with the discussions representing an important 
link in the chain of the co-ordination of the newsroom’s journalistic and logistical 
resources. Story topics and news “hooks” were clarified, the journalist(s) in 
charge were named, crewing requirements were specified, as well as the type of 
report that was desired- be it a full ‘news package’ for television transmission or 
simply some filed copy for use online or on radio. Justifications would frequently 
be offered for why a certain story identified on the news list would be dropped 
or was no longer of interest. The Foreign Editor or their deputy would go through 
the day’s prospective news from abroad in a similar fashion. Afterward, very brief 
updates from Online, Sport and the radio News at One were solicited where their 
plans for the day were outlined, after which the ‘public’ portion of the meeting 
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closed and senior editors held a usually brief and private addendum to the 
meeting to which I was not party. 
 
5.2.2 Applying the editorial “nose for news” 
 
The Chief News editor, rapidly scanning through the news list, applied news 
values in a quick-fire shorthand, picking and choosing from the menu of stories 
on offer. Casting his eye over the topics on the news list, he would briskly read 
out the title identifier- the story “slug”- and deliver his judgement. An item might 
be immediately cast aside with the phrases ‘not very promising’, ‘we’re not going 
near it’, ‘it’s not very newsy’, or ‘unlikely to produce anything great’ or simply 
‘dull stuff’. Another story might be designated a stay of execution with the words 
‘we’ll watch it from afar’ with a view to covering it if its potential newsworthiness 
is later realised. Other stories would be more enthusiastically embraced for a 
variety of reasons. A story might be so obviously suitable that no comment is 
required, or it might be adjudged to offer ‘good actuality’, provide ‘good colour’ 
or ‘great pictures’. It might simply be ‘a good yarn’ that will interest the viewers. 
Generally, the most crucial thing is that a ‘news line’ or ‘peg’ is found to ‘hang’ a 
topic on. As might be expected from editors working predominantly within the 
television medium, a strong visual orientation was observed. If pictures could not 
be obtained from an RTÉ cameraman or an external source, even a strong news 
line would usually not be enough for a story to make the grade. 
 
Potential items that are adjudged to be insufficiently worthy of a standalone 
package but which nonetheless deserve a mention are to be ‘swept up into the 
main report’ by the assigned journalist, evoking an image of the journalist as an 
efficient housekeeper, wasting nothing. Editors frequently asked for existing 
stories to be ‘refreshed’ for later bulletins. Stories that are commissioned but are 
not broadcast that day (usually for reasons of time constraints, and the necessary 
overproduction of news) are placed ‘on the shelf’ for future use. However, some 
of these stories- called ‘held packages’- are ‘time-tied’, with a limited shelf-life, 
and must be broadcast before they ‘go stale’. Packages on the brink of expiry are 
frequently mentioned in the editorial conferences (even described as having a ‘bit 
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of a smell’), with waste frowned on. 
 
With a lot of ground to cover and not very much time to do it in, brevity reigned 
supreme, with topics very rarely discussed in any form beyond a cursory 
affirmation or rejection of a story, let alone substantive discussion on topics. This 
strongly suggested the broad diffusion of shared knowledge about how to 
approach different kinds of items based on recognisable story templates. 
Regularly recurring examples included the “reax” (reaction) package, often a 
secondary package following a main story, involving the solicitation of reaction 
to a given story by conducting a series of tightly-edited short interviews. The 
near-daily presence of a “kicker” story- a piece of “light relief” to end a bulletin, 
was similarly used as the finale of the (usually afternoon) editorial conference, 
and usually offered by the foreign editor on duty. These stories- frequently 
involving animals in humorous situations- seemed to be at least as much about 
giving editors something to smile about after the morning’s work as much as the 
viewers who would later watch the story, although it was clear that there were 
sharply different opinions of the suitability of these kind of stories, seemingly 
stratified somewhat by gender and age. 
 
The judgment of the Chief News Editor was very rarely questioned at the 
meetings I attended; when it was, it was generally an editor or group of 
programme editors requesting that a story to be included on the basis of being a 
good fit for a vacant slot on their programme run-downs.   
 
If the Chief News Editor is a sort of master sommelier, applying his expert nose 
for news to the day’s abundance of potential programme segments, then the team 
around him are one part chef (selecting an array of ingredients for their 
programmes, arranging them just so) one part triage nurse (identifying the 
relative urgency and significance of stories) and one part air traffic controller 
(directing their fleet of journalists in and out of various stories and ensuring that 
completed reports arrive in on time). 
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5.2.3 “Home” news 
 
Clocking in at around six pages though varying by day, the home news list 
distributed at every meeting was far longer and more substantial than the single 
page foreign list, reflecting the far greater resources available to RTÉ’s domestic 
newsgathering operation. An organic, constantly-updated electronic document 
residing on the internal computer network, the news “diary” is gradually added 
to over time in the hours, days and even weeks beforehand. Despite the dynamic 
nature of the document’s production and the variety of news contained within it, 
on a day-to-day basis much of it has a very familiar feel and structure, with a triad 
of heavyweight fields- politics, economics and the justice system- represented the 
categories that comprised the skeletal structure of news output and the bedrock 
of daily newsgathering activities in the newsroom. Political and economic news 
in particular are highly privileged news genres with dedicated staff and resources 
allocated to them through specialised teams- the RTÉ Oireachtas Unit which 
covers parliamentary affairs from its off-site base near the Dáil, and the internal 
business desk which specialises in economic and business news. 
 
The primacy of these genres was reflected in the regular pre-eminence of political 
and economic affairs on the news lists. On days when the Oireachtas was in 
session, there would generally be substantial “Dáil” “Seanad” and “Committees” 
segments on the news list containing detail on the day’s parliamentary agenda. 
“Taoiseach” frequently merited an item of its own too, with details of his daily 
engagements, whether they were photocalls, campaign launches or policy 
announcements. Presidential engagements were also a regular fixture. The laser 
focus of “politics” as represented in news list topics as beginning and ending with 
parliamentary affairs was striking, and crystallised by the comment, heard on 
more than one occasion over the summer, that there was ‘nothing happening in 
politics today really’, justified on the basis of a lack of activity in Dáil Éireann. 
 
The primacy of governmental figures in the hierarchy of legitimate political 
actors was further suggested by occasions where journalistic resources were 
deployed to trail governmental figures on trips abroad. A case in point was the 
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example of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Eamon Gilmore, whose 
temporary position as head of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) in 2012 meant that editors felt that accompanying him on a major 
foreign trip was ‘a box we had to tick’.  The idea that the foreign travel of senior 
ministers on official business was often inherently newsworthy was also evident 
in historic editorial minutes accessible to me in the newsroom. 
 
Economics and business coverage often appeared as more or less 
interchangeable categories that vied for supremacy at the top of the news list. 
Large amounts of daily coverage in relation to topics like economic data, bailout 
issues, and banking affairs were led by the duo of the Business Editor and the 
Economics Correspondent. These were even more rarely the subject of editorial 
discussion than political affairs, suggesting an implicitly legitimated greater level 
of autonomy for a small number of journalists with business and economic 
expertise. Hinting at the de-facto permanent residency on its programmes of 
RTÉ’s in-house economic and business expertise, the Chief News Editor one day 
casually joked that the Business Editor would be appearing on a news bulletin for 
his ‘daily slot’. 
 
Court reporting is another of the ever-present features on the news list. Details 
of a selection of cases taking place in a variety of national and regional courts 
were laid out on the menu, and the Chief News Editor regularly took the time to 
identify during news conferences the cases of particular interest on a given day, 
suggesting that attention to the state’s formal institutions of justice was seen as a 
crucial part of RTÉ’s informational role. 
 
5.2.4 Editorial conferences as a site of critique 
 
As well as a routinised mechanism for directing journalistic resources, editorial 
conferences represent an important opportunity for editors to raise issues about 
various aspects of their work, including their own recent broadcast output. 
 
The conference structure facilitates critical interventions by editors at the 
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beginning of the morning meeting, and in an expanded, dedicated slot at the 
“weekly review” portion of the Friday meeting. However, at the daily meetings, it 
was quite normal for no issues to be raised about the previous day’s coverage. 
When issues were raised, they tended overwhelmingly to be of a technical or 
practical nature; sometimes in relation to the logistics of securing satellite vans 
and crews but most often these pertained to (usually) minor technological 
failures like the absence of, or grammatical errors in captions naming on-air 
speakers. For the Chief News Editor (whose professional background lay in print 
media) an errant apostrophe elicited frustration on the basis that it reflected 
poorly on the professionalism of the national broadcaster. 
 
Suggesting the at least partial endurance of inter-media competitive logics (“Not 
Invented Here syndrome”), on several occasions editors demonstrated a 
reticence to unnecessarily legitimise a “scoop” from a domestic competitor, 
unless the story was deemed simply too big to ignore. Similarly, they exhibited a 
sensitivity to being instrumentalised by publicity-seeking individuals or 
organisations. This tendency is exemplified by internal regret at amplifying a 
Fianna Fáil politician’s ultimately empty threat to leave his party in the run up to 
the Fiscal Treaty referendum, resistance to Sinn Féin’s apparent desire to frame 
the first handshake between a party leader and a British monarch as a “historic” 
event (part of a more generalised heightened awareness amongst some editors 
at least of editorial vigilance required in relation to Sinn Féin’s efforts to secure 
“disproportionate” levels of visibility) and concern toward  a development NGO’s 
effort to book advertising slots to coincide with a news report from Africa which 
had been financially supported by the same NGO.  
 
It appeared that concerns of these kinds tended to be expressed by the more 
experienced editors, while some of the younger programme editors (one 
identified themselves me as a “new-schooler”) tended to accept a story based on 
good imagery or its thematic content even if the coverage would assist a 
commercial or political interest. 
 
An awareness of governmental tactics to drip-feed positive news stories and to 
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delay bad news until an opportune moment was also occasionally evident, 
exemplified by the general dismissiveness that accompanied the decision to 
cover the launch of “The Gathering” tourism initiative, where jibes were made 
about the government’s motivations behind the scheme. However, this 
scepticism did not seem to influence the decision to produce reports, or the 
subsequent content of those reports. What was important was that there was 
news to report; scepticism was confined to backstage venues. The co-existence of 
a ritualised privileging of governmental voices and projects and a persistent low-
level wariness and scepticism about politicians in general is further illustrated by 
an editorial directive on one occasion that a news item on a major, highly critical 
report on Ireland’s track record on providing for children in care would be a 
“politician-free zone” on the basis that insincere politicians shedding “crocodile 
tears” would not be welcome on this occasion. 
 
A marked editorial desire to avoid anything resembling a prurient, “tabloid” style 
was frequently observed. On a number of occasions, concerns were raised in 
relation to the high levels of coverage being devoted to particular items, such as 
the Anders Behring Breivik testimony in Norway, or the murder of Michaela 
McAreavey in Mauritius, concerns that were raised partly on the basis of taste in 
relation to the kinds of disclosures contained therein, whether in terms of 
“gruesome” imagery or the disclosure of information potentially distressing to 
relatives of the deceased. Concern over a sense of creeping internal 
“tabloidization” was expressed by a senior editor several times in which it was 
made clear that such a tendency must be resisted.  
 
This latter sensitivity also expressed itself in how individual tragedies often 
elicited expressions of sympathy around the editorial table, with the 
disappearance of a young Irish supporter in Poland during the Euro 2012 football 
tournament generating a keen interest in deploying journalistic resources to 
Poland partly motivated by a humanitarian desire to attract attention to the 
search. 
 
At least some editors were poorly disposed to the idea of imitating what they 
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viewed as some of the less attractive features of commercial rolling news stations. 
The rolling coverage of the Olympic torch’s whirlwind tour of Dublin in advance 
of the London Olympics attracted the ire of one senior editor who criticised the 
‘non-stop of coverage of nothing’ which was being done on the orders of senior 
news management. Again signalling something of a clash of journalistic cultures 
of an intergenerational kind, I noted that many of the younger and female editors 
had few concerns of these kind and often defended these kinds of set-piece event 
on the basis of their uplifting character and high viewing figures. 
 
Invitations to comment during the Friday “weekly review” conference segment 
would frequently be met with silence, cursory expressions of satisfaction with 
particular pieces of coverage, or less often, a recapitulation of previous criticisms. 
Given that a high proportion of issues raised during the week were in any case of 
a technical nature, or speedily-resolved minor editorial questions in relation to, 
for example, proper levels of disclosure, it is not surprising that the weekly 
review section passed over quickly without much participation or engagement 
from the assembled editors. The paucity of critical reflections either on the 
substance of the week’s news or their journalistic performance suggests that 
formal reflexive processes are narrowly exercised and mostly confined to daily 
exigencies.  
 
Where praise was accorded to colleagues, it was typically in response to 
technical-practical heroics like reacting quickly and efficiently to a breaking story 
by quickly putting together a TV or radio bulletin; for braving uncomfortable 
conditions in the field; for quality imagery in a news report; or for an all-round 
job well done in covering a major set-piece event which required significant 
levels of planning and co-ordination to pull off. 
 
Criticisms of colleagues was only observed a small handful of times. On the most 
significant of these occasions, one journalist strongly criticised an editorial 
decision not to broadcast a news story which had been filed in expectation of 
inclusion in a bulletin the previous evening. A short and rather tense discussion 
followed in which it was explained by an editor that concerns over potential legal 
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issues with one part of the item- concerning commentary in relation to one of 
Ireland’s richest and most powerful men, Denis O’Brien- had resulted in it being 
withheld from broadcast that evening. Perhaps owing to my presence, it was 
indicated that discussion on this matter would continue elsewhere- a reminder 
that much editorial reflection, particularly on highly contentious matters, was 
taking place in venues well beyond my level of access, like the weekly meetings 
of the Corporate Editorial Board. 
 
Only on a small number of occasions was external criticism or pressure discussed. 
One rare example of the latter came in the immediate wake of the publication of 
the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland report on the Mission to Prey debacle. It was 
suggested that pressure was being brought to bear by another wing of the 
organisation to report the story in a particular way- not elaborated on, perhaps 
due to my presence- which editors said they felt must be resisted and that it 
should be covered just as if the events had happened elsewhere. 
 
On three occasions during editorial conferences, newspaper criticism of RTÉ 
journalism was raised. Two of those came from one source, the ex-RTÉ journalist 
Vincent Browne writing in the Irish Times, who in one instance criticised what he 
viewed as disproportionate coverage allocated to one high-profile murder case 
(Michaela McAreavey) compared to another in Limerick, implying a journalistic 
classism (Browne, 2012c), and in the other accused the broadcaster of being 
‘timorous and unprofessional’ (Browne, 2012b) in relation to reportage on a 
story concerning the possibility of continued IMF funding of the State should the 
Fiscal Treaty be rejected by the impending referendum. Browne’s criticisms in 
both instances elicited some personalised derision, although prompting a degree 
of debate- including a discussion on the relative news value of different Irish 
murder victims in Mauritius, Spain, Japan and Limerick- which would not have 
taken place otherwise. This did not amount, however, to seriously engaging with 
questions of ethnocentrism, classism or political subservience in reporting 
patterns.  
 
Journalists conversely appeared more sensitive to feedback from sections of the 
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audience close to them- citing friends and family- that informed them when they 
felt coverage of given issues was problematic for any reason. This sort of feedback 
was used, it appeared, to help calibrate and moderate coverage, providing a rare 
example of audience feedback- even if conveyed through informal networks- 
playing a role in the meetings. However, letters, emails and telephone contact 
from the public containing criticism, praise or suggestions were only mentioned 
in passing a couple of times during my observations, suggesting their low salience 
in editorial decision-making.  
 
5.2.5 Audience Research in the newsroom 
 
Public opinion did nonetheless penetrate editorial meetings via monthly 
presentations from the Audience Research unit, which were delivered to editors 
once a month at the conclusion of the Friday editorial conference. These sessions, 
introduced on one occasion by an editor as ‘doing the figures’, suggested that 
audience research was primarily understood as a quantitative affair. 
 
This was borne out by the nature of the presentations I observed, which involved 
the distribution of a document showing fluctuations in news and current affairs 
programme ratings, broken down both according to absolute numbers on a day-
to-day basis and demographic data (age, gender, and the socio-economic 
groupings ABC1 C2DE) and compared with data from programme output from 
RTE’s only domestic television competitor at the time, TV3.  
 
On one occasion, much of the discussion comprised speculation on why ratings 
were down so substantially across the board compared to the same period the 
previous year. A variety of explanations were proffered for this, including the 
weather, the high volume of sporting events, and in particular an 
acknowledgment that the same month in the previous year was what the 
document described as a particularly ‘strong month for news’. The view was 
expressed a number of times that people were turning off news and current 
affairs programming because of the preponderance of “bad news”, with one 
editor suggesting that during tough times, audiences desire ‘fluffy’ escapist 
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programming about, for example, ‘Gypsy weddings’. Overall however, editors did 
not seem particularly perturbed about falling ratings, and seemed more 
interested in long-term audience trends than short-term fluctuations. These 
reactions, the absence of any discussion on any ameliorative actions that might 
be taken to arrest declines and a more general cultural mismatch between 
rationalised audience measurement and newsroom editorial culture implied in 
an apparent low level of editorial interest in extended discussion on the data 
suggests that News and Current Affairs enjoys meaningful autonomy from at least 
some of the economic pressures that encroach elsewhere within the organisation. 
 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
 
As a key site of decision making, issue raising and information sharing in the 
newsroom (see Mulhall, 2015 for a detailed account of newsroom editorial 
processes), observational data suggests that these conferences are highly 
routinised and predictable affairs, geared toward the efficient distribution of 
journalistic resources and the continued smoothness of newsroom operations. 
Rather than what the Head of News would publicly describe as a venue of ‘robust’ 
(Carr, 2015) institutionalised self-critique, their principal purpose was to 
continually grease the wheels of news production, aligning the priorities of 
journalists, news editors, programme editors and producers to ensure a 
productive newsroom, with self-critique generally confined to questions of fine 
calibration rather than the querying of foundational norms and practices. 
 
These observations reinforce many findings from other newsroom 
ethnographies, not least Golding and Elliott’s (1979) ethnographic work in RTÉ 
more than thirty years prior. From the routinised (ibid: 83) and consistent nature 
of principles of selection (ibid: 93) which guided ‘clearly defined and 
unproblematic’ (ibid: 95) understandings of what constituted ‘news’, to the way 
in these definitions delimited the realm of the political to exclude extra-
parliamentary activity (ibid: 95), to the preoccupation of editorial reflexivity with 
technical detail (ibid) and a cultural mismatch between journalistic culture and 
rationalised audience measurement (ibid: 112). 
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5.3 Other sites of observation 
 
5.3.1 Handling politics: the case of the Fiscal Treaty referendum 
 
While my observations of formal venues of editorial reflexivity for much of my 
time in the newsroom suggested- notwithstanding sources of internal turmoil- a 
period of relative editorial “ordinary time”, the period of the EU Fiscal Treaty 
referendum campaign in May 2012 represented a disruption to this. 
 
As the campaign progressed, editorial frustration around the conference table 
escalated, based on a concern with the perceived low quality of debate and a 
worry about audience intelligibility, reflecting a consequence of a combination of 
the complexities of Treaty itself and the intertwining of the referendum debate 
with the broader domestic political landscape. 
 
Most of the difficulties appeared to arise from a frustration with how the 
referendum campaign period entailed a measure of unwanted external 
interference in normal journalistic practices. Editors demonstrably felt under 
great pressure from several Supreme Court cases- the Crotty, Coughlan and 
McKenna judgements- which shaped the holding, funding and representation in 
broadcasting of actors in referenda in Ireland (for reviews of these cases, see 
O’Mahony, 2009 and Barrett, 2011). The interpretation of the demands of the 
Coughlan judgement- granting equal airtime to both pro and anti-Treaty sides, 
enforced with widespread use of stopwatches and daily tallies- was a source of 
constant frustration. One journalist voiced a view that seemed to capture the 
mood- the idea that with all mainstream political parties on one side and ‘every 
head-banger in town’ on the other, finding what another described as ‘credible 
interviewees’ on the No side evoked editorial angst. That credibility was linked 
to representative status was demonstrated by the particular frustration of the 
Chief News Editor at having little choice but to provide airtime to non-elected 
individuals and groups campaigning for a no vote (see Chapter 6 for interview 
testimony on this topic). On the other hand, concern was also raised that Sinn 
Féin, as the main party in parliament campaigning for a no vote would have to be 
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accorded much greater coverage than their parliamentary strength would 
generally warrant. 
 
While editors took pride in the broadcaster holding firm in a low-level conflict 
with the government’s press office over the referendum nomenclature, which 
RTÉ had been under pressure to describe as the “Stability Treaty”, a more serious 
definitional conflict was evident in the form of a recurring frustration amongst 
editors that the referendum campaign was in danger of being derailed by forces 
on the “no” side who wished to make it about other matters seen as irrelevant to 
the matter at hand. 
 
The frustration with the lack of appropriately focused, rational and productive 
political debate and an apparent sense of responsibility to guide the campaign 
along those lines led in practice to the containment of referendum coverage 
within sharper technical boundaries. That this had a depoliticising effect was 
suggested by an informally-flagged decision to reduce the volume of debate 
formats as the referendum campaign wore on, and taking a stronger control of 
the editorial tiller by producing a range of ‘non-reactive’ planned news items 
about the referendum, some of which would not contain pro or anti treaty views 
but aimed instead at conveying neutral factual information. These items, which 
sought to supplement coverage from the campaign trail, included, inter alia, use 
of the Referendum Commission chairperson who would be invited on to answer 
listeners’ questions about the Treaty (albeit in the constrained, rationalist terms 
of the explicit Treaty provisions), sober and strictly factual items on the separate 
implications of yes and no votes, and an item on the day of the poll itself 
containing information logistical information on voting and a ‘neutral person on 
the importance of voting’, as one editor put it (reflecting the broadcasting 
moratorium on campaign reportage in the hours before and during polling).  
 
This desire to compartmentalise the range of issues raised in the campaign within 
stricter topical boundaries reflects a compromise between ‘sacerdotal’ and 
‘pragmatic positions’ to electoral politics (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986: 74) and 
may be explained as partly due to a general journalistic affinity for rational, fact-
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centred discourses and a journalistic “agoraphobia” (Carpentier, 2007: 157) 
prompted by a highly political campaign that was poorly compatible with the 
aforementioned distaste for extra-parliamentary political contention.  
 
The clash between the twin desires to compartmentalise and delimit debate yet 
to involve the views of what a senior editor described as ‘non-political voices’ is 
captured by the discussion and outcome of a proposal to undertake a ‘town hall’ 
exercise in which members of the public would very briefly explain their views 
on the referendum in a format described as an ‘intelligent vox pop’. In seeking 
suitably ‘interesting people’ for such a segment, both an unemployment centre or 
a Chamber of Commerce were ruled out on the basis of the assumed partiality of 
individuals at those venues. A book club or tidy towns committee were adjudged 
to be more representative of ‘ordinary people’ with a cross-section of views. The 
finished product, a TV news item broadcast in extended form on radio, 
incorporated views of a number of members of the public including a pensioner’s 
computer club, a fitness group, and participants at a poker night in a manner that 
resembled a conventional vox pop item. A journalist suggested to me that such an 
exercise was about finding ‘real people, ordinary people’ without any ‘political 
axe to grind’ and that there would be a need to ensure that an item like this would 
have to be more or less balanced in terms of “yes” and “no” voices irrespective of 
what was encountered on the ground. 
 
Weeks in advance of referendum day, the newsroom swung into planning mode, 
led by staff dedicated to the organisation of special events. The full scale of the 
planning was revealed in a 30-page bound document which circulated around the 
newsroom in the days leading up to the referendum. The document explained in 
dizzying detail the remarkable scale of the logistical plans made to cover the 
referendum count on 1st June 2012, including the precise deployment of 
technical equipment and editorial personnel around the country.  
 
From the vantage point of the newsroom’s referendum nerve centre co-
ordinating coverage, while the morning of the count saw a great flurry of activity, 
the realisation by mid-morning that a clear win for the “yes” side was a certainty 
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seemed to quickly deflate the air of expectation. For the rest of the day, the 
newsroom went through the motions of rolling live coverage, but with none of 
the drama that seemed to have been hoped for. 
 
That contingency plans existed both for an unscheduled edition of Primetime and 
an extension of the Six One News which would be activated only in the case of a 
“no” vote suggested both the expectation of a “yes” vote and that only a result at 
odds with the government’s desires merited emergency programming. It 
additionally suggested an implicit preference for political “stability”, reminiscent 
of a casual comment made in jest by one editor to another on the eve of one of the 
two Greek general elections that Spring that in the event of a win by the SYRIZA 
radical left coalition they would have to hide their money under a mattress.  
 
 
Fig. 5-1: Referendum coverage document 
 
In a context of resource reductions in the newsroom which was regularly 
apparent in everything from satellite van availability to sharp restrictions around 
foreign travel, the scale of the referendum coverage stood out all the more. Its 
apparent significance to the prestige of RTÉ News suggests the ‘sacerdotal’ 
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995) status of these kind of events. 
 
The end of the referendum campaign was met with a certain ambivalence by 
editors. On one hand, the sigh of relief from around the conference table by 
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editors who had long succumbed to campaign ennui was tangible. On the other 
hand, although satisfied with a job well done, at a subsequent review meeting, the 
only note of disappointment expressed was that, from the point of view of ‘good 
television’, it was all over so quickly.  
 
5.3.2 Planning good news 
 
The referendum was, however, only one in a whole series of major televised 
events that involved a substantial amount of advance planning and co-ordination 
by the newsroom. Set pieces like the visit of the Olympic Torch to Ireland in 
advance of the 2012 London Games, the 50th Catholic Eucharistic Congress, the 
2012 football European Championships in Poland and the visit of Burmese 
opposition politician and Nobel Peace Prize recipient Aung San Suu Kyi- amongst 
many others- all took place in a period of a few months, with the news value of 
each teased out in a separate weekly editorial forum, the “futures” meeting, 
focused on near and medium-term planning of various news genres including 
“hard” news, special events and “feature” items. Regular attendance at these 
weekly meetings demonstrated the significance of the latter categories of events 
to morale, whose topical and tonal variety moderates the predictability of often 
rote, “ordinary time” news production. 
 
Like the daily news conferences, pitches for both “home” and “foreign” future 
stories were evaluated, with the determining factors for selection appearing to 
rest on a combination of news value, novelty, the assumed interest of the 
audience, and the expected volume of news from other sources during the 
relevant period (during leaner news weeks, the desire for extra “feature” stories 
was much stronger). 
 
While more relaxed and informal than daily editorial conferences, futures 
meetings demonstrated greater divergences in editorial attitudes regarding what 
sort of events should be covered and why. One example of this is a debate over 
how to approach the Olympic flame trip across the Southern border and into 
Dublin. While a single TV news package was originally envisaged by one editor, 
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several others desired expanded coverage, proposing a three hour live special 
that followed the torch run into Ireland, on the basis that as one editor put it, 
‘people like the ceremonial stuff’. At least one editor plainly felt this to be 
unnecessary and trivial, but the enthusiasm of the others won the day.  
 
In another instance, the extensive coverage plans for the 50th Eucharistic 
Congress- a major international gathering of Catholics involving an array of 
ceremonies over a period of days- which was to take place in Dublin in June was 
an example of an event that was planned not on the basis of autonomous editorial 
selection but an organisational imperative based on the broadcaster’s cultural 
role in providing for the country’s religious majority. In an effort to navigate the 
sensitive cultural territory, a directive from management that television news 
would have to recognise the ongoing Congress every day of its duration, although 
in the interests of appealing to what one editor described as ‘all religions as 
none’…ecclesiastical and theological stuff’ was not desired. For some editors who 
were co-operating somewhat on sufferance, this instruction was broadly 
welcomed, although one editor argued that theological issues shouldn’t 
arbitrarily be excluded from the event. Others were keen to ensure that a sense 
of the crisis in the Vatican (related to ongoing sexual abuse scandals) would be 
apparent from the coverage, and that the tone would not be one of banal 
celebration. 
 
A third type of rationale for dedicating significant internal resources was 
represented by the whistle-stop visit to Dublin of Burmese pro-democracy 
activist and opposition politician Aung San Suu Kyi to accept a number of awards. 
Her visit was the source of visible and sustained enthusiasm by editors, who on 
this occasion used their editorial discretion to accord the visit significant 
resources, the centerpiece of which was a highly unusual live broadcast of the 9 
News from the award venue.  In contrast to the plans made to cover events like 
the Queen’s Jubilee (which was also the subject of an internal directive to be 
covered), the decision to accord the visit such reverence seemed less motivated 
by news value than born of personal admiration on the part of many of the 
editors, whose mood was visibly lifted by the event.  
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More generally, “good” news seemed to play a crucial set of roles in the 
newsroom. Whereas end-of-bulletin “kickers” were often mere amusing trivia for 
journalists to end a day, positive coverage of events fulfilled a different set of 
functions, facilitating greater levels of topical and tonal discretion by editors and 
reporters. Whether light-hearted “feature stories” sourced from around the 
country that could be picked off the shelf on a quiet news day, or to tonally 
balance a programme with too much bad news, the importance of a regular 
stream of positive stories lay in their counterbalancing role against covering the 
mundane and often grim political and economic scene that represented the bulk 
of their work. 
 
5.3.3 Historic editorial meeting notes 
 
While the observations above represent a circumscribed interpretive snapshot of 
daily editorial practice, notes from six previous years of editorial meetings 
appearing to correspond to the Friday editorial review sessions were available to 
me after obtaining access to the internal computer network.  
 
A variety of functions that the meetings fulfilled were apparent, including 
praising good work by individuals and teams, justifying difficult editorial 
decisions, debating whether the right amount of disclosure was made in relation 
to particular stories, teasing out problematic terminological issues, discussing the 
management of editorial resources, reminding staff of their obligations in relation 
to matters like confidentiality, the need to preserve standards of taste and 
decency in their work, and clarifying legal responsibilities around the reporting 
of sensitive matters of various kinds, including court cases, vulnerable groups, 
and suicides. They also included non-editorial matters like discussing notable 
changes in viewership figures, problems of a technical, administrative or 
competitive nature, and updates from elsewhere in the organisation on matters 
that impact upon the newsroom, notably budgetary issues. 
 
Given that the 2006-2012 period in question both preceded and followed the 
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onset of financial and economic crisis, this record represents a valuable source of 
insight into how editors reflected on their work in changing political and 
economic environments. For reasons of brevity, I focus here principally on how 
RTÉ’s responsibilities in relation to crisis were practically interpreted as 
recorded in these notes. 
 
It was noted in relation to a story run about a particular bank at the beginning of 
the banking crisis that such stories carried implications in relation to national 
interest and institutional self-interest. As crisis symptoms escalated, editors on 
multiple occasions alluded to the broadcaster’s general responsibilities and how 
they were heightened by the present circumstances.  
 
Unpacking the version of responsibility explicit and implicit in the editorial notes, 
it appears to principally involve, in practice, the timely provision of accurate and 
objective information to the public, avoiding alarmism, hyperbole and the 
spreading of rumour, dutifully respecting privacy, the law, and the good name of 
individuals, always prioritising getting a story right rather than getting it first, 
and giving due consideration to protecting the national interest.  
 
Such concerns, many of which are captured in the recent Banking Inquiry 
testimony of the Head of News and Current Affairs during the period in question 
(Mulhall, 2015: 9)- as well as corroborated by a newsroom informant who told 
me that in the wake of the bank guarantee in 2008 staff had been instructed to 
regularly reassure the public about the safety of their deposited money- reflect 
an alignment between professional logics, institutional values, an awareness of 
its place in the state and the political surveillance that comes with it. They 
demonstrate a keen awareness of RTÉ’s status as a national public service 
broadcaster with multiple audiences- domestic publics and government, as well 
as, internationally, foreign governments, media and financial markets. 
 
Overall, they suggested that an appropriate journalistic response to crisis is 
founded upon diligent adherence to pre-existing notions of responsibility rather 
than requiring normative or practical journalistic innovations. The records 
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betray little evidence of views that the crisis had created a need for substantially 
modified journalistic practices, save for a sole reference to a call for greater 
diversity in programme contributors and a reference to the increased 
significance of the business desk’s expertise to interpret ongoing events. 
References to public opinion appeared just as marginal as in my own 
observations. 
 
What constituted “good” public service broadcasting in the eyes of the editorial 
team also gives insights into how they conceive of their role. One example was 
provided by the conclusion drawn from positive responses from international 
broadcasters, organs of state and the public to RTÉ’s coverage of the visits in 2011 
of US President Barack Obama and UK monarch Queen Elizabeth II that the case 
for public service broadcasting itself had been strengthened. Elsewhere, 
satisfaction and pride in work undertaken on and around the general elections of 
2007 and 2011 accrued from high viewerships and perceived successes in 
maintaining standards of accuracy and impartiality, avoiding missing big stories, 
avoiding major complaints from political parties and keeping a focus on policy. 
 
The extent of pride engendered by these events is redolent of MacConghail’s 
(1984: 68) suggestion that through its coverage of the event, the visit of John F 
Kennedy to Ireland in 1963 helped embolden RTÉ and gave it confidence in its 
early years. This also calls to mind Golding and Elliott’s (1979: 93) suggestion 
that PSB’s ‘quasi-official status’ as broadcast ‘journalism of record’ is bound up 
with the idea of recording these kind of events as a ‘matter of duty’.  
 
5.3.4 Introduction of new journalism guidelines 
 
The magnitude of the Mission to Prey editorial crisis was such that RTÉ was 
moved to enlist external assistance in an overhaul of its internal journalism 
guidelines in which all journalists would be immediately and compulsorily 
trained (RTÉ, 2011b: 11). I secured access to attend one of the group sessions in 
April.  
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Upon arrival, all participants were presented with a copy of the new guidelines 
and a form that indicated they had been read, understood and that the training 
has been attended. Delivered to a group of about thirty staff over about an hour, 
the session involved a brief overview of some of the key changes to the guidelines 
document since its last revision in 2008, followed by a lengthy question and 
answer session. 
 
Fig. 5-2: Journalism guidelines document 
 
The document (RTÉ, 2012c) was justified to the assembled journalists both in 
terms of the need to restore public trust in the wake of recent editorial failings, 
and the need to clarify journalistic responsibilities in a more codified form as 
newsroom cultural ‘osmosis’ could no longer be relied on to sufficiently inculcate 
journalistic values in staff. The main changes to the document as introduced by 
the organisers were, aside from its shorter length and addition of guidelines on 
use of social media sources, the introduction of a series of 28 ‘mandatory 
obligations’ with which journalists were expected to comply. Given the events 
that spurred the document’s production, it is unsurprising that a great many of 
these were concerned with responding to the weaknesses identified by the recent 
Mission to Prey inquiries and focused on delineating the precise chains of 
responsibility in the carrying out of journalism in RTÉ, particularly regarding 
more sensitive areas like secret filming. 
 
The assembled journalists focused their questions on the new mandatory 
stipulations and what they meant for daily journalistic work- in particular the 
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legal, technical and procedural matters concerning chains of responsibility. A 
number of participants expressed alarm about the motivations behind some of 
these changes, a disquiet which led to a number of staff declining to sign the form 
on the basis that ‘they place unwarranted responsibility on reporters and 
producers that should be made at management level’ (Coyle and O’Brien, 2012). 
Several others spoke about a post-Reynolds ‘chilling effect’ where a climate of 
fear about legal reprisals was resulting in journalists increasingly pulling 
punches. 
 
On the whole, the exercise- hardly worthy of its description as ‘training’- seemed 
to me to be motivated by a combination of institutional self-protection (its blitz 
of pre-emptive responses to the findings of the BAI inquiry seemed clearly 
engineered to head off the prospect of the encroachment of government or 
regulator), the protection of its journalists, and a public relations exercise to help 
restore public trust. Notably, with Mission to Prey the sole referent of its “post-
crisis” focus, the limited nature of the journalistic response to economic and 
democratic crisis was underlined. In any case, the extent to which journalism 
guidelines shape daily practices is questionable. The previous set of guidelines- 
itself years out of date- was never cited during my time observing newsroom life, 
suggesting that ways of doing things emerged from routinised daily practice 
diffused throughout the chain of decision-making, not from adherence to a 
rulebook. ‘Osmosis’, it seems, remained a powerful force.  
 
Indeed, during a wander down a corridor towards the end of my newsroom 
sojourn, I met by chance a senior editorial figure who, before bidding me farewell, 
told me as much. He attributed the main source of ‘suspicion’ around my presence 
as rooted in a professional fear of external scrutiny, specifically in relation to the 
exposure of the reality of editorial decision-making as more ‘instinctive’ than 
‘scientific’.  
 
This suggested to me a mismatch between the public face of professional 
journalism, described so often in terms of essentialised, proceduralised 
adherence to precepts like objectivity, impartiality and balance, did not quite 
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accord with the messy, contingent realities of daily newswork and the thousands 
of daily judgements that it entailed.  
 
This, and other aspects of the response of the public service journalistic habitus 
to the crisis provided ample material for a series of interviews with staff, 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Making the News II:  
Practitioner Perspectives 
 
6.1 Methodological approach    
 
A chief benefit of extended on-site presence at RTÉ meant that the logistical 
challenge of arranging interviews with working journalists-whose availability to 
meet might be curtailed at a moment’s notice- was mitigated by sheer proximity 
to them. The 32 formal interviews undertaken were conducted everywhere from 
journalist’s desks, in the canteen, and at other indoor and outdoor locations 
spread over the grounds of the Montrose campus. Interviews were semi-
structured, with topic schedules varying to a significant extent to account for 
differing professional roles and individual expertise (see sample question 
schedule in Appendix 6-1), and also influenced by the ongoing ethnographic 
observations and lines of inquiry organically emerging from the interview 
process itself. 
 
Most discussions were recorded, with explicit interviewee permission- and later 
manually transcribed in full by the author using the Nvivo qualitative data 
analysis software. From there, interview data underwent two rounds of coding. 
First, responses were coded according to topics which were derived inductively 
from interview data, where individual responses comprised the unit of analysis. 
Seven topic categories were discerned in total, comprising: RTÉ and the crisis; 
RTE and the public; internal and external pressures on RTÉ; news content; 
journalism; funding and commercial imperatives; and RTÉ and politics, from 
which a total of thirty-one corresponding sub-topics were drawn. A second round 
of inductive coding involved the identification of thematic patterns within the 
responses coded to sub-topics- here, sentences and paragraphs comprised the 
units of analysis, allowing question responses to be coded to more than one 
theme. Themes were identified at both semantic and latent levels- that is to say, 
taking into account both explicit meanings and underlying conceptualisations 
(Braun and Clarke, 2006: 13). 
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For reasons of brevity and focus, this chapter explores a subset of three areas of 
thematically-organised interview data most closely associated with the project’s 
key research themes. Firstly, the chapter looks at journalistic conceptualisations 
of crisis, editorial responses, and the durability of journalistic norms at a time of 
crisis. Secondly, journalistic views on the mediation of politics are examined, 
including the links between RTÉ and the national political agenda as well as how 
the role of extra-parliamentary politics on RTÉ is conceived. Finally, attitudes 
towards transparency, accountability and public participation in the project of 
public service broadcasting are explored. 
 
With a relatively small sample size of thirty-two interviews, undue 
generalisations are avoided and all conclusions made are necessarily of a 
tentative nature. Care has been taken to avoid misrepresentation, either through 
incorrect transcription or distortions introduced by out of context quotation. The 
presentation of interview data reflects the relative strength of themes in terms of 
prevalence and intensity. For reasons of concision, interviewee responses are 
frequently shortened, with the convention of ellipses in square brackets […] used 
to indicate non-contiguous portions of quoted extracts. Ellipses without brackets 
indicate interviewee hesitation and pauses. In cases of longer quoted extracts 
which are reproduced separately, ellipses are used at the start of the extract to 
indicate that it begins mid-sentence. Square brackets are placed around the first 
letter of a quoted extract to show where a change in capitalisation is made for 
grammatical reasons. 
 
Unless express permission was attained for the use of more personally 
identifiable information, responses are identified below only with respect to 
general occupational categories. This information is contained in the first letter 
in the alphanumeric code appended to each quoted extract, where [Q] refers to a 
news journalist, [R] to a current affairs journalist, and [P] to an editor or member 
of management in the newsroom or elsewhere in the organisation. 
 
 
 151 
 
6.2 Journalism and crisis    
 
6.2.1 On crisis anticipation and crisis response 
 
RTÉ’s performance in anticipating the 2008 economic crisis arose in several 
interviews, with failings tending to be admitted in the abstract but mixed with a 
certain pride that warnings were heard on its airwaves. The broadcaster’s Head 
of Broadcast Compliance suggested that ‘RTÉ has actually had quite a good record 
[…] in pointing out, along the way, that what was happening was dangerous’, but 
that the media as a whole weren’t sufficiently critical- ‘there wasn’t sufficient 
interrogation about the possibility that it was a bubble…that there was going to 
be a crash etc.’ [P102]. 
 
A senior manager in the newsroom expressed the view in relation to ‘minority or 
dissenting voices getting heard’ that ‘I don’t think that [the crisis] has changed it 
one way or the other’ [P104]. A senior journalist suggested that dissenting voices 
simply weren’t there for RTÉ to find- at least, not sufficiently credible ones. While 
acknowledging that ‘[w]e probably missed out on’ [Q135] critics of the economic 
orthodoxy, this journalist asked ‘but who were they?’ questioning their ‘locus 
standi’ to secure journalistic interest. They added that ‘there are not many people 
who can stand up and say, I told you so’, and that those who did ‘probably did it 
in sufficiently muted terms for them not to be heard’. Asked about the editorial 
response to crisis, the same journalist said that in general the crisis has not 
occasioned significant changes in programme guest selection, saying that ‘in 
terms of having a black book of people you can't use or wouldn't use, there 
wouldn't be many names in it’. 
 
Another experienced journalist however suggested that there has been a greater 
reliance on in-house expertise as a consequence of the decline of authority of at 
least some forms of external expertise, saying that ‘politics and finance has 
become very discredited’ [Q134], illustrating this by suggesting that ‘if you put a 
stockbroker on the television and interviewed them […] you'll get emails and 
phone calls complaining’. 
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For some senior figures, particularly in the newsroom, severe doubt was 
expressed over the idea that Ireland’s current crises represented something that 
presented challenges to journalistic practices of a more fundamental kind. The 
Managing Editor of News described the contexts of crisis as simply ‘another 
element of the story’, and that 
 
…the business of...of news is much the same, whether, you know, society 
is collapsing all around you, or, whether it's a time of...you know, peace 
and plenty and everything's fairly straightforward. [P106] 
 
The Chief News Editor similarly rejected the idea that the current crises represent 
a particular problem for journalism beyond the quotidian challenges of news 
production, saying that journalistic scepticism always needs to be applied, crisis 
or not. To the suggestion that the crisis necessitated a problematisation of 
economic orthodoxies, they replied that such concerns are ‘philosophical 
questions’ which they would leave ‘to the philosophers’ and that they must 
dedicate their time and effort to ‘dealing with the news of today’ [P107]. This was 
echoed by a senior newsroom manager, who said that it was the role of 
‘economists and to some extent political philosophers’ [P104] rather than 
journalists to establish just ‘how fundamental is the crisis’. 
 
One journalist demurred from the idea that the crisis was being adequately 
covered by RTÉ, suggesting that the crisis is manifold and ongoing. They argued 
that Irish society was largely unreflective during the ‘boom years’ [Q125] because 
‘we were largely comfortable’, but that when ‘the house of cards came crumbling 
down about 2007-2008’, ‘it was then that we realised there’s no trust’ between 
the public and a range of state and non-state institutions. This journalist 
suggested that in the light of a sense of disenfranchisement among sections of the 
population, ‘we're supposed to be reflecting that society, and I don't think we're 
reflecting the society now’. 
 
Another implied that not everything that should be said about the crisis had been 
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said by RTÉ or other media, partly because of what they saw as an uncomfortable 
proximity between many journalists and a number of financial institutions later 
implicated in the crisis by virtue of their status as beneficiaries of preferential 
loans, and partly because of the political constraints within which the 
broadcaster exists. On this latter point, this journalist bemoaned that with 
politicians often felt free to treat RTÉ like ‘the punch bag, the ball that can be 
kicked around’ [Q132]. 
 
Another journalist indicated that RTE’s capacity to critically identify sources of 
crisis, even individual sources, was constrained by the fact that ‘nobody has been 
charged or convicted of any offence in relation to the...collapse of the country’ 
[Q124]. This means that while 
 
 …everybody knows that millions have been lost through the financial 
collapse, but that doesn't mean that I can go up with a microphone to 
named individuals and say you're a crook, you know? You can't do that! 
[Q124] 
 
In a much more positive vein, another journalist offered the view that RTÉ had 
done ‘the best job’ [Q127] of any media outlet in Ireland in making sense of the 
crisis, and that ‘without our coverage, I think there would be an awful lot more 
confusion than there is’.  
 
I asked journalists whether RTÉ had the job of contributing to national recovery 
through “positive” news stories over and above the usual programme 
requirements for “light and shade”. While one interviewee suggested that there 
was an enhanced ‘appetite for happier stories’ [Q121] in the wake of the crash, 
most journalists argued that it was their job to reflect reality- even if it did make 
for what one editor described as a ‘bleak diet’ [P109] of bad news, and that they 
would treat government initiatives ‘with the same amount of cynicism’ [Q121]. 
Echoing this sentiment, another told me that they didn’t feel ‘the need to be 
Pollyanna’, to ‘sugar coat what is…an awful situation at the moment in this 
country’ [Q125].  
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The view that RTÉ nonetheless had an obligation to 'cheer up' and ‘boost morale’ 
of gloomy audiences was expressed by the broadcaster’s Group Head of 
Television who said that there was ‘almost desperation for something to get away 
from our current travails’ [P105]. 
 
Several journalists acknowledged the risks of being accused of complicity in 
state-sponsored national boosterism, but for one journalist, the opposite 
criticism- that RTÉ was ‘damaging the national psyche’, ‘talking the country 
down’ and even ‘deepening the crisis’- was something they were ‘acutely 
conscious of’ [Q134]. 
 
The Head of Broadcast Compliance acknowledged that one source of external 
pressure that is making itself felt in the crisis is that of the business lobby, the 
‘Chambers of Commerce type people, the IBEC type of people’: 
 
I am aware that if the Director General goes to a business lunch he is going 
to be cornered by businesspeople saying you know, if only RTE could be 
more positive, it would put up national morale, it would create a sense of 
confidence, it would get consumers spending again, and we'd get out of it.  
[P102] 
 
One journalist spoke at length on the idea that in the newsroom, there existed ‘a 
pressure, almost invisible pressure’ to go along with a ‘dominant narrative’ on 
economic recovery. This was described as ‘pressure on me as a journalist to kind 
of go with the good news…’ in relation to aspects of state’s espoused 
developmental model, which they said they have ‘resisted’, adding that it is 
difficult to ‘get other voices on’ because ‘people who […] don’t share that 
narrative are seen as oddballs’ [Q130]. 
 
The Group Head of Television indicated that RTÉ’s agenda with regard to what 
they described as ‘the knowledge economy’ was directly aligned with that of 
successive governments. Describing Ireland as ‘kind of a centre of excellence for 
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European innovation’, they said that ‘it's an important part of the economy, it's 
important part of the...brand Ireland I suppose… […] we have a role to play, we 
have to reflect that…’ [P105]. 
 
6.2.2 Personal and professional challenges of doing journalism at a time of crisis 
 
Several interviewees commented on how their own knowledge gaps were 
exposed by the crisis, with one describing ‘struggling each day to try and stay 
abreast of what was going on’ [Q123]. 
 
Another spoke about feeling ‘at sea’ when the banking collapse occurred, likening 
it to ‘looking up and seeing up this landscape that you thought was fixed and 
permanent has just sort of melted, contorted, and completely changed’ [Q134]. 
 
Several said that it is their job to draw on the knowledge of those with the 
requisite knowledge. As one put it,  
 
…all we can do is do our best to find people as I say who do have an 
understanding, and then…draw on their expertise [Q135]. 
Journalists I spoke to who commented on the organisation’s high profile editorial 
difficulties were unequivocal in their dismay. On the Reynolds affair, one 
suggested that it represent a moment of epochal significance in Irish journalism, 
saying that ‘[t]here will be journalism before the Fr Kevin Reynolds case, and 
after’ [Q120]. 
 
One journalist spoke about the subjective experience of constantly delivering bad 
news to their audience- and how the Fr Reynolds affair, combined with RTÉ’s 
internal cost-cutting has taken a further toll: 
 
It is our job to tell it like it is, and unfortunately how it is at the moment is 
gloomy. It is horrible. […]  I mean...the last couple of months, particularly 
in light of the Reynolds thing, I haven't wanted to come to work myself... 
[Q127] 
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Describing the situation as ‘utterly numbingly depressing’ and RTÉ’s initial 
response to the Fr Reynolds affair as ‘beyond negligent’ and ‘an absolute 
disgrace’, the journalist went on to say that recent cuts in remuneration 
amounted to nothing less than ‘a tsunami of cutting people's lives apart’ [Q127]. 
 
Another journalist commented on the extent of cutbacks in RTÉ and how the 
organisation’s own internal financial crisis mirrored that of elsewhere in the 
country: 
 
…this organisation is having the guts sucked out of it as well, just as much 
as is happening anywhere else in the country [Q123]. 
 
Beyond morale, most interviewees I spoke to on the topic reported that the 
effects of the cutbacks had real impacts on the kinds of journalism that it was 
possible to do in RTÉ. A senior member of newsroom management told me that 
 
…undeniably, the economic crisis in this organisation has meant that we 
have much less room for discretionary action than we would've had before 
[P104]. 
 
 This was a sentiment echoed by the Chief News Editor who said that spending 
reductions of about 20% were a significant disadvantage [P107].  
 
Another journalist told me that with resource reductions cutting ‘to the bone’, the 
money required for ‘extended research and investigation...just isn't there’ [Q123], 
making it harder for journalists to get away from the daily news cycle and pursue 
other kinds of stories. 
 
6.2.3 Journalistic norms: weathering the storm of crisis? 
 
In order to discern if support for journalism’s underlying professional precepts 
had been shook by the experience of crisis, I queried journalists on the enduring 
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relevance of ideas of objectivity, impartiality and balance. Fulsome, unqualified 
support for these principles was the most common response. For example, the 
Managing Editor of News identified these requirements as the ‘vital’ heart of 
public service broadcasting, describing them as ‘what differentiates public 
service broadcasting from all the other sources that are out there’ and key to the 
maintenance of public trust, because ‘people should be able to know, well if you 
hear it on RTÉ, it has a certain status because you know they've gone through 
various procedures’ [P106]. 
 
Another journalist spoke in support of the requirements, describing them as 
‘essential’ and that if they are viewed by journalists as ‘constraints’, they have a 
problem [Q127]. In a similar fashion, another noted: ‘One has to […] go down the 
middle, and that's right’ [Q132]. Another journalist said that ‘in RTÉ in particular, 
and in news […] your first function is to be objective and to be impartial’ and that 
such an orientation was ‘natural’ [Q133]. 
In a formulation echoed by several other interviewees, one journalist suggested 
that the absence of these principles would lead to the undesirable outcome of 
open ‘editorialising all the time the way some of the newspapers do’ [Q131]. 
The Managing Editor sought to explain the journalistic impulse towards 
objectivity as being rooted in a desire to tell stories as a neutral conduit rather 
than an interested party. For them, 'journalists aren't people with missions that 
they're trying to sell. Journalists like telling stories, they like getting to the facts 
and they like getting on air’ [P106]. 
The removal of personal agendas was identified by multiple journalists as a key 
component of the practical expression of these professional norms, including by 
one interviewee who said that ‘you don’t embark on a story with your agenda’ 
because ‘we have a bigger responsibility than anyone else in public life to get 
it…bang on’ [Q121]. 
Another journalist linked the preservation of journalistic norms with their 
authority and public trust- they must always resist the temptation to simply ‘tell 
it like I see it’ and to ‘be unleashed’ [Q127] because this would diminish trust. 
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Several journalists spoke in support of the principles of objectivity, impartiality 
and balance without viewing them as excluding the possibilities of critique or the 
taking of normative positions. Identifying the ‘essence’ of public service 
broadcasting as ‘explaining, challenging, holding to account...and taking...the 
story forward, into its next steps’, one journalist explained that the “striving for, 
you know, truth and all of that’ ‘should be part of a journalist’s DNA’ [Q125]. 
This was one of the only explicit mentions of “truth” as a driving motivation of 
journalism. The search for truth, according to this view, must be supported- not 
superceded- by objectivity, impartiality and balance. This orientation towards a 
more explicit normativity was further illustrated by a journalist who insisted that 
the highlighting of inequality, for example, is editorially justified because its 
existence is ‘wrong’ [Q125]. 
Another journalist similarly expressed a desire to retain existing journalistic 
norms and that a normative role in the form of a watchdog function was readily 
compatible with these norms, on the basis that so long as one doesn’t ‘editorialise 
or give opinion […] cos that’s not my job’ [Q133], exposing hypocrisy by pointing 
out the contradiction between the words and deeds of politicians doesn’t entail 
partiality because it remained ‘fact-based’. Holding power to account means, 
according to this understanding, holding power to its account and is not 
normatively freighted beyond this. 
A substantial number of interviewees voiced support for the journalistic norms 
of objectivity, impartiality and balance, but qualified them in various ways. 
Several, including the Head of Broadcast Compliance, described objectivity and 
impartiality as an ‘aspiration […] [that] is actually terribly important…’ [P102] 
‘[e]ven if you recognise that it is not achievable…’. That it was seen as a ‘valid 
academic subject’ for the classroom suggests that deeper engagement with these 
ideas was not seen as professionally relevant. 
There was a marked reluctance amongst some journalists, however, to 
essentialise objectivity in terms of clearly codified practice. A senior newsroom 
manager commented that the “rules” of impartiality, balance and objectivity are 
important but complementary to a journalistic sens practique: a feel for the game 
which is reliant on instinct and experience accrued over time: 
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Obviously certain elements of science are applied to it, but...but most 
journalist calls are based on […] experience and based on a feel for what is 
the right thing to do at that moment in time... [P104] 
 
This was illustrated by other journalists, one of whom spoke about how ‘you kind 
of operate on a gut instinct’ [Q135], and another who suggested that good 
journalism is about having a ‘moral compass’ [Q132], with both identifying 
‘fairness’ as a quality emerging from the individual rather than codified in a 
rulebook. 
With “fairness” rather than “objectivity” the preferred formulation of many 
interviewees, the impression was given that many journalists were keen not to 
have professional ethics altogether emptied of substantive normative 
orientations. 
A few, however, offered a critical account of objectivity beyond negotiated 
support. One journalist offered the view that impartiality and balance are 
desirable values, but objectivity may not be, because it would inhibit journalism 
as a catalyst for social change- that journalism ‘can break a consensus, question 
it […] pose problems which are implicit but can make those explicit’ and that 
‘there is no value-free journalism’ [Q126]. 
Another offered the view that whilst they personally supported conventional 
journalistic values, they are ‘only ever be really used when they're thrown…used 
against you’ where errant journalists ‘step outside of the kind of..the..the 
dominant narrative’ [Q130], further suggesting that story selection is itself ‘a kind 
of editorialising’ [Q130]. 
Another suggested that on occasion, the 'constraints' of fairness and objectivity 
sometimes prevented journalists from calling a spade a spade: 
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Sometimes it's not really our position given the constraints on us about 
fairness and objectivity to actually say that something is a pile of shite 
[Q131]. 
 
Most critically, a current affairs journalist described the word objectivity as ‘a bit 
idiotic […] in current affairs, and maybe even more insidiously in news’ [R140], 
because it erroneously implies that journalist approach an issue with no 
perspective which would go on to shape their work. 
 
6.3 Doing politics: voices in the crisis       
 
6.3.1 Referenda and elections: screening politics 
 
In the light of the ongoing Fiscal Treaty referendum campaign which, as 
previously observed, had engendered significant editorial frustration, I discussed 
with interviewees their views on editorial matters pertaining to elections and 
referenda- key parts of the formal machinery of democracy. 
 
Reflecting the aforementioned tendency for journalists to desire a maintenance 
of objectivity, impartiality and balance as core professional tenets yet avoiding a 
rule-based dogmatism, a senior newsroom manager told me that the ultimate 
goal is ‘fairness’ in coverage, and that in general coverage ‘doesn't have to be 
arithmetically balanced’ but ‘[i]n the case of referenda, at the moment it appears 
that it does’ [P104]. The Chief News editor told me that the idea of giving equal 
time to both sides often leads to journalists contriving what they described as the 
‘antithesis of news’ [P107].  
 
One journalist expressed their views on stopwatch-led balance in terms of a 
direct affront to their professionalism, describing as ‘prescriptive nonsense’ the 
idea of giving trained staff the ‘donkey task’ of 
 
… literally having a stopwatch in either hand, one is yes and one is no, and 
they spend entire programmes clicking on and off in order to try and reach 
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exact balance, when we do that over the course of the range of 
programmes anyway. […] We are very very good at, eh, ensuring equal 
access to the airwaves [Q123]. 
 
Queried on the sources of frustration around the referendum campaign, many 
others were unequivocal in blaming interference arising from the legal context 
shaping the organisation and discursive mediation of competing sides in 
referendum campaigns (see Chapter 5). In particular, the impact of the Coughlan 
judgement, seen as forcing RTÉ to hold finely-balanced debates was, as one 
journalist put it, ‘daft’ [Q134] and which even ‘distorts our political process’. This 
position was explained by another who felt that according equal time to both 
sides in a context where the political mainstream was almost unanimous in its 
support for the relevant treaty severed the legitimate, proportional link between 
parliamentary representation and coverage accorded [Q133]. In this vein, one 
said it amounted to ‘public service broadcasting being beaten by a court system’ 
[Q125], because it undermines the way that the public voted, which for another 
is the ‘ultimate say’ [P110], with another describing coverage as ‘tainted’ [Q133] 
for the same reason. An editor suggested that granting airtime to those ‘who have 
little or no...mandate’ [P110] is problematic because ‘in striving for balance, 
you're actually distorting the picture’ [P110]. 
 
Part of the frustration was related to the chief parliamentary beneficiary of time 
allocation during the referendum. In a situation in which, according to one editor, 
‘you had almost the entire political establishment and Sinn Féin on the other side’ 
[P106], the Sinn Féin party was pointed out several times in this respect as an 
undeserving beneficiary of extra time. This is described by another as ‘a godsend 
to Sinn Fein’ that was without ‘any sensible justification’ [Q134]. The Head of 
Broadcast Compliance (also a member of the editorial steering group convened 
to oversee the coverage of the referendum campaign) said that in the absence of 
a diverse parliamentary representation on the “no” side in the Fiscal Treaty, there 
was a need to find non-parliamentary voices to ensure that one party- Sinn Féin- 
wouldn’t ‘totally dominate’ debates [P102]. 
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More generally, one interviewee expressed frustration about ‘handing the debate  
over to people who don’t want to debate what should be debated’ [Q123], while  
another suggested that some of those suddenly granted airtime abuse the  
privilege by seeking to deceive the electorate, warning of the dangers  
of allowing ‘extraneous issues’ from people with ‘very specific agendas’, a lot of  
whom ‘don’t know what they’re talking about’- yet, ‘we have to let them say it’  
[Q133].  
 
6.3.2 Other(ed) voices: extra-parliamentary politics and the public at large 
 
On the broader question of RTÉ’s posture toward the representational legitimacy 
of extra-parliamentary political voices outside election time- including those of 
citizens at large- journalists and management frequently spoke of what they 
viewed as RTÉ’s good performance in representing “dissenting” voices after they 
break through to the political “mainstream”. In this regard, the emergence of an 
increased number of independent TDs and their loose parliamentary alliance in 
the form of the “Technical Group” following the 2011 General Election was 
frequently mentioned as an established recipient of coverage. A member of the 
RTÉ Board told me that in their view RTÉ gives considerable coverage to more 
radical critiques emanating from the parliamentary political sphere but that ‘the 
criteria by which people are given access’ was heavily influenced the 
traditionalism of senior journalists who looked to the parliamentary process as 
the locus of political life:  
 
…the people who become senior within the organisation, the sub-editors, 
the news editors, the people who make the call, will tend to be people of a 
background which has always thought traditionally about it... [P103] 
 
Commenting on the question of how journalists gatekeep access to the news in 
the context of source competition by campaigns, interest groups, professional 
associations and unions, one journalist suggested that although a ‘semblance of 
coherence’ is a prerequisite, ‘[i]t’s often about who shouts loudest’ [Q129], and 
even sometimes that ‘we do certain things to keep some people off our back’ 
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[Q135], suggesting an acquiescence on the basis of expediency to some- 
unspecified- voices clamouring for representation. 
 
One editor suggested in strong terms that it is not RTÉ's job to represent the 
carriers of positions and ideas which have not proved to be 'credible', and that 
RTÉ must first of all reflect the existing balance of perspectives, primarily as 
established at the ballot box: 
 
…show me the alternative idea that has not had the airtime and show me 
the alternative idea that has not had airtime but remains credible. […] do 
we necessarily have to represent the communists and the neo-nazis just 
because...you know, for the sake of political debate? Actually, no, we 
don't..nor should we. If they want to put themselves forward for an 
election and get a mandate, by all means… [P110] 
 
This topic of who should be defined as political agents was something I took up 
with another senior journalist, who suggested that ‘to be taken seriously… […] 
you can’t beat an electoral mandate’ [Q135], and that the outcome of elections is 
the clearest guide to RTÉ in determining who should be asked on to programmes 
as political actors. With time allocated on the basis of ‘what […] first and foremost, 
elections are showing’ [Q135], they added that they were ‘not sure that there’s a 
whole lot of new voices out there offering anything’ in any case. 
 
A senior political journalist expressed the view that extra-parliamentary voices 
are given due coverage when necessary, but that their lack of ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ meant that they were not afforded the sort of status of Dáil parties. 
Noting that ‘they’re not taken particularly seriously by RTÉ, and I wouldn’t really 
have a problem with that’, they said that ultimately, when it comes to determining 
‘how seriously should we take some dude with a bull-horn outside the gates of 
Leinster House?”, that ‘it’s with the numbers’ [Q131]- preferably in the form of an 
electoral mandate. 
 
The suggestion that ‘there is a certain amount of pressure on us from people in 
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the Oireachtas to make sure that we […] cover proceedings in the Dáil and the 
Seanad, and they get very upset when we don't give enough time to them’ 
suggests that this valourisation of parliament is partly due to exogenous pressure 
exerted by the parliamentary sphere, although their subsequent assertion that 
this was only natural because ‘it’s something that we should do as a public service 
broadcaster’ [Q131] demonstrates an acceptance of this logic. A further comment 
to the effect that ‘community-based politics or whatever’ disadvantage 
themselves in media terms by having less hierarchical structures suggests a 
journalistic affinity with conventional leadership structures, a sentiment 
reiterated by a current affairs journalist in relation to the Occupy Dame Street 
group (the largest Irish instantiation of the Occupy phenomenon). In relation to 
the same group, another journalist commented that if they got less coverage than 
‘they probably think they should get’, it was because ‘in a strict sense of the word, 
they represent nobody but themselves’ [Q134]. 
 
One journalist demurred from the consensus around parliamentary numbers as 
the legitimate basis of political representation, suggesting that it allocating 
coverage to parties based on past performance was the ‘most anti-change thing 
we do’, an ‘utterly pro-incumbent’ system that ‘militates against radical change’ 
[R140], particularly in a changing political climate where new, alternative 
political voices are emerging.  
 
The long-established “access” radio phone-in programme Liveline was 
spontaneously raised by several interviewees, and discussed in terms that 
suggested that it operated on the basis of a radically different representational 
mode than news and current affairs programming. Describing Liveline as ‘really 
the only unmediated programme on RTÉ’, The Head of Broadcast Compliance 
suggested that its uniqueness lies in the fact that ‘…the vast majority of space is 
given up to non-professionals, to people who aren’t representative of anything, 
who are just representing themselves’ [P102]. They further commented that the 
agendas of Liveline contributors are ‘…significantly at times quite different at 
times from what is perceived to be the public agenda’, and that it may be seen as 
facilitating a quasi-public, quasi-private discursive space, in which issues raised 
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can ‘…sometimes […] can move from there into the bigger wider public sphere’ 
[P102]. 
 
Describing the programme as ‘the crucial nexus between people…kind of getting 
the gist in the news of what’s happening and then getting motivated, getting 
angry’, another editor identified the ‘Liveline effect’ as a critical part of a chain of 
action which allowed the public to use RTÉ to raise issues and agitate for causes, 
noting that ‘it's been hugely..impressive I think, in...in being able to deal with 
social change’ [P114]. 
 
News programming, on the other hand, must restrict itself to “legitimate” voices, 
because as another journalist put it, 
 
…people nearly read that as a verification […] that if you're on RTÉ, 
therefore you're legitimate. […] So you do have a responsibility that the 
voices you're putting out there are legitimate ones [Q133]. 
 
With one version of the public agenda playing out on Liveline and another on 
news programming, one journalist suggested to me that weaknesses in 
representational diversity in media output was directly related to a diminished 
diversity in the journalistic cohort. While in the past, journalists ‘came from a 
wide range of backgrounds’, today  
 
…that diversity is gone. We all now come through the same four or five 
universities, the same four or five training courses that trains journalists. 
[…]. And the danger is that we're all terribly middle class […] and the 
diversity and the texture and the difference that we had in journalism in 
the past is being lost. And you see that then in maybe a failure to realise 
there are other voices out there that should be heard... [Q125] 
 
Several staff spoke about how programme formats and time pressures of 
newswork mitigated against broader representational diversity in news, 
including one who pointed to the impracticalities of ‘thinking too deeply’ about 
 166 
 
news production because ‘it's what you can get, in the four hour window before 
the six hour..the six o clock news. It's put together in that short timeline and that's 
it’ [P114]. 
 
Another journalist emphasised the perceived need for contributors on 
programmes to be available at short notice and appropriately articulate, and that 
untested contributors are too risky to be used, saying that ‘it's all very well to talk 
about diverse voices and bringing in people from the margins and so on’ but that 
‘You can't...put someone on air who is not ready...who has never done it’ [Q125]. 
 
One senior journalist went against the grain, implicitly critiquing the 
representational mode that underpins the attribution of credibility to those asked 
on to the public airwaves. They cited the example of the Ballyhea Says No 
campaign group against bondholder payments (see O’Briain, 2013) as an 
example of ‘a very interesting piece of local defiance’ of the kind that should have 
a greater place in RTE programming, adding that they were ‘slightly wary’ of ‘the 
amount of access we give to…what you could loosely […] describe as official 
Ireland’, on the basis that, in an inversion of the representative logic used by other 
interviewees, ‘very often’ ‘you have a sense that they’re representing nobody 
other than themselves’ [Q135]. 
 
One journalist offered an example of what they felt was an undue over-
representation and inappropriate facilitation of financial expertise in the 
newsroom, telling me that RTÉ was involved in setting up remote cameras in the 
offices of a number of Dublin stockbrokers to facilitate easy access to the RTÉ 
Newsroom for the purpose of high quality live broadcasts for use in bulletins (see 
Nolan, 2010). According to this journalist, this was an ‘appalling’ privileging of 
‘free, unfettered access to the airwaves’ to ‘the very people who got us into this 
mess’ [Q130]. 
 
6.3.3 Public service journalism, social change and campaigning 
 
Journalistic attitudes to RTÉ’s roles in relation to promoting social change were 
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solicited. A senior member of newsroom management expressed the clear view 
that RTÉ was ‘not there to create a new agenda’ but rather ‘to narrate what is 
going on’ [P104]. They added that although journalistic independence was 
crucial, ‘we do have parameters that dictate, to some extent anyway, the subject 
matter of our journalism’, and that ‘sustaining the national debate’ necessitates 
taking ‘the apparatus of society seriously’. 
 
The Chief News Editor ventured that although RTÉ should do ‘a bit of both', its 
first duty is to reflect; only secondarily to change, suggesting that RTÉ’s 
contribution to society should involve engaging in publics in an educative project 
aimed at creating 'a better society', seeing its roles as including imperatives to 
'educate, report, uncover, disclose'. [P107] 
 
Another editor evoked the Reithian formula that broadcasting should gently lead 
people to new ideas- ‘Not leading them and telling them you have to eat from this 
trough, or you have to take a good dose of that, but leading them to the ideas that 
are out there’ [P114]. 
 
Despite a general reticence to ascribe too much influence to RTÉ, several 
journalists identified the role of journalists in enabling, provoking and reflecting 
social change as important to its contribution to democracy. One correspondent 
described the life-cycle of an issue as ‘like a chrysalis becoming a butterfly, where 
it takes off, and can't be ignored by news editors’ [Q126], a sentiment echoed by 
an editor who spoke about how social change is pushed onto news agendas by 
specific issues and issue sponsors, which act as motors of change insofar as it 
‘forces the […] authorities to look at it in a different light’ [P110]. 
 
One journalist told me although journalists can shine a light on something, after 
this initial thematisation where an issue becomes ‘public, if you like…that was 
RTÉ’s job done’, after which ‘[it] was up to other people’ to keep it on the agenda, 
to ‘make the running’ on an issue [Q135]. 
 
Attitudes on whether “campaigning” journalism had a place in the RTÉ newsroom 
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generally elicited a negative reaction, with journalists and managers alike citing 
the restrictions of genre, journalistic ethics and legislative constraints as reasons 
why it was not usually appropriate to openly advocate for particular causes. A 
senior manager told me that in a news and current affairs context, ‘it’s probably 
the one area of journalism that is difficult for us to do’ [P104]. However, a strong 
strain of opinion was apparent that within those constraints, journalism, even in 
the newsroom, could and should engage- to a limited extent- in explicitly value-
laden activities, so long as it was done carefully. Testimony on this suggested that 
in practice, this meant that any “campaigning” must remain within the realm of 
broad consensus. 
 
When the Chief News Editor, for example, told me that they saw some room for 
campaigning journalism in news and I asked on what issues this might be 
acceptable, they responded that they could campaign for example on 'reducing 
child poverty' and on 'righting wrongs that are obviously wrong' [P107]. Another 
editor similarly suggested that it may be acceptable on some stories where there 
is ‘definitely a bad guy out there, and you’re hunting a bad guy’ [P114]. 
 
A number of journalists made reference to an RTÉ News “campaign” of sorts on 
the high prevalence of road traffic accidents a number of years prior. A senior 
manager in the newsroom told me that a decision was taken to pro-actively 
ensure that road death statistics were not ignored or glossed over, but made 
prominent in the news for a period of time. They said however that this was a 
temporary initiative and that ultimately, ‘we’re a newsroom, we’re not a series of 
campaigning journalists’ [P104]. 
 
Another journalist, although speaking approvingly of the road traffic accident 
‘campaign’, told me that there were ‘very few’ topics which might be similarly 
amenable to campaigning, offering the sole example of ‘mental health’ as 
something ‘topical’ which they felt RTÉ would be able to ‘shine a light’ on [Q121]. 
Citing a British newspaper that actively campaigns, one editor said that it has the 
independence [P015] to do this, implying that RTÉ did not. 
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I asked a number of interviewees about whether climate change might represent 
another suitable issue. Respondents on this were very dubious about the 
suitability of this topic, principally on the basis that as a “contentious” topic it 
would not represent fertile ground for RTÉ advocacy. According to one journalist, 
contrary to road deaths,   
 
Not everyone believes that climate change is an issue […] I don't think we 
can campaign on something where there's very obviously two…massively 
divergent opinions on something. [Q121] 
 
Another journalist told me that in their view, merely placing climate change on 
the agenda without a definite news hook would be seen internally as 
unacceptable, saying that something like this was ‘just so not gonna happen 
basically’ because ‘campaigning journalism is frowned upon’ in the newsroom 
[Q130]. 
 
One journalist’s insistence that ‘you need a hook’ [Q130] to raise an issue was 
mirrored by the Chief News Editor’s clear view that climate change was a poor fit 
with news values, and that ‘climate change was not critical, not urgent’, 
representing neither a ‘daily crisis’ nor an ‘occasional crisis’ [P107]. Perhaps this 
is what another journalist meant when they said that when it comes to raising 
issues on the news agenda, ‘you can’t go too far off the radar’ [Q133].  
 
6.4 Knowing their place: the “public” in public service broadcasting  
 
6.4.1 Visions of the “imagined audience” 
 
Newsroom observations suggested that formal audience data played only a minor 
supporting role in newsroom life. Interview questions further probed journalistic 
and managerial attitudes to the relationships between RTÉ and its public, with a 
focus on conceptualisations of that public as well as the desirable forms that those 
relationships should practically take with regard to journalistic accountability 
and public participation. 
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References to audiences and publics made by journalists in interviews did not 
necessarily refer to either formal or first-hand knowledge, but often to an 
implied, imagined audience, a composite of a variety of sources that included 
family, friends, colleagues, informal encounters with members of the public, 
formal audience research, and also the broader national imagined community. A 
range of diverse and occasionally contradictory visions of the audience were 
articulated.  
 
Meeting the desires of the audience was sometimes talked about in positive 
terms, including when the Group Head of Television told me that programming 
must match the expectations of viewers. Describing audience research as ‘hugely 
important’, and about ‘understanding your market’, they told me that Nielsen 
ratings represented the only way of measuring ‘value for the public purse’, which 
as a ‘public servant’ in a ‘semi-state organisation’, they had a ‘responsibility’ to 
emphasise [P105]. 
 
Achieving big ratings for programmes was described by many interviewees in the 
newsroom as both justification and reward for what they do. One editor directly 
linked good ratings with enhanced ‘credibility’ [P109], while another told me that 
‘big numbers’ to a large degree validate a piece of output as a successful piece of 
public service broadcasting [P114]. 
 
Changing audience news consumption habits struck a chord with some editors 
who articulated a need to react accordingly. According to one, the distribution 
mechanisms of news needed to move with the internet age, but, in an affirmation 
of an assumed audience satisfaction with its content, the news itself did not need 
to change. Describing audience demands to see events ‘pretty much as they’re 
happening’, this editor commented that ‘it’s the platforms that are changing 
rather than the content and the stories’ [P110]. 
 
A recurring theme with many journalists was a strong confidence that members 
of the public will not hesitate to contact them if they’re unhappy. Some spoke of 
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overflowing email inboxes, suggesting, if anything, a surfeit of direct 
correspondence from the public. One journalist described public contact as a sort 
of a centring mechanism, letting you know when they’ve deviated, ‘when it’s like 
the spinning top… […] goes off balance’ [Q132].  Another editor told me that  
 
…when you’re getting it really wrong...you begin to get the feedback 
straight away, and then you gotta make...change your tack... [P109] 
 
Whilst public contact seems to be viewed as a helpful resource in taking the 
temperature of public opinion on a given piece of journalism, it was not 
uncritically celebrated by interviewees.  
 
One journalist described a text-line for a programme with which they were 
associated as delivering a steady stream of both ‘constructive observation, 
opinion and criticism’ but also ‘raw sewage- people who are angry at the world, 
and just want to vent spleen’ [Q123]. 
 
Elaborating on the idea that the public feel a strong ‘sense of ownership and 
entitlement’ [P109] in relation to public broadcasting which emboldens them to 
make their views on programme output clear to journalists and management, 
several took refuge in the broadcasting canard that displeasing a broad swathe of 
different groups is itself an indicator of success. This is illustrated by one senior 
manager’s claim that ‘we're criticised for many things...usually in contradictory 
directions’ [P104]. 
 
Editors and senior management frequently alluded to the impossibility of 
pleasing everybody all of the time in the context of general-interest broad-based 
channels aimed at all demographics. Although buoyed by strong ratings and what 
they saw as strong public trust and hard-earned credibility, several interviewees, 
including the Managing Editor of News, suggested the existence of ambivalent 
public attitudes to RTÉ, partly based on a sense that ‘people regard RTÉ as part 
of the establishment’: 
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…I get the sense that in Britain there is a natural affection for the BBC..they 
call it Auntie Beeb, it's sort of some..almost part of the family, whereas 
RTE, because people feel that they own it, which they do, they therefore 
are annoyed when it doesn't reflect their own views or their own 
interests… [P106] 
 
For their own part, journalists were markedly cool on accommodating public 
views regarding substantive news content, revealing a set of often negative or 
paternalistic attitudes to the public. 
 
Among some interviewees there was a strain of thought that the public are often 
fickle, even intransigent. Discussing the challenges of facilitating public 
understanding of the Fiscal Treaty referendum, one programme-maker 
expressed frustration that even if RTÉ staff were to sit down with ‘every single 
voter in the country and explained it to them, there would be a very significant 
body of people who just don’t want to understand’ [Q123]. 
 
One editor spoke about how ‘audiences don’t really engage’ with ‘big picture type 
of stories’ like climate change or the Palestinian crisis, which the editor described 
as ‘worthy but dull topics’, which they still covered, albeit ‘sometimes it’s just 
with a heavy heart’ [P114]. This is because, as another editor also put it, 
viewerships in current affairs programming tend to drop precipitously- ‘through 
the floor’- on non-domestic items. 
 
Whilst journalists and editors alike often expressed the view that they should not 
‘force-feed’ [Q134] the audience with coverage on issues which they did not feel 
resonated with the public, instead reflecting what one editor called the ‘ebb and 
flow’ of public interest [P114], the example of Northern Ireland was offered by 
one journalist as an example of an area where significant coverage was accorded 
irrespective of assumed low public interest: 
 
…people in the South did not care what was going on in Northern Ireland 
a lot of the time. But we did it over and over and over again [Q127] 
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On the principle that “if it ain't broke, don't fix it”, the Managing Editor of News 
suggested that audience expectations and ratings success discourage changes in 
programme formats, suggesting in relation to the Six One News, ‘what's the point 
in changing it too much if...to a large extent it actually works’ [P106]. Another 
journalist suggested that unless programme formats stay consistent, audiences 
will go elsewhere [Q123]. 
 
Another impact of the imagined audience lies in their assumed desire for news 
that spoke to them personally. One editor argued that coverage of issues is 
focused on what it means for the lives of Irish people, with the assumed insularity 
of the imagined audience absolving journalists of deep engagement with complex, 
systemic matters: 
 
Like, the Euro bailout overnight, ultimately what people want to know is 
what effect is that going to have on my life, not you know, the geo-political 
world of you know, the EU and how political leadership has failed, and how 
a blind eye was turned to the excesses of Greece and France and Portugal 
and Ireland [P110] 
 
A sense that some demographics are increasingly beyond the reach of RTÉ's news 
and current affairs output was expressed by a small number of journalists. 
Suggesting both regional and socio-economic divides in RTÉ’s audience, one told 
me that 
 
Inside the Pale and outside the Pale there are very different impressions 
of RTE and attitudes toward it. […] I think it is regrettable that RTE is 
consumed by a by and large, so many people who are better off 
than...lower down the socio-economic ladder [Q123] 
 
Another applied a similar logic to immigrant populations, offering the personal 
anecdote that in places with large immigrant populations, ‘nobody is watching 
RTÉ, nobody’ [Q130], expressing a concern that RTÉ’s future relevance is in 
question if swathes of the population are disinterested in its output. 
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6.4.2 Accountability and public participation 
 
Many interviewees were also asked for their views on specific transparency and 
public participation measures implemented elsewhere, including “Editors’ 
blogs”, “public editors”, media response programmes which allow the public to 
put questions to journalism professionals about their work, and the more radical 
‘public commissioning’ proposal, put forward by Hind (2010), a form of 
participatory budgeting in which members of the public, as co-owners of the 
broadcaster,  would each be able to exercise a share a share of power in 
determining what kind of programmes were produced.  
 
A range of views were offered by interviewees on this topic, from a strong 
aversion to any increased accountability or participation measures to the more 
sympathetic view that journalism should facilitate higher levels of public scrutiny 
and/or involvement. 
 
One common theme, particularly strong among senior editorial figures, was that 
the public should be kept at a healthy distance from encroachment on journalistic 
autonomy. When asked whether journalists are sufficiently equipped to- or 
should be tasked with- the responsibility of deciding which voices and ideas are 
granted access to the public airwaves, the Head of Broadcast Compliance said that 
‘I'd be nervous about..any..scheme.. […] which actually imposes greater...eh, 
restraint on broadcasters' [P102] and that calls for ‘greater scrutiny of RTÉ’ must 
be resisted because 
 
You have to trust your public service broadcaster to be fair in determining 
what sort of subject matter will be discussed on the programmes we 
report etc. […] I think you have to allow journalism its space, and 
sometimes that space may be misused, but..eh, I think generally speaking, 
that is a lesser...problem, than the alternative, which is actually somebody 
else telling journalists what is the news and what are the stories they 
should be covering [P102] 
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When asked about the desirability of involving the public in programming 
decisions, this interviewee went on to express both normative and practical 
doubts, suggesting that ‘if you allow a degree of democracy to creep in to 
determining who are editors’, editorial behaviour would descend into a 
popularity contest and ‘you increase the likelihood of pandering to prejudice 
rather than challenging prejudice’ [P102]. 
 
For several other interviewees, including an editor and a senior correspondent, 
direct public involvement in influencing journalistic content is undesirable for 
the similar reason that it would result in a thematic dumbing down- what one 
editor described as ‘happy clappy stories about […] stuff happening in their 
communities’ [P114]. One editor portended the arrival of interminable ‘Big 
Brother style television’ [P110] should the public get a say in journalist output.  
 
One editor adopted a firm line against any interference with journalistic 
autonomy, arguing that while journalists should be ‘conscious of’ and ‘receptive 
to’ public desires, this did not mean responding to ‘every... request, crank or 
otherwise out there’. This is justified on the basis of respecting the boundaries of 
professional autonomy- just as lay people ‘don't go into...a shop and tell the 
shopkeeper what to do’ journalists are ‘paid professionals’ whose work is 
similarly not properly subject to direct public oversight [P110]. 
 
The strongest resistance of any interviewee was expressed by the Chief News 
Editor, who dismissed out of hand the idea that the public should have a greater 
involvement in RTÉ News, going so far as to say that they 'resist' ideas that 
involve solicitation of public views in determining what news should be. Focus 
groups should 'buzz off', and that 'corporate RTÉ' can do as it pleases regarding 
audience involvement, but that is 'their business' [P107]. 
 
The idea that RTÉ are already accountable to the public in important ways was 
voiced by many interviewees. One editor suggested that RTÉ are ‘utterly 
accountable in terms of boards, authorities, viewers, etc.’ [P110], a view echoed 
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by a senior newsroom manager who described RTÉ as ‘pretty transparent’ and 
‘open about what we do despite...opinions to the contrary’- although arguing that 
‘consistency’ and ‘value for money’ were also important considerations alongside 
openness [P104]. 
 
Editors and programme-makers in particular frequently noted that much of their 
direct knowledge of the audience came from complaints. One editor suggested 
that ‘most of my relationship with the audience..is..dealing with complaints’ and 
that  ‘you sometimes get the sense that everybody out there is really unhappy 
with what you do’ [P106].  
 
Several journalists alluded to problems of perception regarding the 
accountability and responsiveness of RTÉ to the public, including one who 
outlined inadequacies in extant accountability mechanisms, saying that from the 
public’s point of view, it looks  
 
…wholly unsatisfactory that the only real methods by which I could make 
RTE accountable are to take a BAI complaint, which is a very very flawed 
process, from everybody's point of view, or to go to the courts [Q123] 
 
However, reiterating a point made by a number of other staff, this journalist 
concluded that the internal policy to personally respond to all complaints 
rendered RTÉ responsive to the public- that contrary to what ‘most people’ 
thought, they are not an ‘untouchable’ caste of ‘D4 broadcasters’ [Q123].  
 
The Head of Broadcast Compliance (amongst other duties, tasked with 
responding to formal complaints) expressed broad support- with some caveats- 
for the present Broadcasting Authority of Ireland regulatory complaints regime, 
noting that it tends to ‘force broadcasters to at least think about what they’re 
doing and consider the consequences of what they’re doing’ [P102]. 
 
Several others suggested that the BAI process’ lack of sanction meant that there 
was little or no redress for complainants even in cases where complaints are 
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upheld. One correspondent expressed concern that were journalists to 
acknowledge a mistake in writing to a member of the public, that may be used in 
evidence against them in a subsequent BAI complaint, which ‘actually mitigates 
against…a broadcasting organisation being more open and saying, you have a real 
point’ [Q130]. 
 
Journalists were more likely to cite personal links to members of the public they 
meet through chance encounters as a way of arguing they remained close to the 
public- using them as what one called ‘my own personal kind of…opinion 
conductor’ [Q133]. 
 
A second category of response took a more conciliatory approach to the idea that 
RTÉ's relationship with its public should be closer in various ways- as long as it 
was within what one editor put as ‘within reason, and as long as it did not involve 
them RTÉ being ‘driven by the public’ [P110].  
 
Several respondents advocated a more open, transparent and accountable RTÉ 
not on the basis of any apparent championing of public sovereignty and radical 
democracy but from a pragmatic perspective: if RTÉ open up a little, they would 
benefit from increased public understanding and appreciation of their work, and 
take the sting out of the anger or frustration of potential complainants. Speaking 
in relation to the desirability of a broadcast media response programme, one 
journalist told me that such an initiative might ‘help…dispose of and deal with 
things that could potentially fester into complaints’, enabling the public to 
‘understand better’ and for journalists to ‘articulate and explain’ their decision-
making [Q129]. 
 
Echoing the theme of enhancing public ‘understanding’ (rather than public 
participation), a senior newsroom manager commented on a previous practice of 
holding occasional roadshows or public meetings around the country where 
senior RTÉ staff would meet the public, suggesting that ‘it might be time to do it 
again’ because ‘it's probably wise for us to go out there and explain ourselves as 
much as possible’ [P104]. 
 178 
 
 
Another senior manager suggested however that the roadshows did not attract 
those members of the public who might have the most to contribute to such a 
process, saying that attendees of the meetings ‘fell into two camps; those who 
were...very strong supporters of public service broadcasting and RTE and those 
who were very strong critics’, with the result that managers felt that ‘we weren’t 
actually learning very much from it’ [P102]. 
 
A senior journalist told me that formal accountability and participation initiatives 
are a matter for the ‘wonks and the suits upstairs’, describing the relationship 
between RTÉ and its public as mediated by individual programmes and 
personalities rather than through formal institutional means [Q128]. 
 
Some interviewees expressed a more fulsome enthusiasm for democratic 
openness between RTÉ and the public that transcended pragmatism. A member 
of the RTÉ Board suggested that 
 
…RTE has to create the possibility of ways of involvement of the public, 
otherwise the public will just go elsewhere…and it's not a question just of 
retaining them, I think that's the service [P103] 
 
One senior journalist used RTÉ's response to the Fr Reynolds libel affair as an 
occasion when the broadcaster should have involved the public in the debate of 
what should happen next, suggesting that in the interests of giving ‘effect to the 
accountability that we say we sign up for’, a televised discussion programme on 
the handling of the Fr Reynolds affair should have been arranged [Q135]. 
 
The idea that what one editor described as the ‘tradition of secrecy’ of ‘official 
Ireland’ requires greater challenge was expressed by several editors and 
journalists, including a senior political journalist who went as far as to describe 
journalism as ‘the last sort of unchallenged institution in the State’: 
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…you've seen the authority of the church, the authority of the political 
parties, the authority of the state, the authority of the banks, the authority 
of some of the regulators...all of them challenged in really fundamental 
ways in the last decade, decade and a half, and yet the media not so much 
[Q131] 
 
This journalist added that ‘apart from the libel laws, there’s very little comeback 
for people’ and that ‘[j]ournalists really don't like getting questioned, or 
challenged, and maybe it's time that more of us were. And not just in RTE’ [Q131]. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
Interview data on the three broad topical areas explored above helped to flesh 
out in greater detail and in more explicit ways what was often only merely hinted 
at through observation and casual conversations while in the newsroom. 
 
On the subject of the crisis and its implications for journalistic practice and 
theory, interview data suggested that the journalistic habitus was only weakly 
perturbed. Although general failings were typically acknowledged in terms of a 
failure to offer an early warning of impending crisis, that such a failure presented 
any institutional or professional implications appeared to be elided through a 
displacement and diffusion of blame within the broader contexts of an overall 
failure of media and economic expertise regarding the prediction of the bursting 
of the housing bubble. This did not strongly extend either to the recognition of 
the need for any particular ameliorative actions for journalism.  
 
Interviews with journalists and managers in RTÉ reveal a broad support for the 
prevailing norms of journalism around objectivity, impartiality and balance, 
which on the whole were seen as timeless and not subject to re-examination by 
external events “in the world”. However, somewhat varying interpretations of 
these norms suggests at once their durability, malleability and the simultaneous 
coexistence of varying news epistemologies (Cottle, 2007: 11), including a 
preference for describing the journalistic craft in terms of ‘gut instinct’ arising 
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from experience rather than a slavish adherence to rules. 
Interview and observational data indicated that the greater impact of recent 
crisis came instead in the form of effects from RTÉ’s internal turbulence, central 
to which were both the ‘Mission to Prey’ libel and its fallout, as well as what one 
interviewee described as ‘our private economic crisis’ [P104]- ongoing rounds of 
resourcing, staffing and pay cutbacks. Impacts on morale and the ever-increasing 
pressures of being asked to do more with less meant that the newsroom appeared 
to be dedicating its energies towards maintaining its level of service to the public 
as effectively as possible, rather than reinventing it (notwithstanding internal 
newsroom technological transitions ongoing during the period of ethnography). 
 
The scale of the internal challenges, the energy consumed in responding to them 
and the limited institutional sites for professional reflexivity appeared to 
diminish the possibilities that crisis might occasion big changes in journalistic 
ideology and practice, facilitating the elision and bracketing of implications of 
crisis for journalists, editors and managers in their daily work.  
 
On the topics of RTÉ’s agenda-setting and agenda-building practices and 
supporting praxis of representation, interviewees were attuned to the idea of 
RTÉ as a crucial player in “national” debate and discussion, with the formal 
machinery of democracy playing a central role in helping guide the broadcaster’s 
representative practices in news and current affairs, suggesting the broad 
diffusion of a ‘sacerdotalist’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1986: 74) orientation to 
formal politics. A range of frustrations around the covering of referenda were 
expressed, which seemed to be chiefly emanate from interference in journalistic 
autonomy arising from the perceived requirements of the Coughlan judgement 
during referenda which hinted at a broader unease with how the Crotty and 
Coughlan judgements served to disrupt, respectively, the frameworks of 
representative democracy and how politics is journalistically mediated. 
 
Attitudes toward the representation of extra-parliamentary political voices and 
those of the public at large were characterised by concerns about their credibility, 
representativeness and newsworthiness, diminishing the possibilities of their 
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access to the airwaves. Nonetheless, a general, though sometimes qualified 
satisfaction with RTÉ’s performance in representing “marginal” voices and ideas 
was evident. 
 
Interview data revealed that some journalists saw themselves as performing a 
useful social role that went beyond the mere provision of information but 
included drawing attention to various wrongs. That this implies a catalytic role in 
social change than an outright campaigning role is attributable to the mediation 
between the desire to maintain a normative thrust to journalism and the 
constraints of professional ethics and legislative dictates, underwritten by the 
parameters of the broader cultural context within and outside the newsroom.   
 
Responses on topics pertaining to the role of the public in journalism indicates 
the rhetorical centrality of the collective figure of “the public” to their work. 
Although “serving the public” and discharging the “public interest” appears to be 
a totemic sine qua non of public service journalism, this is generally 
conceptualised as necessitating an arms-length relationship with that public.  
 
Attitudes to the imagined audience of public service broadcasting suggested they 
were a group whose preferences and foibles must often be accommodated and 
even pandered to (principally in the interests of maintaining and growing 
programme audiences), but at other times from which they must also be 
protected from (because a universal, comprehensive public service does not 
merely triangulate to the sum of audience desires). The public as a totality are 
valourised, but individual members of that public who engage with RTÉ are often 
looked at in a much more jaded and even suspicious manner. 
 
The sovereignty of publics- as consumers of and the ultimate judge of RTÉ 
journalism- was repeatedly invoked but the view this sovereignty could not 
unduly impinge upon the independence of broadcasters was even more 
strenuously articulated. In the main, interviewees felt well-connected to their 
audiences and reasonably accountable to the public at large. Lukewarm attitudes 
were expressed at the idea of increased journalistic transparency, but attitudes 
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to the idea of increased public participation and even decision-making power in 
public service journalism revealed a deep unease, fear and strongly-expressed 
concern that journalism quality and essential professional autonomy would be 
undermined by any such arrangement. 
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Chapter 7: Framing Crisis in Europe 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
7.1.1 Democracy and technocracy in Europe: the cases of Greece and Italy 
 
The topical focus of the textual analysis undertaken here centres on a series of 
events in Greece and Italy between late 2011 and early 2013, where the regional 
instantiation of the global economic crisis intersected with democratic politics in 
profound ways in what has become known as the Euro debt crisis. This saw the 
increasing imperilment of the domestic economies of the countries involved as 
well as threatening the cohesion and integrity of the single currency. 
 
The immediate context in the Greek case is represented by an escalating political 
crisis associated with the state’s bailout packages. The first, negotiated in 2010 
with the EU and IMF, was the largest national bailout in history. It entailed a strict 
multi-year regime of cutbacks and market reforms for the country (Macartney, 
2013). In the midst of strong public opposition to the bailout, ensuing political 
instability and the failure of the package to stabilise the country’s economic 
position, a second bailout, this time topping 100 billion euro, was negotiated in 
October 2011 and intended by Europe and the IMF to be the decisive solution to 
Greece’s economic crisis (Blyth, 2013: 72). In the midst of growing domestic 
dissent, in an unexpected development the Greek Prime Minister George 
Papandreou announced that the plan would be put to a confidence vote and 
referendum prior to approval. 
 
The crisis in Italy (while not involved in a bailout agreement) was also occasioned 
by a serious public debt problem, the size of which was second only to that of 
Greece. The consequence of a range of long-run political and economic problems, 
including poor governance, sluggish growth, poor competitiveness and 
exacerbated by the economy’s failure to rebound after the 2008 financial crisis, 
Italy’s debt problem became a debt crisis in the context of anxiety about the 
integrity of the European monetary union and about the ability of the Italians to 
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fund their debt (Anderson, 2014). The size of Italy’s economy meant that a bailout 
along Greek lines was unthinkable, but something had to give.  
 
Over the course of just a few weeks in late 2011 between the end of October and 
November, both Greece and Italy, under direct pressure by European political 
elites and financial markets (Sum and Jessop, 2013: 427, Geithner, 2014, 
Campello, 2015: 203, Papadimitrious and Zartaloudis, 2015: 41), saw their 
democratically elected governments collapse and replaced by caretaker 
technocratic administrations. Over the following months, these temporary 
governments implemented the reforms viewed by European and global political 
and economic elites as necessary to stabilise their respective economies and to 
ward off bankruptcy. Elections were eventually held in both countries which 
restored “normal” democratic governance. In both cases, electorates delivered 
inconclusive results. In Italy, this resulted in two months of uncertainty, with 
prolonged negotiation leading to the eventual formation of a grand coalition. In 
Greece, a second election had to be called, in which the main conservative 
majority won by a margin just large enough to form a coalition. Despite marked 
swings to leftist and other oppositional groups, new governments with broadly 
compliant attitudes to European crisis management were in the end formed in 
both countries. 
 
7.1.2 Crisis construal and framing 
 
Interrogating journalistic sense-making of the range of issues implicated in the 
circumstances surrounding the collapse and restoration of democratic 
governance in the Eurozone periphery is the focus of this chapter. Such sense-
making requires the establishment and retention of crisis construals- frameworks 
for understanding and assessing events, processes, and their contexts- and as 
outlined in Chapter 4, these crisis construals will be elucidated through the 
application of a framing approach to textual analysis. 
 
Gamson et al. (1992: 384) have argued that the concept of the frame is central for 
the analysis of media content. A frame represents ‘a central organizing principle 
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that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of 
symbols’. This emphasis on a frame as structuring and organising meaning is 
what extends it beyond a mere measure of the ‘emphasis in salience of different 
aspects of a topic’ (de Vreese, 2005: 53) and basic conceptualisations of agenda-
setting (McCullagh, 2002). 
 
The frame analysis seeks to shed light on what Gamson (1988: 221-4) calls the 
‘issue culture’ and ‘issue climate’. The former refers to the range of “relevant” 
ideas, clustered into “packages” which become the characteristic set of available 
ideas for engaging in discourse in a particular issue arena. Frames are part of 
culture, and political, professional and institutional and societal aspects of the 
prevailing culture help determine the stock of frames that can be utilised. For 
Gamson and Modigliani (1989: 3), media discourses both reflect and shape issue 
cultures. 
 
Frames are seen here as providing the ‘discursive cues’ which ‘evoke or align’ 
(Hervik, 2011) messages with certain ways of looking at the world. Insofar as 
frames ‘add up to something bigger than an individual story’ (Reese, 2001: 13) 
and ‘project knowledge ahead’ (Reese, 2007: 150) by guiding the interpretation 
of information to come, one can approximate the extent of embeddedness of a 
particular issue culture by examining the consistency of the framing. 
 
The latter term, ‘issue climate’, refers to the conditions that shape the extent to 
which there is fertile ground for re-framing of issues away from their prior 
dominant framing. Times of crisis may engender changes in issue climates, on the 
basis that ‘[w]hen official packages are in crisis and disarray, opportunities are 
created for challengers’ (Gamson, 1988: 241). 
 
The extent to which the general post-2008 climate may have created conditions 
conducive to challenger groups seeking to reframe crisis in particular ways will 
be explored by a frame analysis which focuses on these critical moments of crisis, 
helping shed light on ‘how journalists straddle the contested and hegemonic 
discursive terrains’ (Quinsaat, 2014: 575) represented by these topics. 
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Although framing may be accomplished, as noted in Van Gorp’s (2007: 68) 
distinction, both ‘by’ the media (journalism professionals) and ‘through’ the 
media (in the form of interviewees and other sources who appear on 
programmes), the analytic focus in this chapter is placed, for reasons of focus, 
solely on the journalistic discharge of framing, as observable in textual output- 
corresponding to the outcomes rather than the antecedents of what Reese and 
Shoemaker (1996) call journalistic ‘frame-building’ processes. 
 
7.1.3 Frame identification 
 
If frames are generally understood to be ‘principles of organizing information, 
clues to which may be found in the media discourse’ (Reese, 2001: 14), then a 
series of methodological questions arise about how frames are defined and 
operationalised. A high level of heterogeneity in the definition and identification 
of frames in texts practiced by researchers is a well-established challenge in the 
literature, and its implications for data validity and reliability have been explored 
by Matthes and Kohring (2008: 260). For them, the opaqueness of the 
‘methodological black box’ of the lone researcher in particular is a significant 
problem with framing methodologies, with arbitrary criteria for frame 
identifications producing classifications which may be inconsistent and whose 
provenance may not be clear to the reader. To mitigate this, a range of 
ameliorative measures are taken, including the delineation of sampling and 
coding procedures below, supplemented by appendices and the provision of 
individual coding decisions on request (see also Johnston, 2002: 86-8). 
 
However, the recognition of the ineluctably interpretive nature of frame analysis- 
interested, as it is, in discerning latent meaning structures as well as explicit ones 
in holistic texts- forces one to acknowledge that researcher subjectivity cannot 
be simply erased through ever-greater commitments to methodological rigour, 
and that the navigation of what Gerhards (1995: 243) describes as the ‘Scylla of 
subjective hermeneutics and the Charybdis of quantitative content analysis” is 
not so straightforward. 
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The approach to frame definition, frame scope and frame identification taken 
here is informed by the primary research question of this analysis. The analysis 
seeks to explore the extent to which journalistic frames in RTÉ news and current 
affairs output covering the Euro crisis tends to privilege- manifestly and latently- 
understandings of crisis which have affinities for either neoliberal ideological 
formations or more oppositional ones emanating from the political Left. 
  
As de Vreese (2005: 54) notes in his review of disparate approaches to frame 
analysis, frames-whether they are identified inductively or deductively (“read 
off” from texts or identified on an a priori basis preceding textual analysis)- may 
be defined narrowly in issue-specific ways that are closely attuned to the specific 
topic or event under study, or defined more broadly via abstract generic frames 
that can be applied over a broad range of different topics, aiding comparative 
analysis. 
 
The approach taken is also guided by the necessity for parsimony, the desirability 
of facilitating cross-topic comparisons and the view that establishing in advance 
too rigid a framework for analysis diminishes the validity of subsequent findings. 
As per Van Gorp (2007: 64), frames are conceptualised here as embedded in texts 
not as singular phenomena to be plucked out of texts via close reading but 
identifiable by proxy, through ‘packages’ of constituent elements, and that the 
range of framing devices (Gamson and Lasch, 1983) present in a text form frame 
packages which ‘suggests a definition, a problematization, and an evaluation of 
the event and ultimately results in a number of logical conclusions- for example, 
with regard to who is responsible for the perceived problem’ (ibid: 65).  
 
7.1.4 Sampling strategy 
 
It was necessary to identify the key political events which would inform the 
thematic and temporal parameters of the sample selected for analysis. Because 
of a number of clear structural similarities between events in Greece and Italy, 
the decision was taken to divide the sample in a manner that lent itself to a 
comparative approach. This resulted in the division of the sample into two topical 
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areas- (1) “slide toward technocracy” and (2) “return to democracy” reflecting 
the progression of crisis in both countries from the replacement of democratic 
with technocratic leadership, and the subsequent holding of elections in both 
countries. This generated a total of four sub-topical units corresponding to each 
topical area’s domestic instantiation (with Greece identified by the prefix “A” and 
Italy “B”). 
 
As shown below, the four sub-topics demonstrate a straightforward common 
structure: in each case, an immediate catalyst prompts a range of consequences. 
In topic 1a, this is the announcement of a referendum by Greek PM George 
Papandreou in response to the bailout deal just agreed in Europe. In topic 1b, it 
is the build-up of internal and external political and market pressures on Italian 
PM Silvio Berlusconi in the wake of events in Greece. In both cases, these catalysts 
eventually result in the resignation of both Prime Ministers and their 
replacement by technocratic caretaker governments. Topics 2a and 2b are 
initiated by the announcement of the caretaker Greek and Italian Prime Ministers 
that elections were to be held, prompting the dissolution of their respective 
governments and parliamentary elections campaign which culminate in a return 
to “normal” democratic governance. 
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Timeline of key events 
(1) Slide towards technocracy 
 
 
 
 
 
(1a) 
Greece 
31 Oct 2011 Greek PM 
Papandreou promises bailout 
on referendum 
 
10 November 2011 
Papandreou resigns, 
preparations made for 
caretaker government 
 
11 November 2011 Caretaker 
technocratic administration 
sworn in led by new PM 
Papademos, plans elections for 
early 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(1b) 
Italy 
8 November 2011 Berlusconi 
wins budget vote but loses 
absolute majority, announces 
resignation 
 
12 November 2011 Italian PM 
Berlusconi resigns, Monti asked 
to lead technocratic 
administration 
 
16 November 2011 Monti 
appointed caretaker PM of 
technocratic administration 
(2) Return to democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2a) 
Greece 
11 April 2012 Papademos calls 
election for 6 May 
 
6 May 2012 Election: Stalemate 
result- no coalition formed. 
 
16 May 2012 Efforts to set up 
coalition Government fail. New 
elections called for June 17 
 
17 June 2012 Election: New 
Democracy narrowly wins 
election 
 
June 20 2012 Coalition 
agreement between ND, PASOK 
and DL- Samaras sworn in as 
PM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2b) 
Italy 
6 December 2012 Berlusconi 
withdraws support for Monti 
 
8 December 2012 Monti 
announces plan to resign 
 
21 December 2012 Monti passes 
budget, resigns 
 
24 February 2013 Election: 
Deadlock as nobody wins. 
 
27 April 2013 Coalition finally 
agreed with Letta as PM. 
 
Fig. 7-1: Topical/ sub-topical divisions and timeline 
 
A two-pronged effort was made to attain a full population of RTÉ News and 
Current Affairs audio-visual output readily accessible from RTÉ’s online archive 
which directly concerned the topics listed above. First, the Six One News and 
Primetime online programme archives were manually checked for all coverage 
relating to any of the topics listed in the timelines, using the date ranges indicated 
in the figure above. This yielded a total of 72 segments across the two 
programmes. Using RTÉ’s online search tool, searches were run to find stories 
during the search period which contained references to the events in the timeline. 
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These were noted and included in the sample. When duplicate results from the 
prior analysis of Six One News and Primetime archives were discounted, a total of 
85 additional stories were attained which encompassed stories from other 
television news bulletins and radio news and current affairs programmes (see 
Appendix 7-1 for methodological notes on sample construction). Combined, this 
provided a total sample of 156 programme segments. For reference, these are 
listed in chronological order of broadcast with accompanying web URLs and 
other relevant item information in Appendix 7-2. In the analysis that follows, 
items are referred to according to the “EC[number]” convention. 
 
7.1.5 Crisis construals, framing and ideology: analytical approach 
 
Neoliberal (radical right) and radical left approaches represent two ideal-typical 
poles on either end of a spectrum on which journalistic understandings of the 
crisis in the Eurozone may be located. These positions represent two overarching 
‘metaframes’ at a high level of generality (Dombos et al., 2009: 7).  
 
Assessing to what extent news framings correspond to either metaframe 
necessitates the identification of issue frames and idea elements which ‘provide 
a relatively coherent story/reasoning in which issue specific prognostic elements 
responds to issue specific diagnostic elements’ (ibid: 6), which form distinctive 
“packages” of ideas and which collectively shape the metaframe.  
 
These elements are dimensions of media discourses that deal with ‘justifications, 
causes and consequences’ (Van Gorp, 2007: 64) of particular events. They 
correspond closely to Entman’s schema of four framing functions, which 
distinguish between the promotion of a particular problem definition, the causal 
interpretation of the problem so defined, the moral evaluation of responsibility 
for the problem, and the recommended solution to it (Entman, 1993).  
 
Gerhards’ (1995: 227) typology of framing dimensions, although designed to 
account for the ways in which protest actors seek to mobilise effectively and 
achieve resonance for their framing efforts, may be usefully adapted to provide 
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an analytical framework that is more detailed yet sufficiently abstract so as to 
encompass the sets of topics under analysis and to facilitate a comparative 
approach.  
 
His frame elements are of two broad types- diagnostic frame elements, that 
establish the terrain and parameters of the issue as problematised- its systemic 
location and “stakes”- and evaluative frame elements, in which the behaviours 
and actions of actors and their outcomes are assessed. 
 
Gerhards’ (ibid) first element in a frame analysis is that of issue definition and 
problematisation and it is aimed at establishing the primary “where” and “what” 
of the issues as constructed in the texts- in this case, what Sarikakis (2012) 
described as the ‘geographies of the crisis’. The frame element of causes and 
causal agents proceeds logically from the first, exploring the agentic - in terms of 
‘concrete persons and institutions’ (Gerhards, 1995: 240) rather than spatial and 
systemic loci of the issue. The frame element of issue resolution authority 
concerns the ways in which the substance and legitimacy of actions by particular 
actors are evaluated. It is founded on assumptions about the locus of proper 
political authority and with regard to which particular actors ‘are supposed to 
solve the problems’ (ibid: 241). A further frame element, response evaluation 
criteria, focuses on the “why” of crisis resolution, establishing the justificatory 
basis on which actions should or should not be taken- also implying an attendant 
vision of the post-crisis. 
 
An amalgam of Gerhards’ and Entman’s approach to framing provides the key 
elements of the frame analysis as pursued in this chapter: how the issue is 
problematised, that is, what kind of problem is it presented as, who is identified 
as being the main actors in the events, who is responsible for causing them and 
how and by whom is the issue to be resolved. Each of these elements acts as a 
useful indicator of ideological affinity.  
 
With these criteria in mind, we may outline a simplified sketch of the political 
rationalities underpinning ideal-typical neoliberal and radical left construals of 
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crisis as they pertain to the Euro debt crisis in particular. 
 
A neoliberal approach to crisis diagnosis is apt to foreground the local and the 
regional as epicentres of crisis, specifying in this case peripheral nations like 
Greece and Italy as aberrant European citizens who threaten the stability of 
monetary union and European prosperity as a whole. The resolution of crisis lies 
in the amelioration of present threats to the integrity of monetary union and the 
achievement of systemic “stability”, achieved through transformative means. A 
neoliberal approach to crisis resolution privileges the authority of whomsoever 
has the greater power to bring that stability; and elevates expedience as the key 
criterion applied in the evaluation of particular actions of crisis management. 
 
A radical left approach to crisis diagnosis identifies the sources of crisis in Greece 
and Italy as linked to global, structural factors in the financial and broader 
economic systems which erupted in the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and 
enmeshed most specifically in a European and Eurozone-focused phase of crisis, 
centring around a sovereign debt crisis prompted by the conversion of private to 
public debts at national level. An emphasis is placed on capitalism’s systemic 
imperatives and the power disparities at work in the political, legal and technical 
architectures of global financial and economic systems. A radical approach to 
crisis resolution is concerned with the democratic legitimacy of agencies of crisis 
management, and emphasises the need to evaluate crisis management efforts in 
terms of longer-term and ethical dimensions, foregrounding the realisation of 
social and economic justice. 
 
Given that this frame analysis is focused on journalistic frames rather than the 
frames brought to bear by other actors participating in and represented in news 
discourse, it can be assumed in the first instance that these ideal-typical 
ideologies will not be represented qua ideologies but as diffuse elements of 
naturalised ‘common sense’ (Gramsci, 1971, Fairclough, 2001: 70), likely to 
correspond in practice to less clear ideological positions, for example amalgams 
of conservative and social democratic perspectives. This further compounds 
methodological difficulties inherent to the reliable identification of media frames. 
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The framing of the contribution of actors to crisis and crisis resolution reveals 
journalistic assumptions about the parameters of crisis- the genesis, structural 
and agentic dimensions of crisis, including attributions of causal responsibility 
and evaluations of the consequences of particular courses of action or inaction, 
and helps shed light on assumptions about the legitimacy of particular responses 
by particular individuals and groups, which are geared towards particular ends 
and particular versions of the post-crisis.  
 
With these aspects in mind, as well as the desire to adopt a comparative approach 
in recognition of the series of shared structural features of events in Greece and 
Italy, it was decided to focus analysis on the following dimensions. Analysis of the 
first two sub-topics focuses on: 
 
(i) the representation of the Prime Ministers in Italy and Greece in the period 
leading up to their resignations and the implications of their actions, (ii) the 
representation of the (external) pressure applied to both leaders and governments, 
as well as the representation of their resignations and (iii) the representation of 
their replacement by technocratic caretaker governments. 
 
Analysis of the second two sub-topics focuses on: 
 
(i) the representation of the political choices facing Greek and Italian electorates 
and (ii) the assessment of the implications of electoral outcomes, both actual and 
hypothetical.  
 
To further facilitate cross-comparison of frames between the four sub-topics 
under analysis, these areas of analysis were translated- broadly following the 
schemata of Gerhards and Entman- into the abstract framing functions of (issue) 
problematisation, (actor and action) legitimation, and (outcome) evaluation.  
 
Having deductively identified the parameters of analysis via the specification of 
relevant framing functions, an inductive analysis was undertaken on all 156 news 
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texts across the corpus to identify the precise ways in which these frame elements 
and frame positions are both explicitly and latently present in texts. This firstly 
necessitated the transcription of every item in the corpus of texts. This was 
undertaken with the assistance of audio recordings extracted manually from the 
video files on the RTÉ News online database.  
 
Following this, all journalistic speech acts were isolated and extracted from the 
transcribed corpus, placed into chronological order, and imported into the Nvivo 
QDA software package. They were then categorised according to the broad 
thematic and temporal units as shown in Fig. 7-2, reflecting structural similarities 
in both sets of two sub-topics. 
 
Sub-topical area Greece Italy 
 
Sub-topic 1 
 
Slide towards 
Technocracy 
(1a) Greek referendum 
announcement [119] 
 
(1b) Pressure on Italy and 
Prime Minister [103] 
 
(1a) Referendum 
cancellation, Papandreou 
resignation and technocratic 
government in Greece [75] 
(1b) Resignation of 
Berlusconi, introduction of 
technocratic government 
[168] 
 
 
 
 
Sub-topic 2 
 
Return to 
Democracy 
(2a) Election announcement 
and run-up [17] 
 
(2b) Election 
announcement and run-up 
[74] 
 
(2a) Election outcome, 
aftermath and second 
election campaign [232] 
(2b) Election outcome and 
aftermath [39] 
 
(2a) Second election outcome 
and aftermath [16] 
 
 
Fig. 7-2: Sub-topic units (volumes of coded excerpts in brackets) 
  
 
Excerpts- sentences and paragraphs- corresponding to the frame elements above 
were then identified for each topical sub-unit using the manual coding 
functionality of Nvivo, further sub-divided into a series of 18 thematic codes 
generated inductively from the texts (Fig. 7-3). The framing functions of (issue) 
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problematisation, (actor and action) legitimation, and (outcome) evaluation were 
identified by selecting excerpts which represented contextualising elements 
(language that plays a localising, spatialising role), responsibilising elements 
(language that makes attributions of responsibility) and action evaluative 
elements (language that conveys positions on actor legitimacy, intentionality, 
action justification, action consequences and outcomes). 843 excerpts were 
coded (rising to 1140 excerpts, including sources coded to multiple thematic 
codes) distributed according to the numbers shown in Figs. 7-2 and 7-3. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7-3: Thematic codes 
 
Following this initial phase of coding, all material coded for each sub-topic 
element was collated, forming the textual basis of a qualitative analysis in which 
each block of coded text was examined as a whole in order to discern the broader 
tendencies of framing observed within the full population of texts on each sub-
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topic unit. This process facilitates the identification of more or less coherent “idea 
packages” around which crisis narratives were found to be constructed and 
which are reported on below. 
 
For reasons of length, full transcripts of the textual corpus, compilations of all 
extracts corresponding to each thematic code, and the Nvivo project file in which 
all coding decisions are recorded cannot be included in this volume. These may 
be freely attained by contacting the author. 
 
7.2 Crisis and technocracy in Greece and Italy   
 
The three areas of focus here comprise: (i) the representation of the Prime 
Ministers in Italy and Greece in the period leading up to their resignations and (ii) 
the representation of the context of crisis in which they are embedded, including 
assessments of the direct consequences and broader implications of their 
actions/inactions, and (iii) the representation of their resignations and their 
replacement by technocratic caretaker administrations. 
 
 
 
                                       
     Fig. 7-4: Timeline of key events in subtopics 1a (Greece) and 1b (Italy) 
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7.2.1 Sub-topic 1a- Referendum, Resignation, Technocracy in Greece 
 
7.2.1.1 (i) Framing Papandreou, pre-resignation  
 
A Primetime report [EC25] sets the tone in dramatic style for how the decision to 
hold a referendum intertwines with a particular representation of George 
Papandreou, describing him in macabre terms as ‘the most critical patient in the 
Euro’s isolation ward’ who after having ‘staggered home bearing the latest Euro 
bailout programme’, performed an about turn and ‘donned the political equivalent 
of a Halloween mask and hurled his referendum rocket’. 
 
The referendum announcement is described- each time with specific reference to 
Papandreou- in terms of its shocking and even violent character: 
 
hurled his referendum rocket EC25 
pulled the trigger EC3 
dramatic and unexpected EC13 
seemingly out of the blue EC13 
shock announcement EC13 
shock decision EC3 
huge political gamble EC14 
bolt from the blue EC19 
taking everyone by surprise EC28 
bombshell dropped by the Greek Prime Minister EC3 [see also EC4, EC16] 
 
Fig. 7-5: Papandreou’s referendum decision 
 
The risky nature of the decision is noted in several stories, with three items 
describing it in terms of a ‘gamble’ [EC6, EC8, EC14]. Papandreou’s rationale for 
his actions is queried in several items: ‘What prompted him to do this? What was 
his thinking? What’s behind this?’ [EC12, see also EC6].  
 
Querying the “why” of the referendum segued into a querying of Papandreou’s 
leadership. Describing the ‘Greek situation’ as ‘looking pretty much out of control’, 
[EC7] a journalist speculates on the ‘talk’ asking ‘[h]as Mr. Papandreou cracked? 
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Has he lost it?’ That the decision to run a referendum may have been taken by 
Papandreou alone is emphasised on several occasions, including the rhetorical 
query as to whether he was ‘on a solo run?’ [EC7] and two others that suggest his 
move was a ‘unilateral’ [EC12] one, and that he failed to consult his cabinet [EC6]. 
 
Many of the references to Papandreou concern his weakening internal position 
in the Greek government. Beyond criticism of Papandreou from the main 
opposition party, internal dissent from within the Prime Minister’s PASOK party 
features prominently in a range of stories where it is reported that Papandreou 
is coming under ‘sustained criticism’ from MPs within his own party, which is 
‘convulsed by turmoil’ [EC4, see also EC18, EC16, EC19, EC28]. As the backlash 
against the referendum announcement- internal and external to Greece- 
intensifies, Papandreou is described as ‘defiant’, having ‘faced down his 
government colleagues’ during a ‘showdown’ whom he had ‘shocked’ with his 
announcement [EC8]. Open journalistic discussion of the possibility of the 
Papandreou government falling is frequent, and can be found in items including 
EC8, EC12, EC25, EC4, EC6, EC16]. The backdrop of domestic ‘political upheaval’ 
[EC25] is ever-present. In one interview, Greece’s problems are laid at the door 
of its leaders: ‘your political masters got you in to this position in the first place’ 
[EC26].  
 
Overall, George Papandreou is framed in ways that tend to present him as a highly 
problematic figure who is behaving erratically, dangerously and even violently 
through the announcement of a referendum on the bailout.  
 
7.2.1.2 (ii) Framing referendum implications and consequences 
 
The consequences and implications of the referendum decision are discussed in 
terms of immediate financial outcomes as well as actual and hypothetical impacts 
on the broader economic system, coupled with assessments of what the 
referendum means for European crisis management. The Greek announcement is 
unambiguously described as having ‘triggered’ a ‘crisis’ [EC29], a responsibilising 
framing that pervades news texts on the topic. 
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The immediate consequences of the referendum are portrayed via a strong 
emphasis on drawing a direct link between the Greek decision and the 
deleterious financial implications via the representation of market opprobrium. 
What is described as an ‘exercise in democracy’ [EC19] has prompted ‘a sense of 
things unravelling very rapidly in Greece’ [EC9]: 
 
the Greek decision smashed market confidence   EC3 
triggering financial chaos   EC28 
plunged the markets into turmoil   EC8 
a firestorm right across the financial world   EC19 
scared […] the markets   EC25 
market backlash   EC3 
market turmoil which the move sparked   EC19 
likely to re-introduce turbulence into the markets   EC13 
dreadful effect   EC7 
financial system has shattered as a result of the Greek referendum   EC19 
 
Fig. 7-6: Greek referendum- financial implications 
 
Such an outcome, it is suggested, is no surprise. One item is introduced with the 
comment that ‘predictably, markets reacted negatively to the Greek announcement’ 
[EC11], while in another the newscaster refers to ‘the mantra’ that ‘the one thing 
that the markets hate is uncertainty and here we go again basically’ [EC7], 
parlaying the received wisdom about the desires of markets into a weariness at 
what is taking place politically in Greece.  
 
The ‘enormous’ ‘ripple effects’ [EC27] of the decision are identified as victimising 
Italy in particular, with one item reporting that ‘while it was the Greek Prime 
Minister that pulled the trigger, it’s been Italy that has taken the bullet today’ [EC3], 
representing the decision as an act of violence against Italy, and described in 
others as having been ‘hit the hardest’ [EC2] and having ‘bore the brunt’ [EC11]. 
Italy’s status as ‘simply too big to rescue’ [EC29] contributed to ‘a sense that Italy 
could go under’ [EC19] raising the prospect that ‘the whole of the Eurozone begins 
to shatter’ [EC19].  
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The global nature of the ripple effects is described in an item which describes the 
damage done by Greece to Wall Street, which has already been ‘incredibly fragile’ 
before ‘this hand grenade/bombshell’ was ‘lobbed in on top of it’ [EC27]. With 
viewers told that ‘whole countries…are turning toxic’ [EC25], Greece is identified 
as ‘damaged goods’ [EC11] and Europe described as tainted by association [EC7, 
see also EC11]. 
 
A recurring theme in the coverage is speculation about the consequences of a “no” 
vote in the planned referendum. It is suggested that ‘[a] no vote will plunge the 
Eurozone into an even greater crisis’ [EC29], and that it had the potential to bring 
about a ‘messy bankruptcy’ [EC2]. Even a delayed referendum vote, irrespective 
of outcome, is framed as undesirable: ‘the Eurozone crisis simply can’t afford three 
months of turmoil and political upheaval in Greece at the current time’ [EC29].  
 
The prospect of rejection of the bailout in a referendum is represented in one 
item as having to ‘trigger an immediate default of Greece and pressurize the 
country to exit the Eurozone altogether’ [EC13] and in another- paraphrasing the 
position of the Greek government- as raising the prospect of a ‘disorderly default 
for Greece in which effectively investors walk away from the country in which the 
banks dry up and in which no one gets paid’ [EC114]. The link between a bailout 
rejection and Eurozone exit is made in another item where it is asked whether 
‘[i]s it as stark as saying, do we as a people want to remain or as a country to remain 
in the Euro or do we want to leave and go back to the Drachma?’ [EC6] 
 
A “no” vote ‘will all depend surely on how this thing is worded and how its sold’ 
[EC25], with others asking how ‘could people be persuaded to support the bailout 
deal’? [EC12], with several going so far as to speculate on whether crisis could be 
averted by playing on Greek’s pro-Euro sentiments, including the provision of a 
‘sweetener’ [EC1] from the EU or creative phrasing of the question focusing on 
Eurozone membership, either of which might elicit ‘a more positive answer’ 
[EC29] from the population. 
 
Discussions about the possible consequences for Ireland are infrequent. When 
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they are directly broached, it is in terms of the ‘consequences for us if the Greek 
government collapses, there’s an exit from the Euro, disorderly default’ [EC27], to 
which the reply from the journalist is that the State would be well advised to keep 
their head down and look after its own interests- ‘from the point of view of the 
Irish government, you just have to position yourself for the future. Avoid any kind of 
blame or as much blame as you possibly can […] and position yourself well for the 
future. Make sure that you look after yourself.’ The ‘resonance here in Ireland’ 
[EC25] of the bailout deal is described in one item by a newscaster in terms of 
Greeks being offered a favourable deal that should perhaps be extended to 
Ireland on the basis of ‘being the best boys in the class’ [EC25]. 
 
The consequences of the referendum for European crisis management are 
frequently explored. Statements like ‘Just when it seemed as if the EU had done 
enough to calm the markets, the Greek decision smashed market confidence’, 
causing ‘chaos’ [EC3], with the reversal of ‘all the gains of last week’s post-summit 
euphoria’ [EC11] capture the tenor of framings on this topic, in which an 
intransigent Greece threatens European efforts at stemming the crisis. 
 
With a recent European summit having been ‘meant to have, to some extent at 
least get ahead of all of this’ [EC27], the Greek decision has meant that ‘we are all 
back to square one’, with the referendum ‘extremely disruptive to the plans and 
ideas Europe-wide to do with containing the crisis’ [EC5]. Another item bemoans 
that ‘just when it looked like Europe had started to get ahead of the problems and 
could invite rich people to say, maybe you would like to contribute to helping us, 
suddenly things are starting to unravel again’ [EC7], with China now ‘effectively 
scared off’ [EC40] and Europe’s plans ‘all gone up in smoke’ [EC19]. Greece is 
frequently presented as a problem nation subject to discipline by senior 
European figures. We are made privy to the ‘thinly disguised fury’ [EC29] of 
European leaders who will ‘want to get their lines straight as to what exactly 
they’re going to say’ [EC29] to Papandreou at an upcoming EU summit, who ‘can 
expect a very frosty reception’ [EC8] and who ‘will also have to vigorously defend 
the way he announced this referendum’ [EC28]. Viewers are invited to adopt the 
perspective of EU figures and consider how to ‘deal with’ and ‘put out that blaze’ 
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in Athens, so ‘things can be restored’ [EC25].  
 
The unremittingly negative terms in which the mooted Greek referendum is 
presented clearly identifies the mere act of holding a referendum as provoking a 
deepening of crisis in the Greek, Eurozone and world economies (reinforcing the 
manner in which the Prime Minister was framed), and which tends to legitimise 
the prospect of external intervention in solving the Greek “problem”.  
 
7.2.1.3 (iii) Framing technical government in Greece 
 
European crisis management, Papandreou’s resignation, and technocracy 
 
In general, European intervention in pushing for Papandreou’s resignation and 
the prospect of setting up of a technical coalition to approve the bailout is framed 
in ways that elide negative democratic implications of the European response and 
support the response as self-evidently necessary. That the resignation came as a 
consequence of European pressure is made clear in several items that 
demonstrate a shrewd awareness of realpolitik, including one in which it is 
acknowledged that ‘[t]he Greek premier has just been replaced again under huge 
pressure from Europe and, in particular, the European Central Bank’ [EC60], 
described in simpler terms in other items as Papandreou being ‘decisively faced 
down by France and Germany’ [EC31] or ‘outflanked by the big powers in Europe’ 
[EC26].  
 
External demands on Greece are nonetheless presented uncritically, including 
one item in which there are no less than four unproblematised references to 
European demands in relation to the need to swiftly appoint a new 
administration [EC33]. Negotiations by Greek politicians on the nature and 
duration of a notional interim government are described merely as ‘continued 
brinksmanship’ which ‘appeared to have exhausted the patience of the European 
Commission’ [EC33]. The idea that ‘[t]he rest of Europe as well as the people of 
Greece’ [EC34] are ‘watching and waiting, hoping a new government is formed 
quickly bringing to an end the political turmoil’ establishes the desirability of a 
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new government- any government- as linked to the end of the ‘turmoil’ [see also 
EC34]. 
 
Assessing technocracy 
 
Only one item, an extended Primetime segment [EC26], engages in a 
problematisation of the democratic implications of Papandreou’s ouster, focusing 
on the role of Germany and France. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy are 
described as the ‘assumed leaders of the Eurozone’, whose intervention is 
described in terms of representing ‘almost having a non-military coup trying to 
get a new government in place in Greece’. The broader implications of ‘the big two 
acting for the seventeen in Cannes’ are framed as symbolising ‘a democratic deficit 
at the heart of the Eurozone’, even going so far as to liken the impatience of 
financial markets with democratic processes to current European governance. A 
further problematisation of European governance and technocratic governance 
in Greece comes with the suggestion that ‘this ideal European project […] it’s now 
effectively being run by these unelected guys in the ECB, and the markets’, with 
technocrats who ‘seem to call all the shots’. 
 
The appointment of Lucas Papademos as new Greek PM is met with a series of 
explicitly positive evaluations, rooted in the superior decision-making capacity of 
unelected leaders: 
 
His appointment is the first positive news from Greece in 10 days and 
is helping to calm markets. 
EC36 
With the hopes of a nation resting on his shoulders, Lucas Papademos 
arrived to be sworn in as the new Greek Prime Minister. The fact that 
he is not a politician is seen as a strength in a country which teeters on 
the brink of insolvency due to years of abject political failure. 
EC37 
Welcome to the era of the technocrats: unassuming figures who have 
stepped out of the shadows to form unity coalitions that might push 
through unpopular measures and save the Euro from collapse. What 
they lack in democratic legitimacy, they make up in technical expertise 
and the apparent backing of the markets and Brussels. 
EC38 
In Greece, the new Prime Minister Lucas Papademos is also working 
feverishly. 
EC73 
 
 
Fig. 7-7: Assessment of technocracy in Greece 
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The description of New Democracy leader Antonis Samaras’ initial refusal to sign 
an EU letter committing to the bailout agreement as ‘an inauspicious start for the 
new technical government’ [EC38] establishes the criterion for success of the new 
government as full compliance with external demands, also captured in a series 
of other items: 
 
Lucas Papademos will lead a crisis coalition charged with saving the country 
from default. 
EC21 
if that’s the case then that would be… allow Greece to establish the 
government… approve the bailout deal. Get the eight billion that they need 
to avoid bankruptcy in December 
EC32 
With Lucas Papademos, the new leader, his first priority is to get the latest 
austerity package through, so that Greece can receive its next tranche of cash 
from the EU and IMF. Next week officials from the EU and IMF will visit 
Athens as every effort is made to steer Europe away from a deepening crisis. 
EC54 
the new technical government of Lucas Papademos who has to convince 
Greeks to accept more painful reforms and the international community that 
they have the will to do so. 
EC38 
 
Fig. 7-8: Aims of new government in Greece 
 
There are no negative evaluations of Papademos, apart from one item in which it 
is acknowledged that ‘the relief that people expressed, that the turmoil in Italy and 
Greece in the past ten days had more or less come to an end’ had given way to ‘the 
reality, the realism’ that ‘both countries face enormous challenges’ [EC38]. This 
clearly expresses the view that the installation of technocracy was viewed as 
representing an end to the current phase of crisis, although one whose euphoria 
was short-lived.  
 
7.2.2 Sub-topic 1b- Resignation, Technocracy in Italy 
 
7.2.2.1 (i) Framing Berlusconi  
 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s role in the Italian and European crisis 
comprises a central part of journalistic narratives on this topic of this topic. 
 
Many of the early references to the ‘embattled’ [EC39] premier portray him as 
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under ‘incredible pressure’ [EC61] domestically, with his own party and 
opposition alike frequently attributed as urging a quick departure, ostensibly due 
to ‘a backlash over its [government’s] failure to adopt reforms’ [EC40, see also 
EC44, EC61].  
 
Amid strong suggestions of his imminent departure, denials of his resignation are 
repeatedly cited in a range of items [EC41, EC40, EC42, EC61 and EC63]. Market 
criticism of Berlusconi is amply represented, ratcheting up the pressure further 
still. References to the rising bond yields on Italian debt are frequently directly 
linked with Berlusconi’s political future. We are repeatedly told of the extent of 
market frustration with Italy: how ‘[h]e is very much seen as the problem’ [EC65], 
that ‘it seems the market has lost confidence in Silvio Berlusconi’ [EC39, see also 
EC61], that his resignation is something ‘investors have long sought’ [EC49] and 
that ‘there is the sense that Mr. Berlusconi has to go otherwise this is going to drift 
into chaos’ [EC39].  
 
Both before and after ‘the game was up’ [EC49] when Berlusconi lost his 
parliamentary majority and announced his pending resignation, a broad range of 
items contain commentary that expresses incredulity at his intentions, 
portraying him as a wily political operator who may ‘hold tough and stay’ [EC43] 
or cause problems from beyond the political grave: 
 
The ultimate survivor of Italian politics remained defiant and resisted calls to 
step down. 
EC50 
It’s a very brave man or woman that would predict the demise of Berlusconi 
in Italian politics 
EC43 
he’s still there and the Italians say Berlusconi’s like a boomerang, just as you 
think he’s going away, he comes back again 
EC65 
nobody in the markets and few people in politics trust Mr. Berlusconi even 
when he says he’s going to resign, they simply don’t believe him. They just 
want to see him out the gate 
EC67 
frankly, people in the financial markets and in the political world simply don’t 
trust Mr. Berlusconi anymore and they will not believe that he is resigned until 
he’s actually gone out the gates of the Prime Minister’s palace in Rome for 
good. 
EC47 
many people won’t believe it until they see it EC60 
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to a certain extent, people can’t believe he’s gone until he is actually gone. EC71 
we’ve seen Mr. Berlusconi wriggle off the hook so often I guess we won’t 
believe he’s gone until we see him gone 
EC60 
Is Berlusconi really gone? […] it’s risky to say it because the man has seven 
lives. Do you think he’s finished? 
EC52 
Is there a sense in Italy that he is finished, or that he may come back? EC57 
but his People of Liberty party could still cause problems for the new Monti 
government. 
EC76 
Berlusconi’s party wants the Monti government to be weak and its reign to be 
brief. 
EC58 
 
Fig. 7-9: Berlusconi’s intransigence 
 
Post-resignation, Berlusconi’s legacy is assessed thoroughly negatively. In one 
item, his sleazy reputation is linked with the need for Italian renewal: ‘it is not 
really a time when the world can look on at Italy and say, well the Prime Minister is 
having bunga-bunga parties and that sort of thing’. [EC53] Despite vague 
references to Berlusconi’s enduring popularity [EC40], only negative public 
opinion on his departure is referenced [EC57, EC55]. He is described in another 
as ‘rarely in the headlines for the right reasons’ [EC50] and his resignation is 
described as bringing ‘to an end one of the most scandal plagued eras in Italy’s 
post-war history’ [EC69]. 
 
There is however some recognition that Italy’s problems go beyond a single 
personality, crystallised in the suggestion that even with Berlusconi gone, ‘the 
actual problems remain’ [EC71, see also EC48, EC66, EC60]. The question ‘So will 
sacrificing Silvio change anything?’ [EC60] suggests that his removal represented 
merely an offering of sorts to the markets. Yet, as ‘the man at the centre of the 
storm’, the ‘leading man’ in the ‘soap opera’ [EC60] of Italian political life, 
Berlusconi’s departure is framed as a necessary- if not sufficient- condition for 
the avoidance of European economic catastrophe. 
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7.2.2.2 (ii) Framing political and economic instability in Italy: implications, 
consequences and prescriptions 
 
Once again, journalistic discourse on the implications of events in Italy focuses on 
immediate financial consequences, more systemic impacts, and what events 
mean for European crisis management. 
 
Numerous items directly link the uncertainty about Berlusconi’s future with 
deleterious financial consequences for Italy. ‘Political instability’ [EC66], also 
described as ‘deepening political crisis in Italy’ [EC64] -whose referent is 
Berlusconi’s refusal to step down- is directly linked to ‘financial turbulence’ 
[EC64], ‘horrid’ [EC65] market performance and ‘market jitters’ [EC66, see also 
EC40]. 
 
Market dissatisfaction is journalistically legitimated- rather fatalistically- with 
comments like ‘until there’s someone running Italy who is going to implement those 
reforms, the markets will lose faith in Italy and the situation will only get worse’ 
[EC65].  
 
The upward trajectory of Italy’s bond yield prices provokes discussion of the 
systemic implications of Italy’s political and economic difficulties. This is 
primarily accomplished through an emphasis on the apocalyptic impact of 
unsustainable bond yields, focusing on the ‘critical seven percent barrier’ or ‘cut-
off point’ [EC49], referred to in numerous items [EC39, EC42, EC41, EC44, EC61, 
EC62, EC63, EC64, EC65, EC66, EC73, EC58, EC59, EC74, EC68, EC60, EC46, EC74].  
 
Bond yield hikes are linked to statements freighted with systemic import 
regarding the future of the single currency- with no less than the ‘survival of the 
Euro’ [EC46] at stake, bond prices were ‘heaping yet more pressure on the Euro’ 
[EC64], resulting in ‘the country and the whole Eurozone slipped deeper into crisis 
today’ [EC66]. Regular reminders are offered of looming repayments due by Italy, 
threatening contagion [EC40, EC61, EC62, EC63, EC74]. 
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The spectre of bond market bloodlust is evoked in another item which speculates 
how, post-Berlusconi, ‘the most likely target is going to be the bigger scalp of 
France’ [EC71], with the ‘signs of contagion’ [EC73, see also EC58] also present in 
Spain. One suggests that an Italian default could ‘tear apart’ the Euro and ‘send 
Europe and the US into new recessions’ [EC56, see also EC72]. The potential 
systemic implications for Italian contagion in the context of an inability to fund 
itself is linked to the inability of existing mechanisms to ‘rescue’ Italy, whose 
status as too big to fail is repeatedly reinforced [EC60, EC67, EC66, EC62, EC39, 
EC40]. 
The consequences for Ireland arise in several items and are usually discussed in 
purely economic terms. These included items which raise the prospect of poorer 
Italians purchasing less Irish produce [EC67, see also EC46] and another which 
contrasts Ireland’s nascent ‘recovery’ with the ‘quagmire of bureaucracy and 
political instability’ into which countries like Italy are ‘sinking’ [EC68]. 
 Ireland’s status as a model “bailout state” is suggested again in one item in which 
we are told that ‘Angela Merkel has been singing Ireland's praises’ [EC59], and that 
Ireland is now ‘the least of her worries’. The same item goes on to suggest whether 
Merkel might be willing to ease the bailout terms on Ireland, given that ‘we were 
after all first into the breach trying to stem the contagion’ in Europe. 
The consequences of austerity for the Italian public, meanwhile, are discussed 
only once [EC57]. 
 
A range of items present European politicians and institutions as legitimate 
agents to deal with the problem of Italy, as well as legitimate issuers of demands 
on Italy: 
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Things are still not settled in Athens but the focus today was very much on Italy  
and the man at the centre of the storm, the Italian Prime Minister. 
EC60 
The European Union is watching events in Italy with acute nervousness. EC66 
The incredible pressure placed on Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi today means 
that Italy rather than Greece tops the agenda of Eurozone finance ministers. 
EC61 
I think across the… electorate in Italy he still has a good deal of support so it's 
quite a messy situation and in a sense Europe is now dealing with two political 
messes. 
EC40 
what difference will it make to the possibilities that Europe can righten the ship 
or are things now just going out of control? 
EC42 
this afternoon the package of European-demanded reforms got the seal of 
approval from the lower house. 
EC69 
he’ll have to secure sufficient backing in parliament for some of the tough 
austerity measures needed to satisfy the markets and Eurozone leaders. 
EC72 
The new government will have to implement tough austerity measures to tackle 
the country’s debt crisis. 
EC56 
his first task to implement urgent reforms demanded by Eurozone leaders 
including raising the retirement age, making the hiring and firing of workers 
easier and getting young people back to work. 
EC76 
At the same time though the change of administrations in both Athens and Rome 
had been intended to ease fears about market contagion but they don’t seem to 
have of any great effect 
EC59 
 
Fig. 7-10: Italian governmental imperatives 
 
Given the concern expressed in one item that ‘maybe some big bazooka approach 
to quote David Cameron might be needed’ [EC59] to resolve the crisis, attention is 
turned to the prospect of deeper, more fundamental European responses to 
crisis, involving a redrawing of the Eurozone map and treaty changes that 
promote ‘increased integration, convergence and discipline’ and ‘cohesion’ [EC74, 
see also EC59]. Such concerns are amplified in a context where the EU’s capacity 
to act decisively is openly questioned [EC65]. A journalistic focus becomes 
apparent on the European Central Bank as the actor who can act and indeed must 
act to secure Italian and European economic stability: 
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In the past few minutes the European Central Bank would appear to be 
weighing in and buying up Italian debt so it’s possible that would bring some 
calm and some stability to the market. 
EC39 
I think… people get frustrated when they hear in relation to the ECB it’s not 
part of their original mandate to go out into the market to buy up bonds 
EC42 
Ideally they [the ECB] are in a position where they could do something. I mean 
they are really the only people in a position to do something about this. 
EC42 
The only people who can actually solve this at this point are the European 
Central Bank by doing which it does not want to do, which is crank up the 
printing press and start buying Italian bonds in really really large numbers. 
EC46 
many now looking to the ECB as the great white hope in all this EC67 
 
Fig. 7-11: ECB as white knight 
 
Although several items note the limited impact of ECB intervention to date [EC41, 
EC61, EC42, EC44, EC62, EC66], and a number of others [EC40, EC42] 
acknowledge the risks of further intervention, several comment on the 
undesirability of the ECB underwriting an irresponsible Italian government 
[EC42, EC62]- implying a recognition that the ECB’s actions may have been 
deliberately limited to exert more pressure on the Italian political system. 
 
7.2.2.3 (iii) From democracy to technocracy: framing technical government in Italy 
 
Berlusconi’s eventual resignation is described in news items as due, variously, to 
a combination of domestic political pressure, European political pressure and 
external market pressure [EC56, EC72, EC50, EC51, EC69], leading to his ‘bowing 
to the inevitable’ [EC51]- in another, attributed to diminished investor confidence 
and ‘the open contempt of German and French leaders’ [EC55]. Further direct 
attributions of European political involvement in his departure are made in a 
Primetime episode which suggests that ‘Europe wanted to solve this financial 
crisis that was spreading across Italy and the first step was removing its leader’ 
[EC60] The question is asked- in a fashion which does not suggest disapproval- 
who could ‘claim credit’ for having ‘ousted’ this ‘beast of European politics’ [EC60]. 
 
The role of external forces in Berlusconi’s resignation is occasionally 
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problematised, including in the same Primetime edition in which it is noted that 
his ouster highlights outside ‘interference’ and illustrative of a ‘democratic deficit 
where you have the ECB essentially deciding who’s going to run Italy’. The 
involvement of external agents is conveyed elsewhere in suggestions that a 
‘political revolution’ [EC71] had taken place, on ‘essentially the orders of France 
and Germany’ [EC55, EC60] and ‘finally booted from office not by popular vote but 
through the will of the markets’ [EC76].  
 
A range of items counterpose the political disarray in Italy with the apparently 
ameliorating crisis in Greece, in particular the ongoing efforts to finalise a 
technical government in Athens [EC39, EC44, EC61, EC40, EC41, EC42, EC60, 
EC54, EC73, EC58, EC74, EC76]. This is best exemplified by EC41, which refers to 
the ‘positive spirit of progress’ being made in the talks to form ‘a new unity Greek 
government’, while ‘in Italy, things are getting worse’. Journalistic normalisation 
of technocratic responses is also suggested by interest in whether an alternative 
to elections in the wake of a Berlusconi resignation may be possible [EC48, EC43, 
EC51, EC66]. Even before Berlusconi’s resignation, mention is made of the 
‘interesting’ possibility of ‘two former Eurocrats heading governments in Italy and 
Greece’ [EC43]. That such an arrangement might in fact be desirable came in the 
form of the evaluation of Mario Monti’s appointment as ‘senator for life’ as ‘one 
faint glimmer of anything positive’ and ‘kind of a bright spot’, [EC47, see also EC72]. 
 
The new administration, attributed to Italian President’s Giorgio Napolitano’s 
‘[d]esperate’ urgency to ‘restore stability to Italy’ [EC49], is described using 
various nomenclature that frequently refers to its technocratic makeup [EC72, 
EC73] including one that notes that is contains ‘academics and innovators, but no 
politicians’ [EC74]. Monti, in terms starkly opposed to those ascribed to 
Berlusconi, is described (by way of reference to a previous guest) as a ‘courteous, 
determined, serious politician’ [EC52] and the ‘precise opposite’ [EC23] of 
Berlusconi- ‘more reliable’ [EC54] and a ‘technocrat, low profile but with the 
reputation of getting results’ [EC23]. 
 
His appointment is viewed as setting Italy ‘on the path to political stability’ [EC74], 
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heralding ‘a new beginning for Italy’ [EC56, see also EC72] but that he has ‘got 
some very difficult things to do and to implement’, involving ‘great painful 
measures’ for Italians [EC52]. Yet, in the context of a mandate to ‘save the Italian 
economic and many would argue the wider Eurozone’ [EC53, see also EC56, EC60, 
EC54] Monti’s mission is portrayed in terms of an essential drive to stabilise, to 
cut, to persuade European political leaders and markets of Italy’s viability: 
 
ready to cut wages, raise taxes, change the way Italy works and convince markets that 
Italy remains a safe bet. 
EC55 
But Mario Monti faces a monumental task- preventing an Italian default that could tear 
apart the coalition of 17 countries that use the Euro 
EC56 
Europe and the European Central Bank hope that that new government can save Italy 
from a bailout. 
EC60 
The new government will have to implement tough austerity measures to tackle the 
country’s debt crisis. 
EC56 
He now has to draw up a new cabinet, lay out his priorities, and then secure sufficient 
backing in parliament for some of the toughest austerity measures ever seen in Italy- 
all of which are needed to satisfy the markets and Eurozone leaders. 
EC56 
We assume that Mario Monti can only do what he must do if he has cross party support EC57 
he’ll have to secure sufficient backing in parliament for some of the tough austerity 
measures needed to satisfy the markets and Eurozone leaders. 
EC72 
Leaders are desperate to signal they can bring the country's finances under control. 
The next government faces the tough task of doing just that and doing it without delay. 
EC69 
Mario Monti looks very likely to soon lead a new technocratic government with the 
sole aim of managing Italy’s austerity drive, and fending off the need for a massive 
bailout. 
EC70 
formidable task of reassuring the markets that colossal debts can be reduced and 
economic growth restored 
EC76 
his first task to implement urgent reforms demanded by Eurozone leaders, including 
raising the retirement age, making the hiring and firing of workers easier and getting 
young people back to work 
EC76 
 
Fig. 7-12: Monti’s mission 
 
Monti’s democratic credentials are queried on several occasions, including in one 
item where it is noted that he’d been ‘appointed, not elected’ [EC57, see also EC52, 
EC55], and had no ‘democratic mandate as such’, but the tenor of assessments of 
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the task ahead of Monti suggests that questions like ‘How long will Italians put up 
with’ [EC57] Monti’s unelected status arise from an interest in gauging how long 
Monti might have to dispense austerian medicine rather than a concern with his 
democratic legitimacy. Other politicians, as well as the Italian public, are 
mentioned as possible threats to Monti’s agenda, given that he will ‘still have to 
get painful reforms passed by politicians not far from elections’ [EC73], 
identifying the looming electoral process as something that might hamper the 
smooth operation of technocratic governance, something that makes investors 
‘fret’ [EC73]. 
 
Monti’s support from certain (non-public) constituencies is also highlighted, 
including where it is noted that Monti is ‘who many believe the man that the 
money markets would like to see take charge’ [EC54] as well as support from 
employers’ groups [EC75] and ‘Brussels and competition circles’ [EC47] by virtue 
in part of his capacity to take ‘unpopular measures’ [EC75]. The ‘pro-growth 
measures’ planned by Monti, although likely to ‘put a few noses out of joint’, are 
described as just what the doctor ordered: the statement that ‘it’s probably better 
than a technocrat, somebody who isn’t afraid to take unpopular measures does it’ 
[EC75], explicitly celebrates Monti’s unelected status, while the verdict of ‘[s]o far 
so good’ [EC75] on the pending Italian reform package suggests a journalistic 
support for his policy agenda. 
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7.3 Crisis and democracy in Greece and Italy 
 
This part of the analysis focuses on (i) the representation of the political choices 
facing Greek and Italian electorates in advance of elections and (ii) the assessment 
of the implications of electoral outcomes, both hypothetical and actual. 
 
 
 
                   Fig. 7-13: Timeline of key events in subtopics 2a (Greece) and 2b (Italy) 
 
7.3.1 Sub-topic 2a- Elections in Greece 
 
7.3.1.1 (i) Framing the May parliamentary election  
 
Representation of major political forces in the run up to the first election 
 
Coverage of the first election campaign is sparse, with few suggestions of the 
potential implications of the outcome beyond a general concern with its 
destabilising potential [EC81], linked in one item to the decline of the long-
dominant PASOK party [EC77] in the context of a backlash to austerity [EC80] 
where the ‘established parties’ were coming under ‘electoral pressure from more 
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extreme challengers’ [EC111] The ‘far-right’ Golden Dawn is the only party 
mentioned [EC111] beyond the two largest parties- the radical left coalition of 
SYRIZA is not referred to. 
 
A negative assessment of the possibilities of the election to deliver positive 
change in any way is conveyed in several other items, including one which 
suggests that the election is one which ‘few [voters] believe will deliver either 
political stability or economic improvement’ [EC111, see also EC79]. This 
negativity is mirrored in journalistic discourse that emphasises the limited 
agency of any future Greek government in the context of the strictures of 
European crisis management. One item suggests that ‘whoever is chosen faces a 
difficult choice, implementing more austerity with very little power’ [EC78], adding 
that the key challenge for the new government is not about policy choices but 
rather ‘to keep the country from erupting into more civil disturbance’. This 
suggestion that there is no space for effective political differentiation implicitly 
carries a validation of the technocratic experiment. 
 
Assessing first election outcomes and implications 
 
Assessment of the domestic political implications of the first election suggest a 
pro and anti-bailout/austerity dichotomy, in which the parties supporting the 
bailout and stringent austerity measures were punished by an angry public who 
are suffering [EC83, EC82, EC112, EC85, EC86]. The ‘overall message’ of the 
election ‘was clear: two-thirds of Greeks want no more austerity’ [EC109]. This 
‘realignment of Greek politics’ [EC86] is described in terms of the ‘traumatic 
election results’ prompting ‘disarray’ [EC85, EC117] in the ‘political establishment’ 
[EC85] and broader ‘Greek political system’ [EC117]. 
 
The immediate implications of the election are discussed first in terms of their 
negative financial impacts on markets: 
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political turmoil echoing through capitals and markets. EC116 
The Greek stock market fell to its lowest level since 1992 today as it 
appeared another election might be needed to break the deadlock. 
EC114 
That prospect sent markets in Paris, London and Frankfurt tumbling, with 
the anti-bail out parties expected to do even better in a new election 
EC116 
Both scenarios are causing worldwide losses on markets and prompted 
more speculation the country could be forced out of the Euro. 
EC115 
European shares slumped as markets were hit by deepening fears over the 
future of the Eurozone. 
EC119 
 
Fig. 7-14: Market implications of election  
A stronger emphasis still is placed on the (undesirable) outcome of political 
instability, closely linked to the rise of new political formations on left and right: 
 
One thing we can say is that political upheaval is going to lead to political 
instability. 
EC83 
Now, we’ve seen so much instability in Greece already, will the outcome 
of this election lead to even more instability there? 
EC112 
and so the only thing we can say is political instability is likely to continue 
in Greece for many months. 
EC84 
predictions that yesterday’s election results would usher in a period of 
political instability have proven to be correct. 
EC85 
The fear is that political instability will now reign. EC85 
the significant rise in support for the anti-austerity parties particularly 
on the left suggests political instability will continue for some time. 
EC113 
The Euro zone economy can do without more instability in Greece.  EC116 
The outcome of the Greek election, added to the result in France means 
the cat is now very much back among the Eurozone pigeons. 
EC109 
If a Government isn’t in place in Greece by Thursday, elections will be 
held next month, leading to yet more uncertainty in the Eurozone, with 
opinion polls showing a surge in support for those parties opposed to the 
bailout. 
EC117 
 
                               Fig. 7-15: Foregrounding political instability 
 
Journalistic concern that ‘only a weak government can now take power in Athens, 
which can’t or won’t implement promised reforms’ [EC85, see also EC113] is 
further reflected in assessments of efforts to put together a coalition government 
that belie a preference for a pro-bailout coalition rather than fresh elections 
(despite an apparent recognition that it goes contrary to the wishes of the Greek 
people [EC84, EC86, EC113, EC114]), expressed principally through the portrayal 
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of SYRIZA as intransigent spoiler: 
 
In Greece hopes flickered briefly that the two main parties supporting the 
EU bail out terms could join the Democratic Left party which holds 21 seats. 
That would be enough to create a coalition and avoid fresh elections. 
EC116 
President Karolos Papoulias’s latest initiative is to try and form a 
government of technocrats to implement the EU-IMF deal, but with the main 
leftist party opposed, the efforts look doomed. 
EC89 
Parties opposed to the terms of the bailout are refusing to enter a coalition 
with those that support it. 
EC117 
The man on the driving seat was Alexis Tsipras, the leader of the Coalition of 
the Radical Left, who effectively blocked either option as it would mean more 
austerity. 
EC93 
Clearly, the anti-bailout parties are not prepared to listen to him because he 
wants a government of national unity. 
EC85 
SYRIZA party which came second in the election, refused to join a 
government or to back the EU-IMF bailout. 
EC110 
Their leader is Alexis Tsipras, the charismatic 37-year-old left wing radical 
who has most to gain if these talks fail. 
EC118 
 
Fig. 7-16: SYRIZA as spoiler 
 
The source of this anxiety can be attributed to concerns about the fate of the 
Greek bailout programme in the event of a future SYRIZA victory, which is 
described in positive terms as ‘keeping the struggling economy on life support’ 
[EC86] and ‘keeping the country afloat’ [EC109]. 
 
That the situation prompted by the ‘result that rocked the EU’ [EC110] was one 
for Europe to resolve is established in several items. One suggests that a ‘potent 
test of the European project’ was ‘once more coming from Greece’ [EC129], which 
will ‘occupy European policymakers’ [EC94, see also EC85]. The suggestion that 
the Franco-German alliance ‘underpinning the European project now faces a test 
over policies to deal with the crisis’ [EC109] locates Greece as the locus of crisis- 
indeed, ‘the acute problem’ in Europe [EC89]. 
 
Despite several mentions of European figures being ‘keen to dampen’ ‘open 
speculation’ [EC116, see also EC89, EC110, EC125] about Greece being forced to 
leave the Euro, a torrent of warnings and ultimatums issued by mostly European 
political figures dominate the intra-election and second campaign period, 
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emphasising the dire necessity of Greece respecting the terms of the bailout 
agreements if they desired to remain with the Euro and to remain solvent. This is 
crystallised in one item’s warning of ‘a chorus of voices saying no funds will be 
released until a stable and compliant government is in place in Athens’ [EC115, see 
also EC85, EC112, EC86, EC119, EC120, EC88, EC121, EC95, EC123, EC126, 
EC110, EC128, EC129]. In the context of such unanimity, it is notable that the sole 
Irish voice- Michael Noonan’s paraphrased warning to Greece to ‘stick to EU and 
IMF commitments’’ [EC119]- is described as ‘Ireland […] offering the hand of 
friendship to Greece’- a striking ascription of ‘friendship’ given that was on offer 
from Ireland was manifestly the iron glove of austerity wrapped in the iron first 
of austerity. What one journalist described as ‘pressure’ on Greece ‘building up 
from outside’ [EC85] was legitimated by journalists who, perhaps emboldened by 
the unanimity of European elite concern about the possibility of an oppositional 
government taking power in Greece, themselves give credence to a concrete link 
between the election of a leftist government and a Greek default and Eurozone 
(or even EU) ejection (despite SYRIZA’s explicitly pro-Euro stance). Elite ‘fears’ 
[EC98, EC128], ‘questions’ [EC118, EC94] and ‘concerns’ [EC125] about such an 
outcome are naturalised by a range of journalistic commentary: 
 
Bear in mind the implications of a… second election which may throw up again a 
sizable anti EU-IMF block which would perhaps inexorably leads to a default and an 
exit from the Eurozone. 
EC120 
the strong message coming from particularly Berlin is, you can’t walk away from the 
austerity program, from the bailout terms and remain in the Euro. To what extent if 
at all is that message getting through? 
EC88 
I think they’ve been trying to say to Greek politicians, look, just think of what you’re 
doing. We need a stable and reliable government in Athens that will stick to the terms 
of the bailout. We don’t necessarily want to tell you how to run your business.  It’s a 
democratic process but at the same time Greece has to stick to the program. 
EC120 
Is it your feeling […] that the resistance to the austerity program as is presently 
constituted that people are prepared to go the whole way to default and to leave the 
Eurozone? Do you think there’s an appetite for that there? 
EC109 
if an elected government rejects the demands in the EU-IMF bailout then Greece’s 
potential exit from the Euro will come a step closer. 
EC109 
the political crisis intensifies with the country’s very future in the Eurozone at stake. EC90 
Greece must vote again with a decision to make about its future in Europe and 
whether it stays in the Euro. 
EC110 
Euro or Drachma, the past or the future, those are the choices political analysts say 
are facing Greek voters as they go to the polls tomorrow in a crucial election, the 
result of which could determine the fate of the country and the single currency. 
EC128 
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the result could determine Greece's future within the Euro EC102 
The results of this election are crucial to Greece’s future in the Eurozone and the fate 
of the single currency. 
EC100 
The results could decide whether the country stays in the Eurozone. EC129 
in an election which it’s widely believed will decide the country’s future in Europe. EC99 
Opinion polls suggest that anti-bailout parties will emerge victorious. The 
consequences of such a scenario raise the possibility of a default and questions over 
Greece’s further membership of the Euro. 
EC94 
Polls suggest it could win the June election and if a new Greek government does not 
commit to the program then it is hard to see how the Troika can release fresh funds. 
EC110 
 
Fig. 7-17: Greek election and Euro membership 
 
A range of items link the political uncertainty to financial uncertainty, with the 
concerns of the markets again foregrounded. These include one with the election 
imminent in which we learn of ‘global markets anxious that the result of the vote 
could trigger a potentially calamitous Greek exit from the single currency’ [EC96] 
[see also EC121, EC95, EC125, EC122, EC94, EC96], buttressed by items 
emphasising regional and global economic consequences [EC128, EC100, EC127, 
EC122] One item lists a potential outcome as the possibility of civil war in Greece 
[EC125]. While the negative, even apocalyptic implications of default are 
foregrounded, a number of items include more positive assessments of such an 
eventuality, including one in which the ‘views expressed by many people’ are 
cited that an exit would ‘be better for the Greeks […] and better for Europe’ who 
has already ‘priced in’ the possibility of a Greek ‘departure and default’ [EC92, see 
also EC91]. The suggestion that Greece’s ‘horrendous levels of debts’ must be 
‘dealt with’ whether they’re ‘in the Eurozone or out’ [EC91] suggests an 
inevitability about further restructuring of Greek debt irrespective of the election 
outcome, while others suggest the desirability of a Greek exit for Greeks and for 
markets [EC125, EC110]. 
 
Several items speculate on how ‘Athens can produce a stable government’ [EC110] 
with an interviewer speculating on whether the French President might be able 
to ‘convince the Greek electorate to go the other way and to vote for parties in 
favour of austerity?’ by deploying his ‘charm, his Gallic charm’ on ‘the Germans’ to 
get concessions for the Greeks [EC110], with another suggesting the possibility 
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of ‘sweeteners’ [EC97] if a ‘pro-bailout party’ is elected. 
 
The ‘knock-on effects’ [EC110, EC95] for Ireland from a potential Greek Eurozone 
exit are also speculated on. One item explicitly attributes increases in Ireland’s 
borrowing costs, which had been ‘stable for months’, to ‘fears’ [EC123, see also 
EC124] of a “Grexit”. A series of other items speculate on the way in which 
‘tremors’ [EC110] from Greece could affect Ireland [EC124, EC125, EC110, EC97]. 
These are mostly negative but some contain hints of opportunity, including the 
idea that Ireland might conceivably look to ‘cut some of its debts with a Greek-style 
deal?’ [EC95] On the whole however, in the context of a visit from the Olympic 
torch to Ireland, the sentiment that ‘Many will be hoping it is the only Greek fire 
that will visit our shores this summer’ [EC110] better encapsulates the tenor of the 
speculated implications for Ireland of a Greek Eurozone exit. 
 
7.3.1.2 (ii) Framing the June parliamentary election  
 
Representation of major political forces following the first election and into the 
second 
 
‘Anti-bailout’, ‘anti-austerity’ and ‘pro-bailout’, ‘pro-austerity’ are terms regularly 
used [EC86, EC83, EC112, EC116 EC84, EC85, EC113, EC118, EC119, EC121, 
EC109, EC94] as shorthand for the two main political forces that emerged from 
the first election, New Democracy and SYRIZA, led by Antonis Samaras and Alexis 
Tsipras respectively. The former is also presented as, variously, part of a ‘far-left 
coalition’ [EC85, EC113] the ‘hard left’ [EC109, EC129] with the latter identified 
in the more moderate terms of ‘centre-right’ [EC81, EC111, EC83, EC113] and 
‘conservative’ [EC85, EC86, EC114]. 
 
SYRIZA’s status as front-runner [EC116] is made clear, with one noting that the 
‘momentum is clearly behind’ [EC118] Tsipras, the ‘charismatic 37-year old left 
wing radical’ [EC118]. SYRIZA’s platform is described as, in terms attributed to 
its supporters, desiring to remaining with the EU and the Euro but for the 
abandonment of austerity [EC85]. SYRIZA’s own view that a Euro exit would be 
 221 
 
averted is described in the sceptical terms of its spokesman ‘boldly insisting’ 
[EC127] and making ‘claims’ that it would stay in the Euro [EC96]. SYRIZA’s 
platform is styled as ‘fairly uncompromising’ [EC97] with the emphasis on the 
bailout repudiation and its negative consequences foregrounded. 
 
Beyond the already established journalistic validation of a link between a SYRIZA 
win and an inexorable Eurozone departure, that Tsipras’ increasing appeal to 
voters was problematic is conveyed in several items, including one in which a 
SYRIZA win is described as ‘a significant headache for EU finance ministers’ 
[EC93], and another which suggests that Tsipras’ message has ‘gone down very 
badly in other European capitals as you can imagine’ [EC97] This is reinforced by 
the idea that Tsipras was sending ‘tremors through Europe’ by virtue of his 
assertion that the bailout would be ‘torn up’ [EC118, see also EC93] by a future 
SYRIZA government.  
 
Journalistic acknowledgment of Tsipras’ popularity, unlike the other party 
leaders who are ‘perceived to be out of touch with the mood of the nation’ [EC118], 
is not meant as a compliment- several items imply that SYRIZA’s resonance with 
the national mood is suspicious. One item devotes significant focus to the 
complaint of a dissident former SYRIZA candidate who accused the party of 
‘exploiting the rage of society’ [EC101]. Elsewhere, SYRIZA’s anti-bailout but pro-
Euro position is described in terms of ‘seductive promises’, which voters might 
‘prefer’ to believe than ‘the economic calamity that a Euro exit could entail’ [EC96, 
see also EC127]. Another item speaks of a public fatalism which plays into the 
hands of SYRIZA: ‘life is simply so hopeless that they feel that they can be seduced 
if you like or confident enough to vote for the radical left’ [EC102]. 
 
The responses to a “vox pop” in which a journalist puts the European threats 
directly to members of the Greek public are described as conveying ‘a sense of 
fatalism’ by the presenter [EC97], despite the fact that contributors shown 
explicitly repudiate those threats. Summing up the options open to the Greek 
electorate as ‘demoralizing choice between risking a Euro Zone exit on one hand or 
voting for the parties widely accused of getting Greece into the mess in which it finds 
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itself’ [EC127] denies voters agency or any positive rationale for voting left.  
 
While New Democracy is described as ‘a conservative party’ that ‘wants to stay in 
the Euro’ [EC102] and more ‘pro-European’ [EC129], SYRIZA is described as 
presenting ‘a substantial threat to Greece’s continued existence in the Eurozone’ 
[EC102]. The contrast between “compliant” New Democracy and “threatening” 
SYRIZA is underlined in another item which reports on the political choices of a 
number of voters describing one as voting for ‘parties committed to largely 
abiding by the bailout terms so the country can stay in the Euro’ [EC129], and 
another couple in favour of ‘SYRIZA, the party that wants to repudiate the terms of 
the bailout’ [EC129, see also EC97]. Others casts doubt on the practicality of 
SYRIZA’s plans, suggesting that ‘some economists here say their [SYRIZA’s] figures 
don’t add up’ [EC97], and even legitimising New Democracy leader Samaras’ view 
that bailout repudiation would ‘send Greece crashing out of the Euro’ [EC128] by 
noting that that this position is one with which ‘European leaders agree’ [EC128, 
see also EC99]. 
 
Assessing the outcome of the second Greek election 
 
Reference is made to ‘many observers’ who assessed the result in Greece by 
describing the New Democracy vote as being ‘driven by fear of a Euro exit’ with 
the more emotive terms of ‘anger driving huge numbers of voters into the arms of 
more radical parties’ [EC106] principally referring to SYRIZA, whose rise in 
support is described as ‘startling’ [EC100]. 
 
As it became clear that Greece would have ‘pro-bailout rulers’ [EC103] led by New 
Democracy, PASOK and SYRIZA’s refusal to participate in coalition with New 
Democracy is described in negative terms as ‘the kind of brinksmanship the single 
currency could surely do without’ [EC100], again suggestive of a support for a 
national unity government and disdain for partisan disunity. This is reinforced by 
the implication that the opposition’s desire to remain ‘outside of the tent’ [EC100] 
is merely a strategic gambit, placing future political gain above national stability. 
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References to the election bringing ‘relief to Brussels and Berlin’ [EC100, see also 
EC106] and receiving a ‘broad welcome across Europe’ [EC105]- including by 
Ireland’s Tánaiste- validate the election result as positive, particularly in the 
absence of any dissenting voices. Journalistic suggestions that ‘a disorderly exit 
from the single currency has been averted’ [EC106] and the statement that ‘Greeks 
awoke to find their cash machines still working and the country was still a member 
of the single currency’ [EC106] go further still in this vein.  
 
A remarkable suggestion is made by a correspondent that the hard line take by 
‘Berlin and Brussels’ in advance of the election was aimed at damaging SYRIZA, as 
‘they didn’t want to lend legitimacy’ ‘to that particular party’, ‘who were saying that 
the bailout could be overturned or changed’ [EC103]. Given the uncritical 
reproduction and naturalisation of the European stance in RTÉ coverage, this 
post-hoc admission suggests at least tacit collusion in such a delegitimising 
project. Speculating on the likelihood of significant concessions, it is suggested 
that Greece ‘doesn’t have much of a hand to play here’ [EC104] with a moralising 
attitude present in the question to an interviewee about what response the new 
Greek government ‘should get, deserves to get from the rest of Europe’ [EC107]. 
 
7.3.2 Sub-topic 2b- Elections in Italy 
 
7.3.2.1 (i) Framing technocracy 
Unlike in Greece, where a short-lived technocratic government gave way to 
elections in a planned manner, the longer period of technocratic rule in Italy 
ended in more dramatic fashion with the withdrawal of support for Mario Monti 
by Silvio Berlusconi’s party in November 2012. This precipitated elections in the 
following Spring. The period around this event presented the opportunity for a 
round of journalistic assessments on the legacy of technocratic rule. These were 
universally positive and emphasised in explicit terms Mario Monti’s success in 
restoring Italy’s finances and thus its international credibility: 
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It’s just over a year ago since Mario Monti came to power and pulled 
Italy back from the brink of fiscal disaster. 
EC148 
The political experiment of Italy, putting the economist and former 
European commissioner of the head of government to make hard 
decisions has just come to an end after a year 
EC133 
And Mario Monti, who has got a lot of praise outside Italy, might he 
run? 
EC133 
the man who's given Italy a year of stable government EC150 
Mario Monti's government has managed to steady Italy's precarious 
finances. Ahead of the election he's warned Italian politicians not to 
undo his government’s achievement in saving Italy from the crisis. 
EC150 
he's seen as a stability figure, someone who has brought Italy back 
into the centre of Europe, he's respected by EU leaders, he's respected 
by the financial markets, which has resulted to the Italy's cost of 
borrowing really decreasing. 
EC150 
Remember, fifteen months ago Italy nearly went bankrupt and it was 
only the actions of Mario Monti, the technocrat Prime Minister who 
introduced reforms and austerity measures that brought Italy back 
from the brink. 
EC155 
The outgoing Prime Minister, Mario Monti, did attempt modest 
reforms that restored Italy’s international credibility 
EC137 
 
Fig. 7-18: Assessing Italian technocracy 
 
7.3.2.2 (ii) Framing the choices facing Italians 
 
Representation of major political forces 
 
The incumbent Prime Minister, Mario Monti, the centre-right People of Freedom 
party led by Silvio Berlusconi, the centre-left Democratic party led by Pier-Luigi 
Bersani and the new Five Star Movement led by Beppe Grillo constitute the four 
political forces discussed in the run up to the Italian general election of 2013. 
 
Silvio Berlusconi, who had been ‘forced’ [EC149] and ‘hounded’ [EC154] out of 
office but who was now miraculously rising ‘from the political grave’ [EC136, see 
also EC137] is described as responsible for bringing ‘the Eurozone debt crisis to a 
crescendo’ [EC146]. His long history of involvement in scandals, as well as his 
ability to avoid justice for his role in them is frequently raised [EC149, EC147, 
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EC152, EC146, EC136], contributing to a sense of incredulity about his candidacy 
and his enduring popularity [EC146, see also EC133, EC136]. Berlusconi, 
described in one item as ‘the 76-year-old political schmoozer’ [EC146] is 
presented as a representative of ‘the populist vote’ [EC152] as evidenced by his 
TV-friendly campaigning style and eye-catching promise to, for example, abolish 
a ‘hated’ [EC152] property tax. 
 
Even before he had announced his candidacy, Mario Monti is discussed in broadly 
positive terms by virtue of ‘praise’ [EC133] received outside of Italy. His 
unwillingness to ‘throw in his lot with any party’ [EC150] and readiness to ‘be 
Prime Minister once again if there was an unclear result’ [EC148, see also EC135, 
EC150] is presented without critical comment, suggesting a normalisation of 
technocratic norms. Monti’s poor skills as a campaigner are noted on several 
occasions [EC136, EC150]. As ‘the man voters appear to blame’ [EC151] for 
austerity, it is hinted in another item that he is considered an unfortunate fall guy 
given that he was only implementing measures ‘that many people feel Italy was 
forced to take at the time’ [EC136].  
 
The ‘phenomenon’ [EC152] of Beppe Grillo, also discussed in the context of an 
item focused on ‘the populist vote’ [EC152] is described as ‘threatening an even 
bigger upset’ [EC152] than that promised by Berlusconi. His new grouping, the 5 
Star Movement, is described as a ‘protest movement’ [EC142] and ‘not a political 
party’ [EC152]. The party’s success in having ‘harnessed the web to fill piazzas up 
and down Italy with hundreds and thousands of supporters’ [EC152, also EC136, 
EC140] is recognised. We learn that the ‘wildcard’ [EC136] grouping, an ‘anti-
politics movement’ [EC137, see also EC154] is ‘really designed to capitalise on peak 
cynicism within the Italian public about the political past, about the political 
culture’ [EC136, see also EC137] However, ‘not everyone is convinced that 
populism is what Italy needs’ [EC137] and concerns are raised about his lack of 
political experience and failure to devise a ‘clear political program beyond the five 
principles they are looking for’ [EC140], although the group’s desire to quit the 
Euro is its only cited policy [EC152, EC137]. 
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Pier-Luigi Bersani, despite being described as the ‘front-runner’ [EC148] in the 
polls, is given little attention in the run up to the election. Several items refer to 
the disparate wings of his party which he must unite if he would be to lead 
[EC151, EC136]. We are told, however, that he has ‘promised to freeze the reform 
process’ [EC151] instigated by Monti.  
 
As polls opened, the overall political choices facing Italy were described rather 
derisively as that between a ‘multi-billionaire accused of tax fraud and sex with an 
underaged prostitute, the former communist, technocrat and a comedian’ [EC140], 
summarised more demurely, if no less reductively in another as ‘a choice between 
protest and populism on the one hand and established parties on the other’ [EC153]. 
 
What’s at stake: The meaning of the election and the potential implications of 
particular outcomes 
 
The collapse of the Monti government following the withdrawal of support by 
Berlusconi is met with several items in which warnings from European elites 
about the implications of the upcoming election. A warning issued by European 
Commission president Barroso referred to the need for continued austerity, 
‘irrespective of who is prime minister’ [EC148, see also EC132, EC149], a concern 
setting the tone for the journalistic framing of the election’s context and imagined 
implications. Agreement with Barroso is conveyed with the suggestion that the 
bond yield reductions enjoyed by Italy under Monti were now likely to go the 
other direction- ‘as political instability beckons that’s likely to go into reverse, 
quickly’ [EC148].  
 
With the election described as ‘the most important election in Italy in a generation’ 
[EC153], a pronounced emphasis on political instability and its undesirability to 
European elites and markets- particularly in terms of Eurozone integrity- is 
evident in a range of items in the pre-election period.  
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EU leaders will not relish the prospect of two months of political 
uncertainty in Italy, its impact on the cost of the country's borrowing and 
any knock on effect for confidence in the Euro. 
EC150 
The last few months have brought with them some respite from the 
darkest days of the Eurozone crisis, where the very existence of the 
currency was threatened. But, this coming Sunday and Monday, elections 
in Italy could stir up the hornets’ nest once again. 
EC146 
If the wrong result emerges after these elections, the markets could be 
seriously spooked by Italy’s prospects, and the Euro could be under 
threat again. 
EC146 
Political deadlock its feared, will stall reforms. That could turn markets 
once more against Italy, reigniting the fires of Eurozone contagion. 
EC146 
to vote in a general election which depending on the results, could have 
a major impact on European markets and maybe even reignite the EU 
debt crisis. 
EC136  
 
Fig. 7-19: Negative implications of Italian election 
 
The potential implications for Ireland of the election outcome are discussed only 
once, where it is suggested that ‘Ireland needs stability on the financial markets’, 
ergo, ‘Italy […] needs to be a stable country’, adding that a hung parliament or 
coalition inimical to Monti’s policies would be ‘exactly and precisely the thing that 
Ireland does not want’ [EC150, see also EC146], an explicit validation of 
technocracy, austerity and a conflation of Irish government crisis management 
strategy with the Irish nation.  
 
Journalistic concern with the apparent disparity between the ‘consensus’ [EC143] 
(again, a consensus of ‘many observers’ [EC141]) around what ‘Italy needs’ 
[EC151] and what was likely to emerge from the electoral process was a recurring 
theme. The ‘deep-seated reforms’ [EC137] defined as necessary are explored in a 
range of items, whose neoliberal character is summarised in one item which 
describes Italy as suffering from ‘a chronic lack of competitiveness and an overly 
bureaucratic business climate’ [EC137, see also EC143, EC141]. That this is aligned 
with the desire of the markets is evident when the correspondent says that 
‘[m]arkets are looking for a government that can take the kind of tough reforming 
measures and really get to grips with Italy's deepening economic problems’ 
[EC153]. 
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Yet, we learn that ‘few politicians appear ready’ [EC151] to deliver the necessary 
reforms, with the question asked whether there is ‘any national politician…who 
has the power and strength and the backing to be able to carry out those reforms 
successfully?’ [EC146] Journalistic dissatisfaction with the parties is also evident 
in the idea that ‘the parties that reluctantly supported his [Monti’s] efforts in 
Parliament largely abandoned talk of reform on the campaign trail’ [EC137]. 
 
The ‘confused and disillusioned electorate’ [EC137] are described as possessing a 
‘real cynicism about politics here’ [EC151] as well as being ‘fed up with austerity’ 
[EC151]. A ‘significant protest vote against painful austerity measures’ [EC139] is 
expected, meaning that ‘a lot of voters will be taken away from the established 
parties’ [EC140]. It is clear that this is viewed as problematic, because a large 
‘protest vote’ may result in an ‘inconclusive result’ which ‘would be damaging for 
Italy’s credibility’ (linked to market ‘anxiety’) [EC140] and would represent 
‘possibly the worst outcome’ [EC146].  
 
A glimpse into what might constitute a desirable election outcome is offered in 
several items. One cites the view of ‘most external observers’ who ‘feel a Bersani-
Monti alliance is what Italy needs’ [EC151], with the position of these notional 
external observers legitimated in another item in which the correspondent 
suggests that such an alliance would ‘probably keep Italy’s credibility intact and 
would signal to the European Union, at least, that Italy will continue along the 
path of reform’ [EC136]. This would be contingent, however, on Bersani having 
‘reconciled’ the ‘far-left’ [EC136] elements within his coalition, suggesting that his 
value as Prime Minister would be his ability to provide popular cover to the 
continuation of the Monti agenda. This is supported by the suggestion that 
Bersani, in comments attributed to him, would continue ‘fiscally correct measures 
and reforms’ and be ‘responsible in government’ [EC143]. 
 
Such comments suggest a close alignment between the desires of Eurozone 
leaders, financial markets and what journalists define as necessary ‘reforms’ for 
Italy. 
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7.3.2.3 (iii) Framing election outcomes and implications 
 
The ‘shocking’ [EC143], ‘truly remarkable’ and ‘astonishing’ [EC142] election 
outcome is described in negative, even somewhat apocalyptic terms in a range of 
items. As the ‘worst possible outcome’ [EC155, see also EC144], the immediate 
financial implications are again foregrounded, with references to the adverse 
effect on bond spreads and share prices [EC154, EC141, EC142, EC143, EC144].  
 
Against the background of the prediction of a hung parliament, the emphasis on 
political instability [e.g. EC142, EC144] again casts a long shadow over the 
election’s assessment. We learn that the election threatens to shatter the 
achievement of at least a pause in the Euro crisis which had been ‘somewhat dealt 
with in recent months’ [EC141] but now ‘the prospect of immediate and damaging 
instability looms large’, with ‘more danger for the Eurozone’ [EC154] which could 
threaten its ‘fragile recovery’ [EC154] and raise the prospect of the Eurozone 
crisis ‘reigniting’ [EC141].  
 
The performance of Berlusconi is described as ‘shocking news’ [EC153] the scale 
of whose success was such that ‘it could disrupt hopes for the kind of stable and 
reforming government that Eurozone capitals so desperately want’ [EC153]. 
Conversely, Bersani’s ‘failure to win’ is described as a bitter disappointment’ 
[EC154], a partial statement and highly suggestive of a journalistic internalisation 
of Bersani’s status as preferred candidate of political elites elsewhere. Mario 
Monti’s ‘dismal fourth’ [EC154] is similarly bemoaned; despite being ‘the man 
who appeared to have single-handedly restored Italy’s international reputation’ 
[EC153], his failure is explained by the fact that he was ‘installed at the behest of 
the EU to impose austerity’ [EC142, see also EC143]. 
 
With regard to Grillo’s strong electoral performance, we are told that that Italians 
have elected a ‘comedian-led protest movement with one quarter of the vote’ 
[EC143], eliciting German disapproval [EC141]. The accusatory question of 
‘[h]ow are Italians feeling about what they have done this morning?’ [EC143] is 
strongly suggestive of journalistic disapproval; a sense only enhanced by the 
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correspondent’s suggestion, citing Italian voters he spoke to, that they behaved 
nihilistically- that they delivered their ‘protest vote’ in the knowledge that it was 
not going to ‘help things’ [EC143]. 
 
The nub of the ‘problem’ arising from the election is that Monti’s reforms and 
austerity measures have been ‘roundly rejected’ by voters, and this goes against 
the ‘clear diagnosis about Italy’s economic problems’ which requires ‘deep-rooted 
economic reform’ [EC155] to overcome. In the same item, the correspondent 
speculates that the parties elected may be ‘intrinsically antithetical towards 
reforms and austerity measures’ [EC155]. In another item, the presenter notes that 
we were ‘reminded’ in an interview with European Commissioner Olli Rehn that 
‘to some extent it doesn’t matter how electorates feel about austerity, there is only 
one plan in place for Europe’ [EC143], suggesting an acceptance of the idea that 
that the expression of voter desires in the electoral outcome may be moot. 
 
When, two months later, the Italian parliament was eventually on the cusp of 
electing a workable government, it is described as the Italian President taking 
control of the situation, putting his ‘foot down’ and getting ‘those around you to be 
reasonable as you see it’ [EC145]. The very small number of items that cover the 
formation of the new government conclude that the ‘months of political deadlock’ 
[EC156, see also EC157] are over, although there is no discussion on the 
implications or otherwise of the new ‘broad coalition’ [EC156] government 
coming to office, beyond querying ‘what kind of man’ [EC145] is new PM Enrico 
Letta and whether his premiership provides good prospects for ‘a functioning 
government’ [EC145]- which, in the context of what has gone before, can only be 
assumed to refer to a government that can function to implement the policies that 
the EU requires of it. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
 
7.4.1 Findings in summary 
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter uncovered a range of recurrent framing 
tendencies in the corpus of texts pertaining to the Euro debt crisis across the 
three frame dimensions of issue problematisation, actor and action legitimation, 
and outcome evaluation. 
 
Where patterns of issue problematisation in Greece are concerned, democratic 
processes (both in the case of the proposed referendum on the bailout in 2011 
and the elections in 2013) are themselves identified as threats to the smooth 
operation of European crisis management. Similarly, in Italy, the political failure 
to enact particular kinds of reforms is powerfully thematised as threatening 
Eurozone stability. The proposed referendum on the bailout in Greece is 
consistently represented in negative terms, with a pronounced emphasis on the 
range of negative actual and hypothetical consequences for Greece, Europe, 
Ireland and the world. In Italy, it is the building political and financial pressure 
on Italy’s economy and political leadership that comprises the main early 
thematic focus of the crisis there, as European pressure for rapid economic 
reforms in Italy grew and bond markets threatened to cut off Italy’s capacity to 
fund itself. 
 
Analysis of the second set of sub-topics in both countries suggest that the primary 
mode of contextualisation and problematisation of elections is again through 
their presentation as threatening the stability of a newly-becalmed Eurozone. 
Like in Italy, contextualisations of Greece’s impending elections are characterised 
by the destabilising potential of increasing political polarisation- an outcome 
problematised because it may result in “ungovernability”, arresting the 
unencumbered implementation of European-directed crisis management and, 
notionally, reigniting the embers of crisis. This is evidenced in a recurring 
preoccupation with political and financial instability- in particular with regard to 
repercussions in financial markets and concomitant threats to European and 
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global economic stability. This is at its strongest in the framing of the second 
Greek election as entailing a moment of truth for Greece’s ongoing participation 
in the Eurozone as well as the fate of the single currency, a construal of the 
election that aligned with the escalating rhetoric emanating from Brussels and 
Berlin. In Italy, this is particularly apparent in the almost wistful valourisation of 
technocratic rule under Mario Monti. He is represented as having heroically 
restored Italy’s international credibility but whose achievements are now 
threatened by an unwelcome return of the political. The potential for elections in 
both countries to undermine a nascent Irish economic recovery are underlined, 
with market instability arising from undesirable electoral outcomes discussed in 
terms that clearly locate the electoral preferences of financial markets as in 
accordance with Irish national interests. 
 
In both countries, dominant issue problematisations are closely linked to modes 
of actor legitimation that demonstrate in the first instance a pervasive 
delegitimisation of political incumbents in both countries (Papandreou in Greece 
and Berlusconi in Italy) and later, opposition figures (Tsipras in Greece, 
Berlusconi and Grillo in Italy). The immediate problems facing both countries are 
inextricably linked to the principal actors of the respective Prime Ministers, both 
of whom are the subject of sustained, consistent and sometimes personalised 
pathologisation. Critical discourses around the actions, inactions and intentions 
of both men amount to their stigmatisation as causal agents of crisis. Journalistic 
judgements on these figures turn on the extent of their opposition to the policy 
preferences of European institutions, European political leaders and financial 
markets.  
 
Regarding the representation of the electoral choices open to voters in both 
countries, journalistic recognition of public anger, political polarisation and 
splintering of political loyalties in both Greece and Italy exists alongside a concern 
about the potential inability for compliant governance to emerge in either 
country. In Italy, the emphasis is placed on the threat to Mario Monti’s reform 
agenda represented by competing populisms in the form of a knave (the dreaded 
return of Silvio Berlusconi) and a clown (the unknown quantity of the comedian 
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Beppe Grillo and his 5 Star Movement). In Greece, a subdued treatment of the 
competing parties in the run-up to the first election intensifies in the second with 
a focus on the conservative New Democracy party and a resurgent radical left in 
the form of SYRIZA. Journalistic framings of both parties, particularly in the run 
up to the second election, contrasts the (albeit partly discredited) conservative 
party’s responsible and compliant approach to negotiating Greek’s economic 
future with an emphasis on the hair-raising implications of SYRIZA’s insistence 
on seeking a new deal for Greece, whose intransigence is consistently 
represented as a threat to the stability of the existing order. The public 
resonances of oppositional groupings in both countries are encoded as threats to 
order domestically and in the Eurozone and global economies. Of particular note 
is the tendency to caricature SYRIZA in Greece as dogmatist, oppositional and a 
vehicle of populist anger and unproductive fatalism, rather than demonstrative 
of popular desire for an alternative Europe based on substantively different 
values. 
 
The journalistic delegitimisation of incumbent political leaders and oppositional 
groups proceeded alongside the legitimisation of the subsequent drift to 
technocracy- occasionally in fulsome terms. Overwhelmingly positive 
assessments of Papademos in Greece and Monti in Italy at both the beginning and 
end of their tenures contrasted sharply with the framing of eventual elections in 
both countries as threatening a return to crisis, serving to normalise the 
“solution” of externally-imposed technical governments to the “problem” of 
recalcitrant domestic prime ministers and electorates. Evidence of journalistic 
support for a Monti-Bersani coalition in Italy and a national unity government in 
Greece on the basis of their ability to provide stability demonstrates a desire for 
technocracy by other means- a politics without politics. Conversely, the 
impression is given that the rise of oppositional voices on the left is a reactive, 
dangerous response, not freely chosen and not intellectually justified. 
 
This is supported by the assumption, pervasive in the corpus, that Italy and 
Greece are problems to be solved by, if necessary, European fiat rather than 
domestic electorates, with the EU identified as the proper locus of crisis 
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resolution authority. The assessment of action legitimation therefore tends to 
flow from compliance with whatever outcome will deliver stability as defined by 
markets and European political elites, propelling an elevation of the agents of 
technocracy- the European Central Bank, financial markets, caretaker 
technocratic administrations- as legitimate actors and issuers of demands. There 
is ample evidence to show that “Europe” is identified as the main locus of 
authority for the resolution of crisis, evidenced not least by regular uncritical 
representation of the drumbeat of threats made by political and economic elites 
to both countries.  
 
With regard to outcome evaluation, the onset of technocratic governance in both 
countries is framed positively and assessed similarly positively afterwards, 
particularly in Italy’s case. While the resignation of both leaders was broadly 
attributed to non-democratic pressures from financial markets and European 
decision-makers, this remained largely unproblematised. The elevation of Lucas 
Papademos in Greece and Mario Monti in Italy as technocratic heads of interim 
administrations are framed as positive developments, indeed as the sine qua non 
of Eurozone integrity. Journalistic discourse assessing the new technocratic 
governance in both countries evinces, at their most democratic, a mild 
ambivalence at the extent to which European crisis management has reached into 
domestic politics, and at their least democratic, an explicit relief at the potential 
of the new technocrats to do what their elected counterparts wouldn’t or couldn’t. 
The achievement of “order” and the efficacy of particular modes of decision-
making represent the bar by which the new technocratic administrations were 
initially evaluated, with a pronounced elision of the issues for democracy that 
such “solutions” entail.  
 
The celebration of technocracy contrasts with the thoroughly negative 
assessments of the inconclusive electoral outcomes in Italy and the first Greek 
parliamentary election of 2013. The implications of both are viewed with singular 
dismay, only dissipating with the eventual establishment of coalitions broadly 
compliant with the terms of European crisis management. The negative 
implications in terms of market opprobrium and the problems for European 
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crisis management are foregrounded in both countries, with the resultant 
uncertainty explicitly linked in both countries with the fully-fledged reassertion 
of the Euro debt crisis. Partial positions in relation to desirable outcomes are 
conveyed under cover of references to expert opinion in about what is best for 
Italy and Greece, which substantively support the position of parties with a 
compliant attitude to European crisis management. A clear distinction between 
“bad” and “good” electoral outcomes is demonstrated by the muted, relieved 
response to the eventual cobbling together of coalitions broadly compliant with 
EU crisis management, following months of negotiations in Italy and after a 
second election in Greece.  
 
7.4.2 Journalistic crisis construals: a conclusion 
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter deployed a framing approach to examine 
the ideological tenor of journalistic crisis construals using a series of recent 
momentous events as supranational crisis management and domestic politics in 
European peripheral nations clashed in ways that both crystallised and heralded 
an escalation of the contemporary democratic crisis.  
 
Analysis of the journalistic discharge of framing functions along the dimensions 
of issue problematisation, actor and action legitimation, and outcome evaluation 
revealed an issue culture in close alignment with neoliberal crisis construals. 
 
This is evidenced by, inter alia, a journalistic tendency to pathologise the 
democratically-elected leaders of Greece and Italy for their assumed lack of 
compliance with the dictates of supranational crisis management; to 
subsequently offer implicit and explicit support for the subsequent deposing of 
both leaders; to view the imposition of technocratic replacements as benign 
developments; and to demonstrate an aversion to a return to democratic 
governance in both countries. 
 
The identification of Greece and Italy as aberrant Eurozone members whose 
pathological governance and political cultures presented an imminent threat to 
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Eurozone integrity and regional and even global economic stability serves to 
identify the locus of crisis in ways that elide both its systemic origins and ethical 
dimensions, and pave the way for the legitimation of a state of exception in which 
profound interference in domestic politics- up to and including the usurpation of 
democratic electoral processes- becomes accepted and even celebrated.  
 
The simultaneous acknowledgment of yet failure to problematise an 
undemocratic element in the end of the premierships of Berlusconi and 
Papandreou is indicative of an editorial submission to the realpolitik of 
increasingly radicalised European crisis management and an internalisation of 
the disciplinary logics of supranational crisis management whose patience with 
even the patina of electoral democracy had run out. This weakness, evidenced in 
the extent to which journalistic discourse took up the mantle as a conduit and 
amplifier of elite anxieties over events in both countries, is suggestive of a higher 
valuation of market autonomy over democratic sovereignty, itself premised on 
the thorough internalisation of an economic rationality that evacuates normative 
criteria in the evaluation of crisis diagnoses and decision-making. 
 
Such a neoliberal rationality ensured that the implications of events abroad 
successfully elided problematisation of crisis management at home, with the firm 
emphasis on how events may affect Ireland’s economic recovery- premised on a 
broad strategy of compliance with external demands- playing into Irish 
governmental desires to distance itself from the travails of the European 
periphery and to advocate for Ireland’s special status as a compliant, recovering 
casualty of crisis.  
 
In so doing, the possibilities of airing heterodox crisis construals that expand the 
space for critical engagement with questions of democratic legitimacy, the 
political and economic logics of crisis management (and its social consequences), 
and the possibilities of an alternative Europe are foreclosed; leaving little room 
left but for a grim acceptance of the headlong rush towards post-democracy. 
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Chapter 8: Letting the Outside In: 
Public Participation and Accountability in 
Irish Public Service Broadcasting 
 
8.1 The public in (and on) RTÉ: an overview 
 
8.1.1 Introduction 
 
Although incorporating accounts of the actual and desired extent of the influence 
of public opinion in the newsroom as well as practices and ideologies of 
representation, the empirical explorations of the foregoing chapters have focused 
principally on journalistic practices, professional self-conceptions, and textual 
crisis framings. Given the project’s overarching interest in the conditions of 
possibility of contemporary crisis engendering democratising responses from 
public service broadcasting, empirical scrutiny is warranted to assess the 
democratic constraints and affordances of institutional openings beyond the 
newsroom for publics to intervene both in and through broadcasting. 
 
This chapter accomplishes this through a brief overview of such (historical and 
extant) institutional openings, followed by the detailed account of a participant-
observation case study of a key venue of institutional public participation, the 
RTÉ Audience Council. 
 
8.1.2 “Access” programming 
 
Public service broadcasting in the Reithian tradition, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
has long relegated the public to the predominant status of “silent partner”. In 
Ireland, however, the idea that public service broadcasting has and continues to 
play a powerful role in providing a venue for the nation to talk both to and about 
itself is central to its self-image and institutional mythology. The medium of radio 
has been particularly important to this, captured in RTÉ’s description of its Radio 
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1 station as ‘the authentic voice of the nation- the place where the national 
conversation takes place’ (RTÉ, 2013a: 64). In this context, the role of 
participatory or “access” programming- particularly on radio- has played a 
distinctive role in RTÉ since the 1960s. 
 
Characterising Irish talk radio as a kind of ‘public confessional’, Doyle-O’Neill 
(2013, see also 2015) traces the development of talk radio in Ireland from the 
early years of the newly-incorporated RTÉ from the early 1960s onwards, 
singling out the significance of a number of long-running, mould-breaking 
programmes (Dear Frankie which started broadcasting in the 1960s, The Gay 
Byrne Show in the 1970s, and The Gerry Ryan Show and Liveline in the 1980s) 
which were all built around- and thrived upon- the participation of members of 
the public in contributing at first questions and later stories and points of view. 
To an even greater degree than television, such programmes may be seen as 
central to RTÉ’s contribution to Irish liberalisation in the second half of the 
twentieth century, in particular helping to denude barriers between private 
domesticity and the public sphere. 
 
The extent to which these and other subsequent “access” radio and television 
programmes can be considered “strongly” participatory or democratic is 
questionable, not least owing to the extent of editorial control retained by 
broadcasting professionals (see O’Sullivan, 1997 for a discussion of the 
participative affordances and constraints of the Gerry Ryan show). Separately, 
regular studio discussion programmes with panels of invited guests have been 
charged with being dominated by well-heeled professionals (Lynch, 2014). 
 
RTÉ’s history provides a number of more maximally participative exceptions. 
These include the “Access Community Television” initiative which ran for three 
series starting in 1983 and the Right to Learn project in 1993. The former series, 
which explicitly aimed to ‘democratise the television process’ (M. Murphy, 2012), 
allowed communities and groups to produce their own programmes and air them 
on television. These were undertaken with the support of RTÉ professionals but, 
uniquely, editorial control remained with the community. The producer/director 
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of the project later recounted how ‘conservative forces’ (ibid) in and outside RTÉ 
succeeded in shutting down the project. The latter represented a collaboration 
between RTÉ and University College Dublin, involving a five-party series on 
unemployment, education and the media with the participation of unemployed 
people. 
 
Just as community-made programming on RTÉ briefly flowered and withered, so 
has programming whose subject matter was talking about RTÉ itself. The Mailbag 
programme, which ran for 14 years from 1982, remains the sole example of an 
RTÉ programme focused on airing public views about RTÉ, albeit through the 
non-dialogic format of reading out letters. Both the contexts of its origins and its 
demise (recounted in A. Murphy, 2012) suggest that it was never viewed as 
fulfilling an essential function.  
 
8.1.3 Other participatory venues 
 
Outside the context of programming, the possibilities for public participation 
involvement in RTÉ takes a variety of other forms, mostly of a restricted variety. 
These include occasional opportunities to respond to public consultations via 
written submissions, an internal complaints mechanism (with recourse to 
adjudication by the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland), and Freedom of 
Information requests (less than half of such requests were fully granted in 2012, 
(RTÉ. 2013c: 142) and less than a third in 2013 (RTÉ, 2014c: 143) and 2011 (RTÉ, 
2012e: 116)). Based on information received from the broadcaster’s public 
information office, just three consultations were undertaken in the period 2004-
2015- one on the topic of the Irish language (RTÉ, 2013b) and two which 
informed the development of RTÉ’s Public Service Statements in 2010 and 2015. 
For a time, as noted by interviewees in Chapter 6, regional public meetings were 
occasionally convened where station representatives addressed publics and took 
questions (F. Corcoran, 2004: 42), but this practice has long since fallen into 
abeyance. 
 
It is perhaps through “audience research” (whose influence in the newsroom was 
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briefly discussed in Chapter 5), however, that the public exerts its strongest 
influence on RTE, albeit in aggregate form. The work of the broadcaster’s 
Audience Research Unit is a ‘multi-faceted endeavour’ (Fahy, 1992: 7), serving at 
least three separate functions: providing audience size and composition metrics 
critical to RTÉ's commercial activities through ratings data; underpinning 
modern scheduling practices; and fulfilling a legitimating role, in part through 
providing the broadcaster with data on how the public views the organisation.  
 
Ratings data in RTÉ is supplemented by qualitative data collection methods such 
as focus groups (used on a “relatively infrequent” basis) (RTÉ, 2008: 9), and more 
substantially, by the online RTÉ Audience Reaction Panel (ibid: 8, RTÉ, 2010b: 
98) since 2007. A further source of data built into the television viewership 
measurement system (TAM), “audience appreciation”, represents a hybrid 
between qualitative and quantitative data- a numeric value of perceived quality 
assigned to programmes by the sample of viewers who also contribute ratings 
data (Fahy, 1992). 
 
Notwithstanding qualitative data gathering innovations like the Audience 
Reaction Panel, Murray (2011: 238) argues that ‘today the relationship between 
a public broadcaster and its audience is defined primarily by ratings data’, with 
the schedule representing its practical manifestation. In her analysis of 
rationalised management practices in RTÉ, she argues that the centrality of 
ratings data to scheduling decisions serves several purposes that reflect RTE's 
public and commercial sides. On one hand, it allows RTÉ to plausibly claim that it 
is highly responsive to its audiences- unpopular programmes may be axed, and 
popular ones may be given “better” timeslots and/or renewed for further series, 
enabling RTÉ to argue that it is delivering maximum viewerships for its 
programming investments. Ratings data, of course, is also the ‘currency of 
advertising sales’ (ibid), a key source of the broadcaster’s income. 
 
Linking management by schedule to the gradual extension of market logics into 
RTÉ as a whole, she suggests that a key consequence of rationalised scheduling 
along these lines is that it ‘reflects and reinforces a redefinition of the audience’, 
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citing Croteau and Hoynes’ (2006: 38) ‘market model” which views audiences as 
“consumers of media and as commodities to be bought and sold by advertisers’ 
(Murray, 2011: 237). 
 
The range of audience research tools used by RTÉ can be said, then, to collectively 
represent a relatively ‘minimalist’ (Carpentier, 2011: 17) form of public 
participation in the organisation. Most audience research data is controlled 
tightly by RTÉ and shared on a need-to-know basis with relevant staff; the topical 
agendas for research are set by RTÉ; and the potential participants in audience 
research only represents a small sample of the public.  
 
Audience research as practiced within RTÉ can be described as much more 
closely resembling top-down instrumental market research than bottom-up 
expansive public communication, circumscribing the democratic possibilities of 
public engagement.  
 
It is thus in keeping with the weakly participative tenor of the other ways in which 
the public can seek to bring to bear its influence on RTE through other 
participation and accountability mechanisms, which largely have no binding 
force and are subject to RTÉ’s co-operation which may be given or withdrawn at 
any time.  
 
For example, even in cases where public complaints are upheld by the 
Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, these rulings are not backed by any sanctions. 
Similarly, public consultations undertaken by RTÉ have an advisory rather than 
a binding character. With contributions not made public, and consequent policy 
development undertaken wholly out of public view, whether public opinion 
gathered in this manner has any formative impact is impossible to ascertain. 
 
Freedman’s (2015) account of media policymaking as carefully restricted to 
political, economic, administrative elites resonates with the Irish case. This is 
buttressed by the long-established tendency for a neoliberalised RTÉ to initiate 
and be subjected to reviews and restructuring projects overseen by business 
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consultants (Murray, 2011), reflecting an institutional isomorphism with the 
political and economic fields.  
 
The decline of a range of democratising practices- however weak and partial- 
including the opportunities for publics to produce their own programmes; the 
possibility for viewers to air their views about RTÉ on dedicated programming; 
and the holding of public meetings, all allow for the argument to be plausibly 
made that RTÉ in 2014 is no more “open” and “democratic” now than it was in 
decades prior. 
 
This may be explained in terms of the entrenched tendency, discussed in Chapter 
2, for public broadcasting to conceive of its democratic functions on a “trustee” 
basis, by privileging public “access” rather than “voice”. The centrality of public 
trust- as measured by quantitative metrics and instrumentalised to legitimate its 
continued autonomy from the public- as the bedrock of the desired relationship 
between RTÉ and the Irish public is demonstrably clear. 
 
RTÉ’s ‘Vision Mission Values’ statement (RTÉ, 2012d) defines RTÉ’s ‘Vision’ as ‘to 
grow the trust of the people of Ireland as it informs, inspires, reflects and enriches 
their lives’ (italics in original). The broadcaster’s most recent editorial guidelines 
go further in this vein, stating that ‘[t]rust is the cornerstone of RTÉ’ (RTÉ, 2014a: 
4). With ‘trust’ elevated as the basis of the public’s relationship with the 
broadcaster, ‘participation’ is defined in weak terms. For example, perceived 
success in fulfilling RTÉ’s ‘Mission’ commitment to ‘enable national participation 
in all major events’ (RTÉ, 2009) is justified by vaunting high viewership figures 
for a series of televised ‘major events’ (PwC, 2013:  60). Participation is conceived 
of here in the sense of mere access to observe.  
 
RTÉ use metrics like audience share, reach, appreciation, and trust (see, for 
example, RTÉ (2012e: 108) as “key performance indicators” which demonstrate 
compliance with RTÉ's public service obligations, or as the broadcaster’s 2002 
annual report puts it, ‘The public's recognition of RTÉ's strengths is evident in 
strong ratings and high audience share’ (RTÉ, 2003: 2). High levels of public trust- 
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as revealed by internal survey data- are regularly reported (e.g. PwC, 2013, RTÉ 
2015c) and invariably used to argue that the broadcaster ‘continues to enjoy the 
respect and confidence of the Irish public’ (e.g. PwC, 2013: 49). Such assertions 
are commonplace despite the mostly quantitative nature of this kind of data 
which typically invites respondents to respond to fixed prompts in relation to 
concepts like “trust” and which do not give respondents the opportunity to self-
thematise issues or to elaborate on what it is they do or do not trust RTE to do. 
 
8.2 The RTÉ Audience Council  
 
There is, however, one recently-instituted mechanism- the RTÉ Audience 
Council- through which “the public”, by means of a statutory, representative 
committee, have come to occupy a place embedded within the governance 
structures of public service broadcasting. Between September 2012 and 
December 2014, I sat as an ordinary member on the Council, fully participating 
in its activities. The remainder of this chapter provides a discussion of its 
establishment, the evolution of its place and function within the broadcaster, an 
overview of some key experiences and episodes arising from my period as part 
of the Council and an assessment of the extent of its performance and potential 
as a democratising force acting on and within public service broadcasting. 
 
8.2.1 Co-opted by design? Council structure and constitution  
 
Roughly modelled along the lines of that previously established by the BBC (BBC 
Trust, 2008: 19), the first incarnation of the RTÉ Audience Council was 
established voluntarily by the broadcaster in 2004 as part of a range of 
‘accountability and transparency measures’ (Department of Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources, 2002: 12-13) which were linked to RTÉ's 
successful application for a license fee increase in 2002. The first Audience 
Council was additionally justified by RTÉ in terms of the need to ‘facilitate 
communication, and to enhance accountability’ between RTÉ and its audience 
(RTÉ, 2007). The original Council was set up as an ‘advisory group to the RTÉ 
Authority’ (ibid) with an initial term of four years and comprising 22 members 
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plus an RTÉ-supplied secretary. The group’s membership was split between 
‘representatives of the major social partners and interest groups, as well as 
viewers and listeners from throughout the island of Ireland’ (RTÉ, 2004b: 3) and 
a member of the RTÉ Authority. A chairperson would be selected by Council 
members annually from within their number. The selection of the ‘representative 
members’ were invitees from nominated organisations that included the then 
social partners- IBEC, ICTU, IFA and the Community & Voluntary Pillar as well as 
a range of other (mainly state) bodies. The ‘individual members’ were selected on 
the basis of applications from the public solicited via advertisements on RTÉ 
platforms and publications and with a view to attaining a geographic spread. 
 
The main business of the Council, according to a document issued in 2007 (RTÉ, 
2007), would be to discuss matters pertaining to the ‘public interest tests’ set by 
RTÉ for itself, which include, inter alia, ‘fairness’, ‘accuracy’, ‘independence from 
vested interests and freedom from political control or influence’ and a variety of 
stipulations on programming around thematic, regional, demographic and 
cultural diversity. The same document identifies RTÉ management as the 
principle focus of the Council’s interactions. With contact with the general public 
described as taking place via a website and annual report, it was clear that 
interactive engagement with the public was not envisaged as central to the 
Council’s remit, and that its gaze would predominantly be directed inwards and 
upwards.  
 
Following its dissolution at the end of 2009, new broadcasting legislation 
(Broadcasting Act 2009: s.96) put the Audience Council on a statutory footing, 
and a new Council took its place in July 2010, reflecting the stipulations of the act. 
In crucial structural and functional aspects, the legislative provisions relating to 
the Council reproduced that of its original instantiation, including the retention 
of RTÉ control over appointments and the practice of an RTÉ Board-nominated 
representative sitting on the Council, which would now number fifteen. The 
tradition of reporting upwards was further embedded with requirements for an 
annual report to both the relevant Minister and the Board of RTE. The legislation 
identified the Council’s ‘principal function’ as being ‘to represent to the board of 
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its corporation the views and interests of the general public with regard to public 
service broadcasting by the corporation’. To enable this, the Act contained 
specific provisions allowing the Council to hold public meetings and also to 
empower the Council to require RTÉ to broadcast an hour of televisual and radio 
programming every year at a time agreed by both parties.  In two key respects, 
however, the autonomy and democratic credentials of the Council deteriorated 
significantly, both of which were to be pivotal in both my own nomination onto 
the Council and the nature of my experiences while a part of it. 
 
With RTÉ free to undertake appointments any way they wished, rather than the 
public application process previously undertaken, members were selected on an 
ad hoc basis, with many- including the author- appointed on the basis of personal 
connections with Board members and RTÉ management (in my case accruing 
from the then-ongoing ethnographic research). 
 
Under the new legislation, the Council itself would no longer annually appoint a 
Chair from within its own number but the Board would appoint one to it, granting 
it a further enhanced level of control over proceedings. In a still further 
consolidation of RTÉ influence, the practice of RTÉ supplying a secretary to the 
previous Council was continued.  
 
All of this meant that when in September 2012 I took my seat at the enormous 
table in a top-floor room of the RTÉ administration building adjacent to the Board 
room, I sat not only with 15 or so other handpicked members of the public but 
also an RTÉ-appointed Chair, secretary, a member of the RTÉ Board and even the 
Secretary of the RTÉ Board who attended many of our meetings despite not being 
a member. Overwhelmingly middle-class, professional, urban, liberal and white, 
RTE’s free selection of public representatives was a committee of the respectable 
and comfortable. 
  
Conversations with colleagues and a review of internally-circulated 
documentation obtained prior to my appointment suggests that following an 
extended period of acquainting themselves with various arms of the broader 
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organisation by means of a range of presentations, briefings and question and 
answer sessions with various RTÉ personnel, the Council had begun to advance 
and progress some practical proposals which would give effect to its core 
legislative duties. Some of these- which included the proposal of a media-themed 
radio programme and a public event- were beginning to come to fruition by the 
time I joined the group. 
 
The vignettes that follow recount some of the pivotal episodes during my tenure 
which reflected and shaped the Audience Council’s interpretation and discharge 
of its functions, demonstrating the ways that the Council looked upwards, 
outwards and inwards in an effort to establish an identity of its own within the 
broadcaster. 
 
It did not take long, however, for it to become clear that the terrain for doing so 
in an independent fashion was not altogether promising. Despite its legislatively-
mandated ability to write its own operating rules, and a mode of decision-making 
in which each member had a nominally equal share of power, the Council had at 
an early stage adopted both a set of standing orders (RTÉ Audience Council 2011) 
and a series of informal practices that together embedded a conservative, 
hierarchal orientation that reflected a clearly-apparent desire to ensure that the 
group would be subject to significant measures of top-down control.  
 
Confidentiality was established as the default status of nearly all Audience 
Council documentation save for the meeting “communiqués” which were written 
by the secretary, often in collaboration with the Chairperson. Although these 
were eventually made publicly available online, their content betrayed little of 
the substance of meetings beyond formal decisions. More detailed minutes were 
not kept. The rules, although not granting general decision-making powers to the 
Chair, nevertheless vested in that role various ancillary powers, including those 
of determining the agenda, venue and duration of meetings, as well as the ability, 
along with the Secretary, to speak publicly for the Council (RTÉ Audience Council, 
2011). The draft version of the standing orders even contained a provision 
allowing RTÉ to terminate the membership of any member of the Audience 
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Council at any time.  
 
In the ways that the statutory Council took on the shape of its non-statutory 
forebear (with an even greater democratic deficit in key areas), the limited 
diversity of its constituent members, and in the rapid establishment of a 
conservative modus operandi via a restrictive ruleset, the second Audience 
Council had immediately absorbed important elements of the institutional 
culture of its host organisation that would shape its trajectory over the remainder 
of its term. 
 
8.2.2 ‘The Media Show’ and the limits of participation  
 
When I joined, the Council was reflecting on what on appeared to be a significant 
achievement: the successful progression of a Council proposal for a media-
themed radio series into an 8-part run transmitted earlier that year. The original 
proposal called for the programme to deal with a broad range of media-related 
topics (including democratic issues and the political-economic implications of 
media structures) in a format that facilitated direct dialogue between programme 
makers and listeners, also explicitly noting the necessity of a transmission time 
which would assist the programme in building a sizable audience.  
 
With no Council input sought beyond the initial pitch, the programme that 
transpired bore little relation to what was, in the main, a forward-thinking 
original proposal. The Media Show, whose production was outsourced to an 
independent production company, was transmitted on RTÉ Radio 1 at a 
“graveyard” Saturday evening slot. Thematically, the series was not strongly 
attuned to the democratic or political-economic dimensions of media, instead 
focusing on the emergence of new forms of media and how existing media 
organisations were adapting to new digital technologies and competitive 
environments- a focus reflected in the emphasis on interviews with media elites 
from RTÉ, its competitors, and regulators. Public involvement in the programme 
was incorporated, albeit via the restricted, non-dialogic form of a series of brief 
‘Mediawatch’ (RTÉ, 2012f) “radio essays” by public contributors. 
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The Council had no role in either the programme’s assessment or shaping future 
plans. We learned that while programme ratings were very poor even for its 
traditionally-weak Saturday evening slot, radio management had adjudged the 
programme at least a partial success on the basis that it had generated a 
disproportionate amount of newspaper column inches based on the 
programme’s headline-grabbing interviews with media insiders- a criterion of 
success indicative of a very different set of priorities from those motivating the 
original proposal. 
 
Although disappointed at the poor scheduling and RTÉ’s failure to consult, 
Council members expressed little interest in seeking to shape future series, a 
reticence reinforced both by the Chair who argued against the Council seeking 
involvement on the basis of it being an undue encroachment on journalistic 
autonomy, as well as by visiting RTÉ executives who cautioned against the 
expectation of receiving detailed responses by programme-makers to any ideas 
we may have. 
 
The Media Show was renewed in 2013 and 2015 for a second and third series, and 
occupying similar, marginalised, weekend evening timeslots and media industry-
centric formats. A sustained, contrived ambiguity over whether the programme 
was considered to constitute the Audience Council’s allotted annual broadcasting 
time under law contributed to an inertia that saw the Council make no firm 
proposals for additional programming throughout the remainder of its term, in 
spite of its legally-enshrined entitlements. 
 
8.2.3 Opening the floor up to the public  
 
Again guided by explicit legislative provision, the Council facilitated two public 
events (in 2013 and 2014) during my tenure. The groundwork for a particular 
kind of public of event had already been laid prior to my arrival. The July 2012 
communiqué (RTÉ Audience Council, 2012) explicitly linked the idea of a public 
event with the recommendation of the Horgan report arising from the Fr. 
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Reynolds libel (RTÉ, 2011b: 8) that RTÉ should organise a ‘public expert 
conference’, involving a ‘lecture/seminar on a media-related topic’ which would 
be co-organised by the Council and RTÉ. 
 
Concerned that a format like this would, not unlike The Media Show, deliberately 
avoid cultivating a broad audience and restrict itself to media insiders, I 
advocated for the event to use an accessible venue, a participatory format and 
facilitate a broad thematic range driven by attendees. These suggestions were 
met with disinterest and resistance by colleagues who urged “realism”, viewing 
strongly participatory formats as difficult to organise and not worth pursuing. 
 
In any event, most of the decisions around the event were taken out of the hands 
of Council members altogether. A keynote speaker, the President and CEO of the 
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) in the United States, Paula Kerger, was selected 
and arranged without Council discussion. On the basis that these decisions should 
be left to the ‘pros’, we were additionally advised to leave all logistical matters- 
including the venue selection, format and theme- to RTÉ’s communications 
apparatus. 
 
The event’s title (‘Public Service Broadcasting: Innovating for the Needs of 
Tomorrow’s Audiences’) the selection of the venue (a lecture hall in UCD, a stone’s 
throw from RTÉ’s campus in the heart of affluent South Dublin) and the staid 
approach to event promotion were all decided by RTÉ Corporate 
Communications with no input solicited from the Audience Council. Each of these 
decisions served to imprint the event with the elite identity I had feared from the 
beginning. It was made clear to us that Kerger was the main draw and securing 
media interviews for the star speaker was seen as the corporate priority- the 
Audience Council involvement was a mere footnote. 
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Fig. 8-1 Audience Council event invite (2013) 
 
The event boasted a modest audience of the well-informed and well-connected 
(including many from senior RTÉ management) who politely listened to a 
somewhat incongruous hour-long address (RTÉ, 2013d) on the American 
experience of public broadcasting. An energetic though brief Q&A session 
(appended to the format following objections to a sole focus on the guest lecture), 
focused attention on the domestic context of public broadcasting (RTÉ, 2013e). 
The event’s Chair, the then Press Ombudsman John Horgan made the sharp 
criticism there was ‘a touch of the 19th century’ about the event’s organisation 
and that the Audience Council should institute communication mechanisms that 
stretch ‘participatory activity almost but not quite to the point of anarchy’.  
 
However, despite my repetition of Horgan’s critique at several future Council 
meetings, in the run up to the organisation of our second and final event a year 
later, opposition from other Council members again focused on the idea that the 
more open the format the bigger the risk of ‘malcontents’ and ‘activists’ seeking 
to dominate, signalling to me a regrettable internalisation of an institutional 
aversion to more expansive forms of public involvement. 
 
Nonetheless, the event which took place in early 2014 and which focused on the 
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worthy topic of migrant representation and participation on and in RTÉ, some 
concessions to a more participative format were made. In an effort to reduce the 
formality of the previous event, there would be no lecture, and the whole event 
would comprise a discussion built around audience involvement. There would, 
however, still be a “top table” of invited speakers and the venue chosen, on the 
sole basis of expediency, was the RTÉ Radio Centre, again playing a formative role 
in the identity of likely attendees. 
 
In practice, what was billed as a “public conversation” at first differed 
surprisingly little in format from the previous year’s event, given that the panel 
of six- two from RTÉ, with the others representing different strands of Ireland’s 
migrant communities- ended up speaking for nearly half the whole event before 
it was opened up to the floor. When it eventually did, however, the evening came 
to life, when the hundred or so members of the public in attendance (including a 
large migrant contingent) were able to speak. Their contributions offered 
frequently radical critiques of representational practices in RTÉ that went 
beyond the immediate topic at hand, querying not only what many felt was a 
failure of RTÉ to represent their lives but citing a broader invisibility of “othered” 
groups in general, including those with the “wrong” accents or postcodes. 
 
The genteel complacency of the previous year’s event had been leavened 
somewhat in favour of more frank and critical exchanges, but the subsequent 
Audience Council discussion following the event revealed that it was this very 
dimension that had perturbed a number of members. An alarmingly censorious 
mindset amongst a portion of the Council suggested an ambivalence at the value 
of facilitating discursive spaces for publics to freely talk about public service 
broadcasting. 
 
Several felt that poor moderation of the event meant that RTÉ staff on the panel 
had unfairly become a lightning rod for criticism by audience contributors. 
Another even expressed a desire for the Audience Council to publicly distance 
itself from some of the more critical commentary directed at RTÉ simply because 
they did not agree with the critique. Others argued that the video of the event 
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should not be published online because of what one described as the 
‘grandstanding’ tone of some of the audience contributions.  
 
8.2.4 Climate change and the diminution of the public voice  
 
Another episode which reflected the Council’s marked reticence either to 
immerse itself in public engagements or to adopt a critical approach to intra-
institutional practices was a series of interventions (principally made by the 
Audience Council but also involving the RTÉ Board) in attenuating in multiple 
ways a project undertaken by two Council members (including the author) in 
exploring RTÉ’s performance and responsibilities in its reporting on the issue of 
climate change. The project was planned to involve both a review of RTÉ’s 
coverage of climate change and a process of engagement with RTÉ decision-
makers and external groups and individuals on how communication of the topics 
surrounding climate change may be improved. It was given the go-ahead by the 
Council in November 2012. 
 
The first component of the project entailed a small-scale quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of climate change coverage of RTÉ News platforms over a 
period of several years, with the data gathering and analysis undertaken by this 
author. This was completed as planned, though its findings are beyond the scope 
of this chapter. The second component was envisaged by the project 
subcommittee to involve a process of dialogue between editorial figures in RTÉ 
and a combination of interested members of the public and experts on various 
dimensions of climate change. This proposal was vetoed by Council members in 
early 2014. In addition to offering the familiar justification of logistical 
challenges, this refusal to countenance a participatory process was expressly 
underpinned by the fear that directly mediating dialogue between RTÉ 
programme-makers and the public in this fashion would be met with resistance 
from RTÉ. Insofar as we had a role at all in soliciting direct public opinion, the 
dominant view was that we should restrict ourselves to ventriloquising it to the 
RTÉ Board. 
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In order to secure the support of the Council, we agreed to instead carry out an 
online survey, the results of which would be relayed to the Board.  Potential 
respondents- comprising a targeted sample of individuals and groups outside 
RTÉ with an established interest in climate change issues, complemented by a 
snowball approach- were asked open-ended questions on their views on RTÉ’s 
present and historic communication on climate change and for their suggestions 
as to how coverage of the issues may be improved. 
 
Fearing that RTÉ may prevent the Council from publishing the project’s outcomes 
on our website, I secured internal Council agreement that the already completed 
report arising from the analysis of RTÉ output on climate change (Cullinane and 
Watson, 2014) would be distributed to potential survey respondents, thus 
rendering less consequential any potential later directive to withhold 
publication. The manner in which the almost one hundred public responses the 
subcommittee received to its email account would be communicated to the Board 
was, however, the subject of extended contention within the Council.  
 
For presentational reasons, the subcommittee made the decision to, in the 
separate portion of the report pertaining to the survey outcomes, precede the 
unabridged survey responses on each question with a brief synopsis of some 
prominent themes raised by respondents. Concerns were immediately raised by 
several Council members that because some of the responses made criticisms of 
named RTÉ staff, we should refrain from seeking to distribute the full survey 
responses within RTÉ, and that the brief synopses would suffice. Taken aback by 
the Council’s readiness to effectively amputate the only component of the project 
that involved communication with the public on the mere suggestion that 
elements of its contents may be libellous, I persuaded the Council to accept in 
principle that the responses could be appropriately screened in advance to 
ensure that they did not raise legal difficulties. 
 
Efforts to enlist the assistance of RTÉ’s Audience Research unit and the 
broadcaster’s legal staff for support in clearing the way to disseminate the survey 
responses were met first with trenchant opposition from the Chair (on the sole 
 254 
 
basis that seeking to share survey responses with RTÉ was unnecessary and even 
counterproductive) and subsequently by a failure on the part of the two 
departments concerned to assist in the preparation of the research for internal 
distribution. In the case of the legal department, this was justified on the basis 
that it was not within their remit to offer assistance to the Audience Council.   
 
In a final effort to secure agreement, the project subcommittee themselves 
manually anonymised all criticisms of named individuals. Wielding the censor’s 
pen was not enough, however, and the rationale for withholding the responses 
from the Board shifted again. This time, the prevailing view was that survey 
responses should be excised from the project simply because they would not be 
read by Board members. When reminded of the commitment made to 
respondents that their views would be collated and sent to the Board, a 
compromise was proposed in which responses would not be automatically sent 
to the Board but that they and other senior executives may request access to 
them. Dissatisfied, I insisted that a vote take place on the matter- the first time a 
vote had ever been used to resolve a disagreement during my tenure- in which I 
was the sole vote in favour of internal distribution of the survey response. This 
was initially obscured by omission from the draft meeting communiqué and only 
reluctantly rectified following strenuous objection. 
 
Following the submission of the Council’s series of project reports- whose 
thematic areas included climate change, the criminal justice system, 
unemployment, and economic disadvantage- the institutional response was 
belated and delivered only in verbal form. This was partly attributable to the 
Council’s decision, reflecting an extraordinary level of internalised deference, 
that formal, written responses to the projects by the Board would not be sought. 
This was ostensibly in the interests of maintaining “good relations” between 
Board and Council. 
 
On each of the three occasions in the second half of 2014 where RTÉ personnel of 
varying seniority met with the Audience Council to discuss the projects, the 
emphasis was squarely put on the sensitising function of the reports for RTÉ 
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personnel. This was frequently described as “osmosis”- implying a diffuse 
process of gradual influence, albeit not one that would be measurable or 
accountable, because it did not involve explicit commitments to act on any 
particular recommendation, nor even imply their acceptance. On another 
occasion, it was made clear that because editorial units in RTÉ operate 
“independently”, no cross-organisational approach could be taken to modify how 
climate change was covered by the broadcaster.  
 
The reports would also be strictly contained within RTÉ, because the Board 
refused an explicit request to allow us to publish any of the reports. This was 
seemingly on the sole basis that the Audience Council’s primary reporting 
relationship was with the Board, and the idea of seeking to make its work publicly 
available had the effect of making the Board ‘nervous’, as one senior RTÉ figure 
put it. 
 
Subsequent events rather undercut the regular Board assurances that our work 
was highly valued. Verbal feedback delivered to a Council meeting at which I was 
not present from newsroom management expressing concern with the project, 
ostensibly regard to methodological issues, was not substantiated, nor even 
responded to by senior management by the time of thesis submission, despite 
sustained requests for clarification. Perhaps most seriously of all, however, was 
that in an outcome that vindicated Council members who doubted the interest of 
RTÉ personnel in reading public survey responses, not a single request to view 
the unabridged survey responses was ever received, meaning that the views of 
the 100 members of the public who took the considerable time to fill out the 
survey were never institutionally accessed. 
 
What had started out as a project designed to stimulate meaningful critical 
engagement between RTÉ and sections of the public on the topic of the 
communication of climate change was thus subjected to a gradual, profound 
attrition of its original vision. With the assumed sensitivities of the Board and RTÉ 
management- foremost in the minds of Council members- reliably overriding any 
democratising instincts, the communicative scope of the project was continually 
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watered down. Through internal complicity and external contrivance, the 
project’s path was ineluctably redirected to protect RTÉ from exposure to direct 
public communication both in-person and via written responses; and to prevent 
formal, publicly-disclosed lines of accountability being established between the 
Board, management, journalists, the Audience Council and the public. 
 
8.2.5 Democratisation foreclosed   
 
The nature of the Council’s structural and ideological ghettoisation within the 
broadcaster’s organisational hierarchy seemed to me central to its ongoing 
difficulties in asserting any measure of independence. Its status was originally 
outlined in the broadcaster’s 2002 Annual Report by then chairman Patrick J 
Wright who said that the new Audience Council initiative would not occupy an 
independent position in the RTÉ governance structures but that it would be a 
mere ‘advisory subcommittee of the Authority’ (later, the RTÉ Board) (RTÉ, 2003: 
3). 
 
Despite the new broadcasting legislation in 2009 drawing a distinction between 
ordinary ‘advisory committees’ of the Board and the Audience Council structure 
(Broadcasting Act 2009, Sections 96 and 97) suggesting at least the possibility of 
the Council claiming for itself a unique position in the governance structure, the 
assumption that it was thoroughly and legitimately subordinate to the Board 
would in practice persist into the Council’s statutory incarnation.  
 
The matter of how the group understood our representational status would be 
critical in shaping the Council’s view of how it should practically and ideologically 
orient itself to its parent organisation and the public at large. The prevailing view 
of the incumbent Chair was that simply by virtue of being selected to represent 
the public by RTÉ our job did not necessitate ongoing communication with that 
public any more than members of parliament had to engage with voters in 
between elections, and that as the public’s legitimate representatives in RTÉ, our 
attention should instead be inexorably drawn to the Board. That ordinary Council 
members had no access to, nor ever received notification of any incoming 
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messages to our publicly available email address only enhanced the sense that 
we had no business in engaging with the public at large. 
 
While content in a solely advisory role, some members frequently and openly 
questioned their own representative legitimacy, not least with respect to the 
demonstrably ad hoc nature of their appointment. This seemed to me to a healthy 
response, but its main consequence was to encourage a dynamic of uncertainty, 
purposelessness, submissiveness which dissuaded members from having the 
courage to see themselves as having the locus standi to assert a “public” rather 
than merely private voice around the committee table. This paralysis manifested 
itself in a sustained lack of participation on the part of some members in terms of 
absenteeism and non-participation in meetings, contributing to a high turnover 
of Council membership. RTÉ’s consistent tardiness or even failure to replace 
departed members suggest that this was not seen as a problematic state of affairs. 
 
The necessity for reshaping the Council’s functions, representative status and 
practical relationships with the broadcaster and the public seemed to me acute. 
Any notional revitalisation of our self-conception as a conduit for public 
sovereignty, would, however, have to occur in tandem with a strengthening of our 
own weak internal democracy. Over a series of meetings in early 2013, I proposed 
that we turn our focus towards developing permanent means of two-way 
communication with the public (insisting on a budget to do so) and enhancing 
our internal transparency and democratic credentials by opening up our 
meetings to public observers and democratising the means by which decisions 
are taken internally and the process by which new Council members are 
appointed. The unexpected resignation of the incumbent Chair not long after, 
coinciding with the unrelated departure of the Council’s administrative support 
and Secretary- both RTE staff- provided an unexpected opportunity to seriously 
consider such an agenda, and with the agreement to set up a subcommittee to 
consider these issues, initially it seemed as if the opportunity may be seized.  
 
Free for a moment of the stifling atmosphere of officious formality, the 
interregnum saw formerly silent Council members suddenly find their voice, 
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articulating various frustrations with the operation of the Council to date. It was 
a moment ripe for change, exemplified by the sudden concession of the granting 
of a budget (although the caveat that money would be made available for 
‘appropriate projects’ made it clear that the purse-strings were not under our 
control), the group’s agreements to seek participation in the process of selecting 
a new chairperson (rather than simply have one imposed from above) and to 
convene an externally-facilitated meeting to assist us in a dialogic process around 
how we wanted to proceed as a Council for the remainder of our term in office. 
 
The first sign that this burgeoning process of self-examination and democratic 
renewal might yet be stillborn came with the sudden revelation that a new 
Chairperson had been appointed by the Board. In the light of our express desire 
to be involved in our own governance, the failure of the Board to even 
acknowledge this request felt like a new nadir. The identity of the new Chair- a 
public relations professional, senior staff member of a prestigious research 
institution, and an occasional presenter and contributor to RTÉ programmes- 
seemed to me motivated by the familiar strategy of deploying an “authoritative” 
individual who would suitably mediate the relationship between the Board and 
the Council in a way amenable to the Board’s vision. 
 
It soon became clear that the new appointee was likely to live up to this initial 
appraisal. Early acts of individually meeting Council members in the Chair’s 
workplace and subsequent effort to veto the agreed panel for the forthcoming 
public event suggested a swift return to an executive style of governance. An 
explicitly espoused intent to quickly initiate a programme of activities for the 
remainder of our term seemed likely to derail the possibility of a reflective 
process enabling us to move beyond the customs and practices of the previous 
regime. 
 
The organisation, process and outcome of the facilitated meeting, when it took 
place after the Council’s summer recess, was an abject disappointment. Rather 
than an informal, deliberative process to encourage collective reflection and 
decision-making, the event reflected a range of conservative organisational 
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imperatives. It took place in the same venue as usual, around the same table, with 
the only differences being the presence of a facilitator and the benefit of one extra 
hour. Even the selection of the facilitator was problematic, as someone who was 
not fully independent, but closely associated with RTÉ and employed by them for 
other similar duties. 
 
While the omens were not good, the first half of the meeting nonetheless 
contained a robust and well-facilitated discussion of a broad range of matters, 
both systemic and otherwise. With time running out, and Council members still 
outlining their views on the function and operations of the Council, the Chairman 
made a strong intervention to the effect that a concrete work plan needed to be 
established there and then. This plan, built almost solely around the Chair’s idea 
of bringing specifically targeted groups into dialogue with RTÉ decision-makers, 
was not one I was opposed to in principle (even if it did embody a rather 
conservative conception of controlled participation), but this seemed to be at the 
expense of engaging in consideration of the structural matters identified above. 
The Chair’s position that the Council would wait until the end of its term, after 
having accrued ‘credibility’ with the Board before seeking structural changes was 
one that was never formally adopted but, aided by the absence of a clear decision 
rule clarifying the criteria for agreements, it proved impossible to challenge what 
the Chairman had decided was an emergent ‘consensus’. 
 
The Chair’s control of the agenda, accruing on the basis of the Standing Orders, 
was subsequently used to prevent any challenge to, or even clarification of the 
ambiguities of consensus decision-making, by arbitrarily refusing both my 
requests for a discussion at a subsequent meeting in which the Council would 
make a formal determination on when we planned to address “structural”’ 
matters pertaining to the Council’s internal operation, as well as a subsequent 
request for an agenda item in which we our decision-making procedures could 
be clarified.  
 
Other unilateral efforts to control the flow of Council communications further 
undercut the possibilities of change.  
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An effort by the Chair- quickly dropped- was made to end the practice of open 
email communication between Council members including the Chair. Later, a 
final opportunity existed in early 2014 for the Audience Council to communicate 
with the relevant Minister under the legislatively-mandated annual report 
mechanism. When I reminded the Council that such a report would need to be 
submitted in the near future, we were informed that the report was already 
written. While eventually circulated within the group for comment, my insistence 
that the text should be collectively agreed rather than presented as a fait accompli 
was met with a stony silence. 
 
In another demonstration of the way in which executive decisions were both 
made and passively legitimated by other members, the scheduling of the final 
legislatively mandated annual joint RTÉ Board-Audience Council meeting in 2014 
to coincide with the final meeting of the extant RTÉ Board was undertaken 
without Council participation. Given that the manifest purpose of this meeting 
was to solicit feedback on our recently-completed projects and identify practical 
avenues of influence within RTÉ, the fact that the Board would be dissolved 
immediately following this meeting demonstrably undermined such a goal. It 
would also mean that the Council would not meet the incoming Board before our 
own dissolution, thus impeding the possibilities of pursuing an agenda of internal 
structural reform which would require the assent of the new Board. Efforts to 
secure a re-appraisal of the scheduling decision on the basis of a group consensus 
were simply refused by the Chair. My decision not to attend, explained in a note 
to the Board, did not elicit a response; nor did my subsequent resignation from a 
new subcommittee charged with making recommendations on structural matters 
generate internal concern. This latter action was taken following the Chair’s 
decision to arbitrarily “appoint” (again acting outside their authority) another 
Council member- with no prior demonstrable interest in internal reform- to lead 
the effort. 
 
The text that emerged from a subsequent process on internal “reform”, which I 
did not endorse, focused almost exclusively on formalising, codifying and copper-
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fastening the existing subordinate status of the Council’s relationship with the 
Board. Each of the document’s four recommendations called on RTÉ to devise 
new protocols and arrangements for governing the Council. Three of these were 
non-substantive in character, explicitly leaving it up to RTÉ to decide what was 
best for the Council. The one substantive recommendation called for an open 
public competition for Audience Council appointments and rolling appointments 
to ensure a balance between change and continuity of membership. 
 
In its orientation toward legitimising pre-existing power relations, its de-
emphasis of Audience Council participation in defining its own future, and its 
neoliberal language of ‘best practice’ (bewildering in the context of a paucity of 
comparable participatory structures from which to draw lessons from), the 
document represented a conservative and deferential conclusion to the Audience 
Council’s term of office, offering a blank cheque to an institution that had for a 
decade successfully prevented the Council structure from developing an internal 
culture of autonomy and independent thinking. 
 
The reward for both this deference and the longer-run reticence of the Council to 
assert an independent voice was for RTÉ to allow the Audience Council to fall into 
abeyance for half a year following the dissolution of our group at the end of our 
term at the end of 2014, and the decision to appoint a new Council (once again 
headed by a public relations professional) without any continuity with the 
previous Council membership, thus preventing the possibility of the transfer of 
experiences between Council memberships. It was a response that exposed the 
cynicism of both the broadcaster’s insistence that it valued the Council’s 
contributions as well as the Council’s “strategy” of obsequiousness as a means of 
securing “credibility” that would result in concessions.  
 
It is easy to locate much of the responsibility for the conservative orientation of 
the Audience Council in the Chairs that RTÉ had very deliberately appointed. The 
figures of the patrician and later the PR man represented different establishment 
ideologies about the proper place of the public and how a Council of the public 
should comport itself, but both were complementary in practice. Both men 
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assumed leadership roles commensurate with both the institutional hierarchy 
and their own position in the strata of society, and both could be fully trusted to 
manage the Audience Council. While the patrician used every rule in the (self-
written) rulebook, the PR man knew that rules were but one means of exerting 
power, displaying deft interpersonal skills to control a room, placate a dissenting 
voice, and when all else failed, simply ignoring dissent- in the end, equally 
successful in helping to suppress radical impulses before they had a chance to 
sprout. Both had a gift with language, corralling together a “consensus” of a sort, 
and both expertly used the ambiguities of decision-making to their advantage. 
One was a paternalist with high ideals and the other was a pragmatist whose 
desire for expediency masked an absence of vision, but neither evinced a great 
concern with egalitarian decision-making. Both exerted control via a range of 
practices with the silent support of the RTÉ institutional apparatus which 
unquestioningly accepted the assumed authority of the Chair to unilaterally 
undertake a range of actions. These ranged from composing Ministerial reports 
and holding private, unminuted meetings with senior RTÉ staff on Council 
business to the more prosaic act of supervising the authoring and publication of 
communiqués on the Council website which were routinely and alarmingly 
airbrushed of contention, to the point where a whole series of significant 
decisions and actions remained off the public record.  
 
Ultimately, however, the assumed patrimonial authority of the Chair was only 
possible with the complicity of ordinary members. Such an outcome was ensured 
mostly in advance, through a screening process that filtered out potentially 
unruly participants, with the well-intentioned impulses of those who remained 
diluted by the contrived ambiguities around the Council’s legitimacy and 
functions which made compliance with the agendas of strong Chairpersons and 
the conservative, secretive and elitist practices of the administrative apparatus 
far easier than the exhausting prospect of going against the institutional grain.  
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8.3 Conclusion 
 
Fig. 8-2: Ladder of participation. Source: Arnstein (1969: 217) 
 
In ‘A Ladder of Citizen Participation’, Arnstein (1969) presents a useful means of 
categorising mechanisms of citizen participation according to their power 
dynamics (Fig. 8-2). The ‘ladder’ referred to here consists of three main 
categories- ‘non-participation’, ‘tokenism’ and ‘citizen power’- each of which 
contain a number of levels and which can be readily applied to assess the 
participative qualities of the Audience Council. 
 
The foot of the ladder represents illusory modes of participation. ‘Non-
participation’, characterised by ‘manipulation’ and ‘therapy’ is motivated by a 
desire on the part of power-holders to engineer consent by creating a ‘public 
relations vehicle’ (ibid: 218) that has, for the benefit of participants and critical 
onlookers alike, the appearance of participation but without the substance which 
might threaten existing power relations. In its more ‘dishonest and arrogant’ 
(ibid) form, ‘therapeutic’ modes of participation involve powerholders enlisting 
the participatory group in initiatives which aim at rehabilitating powerholders 
and directly serving their interests. 
 
Arnstein provides the example of Citizen Advisory Committees ostensibly set up 
to give some members of the public a say in housing policy in U.S cities, arguing 
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that they reflected both a manipulative and therapeutic agenda insofar as ‘it was 
the officials who educated, persuaded, and advised the citizens, not the reverse’ 
(ibid: 218). The manipulative dimension was evident in the way that the 
functions of the committees were legitimised using terms like ‘information-
gathering’, ‘public relations’ and ‘support’ (ibid). 
 
The emphasis for much of the Audience Council’s tenure on inviting RTÉ 
executives to meetings to be informed on their work constituted a form of “self-
therapy”, insofar as it sensitised the Council to the work of senior RTÉ 
management as described by management themselves. More generally, like in 
Arnstein’s account of Citizen Advisory Committees, Council members were 
constantly exposed to the explanations and advice of institutional elites, not 
citizens. And like the CACs, while the Council’s functions were carefully 
legitimated on a similar “advisory” basis, the Council was nonetheless cited by 
RTÉ as evidence of its openness to the public (indeed, justified on that basis prior 
to its establishment). The Audience Council’s ultimate decision not to propose 
substantive self-reform but merely to hand the baton to RTÉ to reform it in any 
way the Board saw fit also represented an example of self-therapy. Furthermore, 
that some members repeatedly expressed a desire for RTÉ to better utilise the 
Council as a ‘focus group’ suggests a desire for self-instrumentalisation. The focus 
group format, described by Crouch (2000) as ‘entirely in the control of its 
organisers’ who ‘select the participants, the issues, and the way in which they are 
to be discussed and the outcome analysed’ may be seen as reflecting on the 
difficulties of asserting public agency in a time of post-democracy, wherein at 
least parts of the public are ‘confused and passive in developing its own agenda’.  
 
Arnstein’s category of ‘tokenism’ at the centre of the ladder incorporates a range 
of activities- ‘informing’, ‘consultation’ and ‘placation’- that have as their defining 
characteristic the possibility of engagement with power-holders, but without the 
‘muscle’ (ibid: 217) to follow through with change.  
 
A great deal of the experience of the Audience Council fits into this middle tier. 
RTÉ’s sharing of internal information on the organisation (on the basis of 
 265 
 
confidentiality) and tendency to merely inform the Council of decisions taken on 
its behalf represent notable examples of the first tendency. Repeated failures to 
consult the Council both on internal Council matters as well as on broader 
organisational matters such as strategic reviews and other statutory reporting 
requirements led to some Council members questioning the organisation’s 
commitment to even maintaining the facade of a tokenistic participative 
approach.  
 
‘Placation’ was frequently deployed, notably in the commissioning of The Media 
Show and the belated decision to grant us a budget, but in both cases the limits of 
our ability to seek influence on the programme or develop a programme of 
activities independently of RTÉ were sharply constrained. Elsewhere, the 
accoutrements of power and influence, including the efficient reimbursement of 
travel expenses, secretarial support, annual meetings with the Board (peppered 
with effusive expressions of praise of the Council’s work) and breakfast at a local 
five-star luxury hotel had placatory functions of a different kind. 
 
The category of ‘citizen power’ encompasses scenarios where the ‘decision-
making clout’ (ibid) of citizens is far more substantive. At the lower level of this 
part of the ladder, ‘partnership’, citizens ‘negotiate and engage in trade-offs’ 
(ibid) with power holders. At the top of the ladder, the levels of ‘delegated power’ 
and ‘citizen control’ denote situations where the distinction between ‘citizens’ 
and ‘powerholders’ has blurred to the point that the citizens have become 
powerholders in their own right, and can assert decision-making authority in 
relation to substantive issues including the very structures in which they 
participate.  
 
In the case of the Audience Council, measures of citizen power are embedded in 
a number of ways via the broadcasting legislation, which allows it to compel RTÉ 
to undertake a small number of specific activities. However, these are rather 
minor powers that do not threaten broader power relations, and whose discharge 
was in any event profoundly delimited by the cumulative effect of the 
manipulative and therapeutic tendencies described above.  
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Overall, the participative qualities of the Audience Council reflect the dominance 
of a combination of the non-participative and tokenistic levels in Arnstein’s 
typology, where, in line with Pateman’s (1970: 70) conception of ‘partial’ 
participation, most power rested firmly with the parent institution. The 
administration of regular doses of therapy via the deployment of various forms 
of soft and hard power meant that the opportunities which did exist for the 
Audience Council to prise open the door leading to citizen power were recoiled 
from rather than embraced. The Council’s vague remit, voluntary status of 
participants, internal marginalisation and co-option into a compliant orientation 
toward the institutional order stunted its development and rendered it unable to 
mature into an autonomous yet semi-institutional source of public power.   
 
Treatment of the Council was entirely consistent with the minimalist character of 
modes of structural participation practiced elsewhere in the organisation and 
indicative of a pervasive desire to prevent lay influence from becoming 
established.   
 
If, as Hartley (2002: 11) puts it, ‘the audience is a construction motivated by the 
paradigm in which it is imagined’, then the character of RTÉ’s involvement of 
audiences suggests that rather than a material presence in the organisation and 
a partner in the project of public media, the public are instead principally 
conceived of principally as providing the institution with economic and 
legitimating resources accrued through rationalised systems of measurement.  
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Chapter 9: Public Service Broadcasting’s 
Democratic Imaginary: A Reconstruction 
 
Such responsible journalism rests on the belief that society will, through the 
institutions of Parliament, cure itself of ills which are brought to its attention.  
          (British Broadcasting Corporation, 1974) 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
Part I of this dissertation explored aspects of the general normative character of  
(northwest European) public service broadcasting. Particular attention was paid 
to identifying, first, the powerfully formative nature of its relationships in the 
field of power dominated by the state and market, and second, the configurations 
of institutional legitimating ideologies and professional habitus that shape and 
set the parameters of PSB’s discursive roles in the political public sphere.  
 
Explorations of its historical imbrication in nation-building, linkages between 
development of political and media systems (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) and 
association with normative press theories (Christians et al., 2009) helped identify 
public service broadcasting’s normative framework- including in Ireland- as 
predominantly liberal in character and inflected with a communitarian strand of 
republicanism. This aligns with a contemporary strand of liberal functionalism 
that identifies a key role of public service broadcasting as engendering various 
forms of political, cultural and social integration (Curran, 2002: 134-6, Cardiff 
and Scannell, 1987, Carey, 1992). 
 
It was concluded that the hegemonic tendencies inherent to the public service 
broadcasting project are subject to particularly intense activation in the Republic 
of Ireland. Here, a broadly conservative political culture, restrictive 
communicative opportunities and poorly developed critical political traditions 
have bequeathed to public service broadcasting a limited political and discursive 
opportunity structure that was likely to delimit its autonomous critical capacities. 
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The four chapters in Part II deployed a range of methodologies- ethnographic 
observation, interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation- in an 
empirical inquiry into how the political, economic and cultural forces bearing on 
public service broadcasting from without were mediated by institutional and 
professional cultures from within, shaping its hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
tendencies and capacities. 
 
This concluding chapter draws on the key findings from the foregoing analyses 
and reconnects them with the project’s theoretical concerns. First, the empirical 
findings are interpreted in the service of offering a more precise delineation of 
the implicit and explicit normative models of democracy, democratic 
communication and publicity that characterise Irish public service broadcasting. 
Following this, the counter-hegemonic capacities of this democratic model are 
explored, with a particular focus on the specific circumstances of the 
contemporary crisis of democratic capitalism. Some concluding observations are 
made on the implications of this for public service broadcasting’s adequacy as a 
venue of democratic communication and its future. 
 
9.2 Locating Irish public service broadcasting’s place in politics 
 
9.2.1 Reconstructing Irish PSB’s political role 
 
Bringing empirical findings into dialogue with the implicit and explicit claims of 
normative democratic theory stimulates exploration of a broader range of 
questions, including how institutional and professional media practices and 
ideologies view the roles and capacities of citizens, the responsiveness of the 
political process, institutional accountability, and accounts of legitimacy, 
authority and modes of decision-making that prescribe how the public sphere 
should operate in ‘actually existing democracies’ (Ferree et al., 2002a: 289). 
 
First, institutional and journalistic practices and perspectives about the proper 
role of the public in public broadcasting are explored, encompassing public 
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participation both through and in media, in the forms of on-air participative 
opportunities as well as around production and organisational decision-making 
(Carpentier, 2011: 67-8). This is followed by a broader discussion on the logics of 
representation underlying RTÉ’s practices of discursive inclusion in broadcasting. 
Data shedding light on RTÉ’s role in the nation, state and understandings of crisis 
is then critically engaged with, preceding some concluding comments on the 
overall democratic model suggested by the project’s empirical findings. 
 
9.2.2 Inclusion through participation 
 
Data gathered from newsroom observations, staff interviews and participant-
observation within the RTÉ Audience Council all pointed toward a normatively-
legitimated marginalisation of the public from more direct forms of intervention 
in broadcasting matters.  
 
While an abstract, ‘imagined’ public (Cottle, 2003: 11) enjoyed a high rhetorical 
status, and its assumed interests, mores and attention spans played a substantial 
role in orientating daily professional practice, they appeared in practical form 
mostly in terms of informal and semi-informal contacts between journalists and 
members of the public. The paucity of public opinion invoked during 
ethnographic observations of three months of editorial meetings suggested its 
practical marginalisation to daily newswork, while an entrenched aversion to 
public participation in broadcasting was expressed in interviews. This was 
justified on the basis of jaundiced and often paternalistic views of the assumed 
capacities and preferences of the audience. Circumscribed or no participation at 
all was broadly seen as a prerequisite for the healthy discharge of RTE’s public 
functions, for which the preservation of journalistic autonomy was seen as 
crucial. Clear opportunities during 2012 for the organisation to facilitate public 
involvement in debate about public broadcasting passed without effort to do so 
(these included the commemorative programme for fifty years of Irish television 
as well as the fallout from the Mission to Prey affair). Being appropriately 
responsive to audiences was, generally, reframed in and confined to the 
technological terms of reacting nimbly to changing news consumption patterns. 
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More broadly, the analysis of historical and extant modes of structural 
participation in the broadcaster suggested that participative opportunities- 
including community-produced programming, programmes facilitating public 
comment on RTÉ, public gatherings, consultations, audience research, and modes 
of internal and regulatory accountability generally represent minimalist forms of 
inclusion. By and large, these have either been abandoned or are highly 
circumscribed or purely instrumental modes of participation that cede little or 
no power to individual or organised publics.  
 
The extended analysis of the RTÉ Audience Council as the principal formalised 
means of structural intervention by the public in the broadcaster found an 
extension rather than a break with this weakly participative ethos. It was found 
that the Council, across its multiple incarnations, has been subjected on an 
ongoing basis to numerous modes of endogenous and exogenous disciplinary 
power that actively sought to neutralise its potential evolution into a more 
autonomous source of public power within the organisation. At its worst, its 
management corresponded to a manipulative mode of participation (Strauss, 
1998: 18). 
 
That the most securely institutionalised form of public opinion- audience 
research- involves, above all, the commodified measurement of audience viewing 
habits in the form of Nielsen rating units underlines the extent to which publics 
may intervene only as a depoliticised mass of consumers. Through such 
processes, audiences are instrumentalised as a resource for schedule calibration 
and the currency of advertising rather than as publics with whom public media 
has dialogic responsibilities.  
 
In the same vein, a propensity to use mostly quantitative ratings data and 
measures of satisfaction and trust gathered from intermittent market research 
surveys (e.g. PwC, 2013: 49-50) as proxies for public approval and thus the key 
resource of ongoing institutional legitimacy is further indicative of an aversion to 
two-way communicative relationships with the public and indicative of a clear 
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desire to maintain “trust” as the basis of the relationship between public 
broadcasting and the public. 
 
Such zealous institutional and professional boundary-management corresponds 
to liberal pessimism about the practicality of securing stronger forms of 
democratic consent of the governed. This is indicative both of the grip of 
neoliberal practices of corporate governance and restrictive conceptions of 
democracy, for whom corporate “transparency” and political and regulatory 
oversight- not public power-sharing- is sufficiently democratic. Like the liberal 
state, public service broadcasting elevates the public as its sine qua non but 
confines its input as much as possible. 
 
A clear affinity may be identified here with democratic elitism, a Schumpeterian 
variation of liberal democratic theory that posits a ‘pessimistic understanding of 
the political capacities of citizens’ (O’Mahony, 2013: 121) and rejects popular 
sovereignty on the basis of their lack of interest and competence. This suggests a 
conception of the public denuded of publicity: a mass of private individuals who, 
on the basis of their limited deliberative and reasoning capacities, are seen as 
incapable of discharging what political philosopher John Rawls (1997) described 
as ‘public reason’ (see also O’Mahony, 2013: 49-70) a framework of deliberation 
about matters of public concern. 
 
Conversely, by virtue of their assumed status as ‘socially unattached 
intelligentsia’ (Mannheim, 1936) and on the basis of a normative professional 
conception of trusteeship, journalists, seen as sitting above the fray of ideology 
and conflict, are qualified to disinterestedly manage the public sphere on behalf 
of the public. 
 
9.2.3 Inclusion through representation 
 
Newsroom observations from editorial meetings demonstrated how a singular 
focus on the national parliament as the locus of political activity clearly identified 
the formal political system and its accredited participants as the basis of RTÉ’s 
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means of organising political representation in news and current affairs. 
 
Much of the editorial frustration observed and reported by staff during the 2012 
Fiscal Treaty referendum emanated from a view that a disservice was done to 
democracy by the assumption of a legal necessity to accord equal treatment to 
both sides. The resultant journalistic “agoraphobia” (Carpentier, 2007: 157) 
engendered by the expanded actor involvement provoked an enhanced desire to 
police debate both substantively and in terms of access. Interview data confirmed 
a broad consensus around a representational mode in which RTÉ’s mediation of 
the political is essentially circumscribed by prior electoral outcomes.  
 
This deference to the structuring role of formal politics in representational 
accreditation co-existed with a desire to play an (albeit circumscribed) 
autonomous agenda-setting role detached from the political core. This pointed to 
the existence of a secondary, more pluralistic set of journalistic representational 
logics that leavened the dominance of formal political actors with a ‘relief 
mechanism’ (O’Mahony, 2013: 127) in which organised social interests 
contributed to a broader ‘pressure system’ (Cobb and Elder, 1971: 896) acting on 
institutionalised politics.  
 
Demonstrative of a liberal pluralist outlook, this secondary sphere of 
representation- occupied by pressure groups and lobbyists, unions, 
representative bodies, and campaigners- affords journalists and editors greater 
autonomy to selectively open the sluice gate (Peters, 1993, 2007) of media access, 
granting agenda-building power to a wider array of actors.  
 
However, evidence that groups seeking to complement rather than supplant 
formal parliamentary politics are likely to find an easier path to media 
representation is suggested by interview data dismissing the legitimacy of 
contentious street politics on the basis of a lack of electoral mandate and their 
challenge to legitimate authority: an incompatibility with dominant principles of 
media inclusion that also mitigates against the representation of political 
outsiders in general on the basis of anxieties over representativeness, 
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newsworthiness and concerns over the practicalities of expanding access to less 
credentialed actors. 
 
“Access” programming, with the Liveline radio phone-in programme the chief 
exemplar, suggests the existence of a tertiary mode of inclusion that 
accommodates public voices directly, and is demonstrative of a less elitist, highly 
controlled and more participatory and raucous type of discursive environment. 
Yet, that programming of this kind is both limited in volume and its agendas are 
in the main ghettoised from those considered the proper purview of 
programming under the rubric of News and Current Affairs suggests their 
subordinate and auxiliary status within RTÉ’s broader political role. 
 
This three-level representative model may be viewed as reflecting adherence to 
the variation of liberal democratic theory described by Ferree et al. (2002a: 290) 
as representative liberalism. A sub-set of liberal theory, closely related to 
democratic elitism, this posits the desirability of ‘citizens to be passive, quiescent, 
and limited in their political participation in a well-functioning, party-led 
democracy’ (ibid: 291). 
 
With the public sphere geared towards ‘strengthening a system of formal 
representation through political parties’ (ibid: 290), the logic by which a standard 
of ‘elite dominance’ (ibid: 291) legitimises the status of formal political actors at 
the top of the representational hierarchy is clear. Just as they have won 
‘legitimate domination’ (O’Mahony, 2013: 112) of the state and government on 
the basis of the ‘open mandate’ principle of liberal theory (Habermas, 1994: 8), 
governmental figures are also granted the right of representative domination in 
the public sphere. 
 
With representative inclusion derived from electoral strength or organisational 
size, the public sphere ‘legitimately excludes those ideas held by small minorities’ 
(Ferree et al., 2002a: 293), with the onus placed on social interests to organise 
and put forward “legitimate” representatives. 
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Rather than active participants in deliberative processes, individual citizens are 
rather more minimally conceived as “undecided voters” who, after being assisted 
by the media’s provision of information and facilitation of debate, discharge a 
‘solitary process of reflection, a kind of private deliberation’ (Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996: 37 in O’Mahony, 2013: 59) in the sanctity of the ballot box. In 
so doing, they delegate their authority to the victor(s), after which ‘the public is 
by and large excluded from ongoing processes of justification’ (O’Mahony, 2013: 
65).  
 
The ‘dialogue of the informed’ (Ferree et al., 2002a: 292) sought by adherents of 
representative liberalism and democratic elitism emphasises, alongside formal 
status as the basis of representation, the value of expertise- preferably the at least 
nominally disinterested kind. This criterion of discursive inclusion reflects a 
concern to ‘guide officials toward more knowledgeable choices’ (ibid: 293). With 
efficacy a key concern of representative liberalism, open-ended debate is seen as 
a threat to the ability of the political process to ‘meet citizen needs effectively’ 
(ibid: 294). The norm of closure (ibid), linked above all to parliamentary decision-
making, accomplishes the curtailment of media discussion on issues, preceding 
the raising of new and different issues.  
 
For Habermas (1994: 7), liberalism is far more concerned with the ‘output of 
sensible and effective administrative accomplishments’ than with the input of 
‘democratic self-determination of deliberating citizens’ in processes of rational 
political will-formation. On this account, political efficacy is also threatened by 
too much public inclusion in public discourse, because it may complicate matters 
by ‘politicizing and oversimplifying complex problems that require skilled 
leadership and technical expertise’ (Ferree et al., 2002a: 292). 
 
Like RTÉ’s participative practices, the restricted representation model reflects a 
realist (O’Mahony, 2013: 113) strain of liberalism- a ‘liberalism without illusions’ 
(ibid: 114) that implicitly denies the possibility of strong consent of the governed.  
On this account, politics takes the form of competitive struggles between rival 
party groupings for power. For electorates, their voting choices reflect a kind of 
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democracy of the Schumpeterian ‘consumer sovereignty’ (ibid: 119) variety. The 
normative reach of public political communication is consequently diminished, 
confined to maintaining ‘minimal and formal procedural rules that protect the 
integrity of politics as a competitive, electoral struggle’ (ibid: 110). Such a 
‘disillusioned realism’ (ibid: 121) ascribes a low standing to ‘the idea and ideals 
of a communicative politics’ (ibid: 118), dispenses entirely with a ‘normative 
politics of popular sovereignty’ (ibid: 126) and denies the public a normative 
significance beyond ‘selecting and deselecting the rule of alternative coalitions of 
elites and supportive experts’ (ibid: 121).  
 
O’Mahony (2013: 127) adds that the ‘relief mechanism’ of ‘pluralism as interest 
intermediation’ captured in the secondary and tertiary modes of representation 
discussed above, allows ‘for ongoing inputs from the private sphere and civil 
society’ that mitigates against the formal political system’s capacity to effect 
discursive closure. Although entailing a tacit, albeit partial recognition of the 
inadequacies of the problem-solving capacities of the political core, the 
delegitimisation of contentious extra-parliamentary political actors from this 
representative logic means that it may be seen as representing only a modest 
moderation of the representative model’s overall elitist thrust, Indeed, such a 
moderation may even be functional for the reproduction of both media and 
political systems, insofar as it permits some opportunities for critical discourses 
to emerge from below that lend credence to liberal democracy’s pluralistic self-
image. 
 
9.2.4 PSB, nation and state 
 
Irish public service broadcasting’s liberal moment may be captured in its 
restricted public participative opportunities, a representative model that 
allocates access to the political public sphere on the principal basis of electorally-
achieved legitimacy, and whose overall journalistic mediation is governed by 
professional ideologies around objectivity, impartiality and balance. 
 
Yet, the empirical findings suggest the co-existence of an expanded political role 
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that pushes beyond merely supporting the operation of representative 
democracy towards a higher-order orientation to the national community.  
 
Findings in relation to the everyday journalistic and institutional navigation of 
political life (as well as in periods of crisis) suggest the existence of a liberalism 
inflected by republican logics, a political philosophy which above all, ‘affirms, 
while liberalism denies, the notion of a statewide, substantive common interest 
or good’ (Michelman, 1989: 445). 
 
Newsroom observations suggest the existence of an institutionalised caution that 
is linked in part to a sense of responsibility accruing from its place in the state 
and dominance in the Irish political public sphere (F. Corcoran, 2004: 91). 
Observations suggest it is born in part of a natural deference to established state 
and cultural institutions and an awareness of the demographic and spatial 
breadth of audiences. It is exemplified in the aversion to giving offence to subsets 
of viewers, a marked desire to avoid journalistic prurience, and a heightened 
sensitivity to actual and hypothetical legal implications of journalistic work. 
 
Analysis of historic editorial meeting minutes during the early years of the 
economic crisis revealed an acute senior editorial sensitisation to RTÉ’s assumed 
responsibilities that demonstrate the extent of internal attunement to RTÉ’s 
ability to harm or safeguard the national interest through its reportage. This 
concern for the stability of the state appeared to extend beyond mere concern for 
the consequences of attracting unwanted political scrutiny for errant or unduly 
critical reporting.  
 
Interview data affirming the broadcaster’s role in promoting public morale 
(albeit not at the expense of journalistic truth-telling) was further suggestive of 
the adoption of a role in supporting the national community through implicit and 
explicit support for national economic recovery strategies. Such an orientation is 
latent in a proliferation of “news features” and general “good news” stories and 
is more explicit in programming initiatives around tourism (exemplified by 
participation in ‘The Gathering’ tourism initiative in 2013), regional development 
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(e.g. the ‘Local Heroes’ project), entrepreneurship and a broader institutional 
alignment with national development policy, particularly in relation to science 
and technology (see Curran, 2011: 28, RTÉ, 2015b). This isomorphism with state 
policy suggests a ready acceptance of a role in promoting national economic 
recovery along the parameters established by the political core. This inevitably 
entails the interpellation of publics as national subjects, invited to enlist in 
particularistic projects of nation rebuilding. 
 
Further evidence of an extra-liberal national communitarian tendency is 
provided by the range of integrative ‘media events’ (Dayan and Katz, 1992, 
Freedman, 2014) undertaken during the period of observation. Observations of 
varied, often extensive planning for a range of events- including the British 
Queen’s Diamond Jubilee, the 50th Catholic Eucharistic Congress, and the visits 
of Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the Olympic torch to Ireland- 
represented discretionary or quasi-discretionary activities by the newsroom that 
reflected a clear desire to act as national integrator though the provision of 
coverage and even organisation of media events. 
 
That there are occasions- principally, “events of state” (including the visits of 
foreign dignitaries, commemorations, sporting events and national festivals)- 
when the suspension of the ordinarily sacred rules of journalistic engagement is 
seen as appropriate, in favour of a broadcast journalism ‘of record’ (Golding, 
1981: 71) is indicative of the limits of RTÉ’s liberalism. On such occasions, the 
event’s ‘manifest’ (Dayan and Katz, 1992: 47) meanings- as decreed by the 
principal organiser- are upheld, as the broadcaster ‘only rarely intervenes with 
analysis and almost never with criticism’ (ibid: 8). It is strongly suggestive of the 
institutional diffusion of a higher-order orientation to an imagined national 
community and unitary national identity with the state at its centre (Kelly and 
O’Connor, 1997: 13, Kelly and Rolston, 1995). An explicit affirmation of this may 
be seen in the broadcaster’s current five-year strategy RTÉ (2013a: 87) and 2010 
Public Service Statement (RTÉ, 2010: 4). 
 
‘[P]erformative rites’ Elliot (1980) of this kind, described as ‘ceremonial politics’ 
 279 
 
by Dayan and Katz (1992: viii) serve to express ‘the yearning for togetherness’, a 
direct antidote to the ‘pluralism, argumentation, and the management of 
competing interests’ (ibid) associated with parliamentary politics.  
 
The extent to which such an integrative role is institutionally naturalised is 
indicated both by interview and observational data suggesting support and 
enthusiasm for these events and the fact that the planning and enactment of these 
events is a key competence and source of prestige of the newsroom as opposed 
to non-journalistic programming. 
 
In a similar vein, the large organisational mobilisation that generated a media 
spectacle both before, during and after voting on the Fiscal Treaty referendum in 
2012 demonstrated the institutional significance of these kind of ‘sacerdotal’ 
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995) events and associated ‘media rituals’ (Couldry, 
2003) which attest to their symbolic significance in public service broadcasting’s 
interpretation of its democratic mission. 
 
That the logistics and content of these events are frequently co-operatively 
organised between RTÉ and agencies of the state demonstrates overlap between 
the logics of “public” and “state” broadcasting, and suggests that the imperative 
to valourise liberal representative democracy does not end with protecting the 
sanctity of the practices of representation but involves a deeper affinity with the 
machinery and ideologies of the state (Curran, 2002: 137).  
 
9.2.5 Framing crisis 
 
A marked paucity of collective post-hoc reflection on journalistic work was noted 
during ethnographic observations, suggesting the existence of a stock of shared 
and perhaps stable assumptions around the practices and norms by which 
journalism was undertaken. This was supported by interview data which 
revealed a limited set of critical editorial response to crisis, suggestive of the 
resistance of the journalistic habitus to modification on the basis of changing 
external conditions. This was justified partly on the implicit basis that pre-crisis 
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failures of political leadership and accredited expertise (particularly economic) 
to predict the crash abrogated any specific responsibility for journalistic learning 
from the crash, and further justified on the explicit basis that professional 
journalism in RTÉ had a limited role to play in systemic critique at any time. 
 
Liberal and national communitarian logics may be seen to combine at a time of 
national economic and political crisis, suggestive of a PSB hegemonic “mission 
creep” from a mere culturally-focused identitarian nationalism and liberal 
valourisation of the formal political sphere to assisting in the stabilisation of the 
extant political-economic order. This is exemplified by how the reality of 
increased governmental surveillance on the newsroom during the height of the 
economic crisis was evidently internalised and rationalised not as unwanted 
external interference but as enhancing sensitisation to a particular, legitimate 
interpretation of RTÉ’s national responsibilities preferable to the state. 
 
Textual analyses of media frames evident in a range of episodes during the Euro 
debt crisis revealed crisis construals preferential to state crisis management in a 
range of ways, not least in the manner in which the “return of the political” in 
Greece and Italy was treated. This was exemplified by the abortive Greek 
referendum in 2011 on the country’s second bailout agreement and by a series of 
eventful parliamentary elections in both countries, where analysis of news texts 
pointed to a weak journalistic valuation of substantive democratic legitimacy and 
a preference for the assumed efficacy of the technocratic advantage of “keeping 
politics out” of crisis management.  
 
Framings of outcome evaluation positively assessed the cancellation of a 
referendum in Greece, hailed the subsequent resignations of two European prime 
ministers and heralded their technocratic replacements. They negatively framed 
the eventual subsequent electoral processes in both countries and expressed 
singular dismay at their ambiguous outcomes. This is suggestive of a journalistic 
susceptibility to the ‘lure of technocracy’ (Habermas, 2015) and aversion to 
democratic contestation of top-down crisis management agendas. 
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This impression was reinforced by the amplification of the voices of political and 
business elites critical of the incumbent Greek and Italian prime ministers. These, 
along with their electorates and left-wing oppositions, were pathologised and 
granted restrictive voice and interpretive agency. The tendency to act as a conduit 
for elite anxieties meant that other categories of potentially critical voices in 
Europe and Ireland were rendered invisible.  
 
The preoccupation with “stability” (implicitly defined as coterminous with the 
smooth implementation of neoliberal and technocratic crisis management) 
extended to the manner in which the episodes of crisis were localised and made 
salient to Irish audiences. This manifested in linking Italian and Greek compliance 
with European crisis management with Ireland’s national interests. The portrayal 
of “recovery” and “stability” as only possible within the confines of market-
backed neoliberal crisis management regimes represented interpretations of 
crisis that colluded with the anti-democratic statecraft deployed against both 
countries. 
 
The legitimisation of a headlong rush towards a post-democratic Europe aligns 
the news framings of the Euro crisis with a radicalised version of political realism, 
reflecting a pessimistic view of the possibilities of democratic solutions to 
structural political-economic problems. Its radicalism is exemplified by the 
manner in which the exigencies of crisis saw liberal democracy’s sacerdotal 
treatment of sovereignty- popular sovereignty in elections and referenda, and 
national sovereignty exercised by governments- displaced by the realist 
legitimisation of market sovereignty and supranational domination and the 
coercive imposition of order. This ready alignment with Irish and European crisis 
management on the basis of national economic interest is demonstrative of the 
statism and nationalism to which Irish republicanism has been historically tied 
(Delanty, 2003: 38). 
 
Interview data on another topic of crisis- climate change- suggested that its 
subordinate status and intermittent salience on RTÉ news agendas (Cullinane 
and Watson, 2014) was a function of a perceived lack of consonance with classic 
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news values, lack of relevance to Irish audiences (and journalists) and its 
“politicised” nature. This appears to render it an issue complex which many 
journalists neither wanted nor felt able to elevate on news agendas. This suggests 
a journalistic awareness that thematising a topic as an urgent “crisis” is 
predicated on extrinsic issue attributes. 
 
Efforts on the part of the author to internally raise and challenge the marginalised 
status of climate change and cognate issues through the vehicle of the Audience 
Council was met by the broadcaster with obstruction, stonewalling and 
ambiguity (see Chapter 8). This provided clear evidence of the serious 
impediments faced by publics in engendering critical internal engagement with 
PSB practices, whether in the form of substantive dialogue or even provoking 
justifications- even where pursued through an institutionalised, statutory 
mechanism of public participation nominally designed for such purposes. 
 
9.2.6 RTÉ’s democratic composite 
 
This interpretation of the project’s empirical findings suggest a composite set of 
political roles played by public service broadcasting in Ireland. At once a tool of 
parliamentary democracy’s self-valourisation, a discursive venue of the political 
public sphere, and a rallying point for a shared national identity, an overall 
conception of democracy and publicity broadly in line with elitist, restrictive 
versions of liberalism and suffused with a national communitarianism may be 
discerned. 
 
In particular, the low valuation of popular sovereignty in favour of the legitimate 
dominance of responsible elites renders public service broadcasting’s orientation 
toward (structural and discursive) public inclusion isomorphic with restrictive, 
classical conceptions of normative liberal democratic traditions that reflect a 
pessimism both about the desirability and capacity of citizens to play an 
expansive participatory role. 
 
On the basis of the empirical findings, the public occupy may be seen to occupy a 
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dual normative status: on one hand, reflected in professional and institutional 
rhetoric as raison d’etre and sine qua non of public service broadcasting 
celebrating the public as owner, paymaster, audience and ultimate source of 
legitimacy; and on the other, discouraged or precluded from strong forms of 
inclusion on normative and pragmatic grounds, maintained through the erection 
of professional and institutional-bureaucratic barriers. 
 
The normative affinity with representative liberalism (Ferree et al., 2002a) aligns 
with Scannell’s (1989: 163-4) description of PSB’s democratic orientation in 
which power accrues ‘to the representatives, not those whom they represent’. 
Playing an ‘impartial brokerage’ role between competing (political) parties 
(Smith in Negrine, 1994: 104), the public sphere is imagined principally in terms 
of a ‘support system for institutionalised politics’ (Carpentier, 2011: 68). This 
corresponds to Benhabib’s (1996: 75, cited in O’Mahony, 2013: 58) observation 
in relation to Rawlsian liberalism that the public sphere ‘is not located in civil 
society but in the state and its organizations’ (italics in original). This is 
demonstrative of how the PSB settlement with the state- the trade of autonomy 
for responsibility- dovetails with journalistic ideologies of inclusion.  
 
RTÉ’s liberalism may be seen to extend in some republican directions, evident in 
a Rawlsian social liberal/civic republican moment that ‘emphasises national 
citizenship, attaches importance to a collective ethos that gives rise to a sense of 
justice, and is committed to a relatively strong version of social equality’ 
(O'Mahony, 2013: 67). This is further exemplified by evidence of a dialogic 
orientation whose accredited participants extend some way beyond the 
strictures of formal political arenas and other validated sources of public reason. 
This, however, is ultimately subordinate to the closure and elitism of its dominant 
liberal moment, in addition to evincing what Habermas (1994: 4) calls a 
‘communitarian reading’ associated with modern republicanism, entailing an 
‘ethical constriction of political discourse’ on the basis of the assumed existence 
of the national community’s shared, settled ethical consensus. 
 
Liberalism, however, does not provide the resources necessary for the realisation 
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of the integrative role of the ‘harmony model’ (Butler, 1991: 100) of public service 
broadcasting, described by White (1996: 211) as its tendency to draw the public 
into ‘a national political, economic and sociocultural ‘superunity’, in part through 
adopting the role of celebrant and guardian of cultural heritage and historical 
memory (see also Delanty, 2003: 28). Empirical evidence supports the existence 
of a substantive national integrative role that is politically as well as culturally 
focused. Just as Devereux (1996: 283) argued that the broadcaster’s coverage of 
poverty tended to uphold and obscure asymmetric power relations, this project’s 
frame analysis suggests how a national communitarian tendency elides 
thematisation of interest conflicts in part through the collapsing of government 
interest into Irish national interest. 
 
This composite democratic model- in which the discursive moments of liberalism 
and republicanism are diminished- is congruent with the desires of a 
professionalised journalism under the influence of trustee and social 
responsibility normative models, for which an emphasis on popular sovereignty 
and political authority generated by communicatively-produced citizen power 
(Habermas, 1994: 2) is repugnant. It suggests a vision of the public sphere 
amenable to the state, characterised as it is by a preference for ‘instrumental’ 
rather than ‘dialogical’ political activity, in Habermas’ (1994: 6) ideal-typical 
scheme, and ‘strategic’ rather than ‘deliberative’ in Michelman’s (1989: 489).  
 
It is a democratic orientation that conceptualises publicity and democracy in line 
with both Fraser’s ‘weak’ rather than ‘strong’ publics (1990: 75), whose 
‘deliberative practice consists exclusively in opinion-formation and does not also 
encompass decision-making’, and Barber’s (1984) conception of ‘thin’ rather 
than ‘thick’ democracy. 
 
Insofar as such a democratic role is more concerned with national social 
integration and supporting procedurally-legitimated forms of political authority 
along the aggregative lines of liberal pluralism and secured by electoral processes 
rather than a strongly discursively justified social order, a clear compatibility and 
normative isomorphism may also be identified between RTE’s democratic model 
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and Ireland’s cultural model. 
 
Under the influence of a communitarianism that ‘reduces culture to an underlying 
consensus’ (Delanty, 2003: 29) and which supports a restricted view of political 
conflict under representative liberalism, PSB is poorly placed to mitigate against 
the consensus pathologies present in Irish political culture discussed in Chapter 
3. Indeed, it is a democratic orientation susceptible to going with the flow of elite 
consensus, exemplified over time both in its original role in nation-building and 
a contemporary role in nation re-building. 
 
In the following section, the implications of this democratic model for RTE’s 
relationship with hegemonic power- particularly that pertaining to the present 
crisis- is explored in greater depth. 
 
9.3 Assessing RTE’s counter-hegemonic capacities    
 
How media institutions imagine and practice a democratic role inevitably shapes 
the character of their interventions in the terrain of politics, in turn affecting the 
type and extent of the public sphere’s critical capacities.  
 
Recognising that the stability of a hegemonic order is sustained less by the quality 
of its justifications or ability to secure value consensus and more by the 
efficacious shutting out of alternatives ‘at the very point where oppositional 
attitudes could be translated into political action’ (Thompson, 1984: 63, see also 
Bauman, 2001: 11), the question of the extent to which the practices of Irish 
public media facilitate the gestation and airing of pluralistic, counter-hegemonic 
discourses is of central importance to the research question. 
 
This is explored below firstly with reference to the pluralistic affordances and 
constraints of RTÉ’s democratic model and secondly how these hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic tendencies are reshaped by occasions of crisis, particularly 
its contemporary instantiations. 
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The implications of the political opportunity structure associated with elitist, 
procedurally-focused models of democracy and publicity can be explored with 
reference to their impact on the discursive opportunity structure, implications 
for processes of social learning, and how political legitimacy is measured and 
evaluated.  
 
9.3.1 Liberal democracy, neoliberalism and pluralism 
 
It has already been demonstrated that RTÉ’s democratic model promotes a 
variegated responsiveness to agendas emanating from different social spheres 
and institutional arenas. This has major implications for agenda-building 
processes, both in terms of issue thematisation and actor representation. It is 
argued here that this embeds restrictions on pluralism that circumscribe the 
possibilities of agenda-building from below. 
 
The moderate pluralism called for by RTÉ’s model of communicative democracy 
places a strong emphasis on representational mechanisms- whether in or outside 
of the formal political sphere- as an adequate means of ensuring that ‘no 
significant strand of thought is ignored or under-represented’ (RTE, 2012c: 5). 
However, in granting the status of “full” political actor only to accredited 
participants in the formal machinery of democracy, public broadcasting is 
tethered to the outputs and logics- including opportunity structures and systemic 
biases- of the domestic political system. 
 
It may be demonstrated that this generates a powerful incumbency bias. Cobb 
and Elder (1971: 902) observe that ‘[s]ince the existing bias of a political system 
both reflects and legitimizes the prevailing balance of power among organized 
groups, it follows that the range and type of issues and alternatives considered 
will represent the interests and most salient concerns of previously legitimized 
political forces’. A lag built into representative systems means that ‘old issues will 
always tend to command the most prominent positions in formal political 
deliberations’ (ibid). This inertia makes it ‘extremely difficult to change the 
prevailing bias that determines which issues and alternatives are viewed as 
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legitimate concerns of the polity’ (ibid).  
 
In a context where political parties have grown increasingly aloof from public 
involvement and demands (Mair, 2013: 76), increasing the extent to which an 
increasingly autonomous formal political sphere exerts power by organising 
‘some issues… into politics while others are organised out’ (Schattschneider, 
1960: 71), the inaccuracy of the assumption built into PSB’s democratic model 
that the outputs of the formal political sphere represent the organised expression 
of popular political will exposes the inadequacy of its procedural basis of 
legitimation. 
 
An outcome of this is that neither formal political nor media agendas ‘accurately 
reflect the basic conflicts throughout society’ (Cobb and Elder, 1971: 897). It 
promotes what Gamson (1968: 18) describes as a system of ‘stable 
unrepresentation’ in which ‘the normal operation of the political system serves 
to amplify the power of those groups who already possess it’. Institutional 
agendas are thus poorly attuned to respond to ‘new demands, particularly those 
of disadvantaged or deprived groups’ (Cobb and Elder, 1971: 910). 
 
Public media’s auxiliary tiers of representation, while facilitating representation 
from outside the political core, only partially mitigates this incumbency bias. 
Owing in part to its bureaucratic affinity, journalism displays an enhanced 
sensitivity to groups tethered to systemic logics- ‘power-regulated’ (vermachtete) 
actors (Ferree et al., 2002a: 300), characterised by ‘formal bureaucratic relations 
of hierarchy’. For Habermas (in Ferree et al., 2002a: 300-1) a devaluation of 
autonomous (autochtone) actors closer to the ‘life-world of citizens’ involves a 
significant loss to the public sphere’s pluralistic and critical capacities 
(Habermas, 1996: 485). This is so not least in light of Skocpol’s (2003) account of 
diminished popular involvement not just in political parties but in other formally 
representative civic organisations. 
 
Members of the public- occupying the lowest tier of the representative model- are 
generally excluded on both the normative grounds of their lack of standing and 
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thus irrelevance to political programming, and on the practical grounds of the 
difficulties in accommodating large numbers of participants in mediated 
broadcast discourse. Consequently, the public is consigned for the most part to 
de-politicised roles in news and current affairs programming (Lewis, Inthorn and 
Wahl-Jorgensen, 2005: 84) or ghettoised within the adjunct sub-public sphere of 
access programming. 
 
The alignment of the discursive opportunity structure with the political 
opportunity structure means that public media’s practices of inclusion poorly 
mitigates against the political system’s systemic biases. By attributing a low 
epistemic value to non-institutional and subaltern voices, the possibilities of 
agenda-building from below are attenuated. 
 
They are reduced further still by how public service broadcasting’s democratic 
model embeds restrictive potentialities for major innovations in collective or 
social learning on a structural and systemic level (Eder, 1996, O’Mahony, 2010, 
Miller, 2002). Social learning theory recognises the significance of processes of 
supra-individual- even societal- levels of learning that shape social change, and 
concerns ‘the exploration of existing and new standards of learning of social 
responsibility among groups, organisations and communities in conditions which 
are new, unexpected, uncertain and hard to predict’ (Wildemeersch and Jansen, 
1997).  
 
RTÉ’s commitment to an elite public sphere whose moral-ethical centre of gravity 
is constrained by prior electoral outcomes rather than discursively-generated on 
an ongoing basis, in addition to its legitimate dominance by representatives of 
the formal political sphere and accredited sources of public reason implies a 
particular relationship to social change. This has been identified by Cobb and 
Elder (1971: 912) as characterised by a tentative, piecemeal ‘politics of 
accommodation’ that ‘permits incremental response to new demands and slow 
but ordered social change’. They charge elite democratic theories with saying 
‘little about the prospects for major social innovation within a democratic 
framework’ (ibid: 913).  
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RTÉ’s structural insulation from the public, professional norms of impartiality, 
technological constraints of one-to-many broadcasting and a weakly discursive 
model of public communication all reduce the opportunities for learning to 
proceed on a bottom-up basis. 
 
Geared towards maintaining system stability, the inertia and time lag implied in 
learning process and responses to demands makes the extant political-economic 
order more static and resistant to change. By granting incumbent powers, ‘as 
primary definers’ (Hall et al., 1978: 58) the power to shape the opportunity 
structure in ways that privilege its interests- including by pre-emptively 
neutralising and canalising potential opposition (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 44 
in Cobb and Elder, 1971: 904)- we may also identify this democratic model as 
entailing a conservative thrust that promotes the blocking of learning 
opportunities generated by times of crisis. 
 
It may be further argued that liberalism’s ambiguous commitment to pluralism 
and political contestation renders it (and media ideologies and practices that 
follow its logics) susceptible to a normative hollowing-out under conditions of 
neoliberal hegemony. For Brown (2015: 205) this is rooted in liberal democracy’s 
long-established contradictions: while rhetorically foregrounding universalist 
ideals of ‘personhood, freedom and equality’, it has nonetheless been ‘saturated 
with capitalist powers and values’, working to secure the ‘power and privileges 
of the socially dominant’ and ‘consecrating [...] ‘private property and capital 
rights’. 
 
Liberalism’s desire for a consensual ‘politics without adversary’ (Mouffe, 2005: 
54), or as Laclau (2005: 48) puts it, a scenario in which ‘politics is replaced by 
administration and the traces of social division disappear’- in effect, a politics 
without politics- finds a close stablemate in neoliberal reason. Its anti-political 
desire, for Brown (2015: 68) aims to ‘replace the atomization and individual of 
classical liberalism’ with ‘political integration and consensus’. This is undertaken 
through the ‘pursuit of the disenchantment of politics by economics’ Davies 
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(2014: 19), with ‘democratic political principles of justice’ (Brown, 2015: 42) 
transposed ‘into an economic idiom’ in a manner whose hostility to politics 
radically recasts their meaning. 
 
For Brown (2015: 9), neoliberalisation’s effects on the radical components of the 
liberal democratic imaginary are grave. The process fundamentally ‘assaults the 
principles, practices, cultures, subjects, and institutions of democracy understood 
as rule by the people’. With publicity already restricted under democratic elitism, 
neoliberalism challenges the ‘very idea of a public, including citizenship beyond 
membership’ (ibid: 39), and whose ‘de-democratising’ (Brown, 2006: 703) 
tendencies include the devaluation of public autonomy and the depoliticisation 
of social problems. 
 
Under neoliberalisation, post-democratic regressions where ‘the energy and 
innovative drive pass away from the democratic arena and into small circles of a 
politico-economic elite’ (Crouch, 2013) may be reconceptualised as a radicalised 
expression of liberalism’s extant anti-political drive. The extant technocratic 
affinity of liberalism is suggested by Zakaria (2007: 20-1) who notes that 
‘constitutional liberalism’- the ‘Western model’ of governance- has always been 
‘best symbolized not by the mass plebiscite but the impartial judge’. Liberalism’s 
political aversions and susceptibility to neoliberal incorporation may be seen to 
amplified by the Irish cultural model, whose conservative and authoritarian 
tendencies represent propitious territory for such a process. 
 
9.3.2 Legitimacy and legitimation crisis 
 
For those who ‘are often unable to convert their demands for change into 
important political issues’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 105), the latent 
legitimation crisis of contemporary democratic politics may manifest as and 
contribute to the anomic behaviours of ‘despair, frustration, and anger’ (Cobb and 
Elder, 1971: 913, see also Streeck, 2011: 27). Because liberal democracy’s criteria 
for political legitimacy are premised on the procedural terms of open-ended 
mandates accruing from governing majorities won at intermittent elections, such 
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symptoms may not however engender ameliorative political change even if 
broadly diffused among the populace.  
 
Indeed, under the influence of a democratic elitism primarily concerned with 
‘stable’ and ‘effective’ government (Cobb and Elder, 1971: 894) symptoms of a 
germinating latent legitimacy crisis may be interpreted in the obverse. Indicators 
of anomie such as low electoral turnouts may be interpreted as evidence of 
general satisfaction rather than as a withdrawal of legitimacy, while more 
“active” signs like organised responses to social conflicts including “old” and 
“new” social movements may be seen as illegitimate ‘disruptive influences’ (ibid: 
899) which threaten the efficacy of governance or even liberal democracy itself.  
 
For elite democratic theory, a notional contemporary “crisis of democracy” is 
more likely to be located in the ‘excess of democracy’ identified by the Trilateral 
Commission (Crozier, Huntingdon and Watanuki, 1975: 113) which has 
engendered ‘an overload of demands on government, exceeding its capacity to 
respond’ (ibid: 8) (see also O’Mahony, 2013: 124, Luhmann, 2000). This view 
holds that well-functioning democracy relies on maintaining a safe distance from 
the vagaries of public demands, and that strictly representative systems of 
government with weak participative mechanisms and slack modes of public 
responsiveness are more conducive to system stability (see also Fukuyama, 
2014: 26). Such justifications may be seen for the same reasons as holding an 
appeal to professionalised media institutions- particularly PSB institutions- keen 
to fend off calls for greater participation from below.  
 
9.3.3 Populist challenges to liberal democracy 
 
Liberal democracy’s non-discursive criteria of political legitimacy are thus poorly 
attuned toward the recognition of threats to its legitimacy arising from within its 
borders. Yet, political activity in the form of the populist mode of political 
identification represents such a challenge to the legitimacy of liberal democracy 
in its depoliticised, technocratic register. 
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Despite representing a form of political activity whose content potentially offers 
a powerful source of critique necessary for democratic renewal, here too, liberal 
democracy and institutions of the public sphere parasitic on its representative, 
participatory and cultural logics tend towards self-immunisation to the learning 
possibilities contained therein. 
 
The relevance of this to the contemporary crisis of representation is established 
by the resonances of Laclau’s (2005: 38) description of populism’s ideal 
germinating ground as situations ‘in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and 
an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially 
coexist’. For Panizza (2005: 12) it is linked to an ‘exhaustion of political traditions 
and the discrediting of political parties’- in short, wherever there is a ‘perception 
of betrayal of the democratic promise’ (Fieschi, 2012). 
 
Populist discourses of the left or right may be prompted by a broad range of 
perceived democratic pathologies (Cuperus, in Titley, 2014: 12, see also 
Hayward, 1996; Canovan, 1999, Lasch, 1995) and ‘operate within a social space 
in which people have grievances, desires, needs and wants that have not yet been 
constituted as political demands’ (Panizza, 2005: 10). 
 
At the heart of populism’s challenge to liberal democracy is an ‘anti-institutional 
character’, which implies a profound ‘short circuit in the relation between 
demands put to the “system” and the ability of the latter to meet them’ (Laclau, 
2005: 38, italics in original). Linked to this, by foregrounding ‘the sovereignty of 
the people and its inevitable corollary, the conflict between the powerful and the 
powerless’, (Panizza. 2005: 4) populism shatters the mode of ‘authorisation’ by 
which the representative may speak for the represented (Arditi, 2005: 83). 
 
By directly challenging ‘liberalism’s illusion of pluralism without antagonism’ 
(Panizza, 2005: 28), populism represents a direct threat to public service 
broadcasting’s consensual, integrative mission. Whereas PSB tends to conceal 
social conflict through the unifying power of a shared symbolic affinity with the 
nation (Hall, 1977, in Curran, 2002: 138), populism prevents any such 
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‘reconciliation of the community’ (Arditi, 2005: 93). 
 
Recalling Arendt’s distinction (1970: 52) that ‘[l]egitimacy, when challenged, 
bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies 
in the future’, populism’s abrogation of liberalism’s ‘table manners’ (Arditi, 2005: 
90) by advancing a forward-looking conception of legitimacy based on ethicised 
criteria of justification presents a profound challenge to liberal democracy’s 
model of authority. It interrupts the closure of liberal democracy ‘as a gentrified 
or domesticated political order by overlooking standing procedures, institutional 
relations, comforting rituals’ (ibid)- particularly threatening to public service 
broadcasting, perhaps the acme of the gentrified public sphere (Negt and Kluge, 
1993: 96).  
 
The elitist component to the public broadcasting democratic model and 
conception of publicity is rooted in ‘often mutually contradictory visions of the 
people’ (Panizza, 2005: 16) as simultaneously endowed with democratic rights, 
yet given to dangerous and irrational passions (ibid). This renders it hostile to 
the populist desire for the realisation of popular sovereignty.  
 
Populism’s thematisation of social fissures and demands for a new regime of 
justification beyond representation or expertise threatens the consensual ground 
required for professional precepts of objectivity and balance to retain their 
plausibility. Consequently, it brings into question the ability of media 
professionals to retain their authority as legitimate mediators of and gatekeepers 
of access to the public sphere. To accede to populist demands portends the 
irrelevance of responsible elites (including media elites); all the easier to erect a 
cordon sanitaire (Mouffe, 2005: 59) around all forms of populism, ignoring or 
corralling it into respectable modes. 
 
The demands of nascent or established radical oppositional voices and 
movements are therefore less likely to be seen as signs of democratic vitality than 
as inchoate ressentiment, demagoguery, or even sources of subversion. In this 
way, the opportunity presented by crises of representation to provoke ‘the 
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emergence of modes of identification that seek to bridge the gap between 
representatives and the represented in the name of the people’ (Panizza, 2005: 
14) is arrested.  
 
9.3.4 Political/economic crises and RTÉ’s political role 
 
At times of political and/or economic crisis, incumbent powers are likely to 
continue to benefit from their structural advantages in the public sphere: 
enjoying representative dominance and power of discursive closure in the public 
sphere, and benefiting from the weak normative basis limiting the capacity of 
journalism to subject state crisis responses to substantively enhanced standards 
of justification. 
 
Factors relating to the entrenched genres, formats and routines of news 
production, the technical constraints of a one-way broadcasting model, limited 
practical capacities for radically-expanded actor involvement and the tyranny of 
programme schedules all restrain PSB’s ability to respond to crisis in innovative, 
discursively expansive ways.  
 
Indeed, there are political-economic and technical-professional reasons to see 
that occasions of crisis may, depending on their complexion, afford incumbent 
powers enhanced opportunities for navigating the crisis on preferential 
discursive terms. The expansion of political surveillance, as in recent years 
(McGee and Kelly, 2015, Corcoran, 2008), with its concomitant background 
threat of governmental retribution (National Treasury Management Agency, 
2014: 164) in case of perceived transgressions against its interests may be 
assumed to increase pressure on the broadcaster to hold the line on existing 
thematisation and representational models and mitigate against occasions of 
crisis engendering significant changes in media practices. 
 
Furthermore, owing to Irish PSB’s dependence on advertising income, any crisis 
entailing a decline in economic activity is likely to result in an adverse effect on 
the broadcaster’s finances, reducing its capacity for investment, future planning, 
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inhibiting the likelihood of structural or programming innovations, and in cases 
of sharp or prolonged economic downturn, filtering down in the form of cutbacks 
in pay, staff levels and internal journalistic resources.  
 
9.3.5 Crisis in neoliberalism 
 
Given the status of the regional and domestic manifestations of the North Atlantic 
Financial Crisis as representing a crisis in neoliberalism itself, the question of 
public service broadcasting’s critical potentialities is more acute still. This is all 
the more pressing a question in Ireland given that the Irish instantiation of crisis 
entailed a crisis not only in its developmental model but in its principal political 
rationality (Brown, 2015: 30). 
 
It is argued here that a further set of systemic logics have come into play that 
amplify the general protective role played by public broadcasting toward the 
extant political-economic configuration and its dominant ideologies, which 
collectively serve to prevent a crisis in neoliberalism becoming thematised as a 
crisis of neoliberalism. This is attributable to a range of factors both endogenous 
to public service broadcasting and exogenously arising from the interaction 
between crisis logics and the field of power to which PSB is subject. 
 
In assessing the counter-hegemonic capacity of public service broadcasting’s 
response to contemporary crisis, the question of its ability to repoliticise crisis 
construals and crisis responses is particularly crucial. This is related to how the 
present crisis is bound up in a phase of capitalist development whose enhanced 
opacity and complexity occludes the play of interests involved and whose 
transnational battlefields are becoming ‘ever more remote from popular politics’ 
(Streeck, 2011: 27). This means that whether the ‘fundamental contradiction 
between the interests of capital markets and those of voters’ (Streeck, 2012: 63) 
is made manifest to publics- a prerequisite for counter-mobilisations- depends in 
part on their mediated journalistic representation. The likelihood of such 
contradictions being crystallised is mitigated against by how neoliberalism’s 
crisis accelerates its debasement of the liberal political imagination, with knock-
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on effects for public service broadcasting. 
 
While liberalism needs politics (which are ‘functional for the system’ (Cobb and 
Elder, 1971: 895), neoliberalism merely requires rules- specifically, a ‘rule-bound 
economic policy, with protection of markets and property rights constitutionally 
enshrined against discretionary political interference’ (Streeck, 2011: 7). The 
need for rules and aversion to politics is radicalised by its post-2008 ‘contingent’ 
(Davies, 2014) or ‘zombie’ (Peck, 2010) phase in which financialised capitalism 
has required increasingly authoritarian state interventions in order to survive. 
 
Having long colluded in ideological ‘dissimulation’ (Thompson, 1990: 290) by 
obscuring and denying asymmetrical power relations and interest conflicts, the 
strong activation of the liberal fear of ungovernability arising from the exigencies 
of crisis was always likely to ensure that public service broadcasting would not 
stand in the way of the establishment of a state of exception that paved the way 
for the post-2008 neoliberal entrenchment.  
 
A poor capacity to politicise neoliberal crisis responses may also be linked to an 
institutional affinity with neoliberal political rationality, crystallised both in the 
dual public/private funding model embedded at the broadcaster’s inception and 
its subsequent subjection to and internalisation of private sector management 
techniques and governance philosophies. These material aspects of PSB’s 
political economy help promote an institutional ‘mission drift’ (Brown, 2015: 
139) conducive to neoliberalisation. By reframing ‘the opposition or tension 
between government and the private sector (sovereign and market relations) 
with collaboration and complementarity’ (ibid: 126), an ideological atmosphere 
friendly to neoliberal radicalisation is promoted. 
 
This institutional affinity with neoliberalism finds further expression in its 
philosophy of publicity which conceives of its public principally in terms of silent 
audiences, economic units for advertising and scheduling purposes deprived of 
voice. Where a voice is given, as in the Audience Council structure, it is one 
thoroughly enculturated into neoliberal governmentality. The final act of the 
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Council of which I was part was the submission of a “best practices” advisory 
document that, far from seeking to assert an independent public voice, instead 
retreated to an explicit invitation to further instrumentalisation by its corporate 
parent (see Brown, 2015: 139 on the language of “best practices” as part of the 
lingua franca of neoliberal governance). This is exemplary of the outcome of such 
a denuded conception of publicity and indicative of the extent of the atrophy of 
democratic imagination encouraged by the institutional context. 
 
9.3.6 The political system and PSB’s national role 
 
RTÉ’s capacity and inclination to repoliticise neoliberal crisis management is also 
limited by the contingent political dynamics of crisis responses and the 
broadcaster’s national functions. 
 
Scannell (1990: 24) points out that historically, ‘governments claim the right to 
define the national interest and expect the broadcasters, particularly in a crisis, 
to uphold their definition of it’. This is likely to be all the more effective in Ireland 
given both the long-run conservative domination of parliament, and the fact that 
both coalition governments in place since 2008 (involving five parties of the Irish 
political mainstream) committed from an early stage to a generally consensual 
strategy of crisis management based around a negotiated compliance with capital 
and recuperating Ireland within its existing niche in the world economic system 
(see Chapter 1). 
 
The possibilities of re-politicisation were further mitigated by the restrictive 
discursive opportunities afforded by a parliamentary state of exception as 
various momentous decisions were taken outside the normal timeframes and 
procedures of debate and enacted with great rapidity, behind closed doors or in 
the dead of night- sometimes all at once. Although the timing and content of 
emergency actions was frequently and demonstrably attuned to the daily 
plebiscites of the stock and bond markets (Burns, 1999: 172), the model of 
democracy embedded in Irish PSB as observed in RTÉ by Golding and Elliott 
(1979: 197) promoted the thematic elision of the neoliberal capture of the state 
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and the exertion of power from exogenous, undemocratic sources (Honneth, 
2014: 326)- to say nothing of enhanced governmental surveillance on 
broadcasting at such occasions. 
 
A governmental invocation of a national existential crisis further discouraged the 
repoliticisation of crisis management. This was manifested most strongly in an 
all-embracing call to arms of the self-styled ‘Government of National Recovery’ 
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2011) of Fine Gael and Labour in 2011. Its 
espoused project of nation rebuilding that was ostensibly modernising, 
integrative, consensual and compassionate could hardly have been better 
attuned to resonate with public broadcasting’s institutional and professional 
ideologies. This inevitably not only activated the system-protective tendency 
embedded in RTÉ’s sub-constitutional role as an authoritative, integrative 
national voice, and all but forced it to expand this role into complicity with crisis 
management. 
 
These tendencies promote the effacement of crisis management as contingent 
choices that are politically and ideologically saturated. They are conducive to the 
legitimisation of governmental strategies to establish Ireland as a ‘special case’ 
nation deserving of clemency from creditors on the basis of its submission to 
capital and supranational institutions, while tending to discourage thematisation 
of the many negative domestic and transnational externalities of such crisis 
management (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 13) and the possibilities of solidaristic 
transnational alliances (most obviously, with other peripheral European nations) 
that challenged Europe’s accelerating post-democratic trajectory. 
 
The logic in Reith’s formulation in relation to Britain’s General Strike of 1926 
(quoted in Briggs, 1961: 365) that ‘since the B.B.C was a national institution, and 
since the Government in this crisis were acting for the people […] the B.B.C was 
for the Government in the crisis too’ crystallises too how Irish public service 
broadcasting’s place in the state shapes its understanding of authority, legitimacy 
and responsibility in ways that delimits its critical capacities. 
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9.3.7 Journalistic vulnerabilities to neoliberal crisis construals and responses 
 
A number of tendencies may be identified in the dominant demographic make-
up of the journalistic cohort and its political preferences- as well as normative 
orientations of the professional journalistic habitus- that are activated by crisis 
in ways that promote alignment with neoliberal rationality and crisis 
management. 
 
Just as the public service broadcasting institution of which they are part has much 
to lose from either thorough-going economic collapse or a crisis response that 
entailed a confrontation with capital, so too do a journalistic cohort dominated 
by the middle classes (M. Corcoran, 2004: 30). Whilst repugnant to journalism’s 
social liberal moment and paraideological attachment to ‘altruistic democracy 
and responsible capitalism’ (Gans, 1979: xviii) acceptance of Ireland’s crisis 
management trajectory- protective as it was of class privilege- was always likely, 
in part on the grounds of class membership.  
 
This acquiescence is further aided by the incorporation of social democratic 
parties in Ireland and elsewhere into the neoliberal consensus. This is highly 
consequential given their status as the closest political carriers of the values 
institutionalised in professional journalistic paraideology (M. Corcoran, 2004: 
30-7). The contemporary social democratic repudiation of radical, populist logics 
in favour of realignment ‘more or less exclusively with the middle classes’ 
(Mouffe, 2005: 55) and its somewhat reluctant embrace of neoliberal logics of 
crisis management as a merely pragmatic and modernising response to changing 
economic realities means that journalism’s adaptation to what Tariq Ali (2015) 
calls the ‘extreme centre’ is hastened. 
 
Journalistic susceptibility to naturalise neoliberal logics may be related to their 
form as well as their substance. By presenting itself as a ‘general pragmatics’, or 
‘reason itself’ (Dardot and Laval, 2013: 191, italics in original), neoliberalism 
masks itself as the only possible adaptation to modernity, standing above the fray 
of competing political ideologies- a tendency that further facilitates its 
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embedding as common sense. As an instrumental rationality par excellence 
(Brown, 2015: 119), neoliberalism may be viewed as a natural partner to liberal 
journalism’s professional norms. Its broad political diffusion, its aversion to 
questions of justice and substantive political conflict and its emphasis on 
technicised evaluative criteria make it well-suited to unproblematic 
incorporation into the dominant journalistic habitus.  
 
Indeed, its weakness for technocracy may even be seen to leave journalism under 
its influence positively disposed to the encroachment of external budgetary 
supervision. The intervention of the EU, ECB and IMF in the form of the 2010 
bailout agreement, promised an end to economic management engendered by the 
‘corrupt democratic opportunism’ (Streeck, 2011: 10) of Irish “civil war” politics, 
and whose neoliberal economics would be ‘non-political by definition’ (ibid). For 
the liberal journalistic habitus, perhaps, better the Troika than the populist or the 
clientelist. 
 
9.4 Overall conclusions 
 
This discussion on the implications for pluralism of Irish public service 
broadcasting’s conceptions of democracy and publicity has explored its inherent 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic tendencies and potentialities and how these 
are reshaped under conditions of neoliberal hegemony and the contemporary 
crisis of democratic capitalism. 
 
In the first instance, it is concluded that a democratic model dominated by elitist 
conceptions of democracy does not provide public service broadcasting with 
strong normative and legitimating resources for promoting the development of a 
radically pluralist public sphere. Normatively tethered to the outputs of formal 
political processes and its systemic biases, its bourgeois liberal institutional and 
professional habitus is oriented to misrecognise, sublimate and canalise anomic 
and populist modes of dissent arising from the disappointments of liberal 
democracy in general and with regard to the contemporary latent legitimation 
crisis in particular.  
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The pluralist potential of Irish public service broadcasting is further limited by 
the domestic cultural context, in which the already anaemic pluralist affordances 
of the Irish public sphere are attenuated by the consensus pathologies of Irish 
political culture (see Chapter 3). Spurred by the broad diffusion of neoliberal 
political rationality and a strong official ideology of nationalism and 
communitarianism, this reflects the contemporary dominance of a cultural model 
which exerts an anti-political force in the public sphere and political life. This 
hastens ‘the de-moralized and de-ethicized goals of the techno-conservative 
functionalization of all contexts of life’ (O’Mahony, 2014: 252). 
 
The weak counter-hegemonic capacities associated with public service 
broadcasting are compounded at times of political and economic crisis and 
accentuated by a crisis in neoliberalism represented by the contemporary crisis 
of democratic capitalism. A susceptibility to internalise, legitimise and naturalise 
neoliberal crisis construals and crisis responses is promoted by, inter alia, the 
already weak democratic commitments of the liberal imagination, whose idea of 
democracy as popular sovereignty is emaciated by a broadly diffused 
neoliberalisation, and institutional political-economic constraints which, 
strongly activated by crisis, promote an internalised neoliberal alignment. It is 
strengthened further still by statist and cultural identitarian affinities, which 
shackle it to essentialised, state-defined conceptions of “national interest” and 
support for its developmental projects, including recovery imaginaries, and 
sealed by a range of demographic and professional journalistic affinities with 
neoliberal rationality.  
 
All of this meant that while neoliberal hegemony was threatened by the necessity 
to “re-enchant” economics with politics in the form of massive sovereign 
interventions into the market economy (Davies, 2014), this was not enough to 
catalyse a normative reverse thrust strong enough to propel public service 
broadcasting’s emergence from beneath the shadow of its systemic biases (Cobb 
and Elder, 1971: 911). 
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Notionally, the global, regional and domestic instantiations and reverberations of 
the North Atlantic Financial Crisis prised open space for ‘determined strategic 
interventions to significantly redirect the course of events’ (Jessop, 2002: 92). 
While, as more than a falsifiable economic doctrine, the neoliberal rationality 
undergirding this phase of capitalist crisis was not likely to abolish itself at the 
moment of grand failure on its own terms, hegemonic economic imaginaries 
nonetheless required urgent repair if they were to remain intact and inform the 
basis of crisis responses. Because this repair would have to at least secure the 
compliance, if not the outright support of publics, the public sphere would be a 
key battleground for competing crisis construals. 
 
This chapter has marshalled evidence from the dissertation as a whole to argue 
that the contemporary crisis of democratic capitalism has provoked from Irish 
public service broadcasting a response that tends to support that very repair. It 
has done so by, on one hand, heightening public service broadcasting’s natural 
political agoraphobia and exacerbating its technocratic weakness. This reduced 
the space for political contestation and moral-ethical critique of crisis responses 
at the very moment when it was most necessary for counter-hegemonic collective 
learning. On the other, it has pressed public service broadcasting into applying 
‘therapy’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) to a weakened hegemonic structure, 
communicatively legitimating a state of exception and encouraging self-
enlistment into providing support for a programme of crisis management aimed 
at retasking the state (Peck, 2010, Mirowski, 2013) in support of saving and 
recuperating Irish capitalism.  
 
A key outcome of the current conjuncture has been what Colin Crouch (2011) 
describes as neoliberalism’s ‘strange non-death’, indeed the retrenchment of 
‘resilient neoliberalism’ (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013) and a radicalisation of its 
de-democratising tendencies (Mirowski, 2013). For its contribution to 
maintaining the ‘political manageability’ (Streeck, 2011: 24) of democratic 
capitalism’s contemporary crisis and retarding the development of a legitimation 
crisis, public service broadcasting must bear some of the responsibility for 
helping prevent the emergence of a ‘double movement’ (Polanyi, 1957) against 
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the liberation of the market from society. 
  
The character of public service broadcasting’s responses to and interventions in 
crisis are attributable to a range of endogenous and exogenous factors. These 
include the strength of the systemic logics and powers to which institutional 
public service broadcasting is constitutionally and normatively subject; an 
endogenous institutional and professional journalistic susceptibility to the lure 
of neoliberal reason’s technocratic promise and to the state’s justification 
narratives around crisis construal and responses; a generalised antipathy to 
contentious politics and a weakly discursive conception of political legitimacy; 
and the structural and normative marginalisation of the public within the public 
service broadcasting project as a whole, from which it inures itself to sources of 
democratic dynamism, critique and renewal. 
 
These conclusions allow for the argument to be made that Irish public service 
broadcasting’s political role is signally ill-suited to critically responding to the 
crisis of democratic capitalism and the attendant political project of neoliberal 
de-democratisation. 
 
Nancy Fraser’s (2014b) reading of Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis (1976) suggests 
that for the contemporary rationality crisis of financialised, globalised capitalism 
to develop into a legitimation crisis provoking a structural transformation of 
social organisation leading to democratisation engendering democratisation, 
certain enabling conditions in the type of subjectivities cultivated in public 
culture must exist.  
 
These include the capacity for subjects to conceive of themselves as a public for 
whom their collective subjection to globalised financial capitalism can become an 
‘object of common concern and public scrutiny’; and ability to identify and resist 
ideological projects inimical to democratisation. Also essential is the cultivation 
of a democratic imagination that exceeds the boundaries of the nation state and 
the ability to collectively insist on the imperatives of building ‘democratically 
accountable public power’ rather than resigning themselves to civic privatism 
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and weary self-subjection to the vicissitudes of arbitrary power. 
 
This thesis has suggested that by virtue of its collusion in the maintenance of 
repressive hegemonies, promotion of dissimulation of the causal agents and 
beneficiaries of crisis, along with the encouragement of an anhedonic submission 
to ‘capitalist realism’ (Fisher, 2009), public service broadcasting works against 
the cultivation of such democratic subjectivities. It may even be viewed as 
contributing to the ‘refeudalisation’ (Habermas, 1989: 236) of the public sphere, 
in which ‘leaders and parties routinely seek the acclamatory assent of a 
depoliticized population’ (Thompson, 1990: 113 in Livingstone and Lunt, 2002: 
19).  
 
Lacking the normative resources to expose the arrangements to which publics 
are collectively subject to strong standards of justification, its counter-hegemonic 
prefigurative capacity is sharply delimited. Without such prefiguration, and 
because ultimately, its elitist and technocratic affinity outweighs its commitment 
to a justified democratic order, it is bereft of responses to the crisis of political 
representation and the crisis of democratic capitalism, and cannot perform the 
role of ‘democratic dam against the colonizing encroachment of system 
imperatives on areas of the lifeworld’ (Habermas, 1992: 444).   
 
The sharp limits on public service broadcasting’s response to the crisis of 
democratic capitalism are partly attributable to a key constitutional feature: its 
strong tendency for publics to be seen to ‘correlate with modern territorial states 
and national imaginaries’ (Fraser, 2007: 10). While RTÉ (in common with other 
public service broadcasters under competitive pressures) increasingly looks 
outside of national borders for new audiences and revenue streams, its enduring 
ties to the nation state and national community as the locus of its normative 
imagination and solidaristic obligations tethers it to a register of ‘ethno-
nationalism’ (Appadurai, 2006: 4) that leaves it poorly positioned to respond to 
the contemporary ‘post-Westphalian’ (Fraser, 2007) political-economic order.  
 
In the context of democracy’s failure to keep ‘pace with capitalism’s race to the 
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global’ (Crouch, 2000: 20), the territorially-restricted basis of PSB’s national 
frame of address and recognition is highly consequential. It serves both to 
constrain the cosmopolitan imagination necessary for meaningful, sustained 
ethical engagement with any number of inter-related crises of a global character 
(whether poverty, inequality, climate change, large migratory flows, and other 
economic, social and democratic pathologies generated by capitalist and/or 
imperialist logics) and as such is incompatible with any notional project of 
building transnational public power capable of challenging conditions of post-
democracy. 
 
Viewing public service broadcasting’s democratic pathologies as part of the 
communicative wing of the broader crisis of democratic capitalism demands an 
attendant shift in how alternatives to its present constitution and political roles 
and functions are conceived.  
 
Responding to the scale of the disjuncture in representative democratic systems 
hastened and deepened by the crisis of democratic capitalism requires 
recognition of what Fenton and Titley (2015: 2) argue are the inadequacies of 
media-centric remedial responses to democratic pathologies that prescribe, for 
example, ‘more plurality, less concentration, better representation’ but are 
inattentive to the contemporary diminution of democratic agency (Gilbert, 2013) 
likely to render such solutions politically inefficacious. 
 
Critical democratic theories of the public sphere may be usefully to deployed to 
formulate an approach that is more responsive to the exigencies of the present 
moment.  Nancy Fraser’s (2007: 20) identification of the normative legitimacy and 
political efficacy of public opinion as foundational conceptual components of a 
democratic public sphere is demonstrative of such an approach that goes beyond 
media-centric foci and that fruitfully emphasises the public sphere’s two major 
ideal-typical functions as both a ‘space for the communicative generation of 
public opinion’ and ‘as a vehicle for marshaling public opinion as a political force’ 
(ibid: 8).   
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This thesis has shown how public service broadcasting’s institutional and 
professional complexes, dominant normative model of democracy and place in 
the field of power sharply attenuate its capacity to promote the realisation of 
either function. Yet if the project of realising a substantively democratic public 
sphere that can act as a countervailing force to the de-democratising tendencies 
of neoliberalised political and economic systems is to be taken seriously, then a 
new mission for public media is required at the heart of which is the pursuit of 
the democratisation of the public sphere both in and through the media (Wasko 
and Mosco, 1992: 7).  
 
Detailed discussion of this is well beyond the scope of these concluding 
comments, but such a project would aim toward the generation of autonomous, 
non-repressive public opinion and the catalysing of democratic futures. 
 
A ‘post-bourgeois’ (Fraser, 1990: 58) democratic and democratising 
rearticulation of the public sphere along these lines must be predicated on 
normative and practical innovations that promise a radicalisation of the criteria 
of normative legitimacy around the key conditions of inclusiveness and 
participation in the public sphere, and supported by transformations in the 
normative democratic model at the core of public media’s political role and 
democratic imagination. This will require a decisive rupture with both the 
‘established political mythology’ (Burns, 1999: 180) of elite liberal democracy, 
the ’Westphalian political imaginary’ (Fraser, 2007: 8) in which it is embedded, 
as well as major normative, practical and technical innovations in, inter alia, 
organisational form, mission, ethos, structure, ownership, funding and 
technological models as well as in professional roles, norms and participative 
practices. 
 
Such thoroughgoing transformations appear distant from the short to medium 
term institutional agenda for pursuing public service broadcasting reform in 
Ireland, which is focused in the main on more prosaic matters of its own survival, 
including the seeking of greater funding security (RTÉ, 2015d) and the 
consolidation of its competitive position in the Irish media market (RTÉ, 2013a). 
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Such a restricted agenda broadly reflects the priorities and relative stability of 
public service broadcasting’s modus vivendi in the field of power and suggests 
that the prospects are weak for an endogenously-sponsored project of 
transformation of public media’s place in the public sphere along the general lines 
proposed above. 
 
Where public service broadcasters speaks of hitting a ‘legitimacy barrier’ (F. 
Corcoran, 2004: 34, see also Hujanen, 2000: 76) threatening the sustainability of 
public funding if its audience shares fall beneath a certain threshold, a time of 
fomenting fissures in the legitimation of political authority and growing ‘crisis of 
relevance’ (Cobb and Elder, 1971: 898) of elitist liberal democracy heralds an 
altogether different threat to PSB’s legitimation, related to its material and 
normative location in the field of power. 
 
An institutionalised complacency about the quality and health of its public 
legitimacy- exemplified by the incumbent RTÉ Director General’s view that the 
present constitution of public service broadcasting in Ireland is ‘not some 
accident of history…but it is clearly the sovereign will of the Irish people’ (Curran, 
2011) may represent a more serious threat to its reproduction. 
 
This danger is closely related to public service broadcasting’s structural and 
normative marginalisation of its public. Denying it the right to communicate on 
the basis of collective shared ownership of the airwaves has the character of an 
auto-immune disorder, in which the body misrecognises and damages its own 
healthy tissues. Its persistence may yet engender the return of the repressed in 
the form of the excluded demos. 
 
The “safety valve” of a readily-evaded license fee (RTÉ, 2015c: 9), lack of media 
‘accountability activists’ (Blumler, 1992: 220) of either a liberal or critical kind 
and paucity of experiences of radically democratic media from which to draw 
have to date helped prevent Irish public service broadcasting from becoming a 
sustained target of mass dissent. However, if and when either the latent 
legitimation crisis which it has helped arrest takes hold, or an emboldened 
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neoliberalism pursues the destruction of its institutional shell in the interests of 
the greater liberation of capital, Irish public service broadcasting may find itself, 
like the everyman in Niemoller’s poem, unable to muster public support for its 
salvation.  
 
Public service broadcasting’s trade of relative autonomy for “responsibility” may 
yet leave it with neither. 
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Research Information Sheet 
 This research is being carried out by Mark Cullinane BSocSc, PhD candidate (Social Science) 
within the School of Sociology and Philosophy, University College Cork under the supervision 
of Dr. Ciaran McCullagh, Senior Lecturer in Sociology in UCC and President of the 
Sociological Association of Ireland. This project is funded by the Irish Research Council for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences under the Postgraduate Scholarship Scheme 2011-12. 
Introduction to Project 
This is no ordinary time: a series of complex economic, political, social and environmental 
crises abound, both at home and abroad. At its heart, this project is about exploring the role 
played by RTÉ News in Irish public life in influencing public understandings of these 
present challenges. Yet there is no simple consensus about the nature of these crises: 
indeed, the very basis of social reality has become highly contested, with various 
explanations, diagnoses and proposed solutions being offered by various competing groups. 
RTÉ, as Ireland's Public Service Broadcaster, is uniquely charged with producing news and 
current affairs coverage that must simultaneously serve a broad public whilst also adhering 
to legal obligations for impartiality and objectivity in news coverage.  
The challenge is clear: In this time of profound crisis, how do journalists working within the 
public service broadcasting framework produce news that captures the complexity (and 
uncertainty) of the many significant changes taking place in Ireland and the world, all the 
while remaining within the strictures of (a) their professional journalistic norms, (b) news 
programme formats, and (c) the institutional and legal context of RTÉ? The complexities 
and tensions of this task must be navigated by RTÉ journalists every day. 
The news and the public discourse it facilitates has long been identified as crucial to a 
functioning democracy. Yet most scholarly work on news has been focused only on 
examining the news broadcasts themselves, only occasionally involving the journalists 
which produce them, or indeed the audiences who watch and listen to them. This project 
seeks to remedy this by making central the perspectives of the journalists themselves. It is 
my personal hope that this work will contribute to a deepening of the relationship between 
RTÉ and its public by helping make sense of the many pressures, challenges and 
obligations- of a professional, legal and personal nature- associated with the task of 
producing public service broadcast news. 
Methodology 
My research methodology aims to holistically explore the dynamics of the whole 'circuit of 
mass communication', involving the triad of (a) news producers and the production context 
of news, (b) the news itself, and (c) the news audiences. It is towards the first two elements 
which my research period in RTÉ is oriented. From mid-April I will be on-site in RTÉ for a 
period of some weeks, during which I will take on the role of a non-participant observer.  I 
hope to witness the entire production cycle of news within the RTÉ newsroom, and with 
the express permission of individual journalists, I hope to shadow them- as unobtrusively 
and sensitively as possible- in order to understand the various decisions and choices that 
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they bring to bear on their work as a news item goes from an initial source to a final 
broadcast package. Beyond mere observation, and again depending on the willingness of 
staff to get involved, I hope to interview reporters, editors, production staff and 
management on a variety of topics, ranging from their understanding of public service 
broadcasting, their own professional roles, and the challenges of balancing various 
competing interests in the production of news content- whilst preserving the privacy, 
confidentiality and anonymity of RTÉ staff as outlined below. 
My central research method of ethnography is about understanding the world of a 
particular place or institution according to those involved. The 'expert' in this instance is 
not the researcher but those who work in RTÉ and thus understand it best. The key reason 
for my presence in RTÉ is simply to gain as rich and detailed a picture of the newsroom 
environment as possible, in an attempt to do justice to the complexity of their practices. Yet, 
it is important to note that ethnography does not purport to offer 'the last word' on its 
subject matter: this work is inevitably one of interpretation, and its final outcome depends 
on many contingent factors, not least of which are the particular events which take place 
during my stay and the unique personalities and experiences of those with whom I speak. It 
therefore aims to offer a (partial) snapshot in time of an organisation in the midst of its 
work. 
Following my time on-site in RTÉ, I will also be separately undertaking content analysis of 
news broadcasts, and engaging with RTÉ news audiences in the context of focus groups and 
individual discussions. It is anticipated that the completed project will be submitted in 
September 2014. In recognition of RTÉ's generosity in permitting me access to the 
organisation for this research, I am committed to offering to present my findings to 
interested RTÉ staff in a format preferable to them prior to my thesis' submission. 
Respecting Privacy and Anonymity 
As a work of sociology, this project is about exploring the social forces that impinge upon 
the professional lives of journalists and RTÉ staff. Therefore, although it is keenly interested 
in the individual, it is not necessary that individuals be identified. Indeed, no individuals will 
be named in any publications arising from this research unless permission is explicitly 
given. However, given the various sensitivities associated with doing research in an 
institutional setting like RTÉ where private information may be accessible to the 
researcher, and the fact that many of the individuals observed and spoken with may be 
frequently in the public eye, it is necessary to ensure that mutually acceptable measures are 
taken to ensure that privacy and anonymity (for both active participants and those who 
choose not to take part) are appropriately maintained. I have set out these procedures in 
more detail in a separate ethics document which I will make freely available. This document 
outlines the institutional and professional ethical framework by which I am bound, and 
details the measures I will take to ensure that any potential disruption caused by my 
presence is minimised, and that all data gathered is collected, stored and managed 
responsibly, safely and in line with best research practice.  
Further Information and Contact Details 
I understand that not all staff will want to get involved in this project. However I am keen to 
ensure that the information I provide is sufficient to allow potential participants to make an 
informed decision. Before, during and after my research period in RTÉ I will make myself 
available to speak with any member of staff regarding the project. All correspondence will 
be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
E-mail:    xxxxxxxxx        Postal address:                      xxx            
Telephone: xxxxxxx                                           xxx 
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Because interview discussion themes evolved significantly over the course of the 
ethnographic period and varied considerably according to the length of time available 
for interview, as well as incorporating bespoke questions designed for distinct 
professional roles and specialisms, this indicative, non-exhaustive sample interview 
schedule reflects a broad composite of questions used as topical starting points in 
interviews. The questions listed below are broadly thematically focused around the 
areas of journalistic understandings of crisis, professional responses to crisis, the 
adequacy of existing professional norms and practices in the light of crisis, how RTÉ's 
place in the state and political and economic fields shape the discharge of professional 
norms and practices, and existing and desired relationships with publics. 
 
Journalism and the crisis 
 
-Regarding the various complex crises currently playing themselves out at home 
and abroad- be they economic, political, social, or environmental- do you as a 
journalist feel equipped to make sense of them for yourself, let alone be able to 
communicate them succinctly and sensibly to your audiences? 
 
-In the context of a draining of authority of many sources of power in Irish society, 
do you think that journalism, within RTÉ or without, is similarly facing a crisis of 
authority? 
 
-Do you believe that RTÉ News is doing a good job in its coverage of these crises, 
and what does it mean to be doing a good job in this context? 
 
-Have recent crises engendered changes in journalistic practices, including for 
example the sources of expertise represented in programmes? 
 
-What impact if any have recent resource cuts had on RTÉ's journalism?  
 
Politics, journalistic norms and social change 
 
-In the context of these crises, do you feel that the parameters of debate as reflected 
in news programming are broad enough? In particular, do you feel that there are 
enough dissenting voices getting on air? 
 
-Do you believe that extra-parliamentary forms of politics are taken seriously 
enough by RTÉ? 
 
-What do you feel is, or should be, RTÉ's role towards the dominant social, political 
and economic orthodoxies of the day? Does RTÉ and its journalism have a brief to 
reflect society or to change it? 
 
-Is there a place for campaigning journalism? If so, on what kind of issues might a 
journalist here be able to campaign on? 
 
-Objectivity, impartiality, and balance are inscribed in law governing RTÉ News & 
Current Affairs output. Are these necessary principles for good journalism in a 
democratic society or do they constrain your work?  
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Audiences 
 
-The BBC has several initiatives in its news division, for example The Editors' online 
blog and the Newswatch TV programme, which give viewers a chance to engage 
with programme and decision-makers on coverage and which give editors an 
opportunity to explain their work. Do you believe that the RTÉ newsroom's existing 
formal and informal structures for communicating with the public are sufficient and 
appropriate? 
 
-The project of public service broadcasting since its inception has been linked to 
linear radio and television services broadcast to mass audiences. In the context of a 
proliferation of new media technologies, should public service media seek to 
transplant its existing ethos and practices into an online context, or is a broader 
transformation required in terms of genres, formats and participative opportunities 
for audiences? 
 
-RTÉ since its foundation has been suffused with both public service and 
commercial imperatives. On the one hand, the authors of Sit Down and Be Counted 
criticised this arrangement because of what they viewed as the negative impacts of 
advertising on audiences and its effects on the kinds of programming produced. On 
the other hand, there is the argument articulated by the RTÉ Director General Noel 
Curran in 2011 when he said that not only is a fully taxpayer funded unfeasible, it is 
actually undesirable because the present model promotes a 'good tension' between 
the need to remain close to audiences and fulfilling broader societal goals. Where 
do you stand on the desirability of the current funding model and its impacts? 
 
Formats and media responsibility 
 
-The formats of news bulletins, for example, are not significantly different from 
commercial alternatives. Are these formats sufficient for fulfilling public service 
broadcasting's goals? 
 
-I'd like to ask you something about the responsibilities of news as you see them. 
Journalists tell me that on any given day, they simply follow the news agenda- what 
is happening at home and abroad- and that they have a strong sense of what is 
"news-y" and what isn't. There are many issues, like climate change at a global 
level, or, for example, economic inequalities or the condition of child protection 
services at a national level which do not merit news attention, according to the 
established rules of what makes the news, unless there is an appropriate news 
"peg" on which to hang a report. In the case of climate change, because it is 
something whose worst effects are still years or even decades off, some of the main 
"pegs" to go on are intermittent political negotiations or new scientific data. Given 
evidence that the willingness of publics to demand political action may be linked 
with an issue's media salience, and research showing steep declines in the media 
salience of climate change in recent years, this may suggest a case where news 
values may be inhibiting both the development of popular will and consequently, 
political action. With this in mind, I'd like to ask you whether you believe RTÉ news 
has broader responsibilities to elevate issues beyond the reach of existing news 
values. 
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Sample construction 
 
- When searching the 6-1 News and Primetime programme archives and RTÉ News online 
search engine for coverage of the events recorded in the timelines, programmes on the 
day of the event and at least two days before and after were checked. Excluding these 
buffer periods, the time periods in question encompassed the period 31/10/2011 to 
16/11/2011 for sub-topics 1a and 1b and the period 11/4/2012 to 20/6/2012 for sub-
topic 2a and 6/12/2012 to 27/4/2013 for sub-topic 2b.  
 
- In the interests of identifying a sample of coverage manageable for analysis that was 
also most relevant to the topics identified, only stories that were explicitly linked to the 
country and topic at hand recognisable through the title and/or description of the story 
were included in the sample. This meant that items which focused on general “euro 
crisis” stories not specifically and explicitly pertaining to Italy or Greece in its metadata 
were excluded.  
 
- The RTÉ News online search engine was searched separately using the terms ‘Italy’ and 
‘Greece’ and ‘Italian’ and ‘Greek’ in order to capture items that used either formulation 
over the time period in question. 
 
- Duplicate or near-identical segments, reused in multiple news programmes, were 
discounted from the sample. 
 
- The sample initially comprised 157 items. One of these, a Frontline programme 
discussion from November 2011 [EC45], was unavailable for analysis as it was later 
removed from the RTÉ online archive. It was therefore removed from the sample. 
 
- One item [EC76] from November 14th 2011, which pertained directly to both Greece 
and Italy, was included in the Italian list because the bulk of the story was about Italy. 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1114/3109475-greek-opposition-leader-
opposed-to-further-austerity/ 
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 (1a) Greece 
EC27 Effects of Greek announcement felt 
across Europe 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3097601-effects-of-greek-announcement-felt-
across-europe/ 
EC25 Rita O’Reilly examines recent 
developments in Greece and asks if a 
referendum could be the tipping point 
that plunges Europe back into 
recession 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1103/
3099971-prime-time/ 
EC13 Greek government to hold bail-out 
referendum 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/3110/
3096539-greek-government-to-hold-bail-out-
referendum/ 
EC14 60% of Greeks do not support bail-out http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1031/
3096718-nine-news-60-of-greeks-do-not-
support-bail-out/ 
EC1 Greek PM's announcement a surprise: 
Wall St Journal's Matina Stevis 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3096908-greek-pms-announcement-a-
surprise-wall-st-journals-matina-stevis/ 
EC2 Markets decline on Greek bailout 
referendum plans 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3097129-one-news-markets-decline-on-
greek-bailout-referendum-plans/ 
EC3 Markets plummet on Greek 
referendum announcement 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3097589-six-one-news-markets-plummet-on-
greek-referendum-announcement/ 
EC4 Greek Cabinet to hold emergency talks http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3097599-six-one-news-greek-cabinet-to-
hold-emergency-talks/ 
EC5 Emma McNamara says markets react 
negatively to Greek announcement 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3096965-emma-mcnamara-says-markets-
react-negatively-to-greek-announcement/ 
EC6 Papandreou referendum a personal 
decision: Greek newspaper editor 
Nikos Kostandara 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/0111/
3097158-papandreou-referendum-a-
personal-decision-greek-newspaper-editor-
nikos-kostandara/ 
EC7 Greek political crisis creates world 
market jitters 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/0111/
3097771-greek-political-crisis-creates-world-
market-jitters/ 
EC8 Controversial Greek referendum to go 
ahead 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/0111/
3097677-controversial-greek-referendum-to-
go-ahead/ 
EC9 Much uncertainty around Greek 
referendum: David Murphy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1211/
3097165-much-uncertainty-around-greek-
referendum-david-murphy/ 
EC10 Greek referendum decision a 
'surprise': Minister for European 
Affairs Lucinda Creighton 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1211/
3097296-greek-referendum-decision-a-
surprise-minister-for-european-affairs-
lucinda-creighton/ 
EC11 Markets react negatively to Greek 
announcement 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1211/
3097759-markets-react-negatively-to-greek-
announcement/ 
EC12 Pressure mounts on Greek PM http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1101/
3097652-pressure-mounts-on-greek-pm/ 
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EC15 Greece reacts to referendum call: 
GRN's Maria Kagkellidou 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1101/me
dia-3096858.html  
EC16 People in Greece react to referendum 
announcement 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1101/me
dia-3097141.html  
EC17 Greece is paralysed: Athens Chamber 
of Commerce's Constantine Michalos 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/0211/me
dia-3097965.html  
EC18 Greece coping with capitalist crisis: 
Greek Communist Party's Kostas 
Papadakis 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1102/me
dia-3097997.html  
EC19 Paul Cunningham reports on Greece's 
referendum cabinet meeting 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1102/
3097959-morning-ireland-paul-cunningham-
reports-on-greeces-referendum-cabinet-
meeting/ 
EC28 Pressure mounts on Greece after 
referendum decision 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1102/
3098752-pressure-mounts-on-greece-after-
referendum-decision/ 
EC29 Merkel, Sarkozy set for showdown 
with Greek PM 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1102/
3098818-merkel-sarkozy-set-for-showdown-
with-greek-pm/ 
EC26 Prime Time looks at the latest on the 
chaotic situation in Greece 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1103/
3099971-prime-time/ 
EC31 Greeks debate crucial confidence 
motion 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1104/
3100889-greeks-debate-crucial-confidence-/ 
EC30 Tension in Athens over political crisis http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1104/
3100887-tension-in-athens-over-political-
crisis/ 
EC32 Confidence vote will not end Greek 
instability 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1104/
3100974-confidence-vote-will-not-end-
greek-instability/ 
EC33 Greek president to hold talks with 
main party leaders 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1106/
3101943-greek-president-to-hold-talks-with-
main-party-leaders/ 
EC34 Speculation mounts over new head of 
Greek govt 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1107/
3102855-speculation-mounts-over-new-
head-of-greek-govt/ 
EC35 Greece public still awaits details of 
new govt 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1109/
3105279-greece-public-still-awaits-details-
of-new-govt/ 
EC20 George Papandreou stands down as 
Greek PM 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1109/me
dia-3105502.html  
EC21 Greek interim government to be 
sworn in tomorrow 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1110/me
dia-3105881.html  
EC22 Political, economic uncertainty 
continues in Greece 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1109/me
dia-3104773.html  
EC36 Warnings over potential of a second 
European recession 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1110/
3106403-warnings-over-potential-of-a-
second-european-recession/ 
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EC37 Greek national unity government 
sworn in 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1111/
3107694-greek-national-unity-government-
sworn-in/ 
EC23 New Greek cabinet yet to be 
announced 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1111/me
dia-3107110.html  
EC24 Sean Whelan discusses the new 
governments in Greece & Italy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1411/me
dia-3109473.html 
EC38 Efforts continue to contain eurozone 
debt crisis 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1114/
3109886-efforts-continue-to-contain-
eurozone-debt-crisis/ 
(1b) Italy 
EC39 Paul Cunningham reports that Italy's 
PM is under pressure to resign 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1107/me
dia-3102267.html 
EC40 Italian debt costs soar amid 
uncertainty 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1107/me
dia-3102446.html  
EC41 Italian uncertainty drives borrowing 
costs higher 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1107/me
dia-3103213.html  
EC42 Spotlight on Italy as borrowing costs 
surge 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/0711/me
dia-3102950.html  
EC43 Technical government for Italy? http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1107/me
dia-3103025.html  
EC44 Italian economy in difficulty: BGC 
Partners' Louise Cooper 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1107/me
dia-3102532.html 
EC61 Italian bond yields soar to record high http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1107/
3102547-italian-bond-yields-soar-to-record-
high/ 
EC62 Italian crisis more severe crisis for 
eurozone 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1107/
3102865-italian-crisis-more-severe-crisis-
for-eurozone/ 
EC63 Berlusconi may only have hours left as 
leader 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1107/
3102875-berlusconi-may-only-have-hours-
left-as-leader/ 
EC64 Berlusconi's political future in balance http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1108/
3104183-berlusconis-political-future-in-
balance/ 
EC65 Markets await outcome of Italian 
uncertainty 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1108/
3104187-markets-await-outcome-of-italian-
uncertainty/ 
EC66 Doubts remain over details of 
Berlusconi's planned resignation 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1109/
3105255-doubts-remain-over-details-of-
berlusconis-planned-resignation/ 
EC67 Sean Whelan & David Murphy discuss 
Italy's economic problems 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1109/
3105281-sean-whelan-david-murphy-
discuss-italys-economic-problems/ 
EC68 Italian yields soar on back of market 
uncertainty 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1109/
3105313-italian-yields-soar-on-back-of-
market-uncertainty/ 
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EC60 Berlusconi to bow out of Italian 
politics 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1108/
3104367-berlusconi-to-bow-out-of-italian-
politics/ 
EC46 Bond markets continuing to punish 
Italy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1109/me
dia-3104775.html 
EC47 Slight glimmer of hope comes from 
Italy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1109/me
dia-3105500.html 
EC48 Berlusconi a big part of Italy's 
problems: Italian Democratic Party MP 
Sandro Gozi 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1109/me
dia-3104522.html 
EC49 Italy's borrowing costs rise above 7% http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1109/me
dia-3104763.html 
EC50 Berlusconi dominated Italian politics 
since 1993 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1108/me
dia-3104321.html 
EC51 Possibility of early Italian elections http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1108/me
dia-3104323.html 
EC52 Cabinet change may bring little relief 
to Italy: Corriere della Sera's Beppe 
Severgnini 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1114/me
dia-3109139.html 
EC53 Tough task ahead for Italy's PM: 
Former EU Commissioner David Byrne 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1114/me
dia-3109089.html  
EC54 Debate on Italian austerity measures http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1112/me
dia-3108145.html 
EC55 New Italian government faces testing 
times: Senator Lucio Malan & 
Journalist Gianni Riotta 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1113/me
dia-3108637.html 
EC56 Mario Monti asked to form Italian 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3108767.html 
EC57 Mario Monti leads new Italian govt: 
Democratic MP Sandro Gozi 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1114/
3109097-morning-ireland-mario-monti-
leads-new-italian-govt-democratic-mp-
sandro-gozi/ 
EC69 Italian parliament approves austerity 
measures 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1112/
3108275-italian-parliament-approves-
austerity-measures/ 
EC70 Berlusconi due to tender resignation http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1112/
3108295-berlusconi-due-to-tender-
resignation/ 
EC71 'Political revolution' overwhelms 
Berlusconi 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1112/
3108312-political-revolution-overwhelms-
berlusconi/ 
EC72 Former EU commissioner Monti to 
head Italian govt 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1113/
3108762-former-eu-commissioner-monti-to-
head-italian-govt/ 
EC73 Italy's cost of borrowing climbs above 
7% 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1115/
3111007-italys-cost-of-borrowing-climbs-
above-7/ 
EC58 Italy's cost of borrowing rises again http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1511/me
dia-3110571.html 
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EC59 Italy will be stronger with new 
government: German MP Michael 
Fuchs 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1116/me
dia-3111652.html 
EC74 Italian prime minister Monti sworn in http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1116/
3112039-italian-prime-minister-monti-
sworn-in/ 
EC75 Sean Whelan discusses the new 
governments in Greece & Italy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2011/1411/me
dia-3109473.html 
EC76 Greek opposition leader opposed to 
further austerity 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2011/1114/
3109475-greek-opposition-leader-opposed-
to-further-austerity/ 
(2a) Greece 
EC77 Greece sets 6 May as date for election - 
Journalist Matina Stevis 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/0412/me
dia-3254569.html 
EC78 Election time in Greece - Journalist 
Achilleas Topas 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0504/
3276629-election-time-in-greece-journalist-
achilleas-topas/ 
EC79 Uncertainty ahead of Greek elections http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0504/
3277558-uncertainty-ahead-of-greek-
elections/ 
EC80 Greek leaders appeal to voters ahead 
of general election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0505/
3277847-greek-leaders-appeal-to-voters-
ahead-of-general-election/ 
EC81 Europe watching as French and 
Greeks go to the polls 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/0505/me
dia-3278123.html 
EC111 Voters prepare to go to the polls in 
Greece 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0505/
3277988-voters-prepare-to-go-to-the-polls-
in-greece/ 
EC82 Greece electing new parliament http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0506/
3278399-greece-electing-new-parliament/ 
EC83 Pro-bailout parties lose support in 
Greek election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0506/
3278781-pro-bailout-parties-lose-support-in-
greek-election/ 
EC112 Greek voters expected to punish pro-
austerity parties 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0506/
3278628-greek-voters-expected-to-punish-
pro-austerity-parties/ 
EC84 Efforts underway in Greece to form a 
new government] 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/0705/me
dia-3279041.html 
EC85 Greek elections result in political 
instability 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/0507/me
dia-3279490.html 
EC86 Paul Cunningham on the latest from 
Greece's parliamentary election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0507/
3278907-paul-cunningham-on-the-latest-
from-greeces-parliamentary-election/ 
EC113 New Democracy in Greece trying to 
form government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0507/
3279299-new-democracy-in-greece-trying-
to-form-government/ 
EC114 Efforts continue in Greece to form a 
coalition government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0508/
3280473-efforts-continue-in-greece-to-form-
a-coalition-government/ 
 352 
 
EC115 Radical Left tries to form a coalition in 
Greece 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0509/
3281583-radical-left-tries-to-form-a-
coalition-in-greece/ 
EC116 Last-ditch efforts to form Greek 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0511/
3283984-last-ditch-efforts-to-form-greek- 
EC117 Greek leaders to hold talks on new 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0512/
3284647-greek-leaders-to-hold-talks-on-
new-government/ 
EC118 Greek talks halt in attempt to form 
coalition government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0513/
3285199-greek-talks-halt-in-attempt-to-
form-coalition-government/ 
EC119 Eurozone ministers meet on Greek 
crisis 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0514/
3286220-eurozone-ministers-meet-on-greek-
crisis/ 
EC120 Efforts to form Greek government fail http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0514/
3286259-efforts-to-form-greek-government-
fail/ 
EC121 Greece to hold new elections on 17 
June 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0516/
3288726-greece-to-hold-new-elections-on-
17-june/ 
EC122 Greek uncertainty causing fresh 
market jitters 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0516/
3288730-greek-uncertainty-causing-fresh-
market-jitters/ 
EC123 Fears over Greece send Irish 
borrowing costs higher 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0517/
3289845-fears-over-greece-send-irish-
borrowing-costs-higher/ 
EC124 Political instability in Greece rippling 
out to eurozone 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0517/
3289847-political-instability-in-greece-
rippling-out-to-eurozone/ 
EC125 EU prepares for possible Greek exit 
from eurozone 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0518/
3291016-eu-prepares-for-possible-greek- 
EC126 Francois Hollande says Greece should 
stay in eurozone 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0519/
3291748-francois-hollande-says-greece-
should-stay-in-eurozone/ 
EC109 No clear mandate for any Greek party http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0508/
3280717-no-clear-mandate-for-any-greek-
party/ 
EC87 Greece and growth dominate German-
Franco talks 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1112/
3287580-greece-and-growth-dominate-
german-franco-talks/ 
EC88 No agreement in Greek talks - 
Guardian's Helena Smith 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1505/me
dia-3287000.html 
EC89 Greek instability dominates finance 
ministers' meeting 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1505/me
dia-3286992.html 
EC90 Colman O'Sullivan speaks to members 
of the Greek community about the 
crisis 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0515/
3286681-colman-osullivan-speaks-to-
members-of-the-greek-community-about-the-
crisis/ 
EC91 Second election 'would be bad for 
Greece' 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0515/
3286725-second-election-would-be-bad-for-
greece/ 
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EC92 Still possible for Greece to stay in 
Eurozone - Observer columnist Will 
Hutton 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0515/
3286683-still-possible-for-greece-to-stay-in-
eurozone-observer-columnist-will-hutton/ 
EC93 Fresh elections required in Greece http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0515/
3287578-fresh-elections-required-in-greece/ 
EC110 Greek politicians opt for fresh 
elections 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0515/
3287656-greek-politicians-opt-for-fresh-
elections/ 
EC94 Judge appointed to head interim Greek 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0516/
3288201-judge-appointed-to-head-interim-
greek-government/ 
EC95 Greece to hold elections on 17 June http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0516/
3288924-greece-to-hold-elections-on-17-
june/ 
EC96 Samaras warns against Greek exit 
from euro 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3318966.html 
EC97 Tony Connelly reports on Greek 
campaigning ahead of Sunday's 
election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3318122.html 
EC127 Economic fears ahead of Sunday's 
Greek elections 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0615/
3318739-economic-fears-ahead-of-sundays-
greek-elections/ 
EC128 European leaders rule out 
renegotiation of Greek bailout 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0616/
3319482-european-leaders-rule-out-
renegotiation-of-greek-bailout/ 
EC98 Merkel rules out Greek bailout 
changes 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0616/
3319286-merkel-rules-out-greek-bailout-
changes/ 
EC99 Warnings over Greek exit from euro 
ahead of poll 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0616/
3319628-warnings-over-greek-exit-from-
euro-ahead-of-poll/ 
EC100 Conservatives poised to secure win in 
Greek election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3320377.html 
EC101 A new day' if radical left elected in 
Greece - Syriza European 
Spokesperson Yanis Bournous 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3319937.html 
EC102 French and Greek voters go to the 
polls 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1112/
3319923-french-and-greek-voters-go-to-the-
polls/ 
EC129 Greeks vote in crucial election http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0617/
3320135-greeks-vote-in-crucial-election/ 
EC103 Tony Connelly reports on the result of 
the Greek election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1806/me
dia-3320573.html 
EC104 Election sends clear euro message - 
Athens Chamber of Commerce's 
Constantine Michalos 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1806/me
dia-3320621.html 
EC105 [Greece seeks to form coalition 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3320866.html 
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EC106 Greece inches closer to forming 
government] 
http://www.rte.ie/news/av/2012/1211/me
dia-3321411.html 
EC107 Pro-bailout parties in narrow Greek 
win - New Democracy advisor 
Dimitrios Tsomocos 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1112/
3320581-pro-bailout-parties-in-narrow-
greek-win-new-democracy-advisor-dimitrios-
tsomocos/ 
EC130 Talks on new Greek government 
continues 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0619/
3322342-talks-on-new-greek-government-
continues/ 
EC131 Antonis Samaras sworn in as Greek 
Prime Minister 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0620/
3323602-antonis-samaras-sworn-in-as-
greek-prime-minister/ 
EC108 Greek politicians strike coalition deal http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/0620/
3323078-greek-politicians-strike-coalition-
deal/ 
(2b) Italy 
EC147 Silvio Berlusconi seeks another term 
as prime minister 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1208/
3449296-silvio-berlusconi-seeks-another-
term-as-prime-minister/ 
EC148 Fears of political instability after 
Italian pm airs plan to resign 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1209/
3449688-fears-of-political-instability-after-
italian-pm-airs-plan-to-resign/ 
EC149 Fall in Italian stock and bond markets http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1210/
3450313-fall-in-italian-stock-and-bond-
markets/ 
EC132 EU warns Italy over political stability http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1209/
3449773-eu-warns-italy-over-political-
stability/ 
EC133 Berlusconi remains huge figure in 
Italian politics 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1210/
20123689-berlusconi-remains-huge-figure-
in-italian-politics/ 
EC134 Italian elections to be held in February http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1222/
3457618-italian-elections-to-be-held-in-
february/ 
EC135 Monti willing to head future Italian 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1223/
3457815-monti-willing-to-head-future-
italian-government/ 
EC150 Mario Monti will not take sides in 
Italian election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2012/1223/
3457962-mario-monti-will-not-take-sides-in-
italian-election/ 
EC151 Italian parties neck-and-neck ahead of 
poll 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0221/
3490934-italian-parties-neck-and-neck-
ahead-of-poll/ 
EC152 Italian election rivals neck and neck http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0222/
3491522-italian-election-rivals-neck-and-
neck/ 
EC146 Impact of Italian election on EU http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0221/
3491046-impact-of-italian-election-on-eu/ 
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EC136 Voters go to the polls in Italy http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0222/
20159449-voters-go-to-the-polls-in-italy/ 
EC137 Voting underway to elect new Italy 
government 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0224/
3492585-voting-underway-to-elect-new-
italy-government/ 
EC138 Voting begins in crucial Italian election http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0224/
3492309-voting-begins-in-crucial-italian-
election/ 
EC139 Protest votes feared in Italian election http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0225/
3492822-protest-votes-feared-in-italian-
election/ 
EC140 Voting continues for second day in 
Italy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0225/
20160307-voting-continues-for-second-day-
in-italy/ 
EC153 Uncertainty following Italian 
parliamentary vote 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0225/
3493023-uncertainty-following-italian-
parliamentary-vote/ 
EC154 Italy election leads to market 
instability 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0226/
3493694-italy-election-leads-to-market-
instability/ 
EC155 Italian leaders looking at Coalition 
options 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0226/
3493716-italian-leaders-looking-at-coalition-
options/ 
EC141 Europe Editor Tony Connelly and IG's 
David Jones discuss the market's 
reaction to Italy's elections 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0226/
20161837-europe-editor-tony-connelly-and-
igs-david-jones-discuss-the-markets-reaction-
to-italys-elections/ 
EC142 Italy faces prospect of another election http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0226/
20161173-italy-faces-prospect-of-another-
election/ 
EC143 Italy facing political deadlock after 
election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0226/
20161274-italy-facing-political-deadlock-
after-election/ 
EC144 Italy faces political instability after 
election 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0226/
3493472-italy-faces-political-instability-after-
election/ 
EC145 The man who would be Italy's new PM http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0425/
20193652-the-man-who-would-be-italys-
new-pm/ 
EC156 Letta set to end political deadlock in 
Italy 
http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0427/
3524714-letta-set-to-end-political-deadlock-
in-italy/ 
EC157 New government sworn in in Italy http://www.rte.ie/news/player/2013/0428/
3525070-new-government-sworn-in-in-italy/ 
 
